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C ontinuing Professional
Advancement &.
enhancement
A p ril 18, 1977
M r. Douglas R. Carm ichael 
Commission on A u d ito r’s Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Am ericas 
New York, New York
Dear Doug:
1 have ju s t finished scanning the Commission's Report. In all m ateria ! respects, outstand­
ing —  both courageous and p ractica l —  conceptual and logical —  a real g ian t step. Hang 
on, hopefu lly.
There is, to  me, a g laring omission in the Recommendations fo r Changes in the Legal 
Environm ent, about which I would like  to  make an appearance before the Commission.
A strong recom mendation should  b e made on the makeup, du ties, responsib ili t ies ( i f
the only instrum enta lities  possess­
ing police power over the en tire  profession.
I may be in a un ique p o s itio n  to  te s tify  o n  th is  m a tte r. A f te r  alm ost th ir ty  years in
publ i c practice , including s ta rting  my own practice , partnership in a large local f irm , 
management o f a s ta te-w ide f irm  and managing partner of a large o ffic e  o f a national 
f irm , I am now devoting v ir tu a lly  a ll my tim e  to  various educational a c tiv itie s . C.P.AE. 
is a fam ily-ow ned company which holds review  courses fo r  CPA exam candidates and 
conducts accounting and auditing professional education courses and re-exam  review 
courses fo r  local f irm  professional personnel. C.P.AE. also conducts peer reviews fo r 
local firm s  - -  about 20 to  date. I am now in my fo u rth  year teaching auditing at both 
the graduate and undergraduate levels a t F lo rida  In ternationa l U n ive rs ity  on a year- 
round basis.
M ore germane, I served as member and Chairm an o f the F lo rida  State Board o f Accoun­
tancy 1967-74 and have been one o f its  p rinc ipa l investigating o ffic e rs  since then, m ostly 
investiga ting  professional accounting and auditing m atte rs  involving local firm s. As 
a member of the Board, I made the m otion which set the wheels in m otion fo r  mandatory 
continu ing education in F lorida , early in th is game. I am a co -fa th e r and principal ad­
vocate o f a periodic re-exam ination as an a lte rn a tive  to  CPE courses. More s ig n ifi­
ca n tly  I believe, I am cred ited  as the principal person responsible fo r  changing the F lo rida  
Board from  a typ ica lly  passive one to  the now m ost a c tiv is t in the nation (yet s t ill a 
long way fro m  optim um  fo r  a va rie ty  o f reasons).
In addition, I would like  to  have as much o f the Appendix B s tu ff  not otherw ise available 
which is available fo r  d is tribu tion  or purchase.
Very t ru ly yours,
R . Bob Sm ith, CPA 
President
   
C ontinuing Professional
Advancement & 
Enhancement
June 7, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N. Y.
Dear Doug:
I will plan to be at the meeting the morning of June 22nd.
Within the time frame of twenty-thirty minutes, I would also 
like to discuss the CPA examination and education - a continuum.
I am in the process of an analysis of Florida exam statistics, 
have followed Bob Ellyson's NASBA committee closely, operate 
a CPA review course and, of course, teach at Florida International 
University. The NASBA committee has taken a first step in re­
commending better management of the process.
Simply stated, just as the enhancement of the role of boards of 
accountancy is the key to effective regulation of the profession, 
changing the exam from its present memory-oriented state and 
trend to a thoughtful, analytically-oriented state is the key 
to the future of the people in the profession. As goes the exam, 
so goes the education and the caliber of educators. As go they, 
so go the caliber of entrants into the profession.
A key shift is needed. What we primarily and ultimately do in 
this profession, either as outside ’auditors” or inside "accountants”, 
is to deal with the "fair presentation” of information. The pro­
cess is one of critical, skeptical appraisal. In essence, we are all "auditor's”. Perhaps dramatically stated,students should major 
in auditing in schools of auditing (taking whatever accounting is 
necessary to aid that process) to become experts in auditing (not 
accounting), take an examination in auditing theory and practice 
(including the necessary accounting, law and regulation) to be­
come Certified Public Auditors to render either auditors’ or 
unauditors’ reports. Putting write-up shops to one side (we 
shouldn’t be in that business anyway), everything else we do, ir­
respective of firm size, is ancillary to this central purpose.
It. Bob Smith, CPA 
EMORY UNIVERSITY
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30322
School of Business Administration 
Office of The Dean
April 19, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director  
Commission on Auditors Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Doug:
I am teaching a graduate seminar at Emory University as part 
of my Dean's Role and one of the students is working on the 
report of the Cohen Commission. For that reason, I spent a good 
deal of time this weekend reading the report in detail. I want 
you and the other members of the commission to know that as an 
AICPA board member who helped appoint the commission, I honestly 
believe it is one of the finest and most thoughtful documents 
ever put out on the accounting and auditing profession. I 
congratulate you and the others for the ability to dig under the 
surface and to respond with non-political answers to serious 
problems.
The only part of the report that is not in depth is the 
material on pages 88 and 89 which relate to the Uniform CPA 
examination. I am a member of the current national CPA review 
committee. If your commission could get the tentative report of 
our committee when it is released you would find that the CPA 
examination needs some thoughtful direction.
For example, the auditing standards commission should tie in 
to the Board of Examiners on the CPA exam. The exam tends to be 
much more theoretical than practical. The reason for it is that 
practitioners simply have not had a vehicle or perhaps the desire 
to submit the very practical and real problems of the profession. 
This in turn means that the textbooks themselves that are used in 
the schools tend to be highly theoretical in auditing and 
therefore, the schools are really not preparing individuals for 
the tremendous responsibility of auditing. While this is 
overcome by the larger accounting firms through training and 
development, the smaller firms must use the AICPA professional 
development courses and these in turn may not get down to the 
real day-to-day problems.
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This is a small suggestion in relation to your total report. 
You will have difficulty in illuminating sub-standard practice.
We have tried for generations to find a way for the profession to 
monitor itself but nothing seems to work. Part of it is concern  
over your competitors professional standing, part of it is the 
time problem, and part of it is a lack of facts that enables a 
CPA to report on another C P A ’s sub-standard work. I hope you 
find a practical answer.
Again, congratulations on a superb job.
With best wishes.
Sincerely
Albert J. Bows
AJB/emb
CC: Mr. Manuel Cohen
Mr. Robert C . Ellyson
Mr. William H. Van Rensselaer
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Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
I have just finished reading your Report of 
Tentative Conclusions. It is a splendid piece of work 
that easily sustains the reader's interest, and the 
conclusions are significant and clear. Particularly 
important, it seemed to me, were your Sections 3 and 7 
(which should result in major changes) and I was glad 
to read the careful analysis behind your conclusions 
in Section 10. Congratulations.
Is it possible to obtain copies of two of 
your research project reports: Jaenicke on "T h e  Import
of the Current Legal Climate" and Radoff's "Court Deci­
sions on Auditors' Liability: the Role of GAAP and GAAS?"
Yours sincerely,
  
 
Francis M. Wheat
FMW:MC
A-3
Dayton, Ohio 45431 513 873 2377
Department of Accountancy
April 19, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1 2 1 1 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 1OO36
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
I have just read the conclusions and recommendations 
of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities and I am 
deeply impressed with the quality and direct of your 
recommendations. The entire report is much better than I 
had expected; it really gets to. the heart of the issues in 
a number of controversial areas. Normally, I do not give 
my opinion so generously without appropriate monetary con­
sideration but your recommendations so moved me that I feel 
morally obligated to write this letter. As a college professor 
with business experience in auditing and investment banking,
I strongly support these particular recommendations: 
1. A separate note in financial statements should be required 
on uncertainties similar to that required on accounting 
policies. This is an excellent recommendation; it should 
be adopted as soon as possible.
2. It should be a duty of the independent auditor to search 
for illegal or questionable acts and the auditor should be 
expected to detect those acts that the exercise of profes­
sional skill and care would normally uncover. This is a 
very good recommendation; however, I would expect that some 
difficulties will arise in trying to implement this parti­
cular requirement of accountability.
3. The auditors’ standard report should be revised. A new, 
expanded, flexible report should be developed which consists 
of a series of paragraphs, each describing a major element 
of the audit function. I was really impressed with this 
recommendation.
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There was only one area of your recommendations that I 
was not completely pleased with: the section on the Education,
Training, and Development of Auditors (Section 8). Here I 
question the suggestion that an educational program should 
include a four-year undergraduate and a three-year graduate 
program in a professional school of accounting. Briefly, I 
believe that the desired educational task could be accomplished 
just as successfully in 5 or 6 years in a well-organized, better 
structured accounting program within the Accountancy Department 
of a school of business administration. Nevertheless, I fully 
endorse your recommendation that accounting educators who are 
not CPAs (like myself) should be allowed to join the AICPA and 
state CPA societies and be able to take an active part in their 
professional activities.
Again, I give you the highest possible praise for your 
Report on Auditors' Responsibilities. Yes, there IS a big gap 
between the present performance of auditors and the expectations 
of the users of financial statements. As a sophisticated user 
of financial statements for many years now, I sincerely believe 
that the adoption of the Commission's recommendations is desirable 
and will be successful in greatly reducing the amount of that gap 
in the future.
Cordially yours,
Dean S. Eiteman 
Professor
DONALD A. HELMER
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
429 Central Avenue 
FARIBAULT, MINNESOTA 55021
507 /332-7447
May 1, 1977
Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas.
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
Following my review of the "Report of Tentative Conclusions", 
the following two items summarize what I believe they would 
accomplish:
1 ) Shift some burden of lawsuits resulting from the use 
of undefined words or phraseology from the Auditor 
to Management.
2) Increased and improved audit procedures and increased 
auditor involvement in client operations with better 
educated, publicized, paid and independent auditors.
These may be desireable, but I believe auditor uncertainties 
evolved in the following manner.
In the 1960’s and earlier it was common to include in 
financial reports a summary of the auditing procedures performed 
along with the results obtained. Since that time auditor res­
ponsibility has evolved through the scope expression, "based 
upon generally accepted auditing standards, etc". This has 
resulted in auditors assuming the role of insurer as evidenced 
by legal claims filed by disgruntled stockholders, Managements, 
and the S.E.C.. Those auditing standards have not been generally 
accepted because it is impossible for the standards to encompass 
all areas where the auditors judgement and skill must be applied 
in todays diverse business environment. I do not suggest that 
auditors retreat to the past, however, your recommendations do 
not address the problem that has been thrust on todays auditor.
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The problem causing todays auditor uncertainty is the imposs­
ibility of performing on en audit as a ; lawyer, actuary, appraiser, 
engineer, risk-management specialist, etc. These are the roles 
the auditor is expected to assume in the course of performing the 
audit function "based upon generally accepted auditing standards, 
etc.". The largest accounting firms cannot afford to have this 
variety of skills readily available for the audit engagement.
Some of the large accounting firms do have these skills available 
in conjunction with their Management Consulting services. However, 
this raises two questions, 1 ) independence and 2) the accounting 
firms internal ability to review and judge the specialists con­
clusions in the course of an audit.
The resolution of the auditor uncertainty may be accomplished 
by developing a system of financial reporting with attestations 
from the professions, including auditors, in areas where their 
respective expertise and judgement is required in assessing and 
reporting an Management business decisions affected by the ever 
present fluidity of the business environment.
Respectifully submitted
Donald A. Helmer, CPA
DAH;jjh
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 
3000 SAND HILL ROAD 
BLDG. 4 SUITE 155 
MENLO PARK, CA. S4025 
TELE. (415) 854-5077
April 21, 1977
American Institute of CPAs 
1 2 1 1 Avenue of the Americas 
hew York, NY 10036
He Report of the Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities
Gentlemen:
Since I do not have the addresses of the 
members of the Commission I will just have to satisfy myself 
with a hearty - Bravo!- addressed to them through the Institute 
Obviously, the report is filled to overflowing with provokative 
ideas. The reasoning and lucid style of the authors leaves a 
reader with a feeling of inevitability about the broad, outline 
of their proposal. I am on my second reading now and probably 
will do it yet again. Congratulations!
Very truly yours,
 
  
Richard J. Sullivan
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T U L A N E U N I V E R S I T Y
Graduate School of Business Administration 
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70118
STEPHEN a . ZEFF  
Professor of Accounting
May 9, 1977
T e l e p h on e :  
( 504)  865-4612
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research D ir e c to r .
Commission on A u d ito rs ’ R e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  
1211 Avenue o f  the Americas 
New York , NY 10036
D e a r  D o u g :
I  have a few comments on those p a rts  o f  the Commission’ s rep o r t  
which I  have been ab le  to  read in  the la s t  few w eeks.
On page 78, I  am n o t a t a l l  sure th a t the proposed penu ltim ate 
paragraph o f  the Report o f  the Independent A u d ito rs  is  necessary . 
The a u d ito rs ’ rev iew  o f  co n tro ls  would, I  assume, be covered  b y  
the statem ent r e la t in g  to  c o n tro ls  in  the th ird  paragraph. I  
d o n 't  see why th is  a d d it io n a l re fe ren ce  is  req u ired  even in  
the p resen t c lim a te . The la s t  paragraph would, I  suppose, be 
most im portan t in  the case o f  companies ou ts id e  the ju r is d ic t io n  
o f  the SEC. I f  the au d itors  d id  n ot have access to  the a u d i t  
committee o f  the Board— i f  th ere  were an au d it committee at 
a l l — th is  p o in t  should be made known.
I  was p a r t ic u la r ly  p leased  to  see the Commission's recommendation 
on page 89 th a t s ta te  CPA s o c ie t ie s  develop  a form o f  membership 
to  accommodate educators who are not CPAs. A number o f  s ta te  
s o c ie t ie s  have a lread y  taken th is  i n i t i a t i v e ,  and I  am u rging the 
incom ing p re s id e n t  o f  the Lou is ian a  s o c ie ty  to  do the same.
I  hope to  study o th e r  p a rts  o f  the Report c a r e fu l ly  in  the 
near fu tu re , and i f  I  have any comments I  w i l l  w r it e  aga in .
S in c e r e ly ,
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THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, INC.
INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, ALTAMONTE SPRINGS, FLORIDA 32701 PHONE: 3Q5 • 830 -7 6 00
May 16, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
Managing Director of Technical Services
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, N. Y. 10036
Dear Doug:
The Institute of Internal Auditors desires to make a written presentation 
to the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities on their Report of Tenta­
tive Conclusions. We will send this to you no later than June 13.
We would appreciate it if you would send copies of the Commission’s Report 
of Tentative Conclusions to the individuals as shown on the attached list, 
as we desire to obtain and consolidate their comments. Thank you.
Sincerely yours,
William E.P erry, CIA, CPA 
Director of EDP and Research
WEP/mp
Enclosure
Roger Carolus 
Banco Inc.
1130 Northwestern Bank Building 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480
E. G. Hakula, CIA 
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Rochester, N. Y. 14650
George R. Troost, CIA
General Motors Corporation 
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3044 W. Grand Blvd.
Detroit, Michigan 48202
Benjamin Conway 
IBM Corporation 
1000 Westchester Ave. 2D9 
White Plains, New York 10604
Richard A. Ress 
Shell Oil Company 
Box 2463
Houston, Texas 77001
Frank F. George, CIA 
Norton Company 
1 New Bond Street 
Worcester, Massachusetts 01606
David Dunbar 
Controller Department 
Bell Canada
620 Belmont Street - Room 1215 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
C. W. Gissel 
Thiokol Corporation 
P. O. Box 1000 
Newtown, Pennsylvania 18940
J O H N  R. C O N N E L L Y ,  JR.
262  1 T rement St reet 
Dover, Ohio 4 4 622
May 19, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditor’s Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
I have read with great interest the Report of 
Tentative Conclusions of the Commission. They are 
to be commended for doing an outstanding job.
As a former practicing certified public accountant 
with one of the "Big Eight” firms, I have great empathy 
for many of the comments and recommendations of the 
Commission. As a practicing manager in industry I believe 
that the study has been long overdue.
My only contribution to add to this great work is to 
share with you my understanding about the language of the 
report of independent auditors as the draft appears on 
page 77.
The expression "present fairly” as used in the 
opinion paragraph has been a troublesome convention for 
too many years. Auditors have never been able to 
adequately express their feeling as to just what it is 
that financial statements depict for the entity. The 
Commission’s choice of terminology by using "in all 
material respects" is an improvement in that it is more 
precise in implying a quantitative criterion. But 
materiality alone is inadequate.
More than quantitative criteria must be used to 
prepare financial statements. There must be a recognition 
of the purpose of financial statements. Financial state­
ments communicate the history of an entity. Additional 
criteria are necessary to make sure that all of the 
h istory of an entity is represented by the financial 
statements. The popular term "off balance sheet 
financing" suggests that our criteria for measuring the 
adequacy of financial statements is incomplete. Time is 
a changing influence in itself. Twenty five years ago
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we did n ’t even think about capitalizing finance or 
leverage leases; today we wouldn't think of not doing 
so.
There must be an entity criterion that describes 
the nature of the business so that appropriate recognition 
is given in the financial statements to portray a 
financial profile of what the entity has done within all 
of its functional jurisdiction boundaries. Our financial 
recording techniques must provide for producing a 
financial image of the underlying business activities 
that have occurred not just in their cash terms, but 
to portray in adequate financial terms of services 
received, of services rendered and of financial medium 
of exchange devices, the substance of what the business 
activities really are. Under this criterion, "off-balance 
sheet financing" would never have occurred in our account­
ing history.
I suggest the use of the term "presents a reasonable 
impression". Why? Simply, because I believe that’s 
what financial statements do. They present a reasonable 
impression not of isolated financial transactions, nor 
of just assets or liabilities separately, but of the 
whole business and its "completed" transactions todate 
and its "uncompleted" transactions. Financial statements 
communicate aspects of the historical life span of an 
enterprise. As such, financial statements are molded 
by a significant influence - the influence of management. 
Financial statements for an enterprise present either a 
reasonable impression of the business enterprise or they 
do not. Financial statements put into a common denominator 
all of the actions of management in its functions of 
marketing, production and finance to portray a financial 
profile of results and expectations within a compartment 
of time.
My recommendation to the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants is to provide for the 
implementation of all of the Commissions recommendations 
before the end of 1978.
Sincerely,
 
 
avery, olson, christie, lyle
certified public accountants
915 VV. SECOND AVE. -  SPOKANE, W ASHINGTON 99204
May 19, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Re: The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
Report of Tentative Conclusions -
Section 7 - The Auditor’s Communication with Users
Gentlemen:
Your opening sentence of Section 7 in Communication states: "Evidence
abounds that communication between the auditor and users of his work -
especially through the auditor’s standard report — - is unsatisfactory.”
I suggest that you have identified one of the major problems of our 
accounting profession. Further, I respectfully submit that the Commission’s 
recommended illustration of a revised auditor’s report does not solve the 
problem.
It is requested that the Commission reconsider this problem giving study
to the following thoughts.
1) Accounting is essentially a measurement process. The heart of this 
process is to express the economic condition and operations of a business 
unit in numbers. Numerical expression is the essence of measurement.
2) The accounting profession has done a remarkable job in mastering this 
process.
3) The auditor has failed in his "certification" of this measurement. 
Consider the auditor’s key expressions:
"in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards..."
"included such tests... and other auditing procedures as we 
considered necessary in the circumstances."
"present fairly the financial position ... and results of 
operations ... in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles consistently applied."
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3) Cont'd. -
These phrases are so vague they communicate little.
Consider for a moment the auditor's reaction if the accountant discharged 
his responsibilities with similar expressions on his financial statement:
CPA Corporation
ASSETS -
Current assets:
Cash
Receivables
Inventories
Plant, property and equipment
Accumulated depreciation
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' 
Liabilities
Stockholders* equity
Balance Sheet 
As of December 31, 1976
Substantial balance 
Mostly collectible 
Generally saleable
Fair condition under 
the circumstances
Consistently applied
EQUITY -
No more than considered 
necessary
Fairly substantial
Obviously, generalized statements in the measurement process are useless. 
As a reader, I have received no useful information on the financial 
position of the above corporation.
Likewise, even with training and experience as a CPA, I receive no 
useful information from the standard auditor’s report.
.... I do not know what degree of reliability I can place on the 
statements*
.... I do not know what allowable error is permitted in the report.
.... I do not even know what accounting principles were used, just 
that they are generally accepted, and do not even know by 
whom.
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
Page 3
May 19, 1977
4) Suppose the auditor were required to express his "certification" 
numerically in the following manner:
Auditor’s Report
”We have examined the balance sheet of CPA Corporation as of 
December 31, 1976, and the related statements of income and changes 
in financial position for the year then ended.
The financial statements have been prepared by the management of 
CPA Corporation.
We audited the statements utilizing standard statistical sampling, 
techniques. Our findings indicate the following reliability and 
possible error in the amounts stated on the financial statements:
Maximum Tolerable
Reliability Error (or $ Amount ±)
ASSETS:
Cash 99#
Receivables 95% 2%
Inventories 95% 5%
Plant and equipment 
•
90% 10%
•
•
DEFERRED DEVELOPMENT COST 
•
30# 100%
INCOME 95% 6%
EXPENSES 95# 6%
Our evaluation of the accounting system and internal control 
indicates a 95% general reliability.
The accounting principles used by company management are detailed 
in the "Statement of Significant Accounting Policies”.
We concur in the principles used except (note any exceptions)
Subject to the degree of reliability, allowable error and accounting 
principles used, as stated above, we certify that the financial 
statements of CPA Corporation present accurately its financial 
position at December 31, 1976, and the results of operations for 
the year then ended.”
February 20, 1977 Avery, Olson, Christie & Lyle 
Certified Public Accountants
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
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4) Cont'd. -
An auditor's report of this type has certain advantages:
1) It removes the implication that accounting statements are 
exact, a wide spread misunderstanding among users.
2) It communicates to the user the degree of reliability and 
potential error in numerical terms so he may make an informed 
decision. Our present decisions are an act of blind faith in 
the auditor.
3) It establishes a more definite responsibility for the auditor 
rather than the present vagueness. 
I sincerely hope consideration will be given to a study of this approach.
 Sincerely yours,
Joseph Olson, C.P.A.
 PENNSYLVANIA INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Office of the President  1845 Walnut Street - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 - (215) 491-1821
May 20, 1977
Douglas R. Carmichael, Research Director 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
This is to advise the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
that the Council of the Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants approved a resolution at its meeting on May 17, 1977 "to 
support the tentative conclusions of the ’Cohen Commission Report’ as 
a meaningful basis for resolving the problems facing the accounting 
profession.” The Council further directed that the report immediately 
be used as a means for educating members of the PICPA and the general 
public of the CPAs responsibilities.
In view of the Council’s resolution, I have appointed a 
special committee to implement the resolution. As our plans develop, 
we will be glad to keep you advised.
Sincerely yours
George  L. Bernstein 
President
GLB:kvp
PICPA Headquarters .  1100 Lewis Tower Building. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102 . (215) 735-2635
Officers: George L, Bernstein, President .  Farrell Rubenstein, President-Elect .  Albert A. Reidinger, Vice President .  Edward M. Sullivan, Vice President . Robert J. 
Hilly, Treasurer . F. Willard Heintzelman, Secretary and Executive Director
Council: Eugene DeW. Beisel .  Edgar T. Bitting .  Charles W Brown .  Gene M. Buckno .  Richard P. Bulow .  Elmo M. Clemente .  Daniel J. Collins, Jr. .  Frank 
J. Concannon .  Richard F. Eberhart .  David W. Finnecy .  Robert A. Izzo .  Richard D. Kline .  John E. Kolesar .  Norman B. Lauer .  Robert N. Levy .  Robert
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Mr. Douglas R . Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company submits the following moments 
on the Report of Tentative Conclusions issued by the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities. The Company furnishes electric service to about 700,000 
customers in Northeast Ohio, has annual revenues of over half a billion 
dollars, gross property and plant investment of nearly two billion dollars 
and about 75,000 common and preferred share owners. As a corporate preparer 
and user of financial information, we find the report extremely well done 
and a credit to the Commission and others responsible for its publication.
In the preparation of the final report, we suggest that the recommendations 
(stated as forty in the current report) be listed succinctly in "laundry 
list” fashion, with reference to the page numbers on which the respective 
subjects are more fully dealt with. This would aid the reader to locate 
more conveniently the subjects in which he is especially interested, either 
currently or as a matter of future reference.
Of particular interest to us in the Commission’s Report are the following 
points which we endorse and which warrant continuing attention and recog­
nition: 
1. The gap of misunderstanding between the intent of the auditor's
report and its misconstrued interpretation by the general public —  
and even some courts —  needs to be narrowed, even eliminated if 
possible. This calls for a more explicit message by the auditor 
to preclude its misinterpretation by others.
In a matter related to the preceding point, the public must be 
made aware of the limitations of audits as a means for detecting 
evidence of fraud, illegal acts, or other irregularities.
Serving The Best Location in the Nation
Edgar H. Maugans
VICE PRESIDENT & CONTROLLER 
FINANCE
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3. Expansion of the audit function to include a more comprehensive 
study and evaluation of internal controls would enhance the 
credibility of the auditor’s report. Information on this joint 
would help the reader of financial statements to determine the 
degree of reliance he could place on the integrity of the 
statements.
4. Greater involvement by the board of directors or its audit com­
mittee in selecting auditors, setting the audit fee, and is, estab­
lishing the audit scope should be encouraged. This is especially 
true of those firms which have only recently established audit 
committees as a condition of continued listing on the New York 
Stock Exchange. This would help to reinforce the auditor’s inde­
pendence of management, an essential ingredient to the auditor’s 
objective assessment of management’s judgment and stewardship.
5. A full-time Auditing Standards Board should be established, as 
recommended, to demonstrate the profession’s determination not to 
forfeit its responsibilities to a governmental agency as some 
individuals have suggested. Also, broader participation in. the 
standard-setting process by other affected groups should be 
encouraged.
6. Auditors should do more to ensure the adequacy of disclosure of 
uncertainties, recognizing the possible reluctance of management 
to be as candid as they should be in disclosing potential risks 
which may be adverse to their best interests.
7. The proposal that accounting firms exchange information on develop­
ments in the perpetration and detection of fraud seems a worthy 
endeavor. Likewise, pertinent details of audit failures should be 
published and disseminated to interested parties.
8. The auditor’s responsibilities should not be expanded to embrace 
an evaluation of social programs, e.g., equal employment or envi­
ronmental protection, except insofar as such programs may materially 
impact a firm’s financial statements.
9. To increase the meaningfulness of the auditor’s report to its 
users, the language and terminology should be made more meaningful. 
The expression “in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards,” for example, has a meaning known only to the rela­
tively few people who are familiar with auditing standards.
10. The evidence presented in favor of retaining the same audit firm 
should help to dispel the notion of some individuals that 
auditors should be rotated periodically.
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael -3- May 19, 1977
On the foregoing points, we find ourselves closely allied to the positions 
expressed by the Commission. On the other hand, we find several points 
which raise questions in our minds, among them the following:
1. The statement on benefit-cost analysis (Page 53) raises the ques­
tion of how to assess "the loss that would be sustained" when the 
consequences of any suggested misstatement or omission cannot be 
reasonably established unless such an audit finding is actually 
made. This suggests an attempt to measure the immeasurable.
2. The fourth paragraph of the suggested "Report of Independent 
Auditors" (Pages 77-78) seems to overstate the uncertainties which 
could undermine the validity of the audited financial statements. 
The comments as stated, although true, are sufficiently inflamma­
tory as to cast aspersions upon the financial data.
3. Notwithstanding the responsibility of management to report on con­
sistency in the application of accounting principles, it seems to 
us that a reaffirmation of the same nature in the auditor's report 
is still called for. We don’t understand how a statement to this 
effect casts the auditor in the role of an "originator of financial 
information," as stated on Page 81. The last paragraph in this 
section seems a more reasonable alternative.
The conclusion that cost and time constraints have a negative ef­
fect on the auditor * s independence (Page 92) is subject to question. 
The potential effect on quality is apparent, but independence 
shouldn’t be affected.
We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the work of the Com­
mission on Auditors' Responsibilities, and trust that our observations may 
be of some assistance to you. We will not make an oral presentation at 
your public meeting.
Yours truly,
Edgar H. Maugans
Vice President and Controller
EHM:ag
cc: J. P. O ’Brien
Price Waterhouse & Co.
Commission on Auditors' Resp. 
1211 Avenue of the Americas. 
New York.
Utrecht, may 17, 1977,
Dear Douglas.
I hereby sent you some remarks on the Report of Tentative Conclusions,
In the Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations you say that the financial 
statements are developed by and are the representations of management, I 
think that this is not wholly correct because the auditor certified these 
statements and if he certified them he is also responsible for it; because 
if he is not responsible for it what is then the use of the certification ?
( I exclude ensemble acting from the responsibility of the auditor).
On page 4 you say: the auditor as an agent of social control, I belie­
ve that this is not be good if this would be so. In the circumstance that the
auditor an agent is of social control he is — and must be - employed by the
institute of the social control, in other words: he is employed by the Govern­
ment, The task of the Government is to make the rules and norms for Social 
Costs and she must also audit or control these rules and norms.
The only thing that the auditor can and may do is to give information about 
costs or revenues. But the principal task of the auditor is to be a confidant 
for the whole community. The Government is a part of this community. Therefore 
is it not correct to give one of the members of the community more information 
than the others.
An other problem is the fact that the local rules and requirements of autho­
ritative bodies in matters like air—pollution etc, can give the circumstance 
that the social costs for the same object diverge. In other words: in State 
one the auditor must say on subject A : no social costs; but in State two - 
same circumstances- he must say on the same object A ; social costs. The dan­
ger lies in the inconstancy way of information presentation. Like we say in 
the economic profession: an article cannot have two cost-prices at the same 
time of cost-priceadjustment.
The auditor’s relationship to parties interested in the audit function.
In this section you are saying: the auditor must be independent of mana­
gement etc. But one party you did not mention: the other auditors, I shall 
explain this to you. The generally accepted accounting principles are most­
ly very detailed and there is little space for a own interpretation.
Let us suppose that on the matter B of an g.a.a.p. is a little space for own 
interpretation. The matter is important for the financial statement. Auditor 
A says: this matter must be disclosed and I cannot certify therefor the finan­
cial statement. On this very moment the company threats with: you certify the 
financial statement or you may go. The auditor goes.
Because there are always auditor’s which have a very broad limit on cases 
-which well or not may; thus it won’t be problematic - for the company - to
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and an other auditor who is willing to certify yhe financial statement.
We can also say: the auditor’s are not solidary enough with eachother. This 
is a consequence of the fact that not everything is ruled.
But we have to weight this bias and a totally standarized control or auditing 
system. I don’t know which is the best !!
I also want to make a general remark.
I am glad that the Commission has not attempted to provide a definitive as­
sesment of the performance of auditors. The consequences of all the asses­
ments and regulations is - in my opinion - that - in the future- it is not 
necessary - for the auditor- to make a judgement of the financial statements 
because the only thing he has to do is to ascertain himself that the company 
- which he is auditing- has followed all the regulations. W e can also say : 
by a further regulation and standarization of the auditing principles there 
will be no room left for the skilled judgement of the auditor.
Section 2. Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations.
In the beginning of this section You are speaking about a objevtive jud­
gement. On page 19 you say:” A basic condition must be that the judgement have 
an objective basis", in other words: when two auditors must give a judgement on 
a subject — independently- they will have the same judgement. This is not rea­
listic. You know this(page 19): the position that no objective basis exist to 
choose among alternative principles should not be taken lightly. If you want 
to achieve a objective basis for judgements than you must make regulations and 
accounting principles which are not open to doubt. This imply the basis of the 
regulations etc. have to be mathematic, because only mathematic principles are 
(in generally) not open to question. But this is in my opinion impossible. 
Therefor I want to make the following suggestions: the generally accepted a c ­
counting principles must be extended with rules about to what extend these 
regulations are proper. This will have the consequence that the subjective opi­
nion is - piece by piece- eliminated. On the other hand the notes by the finan­
cial statements must disclose the limits which are used. For example. the in - 
voices: we have audited them with the unit-sampling—methode, limits certainty 
95 maximun fault $ 200,000.
If this kind of information is in the notes than it will be possible to give a 
better judgement about the information and about the company itself.
I believe that this kind of information must be embodied in the financial re - 
porting.
Yours sincerely
 
 
 
 Rob  G . Berkhof.
Vossegatselaan 13 
Utrecht.
Nederland.
bis
Commission on Auditors. Resp. 
1211 Avenue of the Americas.
New York.
Utrecht, may 25, 1977.
Dear Douglas.
On page 28:Recommendations for improving reporting on uncertainties You 
discussed only that kind of uncertainties on which no body can say- in my o - 
pinion- something sensible.
But a kind of uncertainties which — principally- are based on valuations You 
don’t mention.
For example: One of the assets of a firm is real property. The initial expen­
se on 01—01—1972 w as Hfl. 250,000. We may say deprecation 2½ % p.a. (fiscally 
accepted). On 01—01— 1977 this estate is valued on Hfl 700,000.(by three inde­
pendent real—estate agents). When we look at the price-index for this kind of 
property we see a rise of 20 % p.a.total rise ± 150 % . According to the price- 
index Hfl.250,000 on 01-01-1972 is Hfl 250,000 x 250 % = Hfl 625,000 on 01-01-'77 
But in the financial statement the real property shall be glittering for 
Hfl. 250,000 minus (5 x 2½ %) = Hfl.218,750..
Difference with actual price Hfl. 700,000 minus Hfl.218,750 =Hfl 481,250.
In other words: why don’t we try to design a system in which we incorporate 
the matter I mentioned in the example, because the limit's of these uncertain — 
ties are much more narrowed then the uncertainties You mentioned.
The example containes a very important problem by financial reporting: inflation 
In my opinion is it better to try to come to a system that can handle the infla­
tion in the financial reporting. When we have accomplished this mission there 
will be less uncertaintie. At the same time it will be a perfect base to mini­
mize Your kind of uncertainties, but a elimination of Your uncertainties is not 
possible because the great number of dependent variables which are concernt.
Yours sincerely
 
__Rob G. Berkho f.
Vossegatselaan 13 
Utrecht. 
Nederland.
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W. W. Brown
Assistant Comptroller
American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company 
195 Broadway 
New York, N. Y. 10007 
Phone (212) 393-3034
May 27, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael  
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
This is to offer two comments regarding the "Report of 
Tentative Conclusions" of the AICPA Commission on Auditors'
Responsibilities.
My initial comment is in the area of extension of the 
auditor's role; it impacts on other issues identified in the 
report as well. That is, the fact that management, the audit 
committee, and share owners need from the auditors an evaluation 
of the adequacy of internal controls of the company. The only 
guarantee any of these users have with respect to this important 
matter is an evaluation by an outside party. I am aware that 
existing generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) provide for 
this service through a separate engagement; however, present GAAS 
also require that the auditor evaluate the system of internal 
control to determine the extent, nature and timing of audit 
examinations and while the client pays for this examination in 
the annual audit fee, the auditing standards do not provide for a 
report of findings.
Secondly, I believe the present process of establishing 
auditing standards is an effective one and that the AICPA should 
retain this responsibility. My concern is that far too many users 
of financial statement data are not sufficiently aware of nor given 
an opportunity to participate in this process; in fact, I am not too 
sure that all members of the Institute are given this opportunity. 
More exposure should be given to the pronouncements of AudSEC, and 
I recommend that public hearings be held prior to the issuance of 
the more significant pronouncements. This would give more widespread 
knowledge of the important activities of this body and provide an 
improved forum for interested parties to have their say.
I appreciate this opportunity to express my views on this
matter.
Yours truly
A - 1 5
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Dr. Douglas R. Carmichael Research DirectorCommission on Auditors' Responsibilities 1211 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036
Dear Dr. Carmichael,
Following are my comments on Section 3 of the Report of Tentative Conclusions of The Commission on Auditors' Responsi­b il i t ie s . I may have comments on other sections at a la te r date.
The recommendation for a footnote describing material uncertainties and other uncerta in ties to which financial s ta te ­ments are subject is excellent. I t  should give the users of financial statements a better basis for evaluating the total information presented. However, the recommendations to relieve the auditor of the responsibility to evaluate and, where necessary, point out to the reader (with the "subject to" opinion qualification) the uncertainties that are so significant that the reader must exercise special caution in relying on the financial statements, is a step backward.
The information in this section does not support the conclu­sion and, in fac t, contradicts i t .  The Armstrong Cork Company example is a case in point. The auditors apparently believed that there was a reasonable chance that the litiga tion  could have a material adverse effect, but the footnote states that " . . .  i t  is management's opinion that the potential l ia b ility  could have no material adverse effect on the business or financial position of the company." There can be no question but that a reader of these financial statements would attach more significance to the litiga tion  with the qualified auditors' report than without i t .Yet, how can an auditor reasonably question management's subjec­tive opinion in this case? They cannot, but they can emphasize the uncertainty through the ir opinion.
I t  is stated repeatedly that the auditor's reporting deci­sion becomes a prediction of the outcome of future events. This is not the case at a l l .  He evaluates the opinions of management, legal counsel and others and points out to the reader of finan­cial statements when these opinions are insufficient, in his opinion, for a final determination of financial statement amounts. How can this function be reasonably placed on the reader? Who has the opportunity for detailed and in-depth discussions of the uncertainty with management at all levels? Who obtains legal representation Tetters from legal counsel? Who has access to and reviews in detail the legal documents where litig a tio n  is involved or cost accounting data, budgets and forecasts where recovery of cost of assets is involved? Who is in the best position to evaluate the significance of the uncertainty? The answer is obvious.
To eliminate the "subject to" qualification would be in te r­preted, and seemingly rightly so, as another attempt to lim it the auditor's responsibility. The question now being asked by the public and Congress is what is the auditor responsible for?In this case, to say the auditor, with access to management, legal counsel, financial records, legal documents, etc. is not responsi­ble for evaluating the significance of an uncertainty, but that the reader of the financial statements, which include a one (or ten) paragraph description of the uncertainty, is responsible can only foster the decline of the audit function in the public and Con­gressional eyes.
I appreciate this opportunity to comment on this important matter.
G. William Glezen, Jr.
Sincerely,
H O W A R D  C . M c C R A D Y  June 3, 1977
S E N IO R  VICE PR ES ID E N T P H O E N I X
CH IEF F IN A N C IA L  O FFICER  P. O . B O X  71 8 5 0 0 1
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
We wish to register a generally negative reaction to the 
Report of Tentative Conclusions of the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities. We believe the recommenda­
tions, if adopted, would result in more confusion among 
the users of our financial statements than currently 
exists, more expense to produce the statements, more 
expense for the audit and raise serious doubts in the 
minds of those of us who pay for audits whether they would 
be worth the cost.
More specifically, we offer the following comments:
1. A statement is made that "Many users are not 
aware, for example, that the financial state­
ments are developed by, and are the representa­
tions of, management". One apparent theme 
running throughout the report is that the 
Commission wants to correct this deficiency.
Users of financial statements have to put forth 
some effort to make proper use of such information. 
If they have not learned enough to know who pre­
pared the statements they will never be able to 
comprehend them and auditors should not try to 
solve this deficiency. 
2. We believe dropping the standard, easily understood 
certification letter would be a mistake. The sample 
letters shown on Page 77-80 would confuse the 
average stockholder (if he read them). A standard
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letter (with or without the word "fairly") 
should continue to be used. Descriptions 
of how the audit was conducted could be 
carried in a special section of the notes.
We also object to the inclusion in the 
letter or the notes weak statements, such 
as "We believe our auditing procedures 
were adequate in the circumstances to support 
our opinion".
3. We question the advisability of the recommenda­
tion of reporting on "all material uncertainties". 
Such an approach could easily lead to very lengthy 
expositions on all kinds of remote possibilities 
because both management and the auditor were trying 
to protect themselves. As a result, really signifi­
cant matters would be hidden from all but the most 
perceptive reader of financial statements.
4. If all the auditor's report is going to be is a 
document that "could include his conclusion on 
compliance" we have to doubt whether the report 
has much value to management or the user.
5. The potential "Pandora's Box" that is opened by 
the section on the boundaries of the auditor’s 
role is also disturbing. Carried to its ultimate 
conclusion the recommendation could lead to the 
need for management to clear each decision with 
the auditor. However, the auditor would disclaim 
all responsibilities for the decisions. In our 
judgement, the disclaimer at the end of Section 6 
is not sufficient to overcome the tone of the rest 
of the section and the report. 6
6. We believe management should continue to have the 
right to set deadlines for completion of audits.
If auditors feel the deadlines are going to 
"threaten audit quality", they can discuss the 
subject with a client beforehand and refuse the 
engagement if a satisfactory solution cannot be 
reached. Many of the deadlines imposed by
VALLEY NATIONAL BANK
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management result from regulatory requirements.
We do concur with some recommendations:
1) More public reporting of activities of the 
auditing profession, in general, and individual 
firms, in particular, should take place.
2) We agree that the Audit Committee of the Board 
of Directors should evaluate the relationship 
between the Auditor and management and approve 
all arrangements for the audit.
Thank you for your attention to our opinions. We hope full 
airing of the issues involved results in an improved set of 
guidelines for auditors, their activities and their reports.
Sincerely,
HCM:pc
T E N E N B A U M  & T H A W ,  P. A.
20451 North West 2nd Avenue 
Miami, Florida 33169 
651-3020
C E R T I F I E D  P U BL I C  A C C O U N T A N T S
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American In s t itu te  of C e rt i f ie d  Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
Mew York, New York
Gentlemen:
We wish to express our approval of the reorganization of Audsec, 
particu lary  as long as there is a standing sub-committee on pro­
cedures on non-public companies.
V/e desperately need-help in coping with financia l statements for  
non-public companies and strongly feel that the same disclosure 
requirements for the public companies are simply inapplicable to 
the small companies. They merely run up the cost of competent 
accounting simply to protect the accountant, and not because the 
c l ie n t  needs the extended procedures.
Very tru ly  yours,
TENENBAUM & THAW, P. A. 
C e rt if ie d  Public Accountants
MAT/b
R E X  M E I G M E N .  C .  P.  A .  ( 1 8 9 2 - 1 9 7 6 ) 
M A R K  W. E A S T L A N D ,  J R . , C .  P. A,  
R O B E R T  E .  V A L D E S .  C .  P. A .
WM . M. S T A F F O R D .  C.  P.  A . (RETIRED) 
M. R.  M E I G H E N . C . P .  A .
F R E D  F. L A D O . C . P .  A .
H A R O L D  G .  G I B S O N . C .  P. A .
J O H N  K.  M I L L E R .  C .  P.  A .  ( 1 9 1 5 - 1 9 7 7 )  
WIL LIA M J .  F E R L I T A . C . P .  A.
J O H N  C .  R O B E R T S .  C .  P. A .
R I C H A R D  M .  C H A P M A N .  C  . P .  A.
WM, D O U G L A S  S T A F F O R D .  C .  P. A .
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E X C H AN G E N A T IO N A L  S AN K B U IL D IN G
T a m p a , F l o r i d a  3 3 6 0 2
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Research Director
Commission on Auditor’s Responsibilities 
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New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
We have made a preliminary study of the "Report of Tentative Conclu­
sions" and wish to make a few comments as suggested in the Preface.
The Commission has undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the 
profession even though the tentative report raises more problems than it 
solves.
The Commission’s primary attention to and emphasis on audits of public­
ly held companies is set out and explained in the introduction. Some of our 
comments may, therefore, be considered inappropriate but it is hoped that 
they may be considered in the implementation of the Commission's recommenda­
tions .
We are interested in the Commission’s recognition of the vast differ­
ences between publicly held companies and the closely held companies which 
constitute the bulk of the audit practice of all except the very large CPA 
firms. We do not understand, however, how the profession can ever have a 
double standard of audit responsibility for big clients and little clients.
Section 2
On Page 20, the second paragraph appears to us to be arbitrary, too 
broad and imprecise. If there is no authoritative literature, how can the 
auditor take exception to an alternative selected by management? By what 
right may the auditor propose that management cannot select a principle 
which is not forbidden or how can he fail to accept management's rejection 
of a principle that is not required?
If what is meant is that the auditor is not bound to accept a princi­
ple or an application which is grossly improper or misleading in a particular 
circumstance, the language should clearly so state.
Douglass R. Carmichael
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Section 3
On Page 29, the final paragraph under "Recommended Changes in Finan­
cial Accounting Standards" seems to say that every uncertainty no matter how 
small must be disclosed. We do not agree that materiality should not be given 
consideration in respect to disclosing uncertainties.
We have carefully considered the suggestion that "subject to" opinions 
be discontinued and that disclosure of uncertainties be adequate for the 
reader to evaluate the possible effect of the uncertainty. It may be of 
interest to you to know that by a vote of 5 to 4 we endorse the suggested 
elimination of "subject to".
Those in the minority favor retaining the "subject to" because they 
believe the reader should be alerted to an uncertainty which should be con­
sidered in using the financial statements. They do not feel that including 
the information about the uncertainty among today's voluminous footnotes, 
which are seldom read by the typical investor, is sufficient notice.
Section 4
On Page 36, recommends that the auditor's responsibility for manage­
ment fraud should be greater than that prescribed by SAS 16, which in itself 
is far from clear. The discussion, however, is not explicit, the excerpts 
from "The Philosophy of Auditing" speak of
A concept of professional care which indicates in more 
or less specific terms the considerations which must 
govern the performance of an examination.
he is neither excused from discovering any and all irregular­
ities nor charged with an examination so extensive that it 
will uncover any and all irregularities
a standard of professional skill and care is needed to evalu­
ate the performance of auditors.
It is assumed that the Commission expects the profession to develop 
specifics. Two things are certain, with the benefit of hindsight, the audi­
tor will be blamed for every undetected fraud and the cost of audits will 
substantially increase.
Section 5
It is proposed that corporations adopt and publicize codes of conduct 
and procedures for monitoring compliance.
Insofar as large publicly held companies are concerned, it is incon­
ceivable that such codes will not uniformly forbid such things as bribes, 
kick-backs and other illegal acts.
Douglass R. Carmichael
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The report appears to make no distinction in this regard between large 
publicly held companies and small one-man or one family businesses.
What sense would it make for the auditor to be required to report that 
his small local client had failed to adopt a "policy"?
How can the accounting profession dictate such things?
The discussion on Page 47 seems to suggest that materiality is not 
a factor in dealing with illegal acts, even though Page 48 talks about alter­
natives. Would "fixing" a parking ticket have to be accorded the same dis­
closures as bribing a witness, a competitor’s employee or a revenue agent?
Section 6
As is true, understandably, throughout the report, the suggested re­
quirement to disclose weaknesses in controls contemplates an organization 
large enough to make effective controls practical. There are thousands of 
audit reports on small closely held businesses which have no internal control 
but where the auditor is able to satisfy himself by extending procedures.
What possible purpose would be served by requiring the auditor in such 
circumstances to include in his report a statement that the controls were 
inadequate and that he could not provide assurances on the control system?
The suggested disclosure requirement is acceptable for reports on 
widely held companies, but would be more of going through motions to no pur­
pose for the small closely held companies, like the earnings per share re­
quirement .
The suggested expansion of the boundaries of the auditor’s role sounds 
good in theory but how is a businessman to be convinced that he should pay 
more and more for audit services?
Section 7
We fully understand the necessity to emphasize the fact that the finan­
cial statements are the representations of management and that management is 
primarily responsible for them. We do not, however, understand why it is 
suggested that both the auditor and management state an untruth that the 
statements were prepared by management. All of us know that, in the vast 
majority of cases, the financial statements, particularly the footnotes, are 
prepared by the auditor and adopted by management.
The report suggests that an eight paragraph auditor’s report will be 
read whereas a two paragraph report is not read. We hold no particular brief 
for the present standard report but we have serious doubts that a longer 
report is more likely to be read. The present report, has, at least, the 
advantage that the reader can readily recognize any departure from the norm.
Douglass R. Carmichael
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Section 8
It is refreshing that the Commission recognizes that today's college 
graduates, who major in accounting, are not prepared to practice public 
accounting. In most cases today’s graduates have never seen a set of books 
or an income tax return.
It may be an impossible dream, but it has been our experience that 
students who have actually worked in an office and participated in the day 
to day bookkeeping process more readily learn and understand the academic 
side of accounting and become productive in public accounting much more 
rapidly than those who have no working experience.
While the internship suggestions may be the only available solution, 
it has definite disadvantages in a local firm, such as ours, which does no 
write-up work. We question whether the three or six month internship in the 
middle of academic instruction is any more helpful than the same amount of 
time spent after graduation.
It is also questionable whether small firms, such as ours, would 
be willing to expend the time and resources on an intern with no assurance 
that he would become an employee on graduation.
We concur that the assignment of accounting faculty to the colleges 
of business has certainly "held back" the development of adequate practical 
accounting curricula.
We do not oppose, but we feel that professors having associate mem­
berships in accounting societies will not cure the problem of the practical 
v. theoretical.
Section 9
We think the Commission’s concern over employment recruiting and 
placement is well founded, but we are uncertain as to a fair solution.
Section 11
The suggested acceleration of disciplinary action is laudable, but 
we do not understand how it can be accomplished in cases where litigation 
is pending.
Yours very truly,
M W E :mja
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Dear Mr. Carmichael:
We appreciate this opportunity to respond to the Report of 
Tentative Conclusions of The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. 
We compliment the Commission on its thorough analysis of auditors' 
responsibilities and are in general agreement with the conclusions 
and recommendations set forth in the report, except as noted below.
The Independent Auditor's Role in Society
In this Section (page 11), it is indicated that "An active 
board of directors with a significant proportion of independent 
outside directors can also be of benefit to an independent auditor 
in fulfilling his responsibilities." Further (page 12), "Directors 
should regularly receive a report on the company's accounting system 
and the controls over it from the independent auditor." In later 
Sections, it is clearly noted that the auditor's primary interface 
at the board level would generally be with the audit committee 
rather than the full board. We suggest this Section indicate, in 
lieu of the comments quoted above, that the board should have 
enough independent outside directors to form an effective audit 
committee, and that the independent auditors should render their 
reports to such committee.
Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations
We question whether, as a general rule, auditors are in 
better position than management to judge the preferability of 
alternative generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore,
B E T T E R  T H I N G S  F O R  B E T T E R  L I V I N G  . . . T H R O U G H  C H E M IS T R Y
2we would restrict the auditor's responsibility in this respect to 
insuring that alternatives selected do not produce misleading results. 
To have auditors judge on preferability would effectively shift 
primary responsibility for preparation of financial statements from 
management to the auditors, which would be inconsistent with other 
conclusions set forth in the report. Also, it might encourage 
companies to shop around for auditors who would agree with the 
alternatives they wished to use.
Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud
We agree in principle that an audit should provide reasonable 
assurance that the financial statements are not affected by material 
fraud, particularly as regards fraudulent activity by corporate 
management. However, audit procedures designed to provide such 
assurance should be drawn with care to insure the cost does not 
exceed potential benefits, and we believe the recommendation should 
so specify.
Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and its Extension
We are not sure what is intended by the recommendation to 
extend the audit function to other information in the annual report. 
We believe the Commission’s final report should indicate that such 
review would be limited to financial information which is (1) also 
included in the financial statements or (2) reconcilable to the 
financial statements. It is clearly beyond the auditor’s competence 
to evaluate, for example, management’s discussion of research proj­
ects or capital investment programs.
We disagree with the implication that procedures for develop 
ing financial forecasts should be standardized and subjected to 
audit. We do not believe auditors are in position to prescribe 
forecasting procedures or to evaluate management judgment in this 
highly subjective area.
The Auditor’s Communication With Users
While we agree the auditor’s report on the financial state­
ments can be expanded to make it more meaningful and useful, the 
draft on page 79 seems unnecessarily negative (e.g., comment that 
the auditors "found no material disagreement" between the financial 
statements and information in the annual report). Also, we believe 
the comments on audit procedures, while lengthy, are incomplete and 
therefore potentially misleading (e.g., reference to "a sample of
3the transactions" and "an analytical review of the information 
presented"). It is not feasible to summarize the scope of audit 
procedures within the auditor's report.
We agree that a brief management report would be meaningful, 
but suggest the Commission provide only broad guidelines for such a 
report, with details left to management's judgment and changing 
circumstances.
Education, Training, and Development of Auditors
We do not believe that a 7-year college program should be 
required to enter the accounting profession. There is no evidence 
that such extensive training is needed or that the cost could be 
justified.
Maintaining the Independence of Auditors
We strongly support the Commission's conclusion that further 
government regulation or takeover of the independent audit function 
is not warranted. We also agree with recommendations for maintaining 
and enhancing the independence of the auditor, except that we do not 
believe any useful purpose would be served by disclosing in proxy 
statements the nature and extent of other services provided by the 
auditor. Such disclosure would tend to imply a conflict of interest.
The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards
We support the establishment of a full-time Auditing 
Standards Board within the AICPA. We also believe it essential 
that adequate provision be made for greater participation by 
industry in the auditing standards setting process.
Very truly yours,
 
W . E . Buxbaum 
Comptroller
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Douglas R. Carmichael
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New York, New York 10036
Doug:
I have just completed reading through the Commission's "Report of 
Tentative Conclusions" and found all of the material highly interest­
ing and, of course, the entire report is thorough and extremely well 
done. I know you had an important part to play in the preparation of 
that report, and I commend you and the Commission for the work that has 
been done.
I would like to have the enclosed working paper "Some Proposals for 
Strengthening Auditor Independence" considered in the general category 
of written presentations to the Commission in response to the request 
for such presentations. The paper was presented at a meeting of the 
Southeast AAA conference two years ago and was subsequently submitted 
to the Journal of Accountancy but was rejected primarily on the basis 
that rotation of auditors is old hat. I should like to point out, how­
ever, that my stress is not primarily on rotation but rather on reten­
tion, through a fixed period of tenure, and the proposal is specifically 
directed at the idea of improving auditor independence. A later version 
of the paper was presented at the Wichita State University conference 
last month, and the newer version of the paper is once again being pre­
pared for submission to a publication. I as well as many others were 
disappointed that you were unable to be present to deliver your own 
paper at that conference.
Referring to other matters in the report, I was especially interested 
in the responses on education. I am hopeful that from our two-course au­
diting sequence at the undergraduate and then the graduate level that 
many of the stated deficiencies would be satisfied through our program. 
Also, I have tried to address the matter of understanding the mechanics 
of the accounting system, the question of related documentation, and em­
phasis on how to audit as well as the whys of auditing in my text Sys­
tems Based Independent Audits. I was pleased to see the quotation from 
my Auditing Principles text in the report, but hope that the research 
staff also had available to it a copy of Systems Based Independent Au­
dits which contains the same information but does a much more extensive 
job of treating the accounting system.
T H E  UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045
Douglas Carmichael 
June 7, 1977 
Page 2
I am looking forward to the eventual outcome and effect of the Commis­
sion's activities.
Sincerely
Howard F. Stettler
workingpaper
no. 92
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SOME PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Howard F. Stettler, University of Kansas
Although the U.S. public accounting profession was beginning to 
recognize the importance of independence in connection with audits of 
financial statements in the late 1920's, independence did not receive 
really forceful attention until the passage of the Federal Securities 
Acts of 1933 and 1934. The earlier lethargic attention to what is today 
a vital consideration in auditing practice is largely attributable to 
the fact that prior to the public disclosure requirements of the Securi­
ties Acts, auditing services were rendered primarily for the benefit of 
management, directors, and the financial community. Management was con­
cerned about fraud and accounting errors, and directors were interested 
in the determination of the amount of "surplus" available for the legal 
payment of dividends.
Under the conditions then prevailing, frequently the only informa­
tion available to the public was a corporation's dividend record, and 
with the pressure to establish favorable records to support stock prices, 
corporate managements sometimes stretched dividend payments to the limit 
of available surplus. The correct determination of the "profit and loss 
account" balance to be added to surplus as a basis for dividends could 
thus be of vital concern to corporate directors in avoiding the personal 
liability that could arise from the payment of dividends in excess of the 
legal limit, and consultation with auditors on these matters was not un­
common.
2The rash of merger activity in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century similarly involved an "internal" use of auditing services. The 
respective interests of the companies involved in a combination neces­
sitated reliable data, and audited balance sheets were often specified 
to provide an equitable basis for working out the exchange of ownership 
interests. Independence was of little concern with respect to these 
services, and the financial community considered reputation as being 
more important than independence.
Investors' Right to Know
Although the pre-eminent importance of dividend records was widely 
recognized, some forward-looking companies began to publish limited sup­
plementary financial information in the form of a usually abbreviated 
balance sheet that displayed the profit for the year as the balance of 
the profit and loss account added to surplus. Occasionally these figures 
were audited. Additionally, there was some likelihood that loan negotia­
tions might involve banker pressure for the submission of "certified" 
balance sheets. It was from these early developments that full disclo­
sure, generally accepted accounting principles, and the dominant position 
of the attest function within the CPA profession eventually emerged.
January 1933 was an important milestone in the development of the 
attest function, as it was then that the New York Stock Exchange announced 
that listing applications after July 1, 1933 must be accompanied by au­
dited financial statements; companies whose securities were already 
listed were also urged (but not required) to be audited. An article in 
Fortune Magazine of June, 1932 indicated that about two-thirds of the
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companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange at that time were audited. 
Even these tentative steps were undoubtedly influenced by an awareness of 
government interest in making reliable financial information available 
for publicly held companies; an interest that culminated in passage of 
the Federal Securities Act of 1933. It was at that point that the in­
vestor’s right to know became fully recognized.
Additional Leverage Becomes Necessary
When public accountants were almost exclusively engaged in being of 
direct service to management, their reports and recommendations were ac­
cepted and acted upon by clients without question, with this unquestioned 
acceptance a consequence of the faith manifested in the practitioner 
through his selection by the client. Under these circumstances the client 
had complete freedom to act or react to the practitioner’s findings as 
the client saw fit, but these conditions changed as public accountants’ 
services began to have value to third parties. Practitioners experienced 
the frustration of having clients refuse to accept disclosures or account­
ing methods that the practitioner "knew" were right. Instead, clients 
sometimes insisted on alternatives that better satisfied immediate ob­
jectives, despite the fact that the alternatives might be misleading to 
third parties.
 
Out of these conditions developed the need for the practitioner to 
have a higher authority that could be invoked to strengthen his position; 
i.e., to increase the practitioner’s leverage in seeking to accomplish 
needed change. Thus, in addition to the practitioner’s personal insist­
ence that the financial statements be changed, there was a need for a
mandate that required it. The first evidence of a higher authority other 
than published accounting books intended for instruction and guidance came 
in the form of the booklet "A Memorandum on Balance Sheet Audits" pre­
pared by the then American Institute of Accountants. The impetus for the 
preparation of the booklet was a request by the Federal Trade Commission, 
which subsequently approved the document and forwarded it to the Federal 
Reserve Board. The Board gave the document its provisional endorsement 
and published it in the Federal Reserve Bulletin of April 1917. Subse­
quently, reprints bearing the title "Uniform Accounting: A Tentative
Proposal Submitted by the Federal Reserve Board" were distributed to 
members of the American Institute and other accounting organizations and 
to banks, merchants, manufacturers, and associations of those groups.
That booklet was revised by a committee of the American Institute of Ac­
countants in 1929 and the revised booklet was again published and dis­
tributed by the Federal Reserve Board.
Reporting problems surged to the fore with the collapse of stock 
prices that began in 1929, and in 1932 discussions were initiated be­
tween the AIA Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges and the NYSE 
Committee on Stock List with the intention of attacking the problem of 
misleading financial reporting practices of the pre-crash period. The 
awareness of the magnitude of the reporting problem that developed from 
these discussions was subsequently reinforced by pressure from the SEC 
for an authoritative pronouncement on generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples, and in 1938 the AIA formed the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
to begin work on this task. The Committee on Accounting Procedure chipped
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away on this task until 1959 when it was succeeded by the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board, which functioned until 1973 when it was supplanted by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. Although none of these activities 
succeeded in producing the comprehensive and definitive pronouncement 
that had been sought, there was at least a recognized authority for au­
ditors to invoke to increase their leverage in dealing with recalcitrant 
clients.
Independence As an Aid to Leverage
The importance of independence as a leverage factor is evident in 
the move to transfer the rule-making authority for accounting principles 
from the previous appendages of the AICPA to a completely independent 
FASB. Although not so stated, presumably one reason that the Wheat Com­
mission recommended a completely separate rule-making board was to assure 
maximum independence and thereby avoid the suspicion that had previously 
existed that accounting firm representatives on the APB sometimes voted 
according to the expressed preferences of major clients rather than ac­
cording to their true convictions.
Independence can similarly provide leverage in the direct confronta­
tions that may occur over accounting matters between auditor and client. 
Losing the client is a Damocles' sword that inevitably is present to 
some degree (sometimes only subconsciously) whenever an auditor questions 
or disagrees with a client’s predilections. In some of the recent im­
broglios that have surfaced through legal action there have been "grey 
area” questions of interpretation as to disclosures or the determination 
of accounting figures, and there is a strong possibility that the
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decisions made might have been different had the defendants been truly 
independent— in other words, had they been completely free to follow 
personal convictions or preferences. The more likely orientation in 
such situations, however, tends to be to "serve" the client by searching 
for an authoritative statement or position that can be interpreted as 
countenancing the client’s preferences.
It is entirely possible in those unfortunate cases that went against 
the auditor-defendants that had the defendants been practicing with the 
independence of IRS agents (who never need fear losing a client and thus 
have maximum leverage in resolving differences), the hapless defendants 
might have insisted on alternative treatment or disclosure and the cases 
might never have occurred.
Client Confrontations and Gresham’s Law
Closely allied to the potential loss of a client over a disagreement 
concerning disclosure or accounting treatment is the possibility that the 
client may be able to find a more "understanding" accountant who, for a 
variety of possible reasons, may stand ready to accept both the client 
and the client’s position in the controversy with the predecessor account­
ant. To the extent that the successor accountant may be tempted to sub­
scribe to the prospective client’s position as a means of assuring his 
selection, Gresham’s law for the circulation of money tends to be applica­
ble to the circulation of accountants as well. The difference between the 
predecessor and successor accountants is not actually "good" and "bad" as 
with money, but is more likely to represent a difference in standards or 
in the interpretation or application of the standards. When such
differences exist, there follows a tendency for the standards of the pro­
fession as a whole to be reduced to the lowest common denominator.
To avoid such pressure on standards, to strengthen the accountant’s 
position vis-à-vis the client, and to relieve currently engaged auditors 
of the temptation to be biased in the client’s behalf as a means of as­
suring client retention, it is proposed that the profession’s code of 
ethics be expanded to include a rule that would preclude a successor au­
ditor from assenting to an accounting treatment or nondisclosure of in­
formation if the predecessor accountant held to a different position.
The necessary information for the operation of such a plan already exists 
in the SEC’s 8-K reporting requirement concerning the disclosure of dif­
ferences between registrant and accountant when a change of accountants 
occurs.
Not to be overlooked in connection with such a plan, however, is the 
possibility that a client’s position may actually be justifiable and the 
accountant’s position is the one that is in error. Clients must, of 
course, have some recourse from such a situation, and the recourse that 
is proposed is to form within the Financial Accounting Foundation an ap­
peals board to which either party of a dispute would have access, and 
with the parties to the dispute sharing the cost of maintaining such a 
board.
Tenured Appointment As a Further Source of Improved Leverage
The thrust of the proposal that the public accounting profession 
close ranks in opposition to "imaginative" and anti-disclosure clients is 
a reduction of the ever-present concern over the possibility of losing a
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client, but so long as the accountant is dependent on his client for his 
fee he can never be truly independent. It is perhaps in part for this 
reason that the Congress considered the possibility of having the federal 
government assume the responsibility for the attest function when the 1933 
Federal Securities Act was being deliberated. Fortunately for all con­
cerned, however, that alternative was rejected, and even an SEC commis­
sioner is quoted in Rappaport's SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure 
as having stated, "I believe we can all agree that independent certifica­
tion was, and is, the better choice.” Another possibility that is equally 
distasteful would be to have a special tax generate the revenues neces­
sary to permit the federal government to compensate (and presumably also 
to select) the auditors certifying financial statements related to SEC 
registrations.
To obtain much the same benefits of these possibilities in terms of 
increasing the auditor's leverage by removing the threat of client loss, 
but without incurring the obvious shortcomings of the two alternatives of 
government audits or payment of fees from public coffers, a system of 
finite tenure for auditors is proposed. The intent of such a proposal is 
to retain most of the favorable aspects of the auditor/client relationship 
but to improve the auditor’s position vis-à-vis his client by removing the 
pressure for client retention. The key words of the proposal are finite 
and tenure, reflecting a contractual relationship for audit engagements 
for a specified number of years, with a mandatory change of auditors at 
the expiration of the specified period.
Using the accepted sabbatical concept of Jewish antiquity and academic 
tradition, the tenure period is proposed at seven years. Longer periods
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would forcibly tie a client to a given auditor for an unreasonable length 
of time, although regardless of the established period, there would have 
to be some form of escape involving the normal constraints of a formal 
breach of contract action. Nevertheless, the period should be fairly long 
in order to spread the added costs of new auditor indoctrination over as 
many years of service as possible. Partially offsetting the cost of chang­
ing auditors is the value of a "fresh approach"— a factor that has been 
responsible for the voluntary periodic change of auditors made by some 
companies.
Maximizing Independence
The focal point of any change affecting the auditor/client relation­
ship must be the protection of the financial interests of third parties 
by assuring maximum objectivity of the audit review of client financial 
statements. Anything less than absolute auditor independence must of 
necessity involve some loss of relative strength for the auditor in re­
solving differences that may arise. Although auditor independence has 
been strengthened in many ways, notably through the profession's code of 
ethics in proscribing relationships that would reflect on the appearance 
of independence and also in removing the determination of acceptable account­
ing principles from the contemporaneous audit situation, client power
 
associated with the selection and compensation of auditors has remained a 
potentially insidious element in the auditor/client/third-party triangle.
To maximize the strength of the auditor's bargaining power vis-à-vis his 
client— i.e., to strengthen auditor independence, two proposals have been
made:
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First, the auditing profession should close ranks and agree to support 
the position of the displaced auditor when differences exist between the 
client and the auditor and are unresolved at the time of dismissal or non­
reengagement. As a related matter, an independent appeals board on account­
ing and disclosure questions is also proposed to further relieve the pressure 
on auditors to accede to client preferences.
Second, audit engagements involving publicly held companies should be 
based on a seven-year period of tenure with no successive reappointment of
the same auditor
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Dear Sir:
Dayton-Hudson Corporation is a publicly held company subject to 
the reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The Corporation has been audited by the same firm, 
a member of the "Big 8", for 46 years.
We commend the Commission for its pragmatic approach to the 
subject of Auditors' responsibilities. Its analysis of current 
problems is complete and well balanced between the needs and 
expectations of financial statement users and the inherent 
limitations of the auditor's role. We believe both the short­
term and long-term recommendations suggest practical, workable 
solutions. We strongly agree that solutions for existing prob­
lems should be logical extensions of the practices developed 
in the past. Radical departures from existing standards and 
methods may cause more problems than they resolve.
As the accounting profession changes in response to current 
criticisms, we suggest it should emphasize a continuing pro­
gram to educate users of financial data both about the 
assurances provided by various types of audit work and the 
methods used to provide those assurances. As long as users 
do not fully understand the auditor's role, the accounting 
profession will continue to be criticized.
We appreciate the opportunity to submit the attached comments 
on this report.
Yours very truly ,
Thomas E. Nave 
Vice President and
Controller
TEN:lj 
attachments
Response to Cohen Report - Dayton Hudson Corporation
The Independent Auditor's Role in Society-(Section 1)
We agree that the auditor's most useful role is that of a third party intermediary in 
an accountability relationship between the issuer of audited financial information and 
users of that information, with primary responsibility to users of his work. Manage­
ment also benefits from this independent auditor relationship through the confirmation 
that it is properly fulfilling its stewardship function.
We support the concept of closer, more active cooperation between auditors and inde­
pendent outside directors. We believe this interaction strengthens both the actual 
and perceived independence of the auditor to the benefit of both financial statement 
users and company management.
Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations-(Section 2)
We agree with the Commission that the phrase "fairly presents" is vague and subject 
to varying interpretations. A more effective role for the auditor would be to 
evaluate the choices made by management and comment on the appropriateness of the 
accounting alternatives chosen. However, we view this as a long-term goal. While the 
auditor could state that the company’s choice of accounting principles tend to reduce 
or increase earnings, the current availability of acceptable alternatives prevents him 
from concluding that the company has made the most appropriate choice. If accounting 
principles are refined in the future to permit objective determination of preferability, 
the auditor's role could then extend to reporting on the propriety of management’s choices.
Reporting on Significant Uncertainties-(Section 3)
We concur with the recommendation for changing the auditor's focus from predicting the 
outcome of uncertainties to evaluating the adequacy of disclosure of uncertainties. As 
there is always risk inherent in doing business, it is appropriate that the primary 
concern of the independent auditors should be the usefulness of financial statement 
disclosure to the users in the evaluation of that risk. Users are better served by 
complete information as a basis for their own judgement than by reliance on an auditor's 
evaluation of the risk. There is no reason to believe the auditor is in a better 
position than the company management or financial statement users to assess continued 
business success/failure or the outcome of other business uncertainties.
Clarifying Responsibility for Detection of Fraud-(Section 4).
We believe the auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud must be clarified 
and communicated to the financial statement user. Clarification of the auditor's 
responsibility will be of direct benefit to all three interested groups - financial 
statement users, auditors and company management. Establishment of a standard of "due 
professional care" will result in consistent standards of fraud detection being applied 
to all auditors and aid the auditor in improving the quality of audits. The standard 
should-also protect auditors from unrealistic user expectations. Users of financial 
information will benefit from a better understanding of the type of fraud that should 
be revealed by audit.
We support the recommendation for exchange of information on fraud detection methods 
within the accounting profession. Such a program would result in higher standards of 
audit work and better protect corporate assets.
We believe the auditor's role in detecting fraud could be expanded; however, the cost 
benefit relationship of such expanded role must be of prime concern. The clarification 
of the auditor's role, establishment of effective standards and healthy skepticism on 
the part of the auditors will do much more in solving the current difficulties regarding 
fraud detection than would expanding their role to that of a criminal investigator.
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Corporate Accountability and the Law-(Section 5)
We agree that auditors should search for illegal or questionable acts that would nor­
mally be uncovered by the exercise of auditors' professional skills, once those acts 
are defined. However, we believe that both management's disclosure and the auditor's 
responsibility to uncover illegal or questionable acts must be evaluated in light of 
the legal and business climate at the date the financial reports are published, rather 
than the conditions prevailing at some later date. The accounting profession should 
work with the SEC to develop and maintain current standards for defining questionable 
acts.
We support clarification of the auditor's responsibility and the expansion of the legal 
profession's role in dealing with illegal or questionable acts. The legal profession 
has the competence to uncover illegal acts, advise management on the possible con­
sequences, and evaluate the outcome of actual or potential lawsuits. The auditor should 
not be in the position of evaluating the advice of a company's legal counsel. The 
auditor should only be responsible for the adequacy of the financial statement dis­
closure.
We concur that the conventional materiality standard is not appropriate for known illegal 
or questionable acts, as it relates to the independent auditor. All illegal, or question­
able acts discovered should be brought to the attention of management and their lawyers. 
The auditor, lawyer and management should then work together in determining what dis­
closure is necessary. However, the primary responsibility for disclosure or lack there­
of must rest with management. The auditor should retain the responsibility for disclos­
ing illegal or questionable acts only if managment does not fulfill its responsibility.
The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and Its Extension-(Section 6)
We believe the public accounting profession must respond positively to change in dev­
eloping auditing standards and responsibilities as well as in developing accounting stan­
dards. Resistance to change will encourage government intervention. We believe it is 
in the best interests of financial information users and corporate management, as well 
as auditors, for auditing and accounting standards to be developed in the private sector.
Financial reporting should continue to be the responsiblity of corporate management - 
it is their report to the owners of the company on how they have fulfilled their steward­
ship function. The auditor's role must be restricted to evaluating management's dis­
closure. Involving the auditor in preparation of financial information inevitably 
erodes his independence.
The auditor should only be responsible for evaluating information of an accounting 
or financial nature. The field of business is complex enough to provide a challenge 
simply to achieve and maintain competence in financial matters. Any attempt to broaden 
the auditor's role to include competence in other fields such as law could only result 
in decreased competence in his primary field. Society can draw on the expertise of 
professionals in other fields for the assurances on matters outside the auditor's com­
petence.
Expansion of the auditor's responsibilities to include an evaluation of the function 
of the accounting systems and controls is desirable from the viewpoint of both users 
and company management. If auditors must detect fraud, and illegal and questionable 
acts to expand their role in insuring the reliability of reported financial data, 
they must audit the systems, procedures and controls that produce the financial informa­
tion on an ongoing basis rather than the numbers in the financial statements at a point 
in time. While most large companies have internal audit departments to review control 
systems, the internal auditor may not be totally objective as he is an employee of the 
company. Users of financial information frequently rely on the outside auditor's review
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The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and Its Extension-(Section 6) (Cont'd)
of controls for independent assurance that control systems are adequate and functioning 
as intended. This reliance is misguided as the auditor primarily reviews internal con­
trols to determine the scope of his audit work. Management also benefits from inde­
pendent confirmation that accounting systems are working properly, as it makes operating 
decisions based on data provided by these systems. Both management and investors in 
the company benefit if those decisions are based on complete, correct data.
A report by the independent auditors on the company's control system would reward those 
companies with good systems by making them more attractive to investors. Investors would 
be able to better evaluate the risk involved in their investment decision.
We support the involvement of auditors on a continuous basis. Our auditors have been 
involved with the issuance of interim financial data for several years. Since 1975 
they have performed a limited review in accordance with SAS #10. We believe this in­
volvement has improved reporting systems. Continuous auditor involvement has a number 
of advantages. The auditor obtains a better understanding of the client company. Potential 
problems can be corrected before they become serious. Financial data is improved through 
the emphasis that it will be reviewed by the auditor. Properly planned, interim audit 
work can reduce work normally done at year end, with no significant increase in total 
audit fees.
The Auditor's Communication with Users-(Section 7)
While we believe that users of financial information should carefully read audit reports 
rather than viewing them as a symbol, we agree that the current report should be revised 
to be more explicit about the work performed and the auditor's conclusions. The reader 
should not be expected to guess at the meaning of the report. We support the recom­
mendation that auditors’ reports should be revised to cover the entire audit function 
and be tailored to meet the specific circumstances of each company.
We also specifically agree that a report covering the financial information should be 
issued by management. This should help to clarify the responsibilities of management 
and the auditors as they pertain to the financial statements. A report by management 
would help the user to better understand that the primary responsibility for financial 
statements rests with the issuer not the auditor.
We agree there is currently a deficiency in audit reports when more than one auditor is 
involved. Rather than having the primary auditor review the other auditor's work, we 
favor the option of having management present the other auditor's report. Assuming all 
portions of the data are audited by competent professionals, the additional fees nec­
essary to have the primary auditor review the work of the other auditors to cover all 
data in his opinion do not appear to be justified by any benefit to users.
Revision of the opinion currently given on unaudited statements should be given high 
priority. This revision should be accompanied by a program to educate users as to the 
level of assurance intended. Adoption of several descriptive reports on unaudited state­
ments would be greatly beneficial both to users and to auditors. The current disclaimer 
on unaudited statements confuses financial statement readers by implying that the data 
is or may be erroneous. The reader is unable to evaluate the assurance related to 
auditor involvement with the data. With no data available on the reliability of the 
company's accounting systems and controls, or the level of work performed by the auditor, 
the auditor's involvement is meaningless. This confusion on the part of users only in­
creases potential liability for the auditor. A revised auditor opinion that indicates 
the data is correct within certain defined limits would be of great benefit to both users 
and auditors.
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The Auditor's Communication with Users-(Section 7) (Cont’d)
The mixing of unaudited data (but with which the auditor is associated), such as re­
placement cost, within audited financial statements is also very confusing to the 
average user. The changing of the auditor’s report to address what work the auditor did 
should eliminate the need for such "unaudited” labels.
The Education, Training, and Development of Auditors-(Section 8)
We do not have strong feelings regarding the formal accounting education in schools of 
business. However, we think that it is important to consider the responsibility and 
requirements being placed on auditors. Financial data is so widely disseminated that 
the impact of auditor’s decisions and the related exposure to liability are equal to 
if not greater than that of the legal or medical profession. In both of these pro­
fessions, separate graduate schools of education are required.
A uniform CPA examination is given throughout the country. Upon successful completion 
of the CPA exam, the experience required is not uniform. We recommend that the education 
requirements to take the examination and the experience requirements after passing the 
exam be standardized. We also recommend a continuing education requirement similar to 
the programs recently adopted by several states.
Maintaining the Independence of Auditors-(Section 9)
We strongly concur that the present system of a private profession, regulated by a 
combination of private and governmental efforts including the SEC and courts is sup­
erior to the other alternatives available. Although there is certainly room for im­
provements in the workings of the current system, sweeping changes such as those call­
ing for substantially more government involvement are not necessary.
The audit committee and/or board of directors should have the final responsibility for 
reviewing the audit scope and fees after appropriate review by management. This final 
review should be done with the auditors present, to allow them to answer questions and 
communicate their concerns to the audit committee. Total service, including those other 
than the normal audit, and their impact on the audit should be discussed at this meeting.
Companies should not subject the independent auditor to unreasonable pressure. Keeping 
the auditors informed of the major developments on a continuing basis should eliminate 
the need to place extreme pressures on the auditor. However, it must be pointed out 
that on occasion management is placed under unavoidable time pressures and that it 
may be necessary for the auditors to be subjected to the same pressure. However, such 
situations should be rare.
We support the concept of rotating auditors. Such a procedure should yield a good re­
turn to all concerned - shareholder, management and auditor.  
The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards-(Section 10)   
We strongly advocate retaining responsibility for setting audit standards in the account­
ing profession. We believe this strengthens the independence of auditors. In disputes 
with management the auditor is, and should be, defending standards he has helped establish. 
If auditing standards were set by a governmental agency, the auditor would be encouraged 
to identify with management on questionable issues. The potential liability for non- 
compliance with government established standards would force auditors into a narrow 
approach of auditing to avoid legal liability. We believe this would discourage the 
overall viewpoint and innovative judgement necessary for a professional audit. We also 
believe that accounting practioners with broad experience are more competent to set 
technical auditing standards than a governmental agency.
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Regulating the Profession to Maintain the Quality of Audit Practice-(Section 11)
The proliferation of "nuisance suits" against companies and their auditors is a deterrent 
to the auditing profession and to the experimentation and implementation of new financial 
disclosures such as current value and forecasting. We concur with the Commission's re­
commendations of assessment of costs against unsuccessful plaintiffs, statutory limita­
tions of damages and the extension of the "safe harbor" concept.
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Dear Doug:
The Report of Tentative Conclusions is a very timely and definite answer 
to many of the charges made in the Metcalf report against the profession. I 
am impressed with the Commission's Report. The conclusions and recommendations 
appear to me to be internally consistent and fully supported by substantive 
evidence and logical reasoning.
The comments which follow will be addressed to the major conclusions and 
recommendations of the Commission. In most instances my comments will be 
supportive of the Commission's tentative positions. In one or two cases, my 
comments will reveal a contrary point of view.
1. The Independent Auditor's Role in Society. Section 1 is a good 
exposition of the auditor's role. The section, however, is weak 
on recommendations. I believe the final report of the Commission 
should contain specific suggestions for educating the public as 
to the auditor's role, his responsibility for fraud, and his re­
lationship with management. One approach is for the AICPA to 
undertake a vigorous public relations program.
2. Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations. I concur in the 
recommendation to eliminate the word "fairly" from the auditor's 
report and in the need for additional guidance from the profession 
concerning generally accepted accounting principles. The recommen­
dations in this section should be addressed specifically to the 
Auditing Standards Executive Committee.
3. Reporting on Significant Uncertainties. The tentative conclusions 
of this section are well stated and adequately documented. Steps 
should be implemented as soon as possible to implement these con­
clusions. The SEC may prove to be a major obstacle in this process 
in the light of their outright rejection of the elimination of 
"subject to" in the development of SAS No. 2.
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4. Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud. SAS No. 16 
is an improvement but not a complete answer to clarifying the 
auditor's responsibility for fraud. I concur that an explicit 
positive statement is needed to the effect that an audit should 
detect material fraud. The specific recommendations on "stan­
dards of care" have merit. I worry, however, about the concept 
(standard) of "due professional care." This concept is both 
broad and nebulous. Moreover, Statements on Auditing Standards 
offer very little guidance for complying with this standard. 
Additional SAS's are urgently needed on clarifying this standard 
in the conduct of an audit.
5. Corporate Accountability and the Law. The conclusions and recommen­
dations here are sound. A more positive and less defensive approach 
should be taken by AUDSEC, particularly in the area of public dis­
closure. I concur that traditional standards of materiality are 
not applicable in this area.
6. The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and its Extension. The 
conclusions and recommendations on interim reporting should 
be vigorously pursued. The material on financial forecasts, 
however, is a major disappointment. While this topic is ad­
mittedly on the back burner currently, the final report should 
discuss the issues, state conclusions, and make suggestions for 
possible auditor involvement if financial forecasts are required.
7. The Auditor's Communication With Users. The recommendations for a 
management report and an expanded auditor's report are excellent. 
Suggestions for implementing these recommendations should be in­
cluded in the Commission's final report. I concur in the elimina­
tion of the second standard of reporting. I am disappointed, 
however, that this section makes no reference to the third standard 
of reporting. With the increased emphasis on disclosure and with 
an expanded auditor's report, I believe the auditor should be re­
quired to make a positive statement on the adequacy of disclosures 
in his report. I further urge the Commission to evaluate the recent 
trend on AudSEC to "bury" disclosures under GAAP. There are many 
examples in practice of differences between GAAP and disclosure 
requirements and these differences should continue to be recognized 
in Statements on Auditing Standards.
8. The Education, Training, and Development of Auditors. Arguments for 
and against separate professional schools have been widely publicized 
in recent years. My personal view is that a professional accounting 
program is more important than the organizational structure in which 
it is given. There are major obstacles in academia that must be 
overcome before there will be any significant trend toward separate 
schools in AACSB member institutions. The Commission may wish to 
suggest both short-term (professional programs) and long-term (pro­
fessional schools) as objectives for entry into the profession.
It is conceivable that the Commission may also wish to comment on the 
advantages and disadvantages of separate accounting accreditation.
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9. Maintaining the Independence of Auditors. Conclusion No. 1 is a 
status que position which is not likely to be an adequate response 
to the Metcalf charges. My article in the April 1968 Accounting 
Review contained some suggestions in this area. The other three 
conclusions are sound.
10. The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards. The setting of 
auditing standards should definitely remain in the private sector.
I strongly support the recommendation of a 5-9 member full time 
auditing standards board, with one member from academia. My pref­
erences would be for the board to be independent of the AICPA but 
organizational and economic considerations may well be overriding.
I would urge prompt and vigorous action on this proposal to head 
off any Washington efforts to have the SEC become the standard­
setting body.
11. Regulating the Profession to Maintain the Quality of Audit Practice.
The conclusions and recommendations here appear to be sound. I have 
only two comments: (1) I do not believe the voluntary AICPA quality
control programs have been very successful. The AICPA should estab­
lish mandatory peer review requirements at the earliest opportunity.
(2) Some reference to Hochfeider or the significance of this case 
might be included in the final report, in view of the fact that Metcalf 
has called for a reversal of this decision.
The Commission is to be commended for its efforts and on its tentative 
conclusions. I trust that this letter will be useful to the Commission in 
the issuance of its final report. I do not request an opportunity to make 
an oral presentation to the Commission. However, if the Commission wishes 
to solicitate my oral comments I will, on your request, be pleased to oblige.
Very truly yours
Professor of Accounting
WGK/mb
N O R T H W E S T  EN ERG Y COMPANY
JA M E S  W. ALLEN  
c o n t r o l l e r June 10, 1977
P .  o. B O X  1 5 2 6
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4110 
6 0 1 - 5 2 4 - 3 2 6 7
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
Northwest Energy Company ("Northwest") is engaged, through subsidiaries 
and investees, in the interstate transmission and sale of natural gas subject to 
Federal Power Commission regulation, the exploration for and production of oil 
and gas, the operation of an underground coal mine, the manufacture and sale 
of chemical fertilizer, and the production, refining and marketing of oil and 
petroleum products. Northwest's common stock is publicly traded on both the 
New York and Pacific Stock Exchanges and the preferred stock and debentures 
of its principal subsidiary, Northwest Pipeline Corporation, are also publicly 
traded. Northwest and most of its subsidiaries are required by law, regulation 
or contract to have audits at least annually and more frequent audits can result 
from such situations as general rate increase filings with the Federal Power 
Commission or the public issuance of securities. Accordingly, Northwest has 
an interest in the role and responsibilities of independent auditors and appreciates 
this opportunity to comment on the "Report of Tentative Conclusions" by the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities ("Commission").
Northwest notes that the Commission's report is oriented toward publicly 
held companies. Northwest, as stated above, is publicly held and, therefore, 
believes that it is in a position to comment upon the Commission's tentative 
conclusions as they relate to that type of environment. With this background, 
Northwest offers the following comments and observations for the consideration 
of the Commission.
There are two general areas which are of particular concern to Northwest. 
First, the Commission does not appear to have explicitly defined the objectives 
of the audit function. It is apparent that the Commission considers that an audit 
provides an important service to users of financial statements, including audit 
committees made up of companies' outside directors as representatives of the 
shareholders. In Northwest's opinion, the primary objectives of an external audit 
are twofold: (1) To comply with legal or contractual requirements and (2) to
supplement existing internal controls. The first objective carries with it the 
connotation that an auditors' report lends credibility to management's financial
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statements. This concept of ensuring credibility has given rise to auditing standards 
and appears to be the focal point of the Commission's report. Northwest notes 
that an audit may add credibility, but it does not necessarily add quality, nor is 
it necessarily significant, to all financial information (such as interim reports) 
published by a company. The second objective, as stated above, explains why an 
audit is not significant to all financial information. Simply put, a publicly held 
company typically has an extensive and relatively effective system of internal controls, 
including an active internal audit function. An external audit, in this situation, 
serves only to complement other internal controls which are in place and operating 
continuously to ensure the integrity of financial information.
Secondly, the Commission's report appears to be recommending what Northwest 
considers to be infringements on management's perogatives. Northwest commends 
the Commission for stressing that an auditor should evaluate the propriety of manage­
ment's financial disclosures (thus resulting in the abolition of the "subject to" opinion) 
but feels that the Commission is overstepping its bounds by suggesting, for example, 
that management should adopt and publicize detailed policy statements on employee 
conduct. Any matter of this nature should be implemented, if at all, at management's 
option and not at the direction of the AICPA. Managements and boards of directors 
commonly recognize their responsibilities to shareholders and to the public and should 
be considered responsible enough to fulfill these responsibilities even though the 
methods used will vary depending upon individual facts and circumstances. In 
Northwest's opinion, encroachments upon management's perogative, such as the one 
discussed above, are not the proper concern of the Commission or of auditors generally. 
In addition, Northwest is concerned that if management is to be responsible for its 
financial accounting and reporting, as it must be, then it needs the freedom to 
fulfill this responsibility without limitations in the form of auditing standards. For 
example, in discharging its responsibility, a company's management, including the 
audit committee of its board of directors, should be the ones to decide whether to 
expand auditor association with interim or special financial information or whether 
to limit such association to an annual examination of financial statements.
Northwest has made certain other observations which it also submits for the 
Commission's consideration. They are:
1. The proposed auditors' report appears to effectively preclude the auditor 
from expressing his opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole.
If the term "fairly" is not considered acceptable, some other word or 
phrase should be used since an auditor's expertise is wasted unless he
is required to reach a conclusion in his report. 2
2. The FASB's "Tentative Conclusions on Objectives of Financial Statements 
of Business Enterprises" states that financial statements should be under­
standable to those "who have a reasonable understanding of business
and economic activities and financial accounting and who are willing
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to spend the time and effort needed to study financial statements." 
Presumably, this same knowledge and study would be applied to the 
accompanying auditors' reports and would eliminate much of the con­
fusion perceived by the Committee.
3. Monitoring compliance with management's policies is typically an 
internal audit function and delegation of this responsibility to outside 
auditors should be done only at management's option.
4. Reports to the public on internal control, whether by management
or by independent auditors, would have only very limited usefulness. 
This is so because the disclaimers included in such reports would 
largely negate their potential impact, because an understanding of 
the reports would require a high degree of sophistication and because 
the conclusions drawn from such reports would not impact any specific 
past or future financial disclosures.
5. Northwest concurs that participation from outside the public account­
ing profession should be sought in setting auditing standards.
Northwest appreciates the opportunity to comment on these issues which it 
considers to be of extreme significance to the business community.
Yours truly,
JWA:bh
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Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
Managing Director, Technical Services
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, N. Y. 10036
Dear Doug:
We put together comments on the exposure draft from the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities. This was based on a consensus of opinion 
from our membership and will be signed by our international president 
(Stan Gross) and sent directly to you.
After receipt of that, we have gotten some additional comments that I 
would like to give you for your consideration. These are:
Section 1 - Auditor relationships with client management should 
include exploration of the relationships with Internal Audit 
Departments.
Section 4 - It seems appropriate for the external auditor to rec­
ommend to client management the assignment of internal audit work 
as a supplementary aid in fraud detection; at least this matter 
should be discussed and reviewed in this section.
Section 4 and/or 6 - Possibly some consideration should be given 
to planned discussion with client employees or client consultants 
which have the business ethics and security responsibilities as 
part of internal control reviews.
Section 8a - The body of knowledge requirements are expanding so 
fast that a justification can be made for developing the future 
auditor at the graduate or masters level. On-the-job experience 
should be a part of the graduate work.
Section 8b - Semester courses should look at auditing in a general 
way and include internal as well as external auditing as part of 
the body of knowledge.
Section 8c - EDP knowledge in some depth should also be required.
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Section 8d - A greater emphasis should be made on the sociological 
aspects (Behavioral Patterns) than is being done at present.
Sincerely yours,
William E. Perry, CIA, CPA 
Director of EDP and Research
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MACHINERY and ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE
1200 EIGHTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 202-331-8430
June 10, 1977
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Attention: Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
Research Director
Dear Members of the Commission:
A-26
"Report of Tentative Conclusions" of the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
The Machinery and Allied Products Institute is 
pleased to have this opportunity to comment to the Commission 
on Auditors' Responsibilities (hereinafter "the Commission") 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) on the Commission's "Report of Tentative Conclusions." 
We assume that the Commission is making a public record of 
its proceedings, and therefore request that this commentary 
in its entirety be made a part of that record.
As you may know, MAPI is the national organization 
of manufacturers of capital goods and related equipment.
Most of the Institute’s member companies are publicly held 
and all of the Institute's member companies at one time or 
another either are subject to independent audit or engage the 
services of independent accountants for audit or other pur­
poses. Also, all of these companies are users of financial 
statements and other materials that have been subjected to 
verification or other oversight by independent accountants.
For these reasons, it is fair to say that organiza­
tions such as MAPI and its member companies have as direct an 
interest in the Commission's study, findings, and recommenda­
tions as any other group, including independent accountants 
and their associations. We make this point at the outset be­
cause portions of the Commission's Report seem to reflect a 
belief that audit reform is mainly auditors' business. In 
our opinion, self-regulation of financial audit could not 
continue for long on any such basis.
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To capsule our views as to the tentative conclusions and 
recommendations of the Commission, we have mixed feelings. On the posi­
tive side, we are completely in accord with the view that financial audit 
should remain a private sector responsibility. Also, we concur that 
changes might be made in the audit process to improve public under­
standing of the auditor's role. Further, we accept that the mechanism 
for standard-setting for financial audit can be improved. Finally, as 
noted in the Report, there are a number of areas in which the profes­
sional standards for independent accountants might be clarified.
On the other side of the ledger, MAPI does not concur in those 
of the Commission's findings which would substantially enlarge the auditor's 
role because they are likely to be cost-ineffective. Nor do we agree with 
those recommendations that would have auditors narrowly circumscribe their 
liabilities while increasing their functions, or insulate themselves from 
clients' managements, from time budgets, and from competition. We noted 
earlier that audit reform should not be considered mainly auditors' busi­
ness, and that is particularly true for proposals such as these.
Before moving to our more specific views, we wish to commend the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities for its work even though we do not 
agree with all the points covered in the Report. The Report is a candid 
and illuminating analysis of issues which concern independent accountants, 
and it is timely in that the accounting profession has been subjected 
recently— along with its clientele— to much careless and very demeaning 
criticism, although we would not presume to conclude that all criticism 
has been of this nature. In reviewing the mechanism for self-governance 
of financial audit, we should, of course, evaluate the system objectively 
and not be pressured by those who have been incapable of such analysis. The 
Commission's Report is an important start in this task, and it is signifi­
cant to us that many of the changes recommended could be implemented by 
voluntary, cooperative action between auditor and client.
Finally, we agree with the Commission that a gap exists between 
the expectations of users of financial statements and the performance of 
independent auditors. Also, we recognize that this gap results in signif­
icant part from a misunderstanding of the audit function. The way to deal 
with this, in our opinion, is to correct the misunderstanding, and not to 
enlarge the audit function or make it over into something it was never 
intended to be. Also, inasmuch as much of the worry with financial audit 
stems from so-called questionable corporate payments, critics of the audit 
process should be advised that these problems are being addressed in other 
more appropriate ways.
The remainder of this letter consists of our specific views on 
selected recommendations of concern to us, and a concluding comment.
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Comments on the Commission's 
Recommendations
Our comments to follow are concerned with (1) "fairness" and 
"consistency" as a part of the auditor's report; (2) uncertainties and the 
"subject to" qualification; (3) detection of fraud; (4) corporate account­
ability and the auditor; (5) extension of the audit function; (6) the 
auditor's report; (7) independence; and (8) the setting of auditing stan­
dards.
"Fairness" and 
"Consistency"
The Commission reports that there are difficulties arising from 
the different meanings attributed to the phrase "present fairly in conform­
ity with generally accepted accounting principles," and that the word 
"fairly" should be eliminated from the auditor's report. According to the 
Commission, "fairly" is often used loosely as a synonym for other quali­
tative characteristics of financial information on which attention might 
better be focused directly. Also, the Commission would rather have auditors 
not be responsible for reporting on consistency because that is considered 
to be management's responsibility.
Comment.— It is not clear to us from a reading of the Report, 
with particular attention to Chapters 2 and 7 dealing with the auditor and 
his communications, how if at all the auditor's report would be modified 
to deal with such characteristics of financial information as the adequacy 
of disclosure, substance over form, inherent imprecisions, etc. Evidently, 
"fairness" and all the word conveys would be abandoned with nothing in the 
form of standard terminology to replace it, but the Report is not clear in 
this matter.
We have no strong feelings about the Commission's proposal to 
drop a "value" concept such as "fair" from the auditor's report. Nor do 
we take strong exception to the proposal in regard to "consistency." How­
ever, the impression easily derived from the Commission's Report overall 
is that auditors would like to have more work assured to them and less 
potential liability with respect to it. Part of this pattern is reflected 
in the proposals to delete all references to fairness and consistency 
from the auditor's report.
Although we understand the reasons behind these recommendations, 
it seems to us that the process of independent audit is more likely to 
remain in the private sector if it results in reports to the public which 
contain some assurances they can understand— even if they interpret them 
differently. As the Commission notes, the current standard report has been 
around since 1948, and is a known and tested vehicle for communicating the 
auditor's message. Whereas improvements obviously can be made, we question 
the timeliness of those just mentioned which appear to be mainly offered 
in anticipation of beneficial effects on auditors' liability.
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Uncertainties
The Commission finds that present reporting does not adequately 
emphasize uncertainty. Accordingly, the Commission believes that manage­
ment should be required to include a separate note in financial state­
ments on this subject similar to that required for accounting policies.
This note would identify uncertainties and explain their significance for 
earnings and financial position. Auditors' requirements pertaining to 
the "subject to" qualification would be eliminated.
Comment.— The subject of uncertainties has been a sore point for 
auditors if only because they perceive that they may incur liability when 
misfortunes befall the clients whose financial statements they have examined. 
The solution, in our judgment, lies not in disclaiming responsibility for 
uncertainties, but in defining that responsibility and communicating in­
formation consistent with the definition. We disagree that a report and 
disclosure such as presented on pp. 24-25 of the Commission's Report is 
"confusing" to statement users. Also, we do not believe that the absence 
of a "subject to" qualification causes statement users to believe that 
a company faces no uncertainties that could materially affect its finan­
cial condition or operating results.
As to management's disclosure responsibility for uncertainties, 
we think they were explicitly stated in Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 5, and we feel the matter should be allowed to rest until 
FASB sees fit to review it. In fact, FASB has just commissioned a study 
on the economic side-effects, if any, of Statement No. 5. With that eval­
uation in process, we see no purpose in returning to the subject soon for 
rulemaking. Regarding the "subject to" qualification, we doubt that it 
has misled users, and the Commission's argument seems rather strained to 
us. If anything, such a qualification serves as a useful "flag" for a 
user, quickly directing him to important financial statement analysis of 
material uncertainties.
We should point out that it may not be of much consequence to 
statement preparers that they would henceforth be relieved of this type 
of qualification in the auditor's report. Indeed, some may find it advan­
tageous. If the Commission feels that elimination of the qualification 
is clearly in the public interest, then we do not take strong exception. 
However, if this is construed by others as the withdrawal of a protection 
now afforded by independent audit, then elimination of the qualification 
requirement is likely to attract more criticism of the way financial 
audit now is handled.
Fraud
The Commission feels that an audit should be designed to pro­
vide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are not affected 
by material fraud. To help define and evaluate auditors' responsibilities
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with respect to the detection of fraud, the Commission recommends a con­
cept of "due professional care" and describes it to include such things 
as (1) the establishment of effective client investigation programs;
(2) prompt action on evidence that management may be untrustworthy, in­
cluding resignation where the evidence cannot be refuted; (3) observance 
of conditions suggesting predispositions to management fraud; (4) main­
taining an understanding of a client's business and industry; and (5) 
concern with controls related to fraud prevention and detection.
Comment.— This may be the most important subject covered by the 
Commission inasmuch as fraud and questionable activity is one of the main 
reasons for this reevaluation of auditors' responsibilities. All of the 
steps listed above are important, and conscientious auditors already con­
duct themselves with "due professional care." We have some question about 
the study and evaluation of internal control beyond that now required 
because fraud and questionable activity generally are performed outside 
of the system of internal control— according to government's experience—  
frequently with collusion by the persons involved. Although it is appro­
priate for an auditor to evaluate and comment on controls and that is 
useful to management as well, we doubt that formalization of the process 
would be cost-effective generally or very useful in detecting fraud in 
particular.
Further along these lines, SEC is studying proposals to require 
that registered companies maintain accurate books and "adequate" controls. 
Here again, the proposal is not really responsive to the problem (i.e., 
questionable payments), and we do not favor it for that reason. It appears 
that the public's reaction to questionable corporate practices and the 
widespread misunderstanding of auditors' capabilities in this area has 
resulted in some casting about for remedies, however ineffective they may 
be.
We should hope that both SEC and the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities would keep in mind that much has already been done to 
curtail inappropriate practices. To establish "police" measures now for 
all companies in an attempt to discourage errant activities of a few 
would exact a huge toll in exchange for comparatively little benefit. 
Auditors can and should express their views about clients' controls, but 
the process need not, in our opinion, be any more formal than it is.
Corporate Accountability
Here, the Commission would have the independent auditor search 
for illegal or questionable acts, and he would be expected to detect those 
acts that the exercise of professional skill and care would normally un­
cover. However, management would bear the primary responsibility for 
corporate accountability. More specifically, the Commission believes that 
management should adopt and publicize detailed policy statements indicating 
the conduct that will not be tolerated and develop appropriate compliance 
procedures. The independent auditor then could be involved in monitoring
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compliance with these policies, and his report could include his conclusion 
on compliance.
Detected illegal or questionable acts, according to the Commis­
sion, should be considered by the auditor without regard to traditional 
standards of materiality. Also, the principal responsibility for assur­
ance on information on legal claims and litigation against clients would 
lie with management acting in consultation with their lawyers.
Comment-— We see some merit in the recommendations above for 
management. Management already does bear primary responsibility for 
corporate accountability, and many companies have policy statements relating 
to business ethics. "Appropriate" compliance procedures should in our 
judgment, be left to management judgment because of organizational differ­
ences, personnel relations considerations, and the need to evaluate known 
costs and likely benefits in widely varying contexts. However, we would 
not formalize the auditor's role by having separate procedures for moni­
toring compliance, for all the reasons stated earlier.
As to materiality in this context, we think it should be a facts- 
and-circumstances determination, as described at some length in the Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission's report of May 12, 1976 to the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. To put aside materiality altogether 
would give an appearance of significance to some events which are isolated, 
non-recurring, and unimportant for financial reporting purposes by any 
reasonable measure. On a final point, any shifting of responsibilities for 
disclosure in this area toward lawyers will have to be very carefully con­
sidered in light of the attorney-client privilege. We do not suggest that 
auditors should have duties for which they are not trained. However, there 
will be situations in which lawyers cannot be involved in any way.
Enlargement of the 
Auditor's Role
According to the Commission, the audit function should expand to 
include information of an accounting and financial nature that management 
has a responsibility to report, provided that it is produced by the account­
ing system and the auditor is competent to verify the information. Also, 
the Commission feels that the audit function should include greater in­
volvement in a company's financial reporting process on a more current 
and continuing basis.
Comment.— It is ironic to us that the Commission would signifi­
cantly enlarge the auditor's role because many financial statement users 
recognize that an auditor's "association" with data does not necessarily 
add to its credibility. Indeed, the Commission would practically assure, 
through disclaimers and caveats to users, that they not rely on any of 
the costly work for which clients are charged. In our opinion, this ex­
pensive exercise has been carried quite far enough with "limited review"
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of interim reports. As the Commission knows, this newly instituted 
practice results in financial statement footnotes labeled "unaudited."
We thought the process of limited review to be most unusual 
when it was first imposed on larger SEC registrants, and there are 
companies which to this day cannot reconcile the sizable additions since 
made to their audit fees with any benefits derived. In fact, there are 
many managements so firmly convinced of the cost ineffectiveness of this 
that they refuse to permit so-called limited review on any basis other 
than a look-back from year-end. In considering enlargement of the 
auditor's role, the Commission should, we think, recognize that indepen­
dent audit is another form of overhead. It strains reasonable minds to 
find costs of "professional" service justified where the persons deliver­
ing the service will only do so with blanket disclaimers of liability.
Also, as the Commission acknowledges, there is more than the usual amount 
of imprecision involved in reporting for periods of less than a year.
No amount of third party oversight will cure that.
We understand the auditor's lament with respect to seasonality 
of the accounting industry, as well described by the Commission in its 
discussion of time-budget pressures. Also, we recognize that current and 
continuous auditor involvement in all aspects of a client's financial 
reporting would relieve this problem to some extent. However, the bene­
fits derived from auditor involvement in financial reporting diminish 
sharply in relation to cost when such involvement is made more nearly 
current and continuous. Therefore, we cannot support the Commission in 
its recommendations to substantially enlarge the auditor's role.
The Auditor's Report
The Commission recommends a new, expanded, flexible report 
consisting of a series of paragraphs with standard wording or alternatives, 
each describing a major element of the audit function. Also, the Com­
mission would have corporate management present a report that acknowledges 
management's responsibility for the representations in the financial 
statements; states that the information is presented in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles appropriate in the circumstances; 
and states that legal counsel has communicated the company's position 
with respect to litigation, claims, and assessments to the independent 
auditor and is satisfied that it is properly disclosed in the financial 
statements. Management's report also would present its assessment of the 
company's accounting system and controls over it, and describe the 
response of the company to material weaknesses in controls identified 
by the independent auditor.
As previously noted, references in the current auditor's report 
to "fairness" and "consistency" would be deleted, and responsibility for 
disclosure of changes would be reserved to management. Also, the method 
of referring to the work of other auditors would be revised, and the
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auditor's reporting requirement for unaudited information (associated 
with audited information) would be clarified and expanded.
Finally, auditors would be required to be present and available 
to answer questions at the annual meeting of shareholders.
Comment.-— The Commission's proposed auditor's report in part 
reflects other recommendations of the Commission. We take no issue with 
the idea that the auditor's report should be upgraded to communicate more 
effectively with statement users. However, it taxes our credulity to 
be told that many persons who, in fact, know what an auditor's report is 
and read it now consider it to be a "seal of approval" or a symbol that 
the audited entity is financially sound. We doubt the problem is that 
serious, and, of course, do not agree with those changes in the report 
to which we already have taken exception. For example, we refer the 
Commission to our remarks on "fairness" and "consistency," uncertainties 
and the "subject to" qualification, fraud, corporate accountability, and 
the enlargement of the auditor's role.
As to the management report, we have no immediate problem with 
the concept and acknowledge that the report could help improve users' 
understanding of the respective roles of statement preparers and auditors. 
It seems to us that much of what is needed for this purpose is set forth 
in paragraph 1 of the illustration on page 79 of the Commission's Report, 
and we have no objection to that. Certain other sections of the illustra­
tive management report reflect proposals to enlarge the audit function, 
alter the responsibility for uncertainties, etc., and our views on those 
subjects were expressed earlier. We would add to this that managements 
would want some discretion as to both the form and content of any such 
report, assuming the practice of reporting in this way is adopted, and 
we agree that management should not be confined to standard language or a 
standard form of presentation.
According to the Commission, principal responsibility for the 
selection and appointment of the auditors and the setting of fees should 
be centered in the board of directors or its audit committee. Also, the 
board should evaluate the relationships between the auditor and management; 
review and approve all arrangements for the audit, including the fee, 
scope, and timing; and recommend the appointment of independent auditors 
to shareholders.
Elsewhere pertaining to the independence of auditors, the 
Commission recommends that the nature and extent of other services provided 
by the auditor should be disclosed in proxy statements. Finally, the 
Commission states that elements in the business environment, such as 
arbitrary deadlines, affect the quality of the audit, place unnecessary 
stress on the auditor's independence, and should be changed. To that end, 
the Commission believes that arbitrary deadlines imposed by clients should 
be resisted when they threaten audit quality.
AICPA June 10, 1977- 9 -
A further suggestion of the Commission is that the disclosures 
now required by SEC when auditors are changed should accompany all audited 
financial statements.
Comment.-— The audit committee principle is one which has found 
wide acceptance on a voluntary basis, and we think that it has merit for 
a number of reasons which include auditors' independence. Some companies 
already have in place the kinds of procedures recommended by the Commission. 
However, their purpose is not to "insulate" auditors from management.
Indeed, this would not be appropriate because management is in a position 
to make judgments about such matters as the scope of audit and auditor 
performance, whereas an outside audit committee is not. Also, management 
is much better situated to reconcile audit objectives with other demands 
on the company, including filing deadlines and other timing requirements 
for the release of financial information. In sum, on this point, we do 
not object to the interposition of the audit committee in this relation­
ship as long as it is not structured to eliminate those checks and balances 
which normally should operate between auditor and client.
As to the management advisory services and other auditor work 
considered by some persons to give the appearance of conflict, these could 
be disclosed in proxy statements, as the Commission has recommended, or 
they could be disclosed in some other appropriate document. It is unfor­
tunate, we think, that there must be any disclosure at all when the Com­
mission's investigations of these services have failed to disclose any 
effect on auditors' independence. Certainly, the disclosure itself will 
do nothing to correct the appearance of conflict. Considering that the 
remedy would be nonresponsive to a non-problem, the Commission should 
reconsider whether it is necessary at all.
On another item, the Commission gives much space in its Report 
to time budgets and competition, and the substandard audit performance to 
which they allegedly can lead. We agree that there may be cases in which 
"arbitrary" deadlines imposed by clients could threaten audit quality and 
should be resisted. Obviously, one cannot expect miracles of independent 
accountants. On the other hand, what may seem arbitrary to an auditor 
whose only principal concern is his own calendar, may be not arbitrary at 
all and be absolutely necessary in the circumstances confronting manage­
ment. Also, an auditor who is inexperienced, slow, and/or inefficient 
for other reasons may consider that almost any deadlines are arbitrary and 
threaten the quality of services he would deliver.
Consequently, we strongly disagree with the thrust of any 
Commission recommendations which aim to insulate auditors from the con­
straints of time budgets and competition. These are elements of the work 
environment which keep all providers of services efficient, and there is 
no good reason we can see to exempt independent accountants.
Auditing Standards
The Commission proposes to replace the present Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee of AICPA by an Auditing Standards Board within AICPA
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composed of five to nine full-time members. Changes would be made to 
encourage participation from outside the profession. Also, auditing 
standards would be restructured to recognize the changes in the audit 
function recommended by the Commission; to give more attention to the 
special needs of public accounting practices involving nonpublic com­
panies; and to increase the quality and timeliness of the guidance pro­
vided.
Comment.-— Although we do not consider the existing apparatus 
for standard-setting to be inadequate, we of course are aware that it 
has drawn some criticism. If we may generalize, the criticism comes 
from those who want increased accountability and believe that uniformity 
in financial accounting and audit practice is a means to that end. 
Auditors and clients alike recognize the fallacy of this position, but 
the cost of failure to respond could be high. In that light, the Aud­
iting Standards Board proposal strikes us as an acceptable compromise 
for now. However, as in the case of FASB, it may be necessary over time 
to have this organization be less dependent on its auditor constituency.
On that point, we are concerned by the insularity of the Com­
mission in its discussion of the Board and the expected participation 
in the process of setting standards. It is evidently assumed that all 
members of the Board would come from public accounting, and that there 
would be no other representation. Also, in the Commission's discussion 
of participation in the standard-setting process, there is practically 
no recognition that management accountants should be involved, except 
with the Industry Audit Guides. We would remind the Commission that 
management has a direct and legitimate interest in audit standards as 
a preparer and user of financial statements. As AICPA's Accounting 
Principles Board learned to its regret, generally accepted accounting 
principles will not be defined by a narrow segment of those persons 
affected by the principles being defined. The same experience may be 
encountered with auditing standards as the stakes in that activity in­
crease.
Although a FASB-type mechanism may lie ahead for auditing 
standards, the Commission's proposal is a logical intermediate step. 
However, we recommend that there be business representation and active 
solicitation of management participation in the work of the Board.
Concluding Comment
In conclusion, we repeat that in spite of our several criticisms 
of the Commission's Report, we find it illuminating. On a fundamental 
point addressed by the Commission, we agree fully that financial audit 
should remain in the private sector. To keep it there, auditors and 
their clients must perform reasonably to the public's expectations. Also, 
because statement users' needs for financial information and audit 
assurances are not static, auditors and their clients must strive con­
stantly for improvement in their respective functions and accept that 
their roles may change.
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Indeed, it is quite clear from recent events that these roles 
are changing, and that more is expected of auditors as well as of the 
enterprises they examine. We feel that the Commission should thoroughly 
reconsider its tentative conclusions as to their consistency with the 
growing expectations of the public regarding financial audit and the 
mushrooming costs to clients of financial reporting, including audit 
costs. As we have suggested elsewhere in this letter, it appears that, 
in part, the Commission would have independent accountants withdraw from 
responsibility for their work, greatly enlarge the territory within 
which they operate, and shift potential liabilities to management. Neither 
the statement users who want reasonable audit assurances nor the state­
ment preparers asked to pay for "audit" procedures that are increasingly 
cost-ineffective will find these changes to their liking. Accordingly, 
we suggest further study.
The Commission is well situated to influence the direction and 
pace of change in the audit function, and we hope that MAPI's thoughts 
on the tentative conclusions will be of some help.
Very truly yours. 
P r e s i d e n t
CWS:mcr
L e w i t t e s  &  C o m p a n y
C e r t i f i e d  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t s
Da v id  J .  L e w it t e s  
P h i l i p  J .  G ib b o n s
C h a r l e s  H. P h e l a n
80 Wa s h in g t o n  St r e e t  
P o u g h k e e p s ie , N . Y .  1 2 6 0 1
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June 10, 1977
Douglas R. Carmichael, CPA 
Research Director
Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
With regard to the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities: "Report 
of Tentative Conclusions", I have several comments and/or suggestions 
which follow:
1. Scrutiny of Auditor Changes (Pages 104 and 105)
I basically agree with the discussion and the concept of 
correspondence between predecessor and successor auditors. 
However, I believe that the last paragraph in this 
section should be expanded in order to make it clear 
that not only should management explain why the change 
in auditors was made, but that the predecessor auditor 
would also have an opportunity to express his side 
of the disagreement in the event he did not agree with 
management's statement.
As a practical matter how this could happen, I'm not 
certain, but I could envision a procedure whereby 
users would have the right to contact the predecessor 
auditors directly and ask them to confirm the position 
taken by management or explain their side of the change.
The confidential nature of our relationship would be 
involved. One thought that has occurred to me to 
cover this point in private situations (i.e., non-SEC) 
is to suggest to users to have their customers agree 
to allow the users to speak with the predecessor auditor 
in the event the customer did make a change at some future 
time. For example, a bank could have this agreement 
before lending money to a customer. The result would 
be basically no different than the SEC arrangement 
which also gives the predecessor auditor an opportunity 
to explain disagreements with management. Ultimately, 
this could become a normal operating procedure.
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The thought behind my proposal is that a dishonest 
client is now able to find a dishonest, naive, 
or hungry successor accountant and be able to 
readily make changes in accountants knowing that 
the predecessor accountant is not able to give 
his side of the story, especially to a user. In 
our profession, the repercussions of an improper 
or inadequate audit only occur if the client 
fails; but, if the client is lucky enough to carry 
on a little bit longer or have the business cycle 
turn in his favor, then improper statements and/or 
disclosures might never be known. It is only 
when the client fails in some manner that the 
scandal is known and then the auditor and the 
profession as a whole get a black eye. This kind 
of occurence could be minimized by giving the 
predecessor accountant an opportunity (and preferably 
making it mandatory) to express his side of the story 
to the financial community known to be using the 
statements.
2. A New Approach to Reporting (Pages 75 through 80)
Though I understand the problems with the current 
standard language described in the report, I am 
afraid that the revised report as illustrated in 
the booklet and also as explained on pages 75 
and 76 is also doomed to failure. I feel it 
is impossible for any report to cover all of 
the problems of auditing. It is impossible for 
any auditor's report, whether short form or long 
form, current or revised, to explain all of the 
problems and pitfalls related to auditing, 
especially to a layman. I think what is necessary 
is a recognition on the part of the profession, as 
well as the public, that a layman is just not 
going to realize all of the ramifications of what 
a professional auditor's report says.
When I read the proposed revised illustrations of an 
auditors report on pages 77 and 78, I shudder to 
think of some of our smaller clients trying to 
understand the ramifications of "a study and evalua­
tion of the accounting system and controls...having 
the following uncorrected material weaknesses not 
described in the report by management...". Doesn't 
this also raise questions in the minds of the readers 
and is it ever going to be possible to explain to 
the reader that it may or may not have significance 
and how much, and when, etc.? I feel that the report
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could be better served if it were to say something 
to the effect that the accounting statement 
should be read in conjunction with the advice of 
a CPA (or a professional trained in the reading of 
financial statements); or in conjunction with the help 
of accounting and auditing information published by the 
AICPA. This would be similar to standard law forms 
which can be obtained at any stationery store, where 
there is a notation that the form should be 
prepared in connection with the appropriate law 
or sometimes it says with the assistance of an 
attorney. I feel that the commission is missing 
the mark by not warning the reader that the statements 
can be complicated and should be read with the 
assistance of a professional rather than try 
to expand the auditors report to make it all 
inclusive and all explanatory, which is impossible.
3. Reporting on Significant Uncertainties (Section 3 - 
Page xviii)________________________________________________
In the last sentence of the second paragraph in the 
above noted section it states that footnotes should 
describe "all material uncertainties, not only those 
that might have resulted in a qualification". I am 
concerned that this kind of a footnote would actually 
become boiler-plate. After all, everything in 
business is uncertain and I am afraid that some 
kind of a general comment by management in the 
footnote would end out being so standard that people 
would not read it. I am not certain that this 
accomplishes what we are after, namely, warning the 
reader of a problem. What this is saying is that the 
reader has to read all the footnotes, which unfortunately 
does not happen, and certainly will not if they become 
routine.
Thank you for understanding and reading of my comments. I will 
be happy to expand on any if I have not made myself clear.
In general, I found the Commission's, "Report of Tentative 
Conclusions" stimulating, generally accurate, and on the 
right track.
David J. Lewittes
DJL:jw
John Rapp, CPA 17 Butler Parkway 
Summit, N.J. 07901 A-28
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Dr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 1OO36 
Dear Dr. Carmichael:
In connection with the tentative conclusions as to the 
education of auditors, I would like to suggest that the 
interchange of personnel between the world of practice 
and the groves of academe be made into more of a two-way 
street than it is now. To that end, I wonder whether 
colleges, schools of business and schools of accounting 
might be persuaded to have auditing and certain account­
ing practice courses taught by practising C PAs seconded 
to the faculties for one or two years on a part-time or 
a full-time basis, to impart to the students some idea of 
the diversity and the challenges of the real world.
Those CPAs involved on college-level teaching could pro­
bably further their own continuing education through such 
work and concurrently earn CPE credits towards the re­
quirements that seem to become increasingly mandatory. It 
would be well to draw such visiting professors from local, 
regional, national and international firms. In the case  
of large firms that have or will have specific partners 
in charge of auditing standards and others in charge of 
quality control, it might be interesting to try out a 
procedure by which those considered for assignment to 
those positions should serve as visiting faculty as a 
condition for attaining those important posts in their 
firms; this would permit giving technically competent 
people diversified practice  in effective teaching.
It might also be worth while to consider the u s e  in gra­
duate schools, of practitioners and partners seasoned by 
many years of experience and faced with compulsory re­
tirement from their practice units when they still have 
years ahead of them to devote to constructive service to 
the CPA profession and ca n convey to qualified students 
that broad sense of perspective accumulated from their 
experience.
Some firms or groups of firms might even band together to 
endow chairs of auditing on leading institutions of
higher learning. While there are currently some endowed 
chairs of accounting, I do not believe this to be the 
case for auditing. Some of these chairs might be named 
for retired or deceased prominent leaders of the pro­
fession in the field of auditing.
As to the composition of the suggested full-time Audit­
ing Standards Board, I would favor 9 rather than 7 mem­
bers, including professors, bankers, financial analysts, 
CPAs currently practising in large and small firms, plus 
an active and interested "elder statesman" of the CPA 
profession.
To help maintain the quality of audit practice, I would 
view with favor a procedure by which practitioners would 
be invited to submit, with all identification deleted, 
practical accounting and auditing problems encountered 
and solved in their own practices. In time, such an effort 
may result in the building up of local, regional or even 
national subject files which could form the basis of the 
kind of case library usual in most other learned profes­
sions that could be a powerful instrument for accounting 
and auditing research, give participating firms a sense 
of accomplishment, and enhance the standards of practice 
of our profession.
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Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
AICPA Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities - 
_______Report of Tentative Conclusions__________
U. S. Steel believes that the Commission has done an outstand­
ing job in developing the Report on Tentative Conclusions. We think that 
many of the recommendations have merit and are very timely. We trust 
that the accounting profession will accept the report and embrace the 
general thrust of the recommendations so that the public will gain a 
better insight into the audit responsibility as well as the responsibility 
of management.
U. S. Steel's Management has always recognized our primary 
responsibility for the integrity and objectivity of financial statements 
and for the necessity of sound internal controls. To closely monitor in 
depth on a current and continuing basis the significant financial happenings 
a strong and independent internal auditing organization is maintained. This 
group as well as our line accounting organization and other affected manage­
ment work closely with the Audit Committee of our Board of Directors con­
sisting of five outside directors.
We believe that this comprehensive internal accounting control 
functioning augmented by the present oversight responsibilities of our 
outside auditors, assures full and accurate disclosure of significant 
financial information. Such benefits are obtained at what we consider a 
reasonable cost.
We do not believe that so-called arbitrary management deadlines 
should be cited as a possible cause of poor quality audit performance. We 
think that management requests normally arise from a true need. Certainly 
any truly independent outside auditor should decline an engagement in which 
sufficient time were not allowed for adequate coverage and completion. 
Management cannot be expected to know such things as staff availability, etc 
of the independent auditor.
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
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Although we see no problem of disclosing the amount paid to 
independent auditor for other than auditing services, we fail to see 
where a proxy disclosure of this information would be of any particular 
use to the shareholder. Also, the definition of "auditing services" as 
distinguished from other services as might be rendered from time to time 
would involve problems of definition of services which could be incon­
clusive as to the type of service actually performed.
We fail to see the need for footnote disclosure of uncertanties 
beyond that now required by FAS No. 5. In fact, the disclosure in a partic­
ular note related to a financial statement item would appear preferable 
to inclusion in a multi-faceted note on "uncertainties".
There is not, in our opinion, a need for a further increase 
in the scope or scheduling of outside audit work. With the association 
of the independent auditor with quarterly results, certain work is now 
required during the entire year. To try to spread this work out further 
could well cause inefficiencies, the cost of which must be borne by the 
client with no value to him or to the shareholder. A soundly established 
and functioning internal auditing and accounting control system precludes 
the need for any further expansion of the outside auditor's role. The 
publication of a management report, as recommended by the Commission should 
provide an excellent means to so communicate to the public.
We appreciate the opportunity afforded us to comment on the 
Commission’s important report.
Yours truly,
 
B. L. Thurman, Jr. 
Assistant Comptroller 
General Accounting
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June 9, 1977
Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear M r . Carmichael:
THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES: 
REPORT OF TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
We are pleased to respond to the "Report of Tentative Conclusions" (the 
"Report") of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. In general, 
we agree that there is a need to clarify the responsibility of auditors 
of major publicly held companies. We disagree, however, with the majority 
of the tentative conclusions of the Commission, as set forth later in 
this letter. We also question whether these conclusions should apply to 
all companies or whether the responsibilities of auditors for major 
publicly held companies should be segregated from those responsibilities 
of auditors of smaller privately owned companies.
Summary
We think the Commission's tentative conclusions fail to recognize a 
significant credibility problem for auditors in their association with 
the business managers and financial managers of their clients. We think 
the Commission's tentative conclusions are extremely self-serving, 
reflect inconsistent logic, are biased toward relieving auditors of 
their publicly perceived responsibility, and places additional burdens 
on financial management and companies which are not cost justified. The 
principal conclusion which emanates from this report is that the time 
pressures placed on auditors by business managers and financial managers 
are too great for the complex problems involved with financial reporting. 
We in industry would like to be able to tell our superiors that they 
should not be concerned about the cost or the timeliness of information 
given to them, but should only be concerned about its quality. We also 
know that our salesmen would like to tell our customers that they should 
not be concerned about the cost of the product which we are manufacturing 
or the timeliness of its delivery but should only be concerned about its 
quality. We know, however, that this is not capable of practical appli­
cation.
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We question whether the Commission has fully considered the practical 
economic effects of its recommendations on auditors' clients because the 
Commission has apparently failed to consider the concept of cost justi­
fication. We are sure that the Commission is well aware of the positive 
economic impact of increased fees its recommendations will have on 
auditors.
We agree with the Commission's conclusion that the financial statements 
are a representation of management and that management should so indicate; 
however, the recommended report of management on financial statements 
does not improve the current situation and contains many ambiguous terms 
which do not clarify the situation with the average reader of financial 
statements. We think a simple statement that the financial statements 
are representations of management is all that is warranted.
1. THE INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' ROLE IN SOCIETY
We agree that there is a need to clarify the auditors' role in society.
We also think there is a need to clarify the investors', consumers', 
laborers', managers', businessmen's, etc., role in society and to educate 
society in general in the workings of our American economic system. The 
need to clarify the auditors' role arises from the fact that users of 
financial statements outside the enterprise expect complete accuracy of 
the financial information they receive. We think it is impossible for 
financial statements to summarize the complex business, financial, and 
economic activities of an enterprise in a limited amount of numeric 
information and verbage with the degree of accuracy expected by the 
users of financial statements. We must emphasize that accounting has 
always been defined as an art. Scientific rules or laws cannot be 
applied to financial information because of the complex involvement of 
judgment and estimates in almost all facets of accounting. Net income 
and earnings per share receive significant attention from users of 
financial statements; however, such amounts are not capable of being 
scientifically proved. Those numbers are nothing more than an estimate 
of the results of operations of a particular enterprise for a particular 
segment of time. Pragmatically speaking, no amount of clarification of 
auditors' responsibilities or promulgations by the AICPA or any other 
authority outside of Congress will alleviate the auditors' current 
problems of litigation. Investors will invariably seek redress from 
officers, directors, and auditors when an enterprise experiences finan­
cial difficulty and actual or perceived losses are experienced regardless 
of the quality of the audit or management.
The Commission's conclusions emphasize that accounting results can be no 
more accurate or reliable than the underlying accounting measurement 
methods permit and that the quality of financial statements cannot be 
overcome by that inherent limitation. In section 2 of the Report, the 
Commission indicates that when business transactions are structured to 
comply with the form of specific accounting requirements and ignore 
their substance, the auditor should insist on reporting the transaction 
in conformity with its substance or qualify his opinion. These two 
positions appear contradictory, if not mutually exclusive, to us. When 
accounting rules are prescribed in strict, rigorous form and when
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accounting promulgations ignore what management perceives to be economic 
substance and economic reality, transactions will always be structured 
in a manner to present what management believes is in the best interest 
of the Company. This involves designing transactions with the specific 
accounting results in mind. There will always be differences of opinion 
between management and auditors and among auditors (or more specifically 
among auditing firms) as to "the substantive issues of accounting pro­
nouncements" and as to "economic substance and economic reality." We 
question the Commission's obvious conclusion that the auditor is omniscient.
In this section, the Commission also discusses the duties of financial 
statements to potential shareholders and potential creditors as opposed 
to such duties to existing shareholders and existing creditors. We 
think the discussion of what is owed shareholders and creditors by 
financial statements or the purpose of financial statements should be 
left to the Financial Accounting Standards Board's current discussion on 
the "Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting." The 
Commission's conclusions and discussions of this subject are unwarranted.
The Commission indicates that directors should regularly receive a report 
on the enterprise's accounting systems and controls from the independent 
auditors. Most companies currently receive management letters or comment 
reports from auditors. These reports comment on weaknesses in internal 
control and other matters and include recommendations for improvement of 
the accounting system. We have noted that such reports rarely distinguish 
between material problems and other matters which the auditor believes 
should be brought to the attention of the audit committee or the board 
of directors. A significant amount of work is yet to be done in the 
definitions of a "material" weakness in internal control and an "adequate" 
system of accounting. We think, therefore, a significant amount of 
pragmatic research in this area is required before the Commission recommends 
such a report be issued.
2. FORMING AN OPINION ON FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS
The Commission indicates that the auditor is responsible for determining 
whether management's judgment (as applied to its financial activities) 
was appropriate and goes further to indicate that the substantive 
requirements of accounting pronouncements should be followed. There 
will always be situations in which there is a difference in opinion or 
judgment as to the economic or financial substance of a specific trans­
action and "economic reality." Many of the recent pronouncements from 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board have raised questions regarding 
whether economic substance is being reflected in financial statements 
and there are an equal number of respected opinions on both sides of a 
particular position. Again, we think when financial accounting require­
ments are so verbose and provide such restrictive criteria and guidelines, 
that it is impossible for differences in opinion over substance to be 
used by the auditor for insisting on revision in accounting or financial 
statements.
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In this section of the Report, there is a discussion regarding selecting 
among alternative accounting principles and the Commission mentions 
specifically accounting for investment tax credit, depreciation, and 
inventory costing as areas in which there are several acceptable alter­
natives under generally accepted accounting principles. We contend that 
there are many other areas not mentioned by the Commission for which 
there are acceptable alternatives and involve differences of personal 
opinion regarding the preferable method of accounting or reporting. In 
those specific cases mentioned, the Commission indicates that the auditor 
can conclude that there is no objective basis for evaluating management's  
selection and, therefore, the auditor may accept management's selection.
In the very next paragraph of the Report, the Commission goes on to say 
that the mere absence of authorative literature specifying choices among 
alternatives is not sufficient grounds for the auditor to accept a par­
ticular selection and, when there is a change to a new principle of 
accounting, the auditor would be expected to qualify his opinion if the 
required justification were not given. We believe these three paragraphs 
in the Report highlight the inconsistency that permeates the entire 
document. We see no justification for an auditor's qualifying his 
opinion on financial statements when the accounting principles used 
therein are generally accepted either in specific literature or through 
practice. Because the financial statements are primarily the responsibility 
of management, we think an auditor's qualification regarding the selection 
of a specific accounting principle when several acceptable alternatives 
exist is completely unwarranted. As the Commission has stated in other 
sections of this Report, an auditor neither adds to nor detracts from a 
bad principle of accounting. Personal views and personal opinion on 
accounting matters will always differ and we think the auditor should 
have no responsibility to let his personal views on a particular matter 
enter into the financial reporting process of an enterprise.
3. REPORTING ON SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES IN FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS
The Commission has discussed an area in this portion of the Report that 
has caused significant problems for both auditors and management in 
recent years. We agree with Commission's recommendation to eliminate 
"subject to" opinions for the reasons stated in the Report; however, we 
think the Commission's recommendation for a separate note in the financial 
statements to discuss uncertainties has "opened Pandora's box." With 
the complexities of business transactions today, the uncertainties 
regarding financial information presented are unlimited. The user of 
financial information must recognize the technological, economic, and 
political uncertainties surrounding the mere existence of business 
enterprises in the free world today. To discuss any uncertainties other 
than those loss contingencies required to be disclosed by FASB Statement 
No. 5 can only lead to more litigation for both management and auditors 
regarding the adequacy of disclosure. Again, the Commission has appar­
ently decided to expand its purpose by recommending changes in financial 
reporting. We think this should be left to those authorities charged 
with that responsibility.
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4. CLARIFYING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETECTION OF FRAUD
The Commission is finally discussing in this section of the Report what 
we perceive to be the major contributor to "audit failures" i.e., the 
auditors' maintaining an understanding of business and industry. We 
contend that a study of the well publicized "audit failures" will yield 
that, in the majority of the cases, the auditors failed to attain a 
thorough understanding of the business and industrial problems of a 
particular client, or ignored their findings, and also failed to use 
common sense in understanding the intent and motives of management. We 
believe this particular problem (i.e., understanding the client's 
business) cannot be over emphasized to auditors. In our own experience, 
we have noted a significant number of auditors who fail to have or 
obtain the most meager amount of knowledge pertaining to the operation 
of business in the current economic and political environment.
5. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW
Much attention and publicity has been given to this particular area that 
the Commission is addressing in the so called "Watergate Era." Industry 
has been required to spend an inordinate amount of time and money to 
satisfy the current moral philosophy of the nation. We think too much 
attention has already been placed on this particular subject and we 
believe the Auditing Standards Executive Committee's recent promulgations 
(SAS Nos. 16 and 17) should adequately cover the auditor in this area.
We have noted recent proposed legislation that would require Corporations 
to maintain "accurate books and records and an adequate system of internal 
control." We think the terms "adequate" and "accurate" are too nebulous 
and not susceptible to a sufficient precise practical definition that 
would be acceptable to all parties involved; accordingly, we recommend 
that the Commission not use such terminology. We also recommend that 
auditors and legislators refrain from using such terminology in any 
promulgation or legislation.
The Commission has indicated its preference for Corporations to adopt 
codes of conduct and for an annual reporting on compliance with this 
code by the auditors. Such implies a requirement for auditors to audit 
against a code which will vary from company to company. We think that 
this is not susceptible to practical application and is not cost justified.
The Commission has indicated its preference for increased involvement in 
public financial reporting by lawyers and presumably by other experts 
such as actuaries, engineers, appraisers, etc. We think business in 
general is sufficiently bogged down by present rules and regulations 
that there is an inherent requirement for continued involvement of legal 
counsel, both internal and external. To require, however, increased 
involvement of lawyers and other experts in public financial reporting 
is, we think, unwarranted and not cost justified.
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6. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITORS' ROLE AND ITS EXTENSION
This section makes clear the self-serving nature and illogical conclusions 
of this Report. The Commission indicates conclusions which are not 
supported by research, documentation, logic, or common sense. The first 
example of such is in the consideration of the audit function regarding 
audit services and the extent of those services. The Commission states 
that "the extent of audit services cannot be determined by a free market 
in the mixed economy of the United States in the 1970's." We do not 
understand what the Commission is trying to say in that statement because 
it arises unexpectedly in the reading of the Report without adequate 
consideration or support in research, theory, or logic.
The Commission seems to take for granted that there is a need to expand 
the audit function. We think there is a need to contract the audit 
function and for redefinition and better understanding of the audit 
function. This need should be aimed primarily toward auditors and users 
of financial information. There is, as emphasized in the Report, a 
misunderstanding by users of financial statements of the auditors' 
involvement in the preparation and examination of financial statements 
of an enterprise.
Our most recent experience in involving auditors in financial information 
other than annual financial statements causes us to believe that the 
auditors themselves do not want expanded responsibility for financial 
information or involvement with that financial information. Our examples 
include the type of reports that we have been able to receive from our 
auditors on interim financial data, comfort letters for public offerings, 
and replacement cost data required by the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission. In all of these instances, auditors have insisted upon such 
qualifying language in their report as to render their involvement 
almost useless from the company's point of view and, we think, from the 
users' of financial information point of view.
The Commission advocates increased involvement of the auditor in financial 
information if the auditors' competence is relevant. The auditors' 
competence, we think, would be substantially enhanced if their knowledge 
of general business, financial management, and economics was increased. 
Auditors' increased involvement in financial reporting is, we think, not 
cost justified and only serves to increase the auditors' fees. Financial 
analysts, auditors, and management do not want increased involvement by 
auditors in the financial reporting process as has often been stated by 
distinguished members of these professions.
The Commission's proposed timely reporting by auditors on interim finan­
cial data does not provide any greater assurance to the user of such 
data than is currently provided by management. The only conclusion 
recommended by the Commission is a statement that such work performed by 
the independent auditor disclosed no material weaknesses in the process 
of preparing interim financial information and any adjustments or 
additional disclosures proposed by them have been reflected in the 
information. We think such a broad statement regarding adjustments or
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disclosures brought to the auditors' attention by his review is not 
capable of practical application because it involves no concept of 
materiality. Also, we disagree with the concluding statement of that 
report regarding subsequent information or events may require adjustment 
to the reported data. Adjustment would be required only if there has 
been a misapplication of facts existing at the time financial information 
was issued (i.e., a correction of an error is required). This concluding 
sentence does not enhance the validity of interim financial information 
but only serves to raise more questions regarding the interim reporting 
process. As we have previously indicated, the definition of material 
weaknesses in internal control for accounting processes has never been 
defined and is probably less susceptible to a definition that is accept­
able to all parties involved than the concept of materiality in relation 
to pure financial data.
The auditor already has a responsibility to review other information 
contained in financial reports to attain reasonable assurance that such 
information is not inconsistent with the basic financial statements.
The Commission's recommendations that the auditor recompute information 
stated in percentages or combined in a manner different from that in the 
financial statements, etc., is unwarranted as such is already performed 
under the current auditing standards.
The Commission discusses the auditors' involvement with financial fore­
casts without reaching a conclusion and, therefore, we are unable to 
respond except to state that we think the auditor should not be involved 
in forecasting and that companies should not be required to publicly 
disclose forecasts.
The Commission also discusses whether the auditor should be involved in 
reaching conclusions regarding the efficiency, economy, and effective­
ness of the use of corporate programs and funds as is sometimes required 
during the audits of governmental units or units funded by governments.
We think the auditors' expertise in accounting and auditing does not 
lead him to an ability to judge efficiency, economy, and effectiveness 
of policies. This information cannot be drawn from financial statements 
or financial data alone.
We agree with the Commission's conclusions that auditors should not 
evaluate management or corporate performance, but not for the reason 
given in the Report. The Commission is concerned that such may jeop­
ardize the audit function. We think that the auditor does not have the 
necessary expertise to perform such evaluations.
7. THE AUDITORS' COMMUNICATION WITH USERS
In this section of the Report, the Commission recommends a changed 
auditors' report by replacing the current terminology of "fairness" and 
"consistency" with the terminology "in all material respects" and 
"appropriate in the circumstances." We think this is regression rather 
than progression because such terminology is more nebulous and less 
susceptible to a reasonable definition that would be acceptable to 
management, the auditor, and the users of financial information.
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The Commission is also recommending that the auditor state a conclusion 
regarding uncorrected material weaknesses in internal control. Again, 
we question the validity of such a requirement in public reporting when 
internal control, as it is currently defined, recognizes a cost justi­
fication principle. Comments regarding uncorrected weaknesses in 
internal control should not be included in an auditors' report on 
financial statements when the auditor has performed sufficient work to 
be satisfied with the reasonableness of such statements and management 
has decided that the costs of correcting the weakness exceed the benefits 
to be derived. The definition of a material weakness in internal control 
would be a personal decision by the auditor as there are no definitive 
criteria generally acceptable to all parties. Also, the qualifying 
language in the proposed auditors' report concerning internal control 
renders such almost useless.
The Report also recommends a conclusion stated by the auditor regarding 
other information appearing in the annual report or other document con­
taining financial statements regarding material disagreements. We think 
the word "disagreement" is inappropriate because the information either 
agrees or disagrees and we cannot understand how a material disagreement 
can arise. The concept of materiality does not appear to apply to the 
term agreement.
The Commission is also recommending that management's report on financial 
statements indicate that "appropriate" accounting principles have been 
applied and "best estimates and judgments" have been made. We think the 
auditor would loathe to use such terminology and we, therefore, question 
management's use. We think this type of reporting is inviting litigation 
and, accordingly, recommend that such a report not become a requirement.
We recommend that the management report on the financial statements 
simply state that such financial information is principally the respon­
sibility of management. This has been understood by most parties for 
years. We think such a statement should be made in order to clarify the 
principal or primary responsibility for financial statements; however, 
we think the lengthy report recommended by the Commission does not add 
any information to the users of financial statements. (We recognize the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is the only authority that could 
require management to issue such a statement and our recommendations 
will be submitted to the SEC if the subject is considered.)
8. THE EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITORS
We cannot respond to the Commission's recommendations in this section of 
the report other than to add that we think auditors should be trained in 
financial and business management and economics to a much greater extent. 
Our experience has shown their level of knowledge in these areas is 
weak.
June 9, 1977
Page 9
9. MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF AUDITORS
We agree with the Commission's conclusions that "total independence is a 
practical impossibility." We think the term "objective" would be much 
better applied to the auditors relationship with his client than the 
term independent.
We think the Commission reaches conclusions in this section of this 
Report which emphasize the self-serving nature that permeates the 
entire Report. Specifically we are referring to the support the Com­
mission uses in reaching its conclusion that there is no evidence that 
the auditors' providing services other than auditing has actually im­
paired the independence of auditors while concluding that the pressures 
of pricing have a negative effect on the ability of auditors to remain 
independent and the arbitrary time deadlines established by clients 
place unnecessary stress on the auditors' independence. The Commission 
admits that no "audit failures" have specifically been traced (1) to 
time pressures placed on the staff of auditing firms by pricing policies 
of management of accounting firms or arbitrary time deadlines placed on 
the auditor by clients or (2) to the auditors' providing services to 
clients other than auditing. Yet the Commission reaches exactly opposite 
conclusions in these two areas. The Commission believes that by being 
able to provide services other than auditing, the accountant auditor 
should be able to provide better services to his client without impairing 
his independence and, therefore, no change is justified. Price and time 
pressures, however, by the management of accounting firms and clients, 
respectively, inherently cause problems with the auditors' independence 
and, therefore, should be changed according to the Report. The Commission 
indicates that there is no empirical evidence to reject either conclusion 
and we contend that there is no empirical evidence to support either 
conclusion.
The Commission states "the evidence contradicts the theory" when dis­
cussing the matter of other services provided by auditors and the theory 
that such impairs the auditors' independence. We contend the proper 
statement based on the support the Commission developed for its position 
would be "the theory is not supported by evidence." The Commission put 
forth no evidence to contradict the theory but was merely unable to find 
instances to support the theory. We do not necessarily agree or disagree 
with the Commission's conclusion in the area of other services. We 
think, however, the Commission does not adequately support its conclusion 
and several other statements in this section of the Report with empirical 
evidence or logic.
"The Commission's research suggests that time pressure generated by 
unduly low fees and by arbitrary deadlines are the most significant 
cause of substandard performance by auditors". "Although there are 
other factors, the Commission believes that excessive time pressures are 
the most pervasive cause of audit failures" (emphasis added). The above 
quotations from the Commission's Report emphasize what we perceive to be 
a major creditablity problem. The Commission has not supported its 
conclusion with evidence or logic for the unbiased reader. We believe a 
survey of financial and business managers and industry accountants would
June 9, 1977
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yield a similar conclusion that "if we had more time, we could perform 
better." We also believe that the work load has a tendency to expand to 
fill the time available for both industry accountants and auditors. We 
put little faith in the objectivity and creditability of the responses 
by auditors to the Commission's surveys and the conclusions the Com­
mission reaches from such surveys.
We think these specific examples emphasize the overriding problem in the 
Commission's conclusions and causes us to believe the document is extremely 
self-serving for auditors by recommending changes which are neither cost 
justified nor supported by researching "audit failures" or other empirical 
evidence. Again, we think the "audit failures" that the Commission has 
considered and "audit failures" in general have been caused principally 
by a failure of auditors to have the most rudimentary level of knowledge 
regarding business management and financial management concepts in the 
client organization they are auditing. An objective review by auditors 
of the financial and business management decisions in many of the well 
publicized "audit failures" combined with a simple understanding of 
business and financial management concepts and, in some cases, common 
sense would have caused the auditor to question his involvement with a 
particular client. One rule, however, which overrides all others is 
that regardless of the business ethics or auditors ethics involved 
someone, somewhere will risk reputation and make the necessary judgements 
to become involved in difficult situations for the financial remuneration 
involved.
The Commission's conclusions regarding scrutiny of auditor changes and 
rotation of auditors again emphasizes the self-serving nature that 
permeates this entire Report. Financial managers and auditors almost 
unanimously have disagreed with the SEC's attempt to require disagree­
ments between auditors and clients to be disclosed in financial statements 
when auditor changes are made or anytime. The question of rotation of 
auditors has been discussed for a number of years and has never been 
required principally because of the high cost involved. We question, 
however, the Commission's motive in discussing the problem of auditor 
rotation because of the conclusion that rotation would place a large 
number of clients "up for grabs" which would intensify the competition 
among auditing firms.
10. THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AUDITING STANDARDS
Our comments regarding the Commission's conclusions in this area are 
simply that a full time auditing standards board may be appropriate and 
may be cost justified. We would encourage that members of industry also 
be represented on any such a board and that the board realize that its 
promulgations will be applied to practicing auditors who audit the 
financial statements of small privately owned companies in addition to 
those auditors who are involved with the audits of financial statements 
of major publicly owned corporations. We would encourage any such board 
to adopt a cost justification concept that must be considered in connec­
tion with each promulgation.
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11. REGULATING THE PROFESSION TO MAINTAIN THE QUALITY OF AUDIT PRACTICE
Auditors in general, based on our experience, fail to have an appre­
ciation of the cost justification principle of financial management. 
Auditors tend to react to external and political pressures without 
recognizing someone must bear the cost and that someone is the client 
and ultimately the consumer. Therefore, we would recommend that those 
who may be responsible for regulating the auditors' profession keep that 
simple concept in mind in any promulgations.
We would be pleased to discuss any of the above matters with the 
Commission or its staff at its convenience.
Yours truly
ARMCO STEEL CORPORATION
Lonnie A. Arnett 
General Auditor
U t a h  P o w e r  &  L ig h t  c o m p a n y
1 4 0 7  W E ST  NORTH TEM PLE ST R E E T  
P. O. BOX 8 9 9
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110 
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O RRIN  T. COLBY, J R .
ASSIST A N T  CONTROLLER June 9, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director 
Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
RE: Response to Report of Tentative
Conclusions - The Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities
I am enclosing a copy of my comments made to the Utah Associa­
tion of CPA’s special "Member Forum" for your consideration.
Very truly yours,
0TC:HAW:gh
Enclosure
A - 3 1
RESPONSE SHEET
Section 1:
Section 2:
MEMBER FORUM DISCUSSION
“Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: Report of Tentative Conclusions"
The Independent Auditor's Role in Society
A. Should AICPA encourage closer cooperation between audit committees of Boards 
of Directors and auditors? Should Boards regularly require a report from the 
auditor on the accounting system and controls over it?
Yes X  No______
Comments:
Independent objective review of the accounting system and controls 
by the independent auditors can be reported to an audit committee 
of the Board as long as all facts have been cleared for objectivity 
through management.
Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations
A. Should the auditor's reporting role be clarified as recommended?
Yes X No______
Comments:
Caution must be exercised, however, to make sure the statement reader 
is presented with a clear explanation of any disagreements with 
clients on application of accounting principles.
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
Section 3:
Section 4:
- 2 -
Reportinq on Significant Uncertainties
A. Do you agree that the auditor's report should be revised as recommended? 
Yes X No______
Comments:
B. Should AICPA urge the FASB to adopt a standard that requires a separate note on 
uncertainties?
Yes x No______
Comments:
Care should be taken to assure that the user of the financial_____
statement evaluate the risk a business faces and the auditor only 
evaluate the adequacy of the disclosure of risks as indicated on 
pages 26 and 27.
Clarifying the Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud
A. Do you agree that the application of the recommended guidelines would benefit 
both third parties and auditors?
Yes X No
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
Comments:
- 3 -
We agree that if auditors adhere to standards of professional____
skill and care that covers detection of fraud, they should not be
held liable for failure to detect all material frauds.
B. Should guidelines cover recommended requirement:
a. Yes X No______
Comment:
b. Yes X No
Comment:
c. Yes x No
Comment:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
- 4 -
d. Yes X No
Comment:
e. Yes X No
Comment:
f. Yes x No
Comment:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
Section 5:
g. Yes X No_
Comment:
- 5 -
h. Yes X No
Comment:
Corporate Accountability and the Law
A. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement this recommen­
dation?
Yes______  No X
Comments:
This area should be studied further before arriving at any_______
conclusions._________________
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
- 6 -
Section 6: The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and its Extension
A. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's role as recommended 
in Recommendation 14?
Yes______  No X
 
Comments:
See response to item C._________ ________ _______________
B. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's role as recommended 
in Recommendation 15?
Yes______  No X
Comments:
See response to item C. Uncorrected material deficiencies in a 
company's internal control that are not disclosed by management 
should be disclosed to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors 
who as outside directors could insist on better compliance. A 
detailed report of internal control weaknesses to statement readers
(over)
C. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's role as recommended 
in Recommendation 16?
Yes______  No X
Comments:
The recommended expansion of the Auditors' role must be considered
in relation to cost-benefit relationships. Public companies_____
(over)
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
Section 6 - Part B.
would be very confusing and could be considered to be much more 
serious than necessary and a real disservice to the client.
Section 6 - Part C.
operating at historically low net-earnings levels would not be 
able to afford expanded audit functions.
Section 7:
- 7  —
The Auditor's Communication with Users
A. Should the auditor's standard report be revised to provide for an expanded flexible 
report?
Yes X No______
Comments:
But the expansion must be carefully worded so as to not complicate
things with so much detail, i.e. descriptions of internal control
weaknesses, that after the statement reader has read the flexible
report he wonders how serious the matter really is. The non-accountant
reader of the report would well be inclined to "write-off" a company 
where internal control problems may not be all that serious.
B. Should the report reflect the recommendations concerning:
1. Consistency
Yes X No______
Comments: 2
2. Reliance on work of another auditor 
Yes X No
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
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Comments:
3. Unaudited information associated with audited information 
Yes X No______
Comments:
Additional research should be done in this area before 
implementation is required.___________________________
C. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to require that corporate 
management present a report as recommended?
Yes______  No X
Comments:
The requirement of a report by corporate management could he viewed 
as an additional hedge on behalf of the auditor to relieve his 
liability exposure._________________________________
If  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
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Section 8:
D. Should AICPA urge the stock exchange to implement the recommendation that 
auditors be required to be present at the company's annual meeting to answer ques­
tions of shareholders?
Yes X No
Comments:
The Education, Training and Development of Auditors
A. Should AlCPA's goal be a four-year undergraduate and three-year graduate program 
of entrance education?
Yes x No______
Comments:
B. Should AICPA work toward separate schools of professional accounting or place 
principal emphasis on graduate degree programs in professional accounting regard­
less of organizational structure?
Yes X No______
Emphasis should be placed on schools of professional accounting.
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 1 0 -
Comments:
C. Should AICPA provide a form of membership for non-CPA accounting educators? 
Yes X No______
Comments:
D. Should AICPA encourage state societies to provide similar forms of membership? 
Yes x No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
-11 -
Section 9: Maintaining the Independence of the Auditor
A. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement Recommendation 
25?
Yes X No______
Comments:
B. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement Recommendation 
26?
Yes x No_______
Comments:
C. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement Recommendation 
27?
Yes X No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
- 1 2 -
D. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct to implement Recommendation 28? 
Yes X No______
Comments:
Although audit firms should not "place" former employees in these
positions, it should be appropriate for a client, on client's____
volition, to hire an employee of the audit firm for any position.
E. 1. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement Recom­
mendation 29?
Yes x No______
Comment: 2
2. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct which would require a successor 
auditor to insist on such disclosure?
Yes X No______
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 1 3 -
Comment:
F. Should AICPA support Recommendation 30? 
Yes X No______
Comments:
G. Should AICPA implement Recommendation 31 through its Quality Control Review 
Program?
Yes X No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
14
H. Should AICPA implement Recommendation 32 through its Quality Control Review 
Program?
Yes x No______
Comments:
I. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct to implement Recommendation 33? 
Yes X no_______
Comments:
Section 10: The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards
A. Should an Auditing Standards Board of full-time members be established?
Yes X No______
Comments:
Care should be taken to ensure that the Board is not predominantly 
membered by Big-Eight firm members._________________________ _____
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 1 5 -
Section 11:
B. Should AICPA implement the recommendation that more attention be directed to 
the needs of firms involved with non-publicly-owned companies?
Yes X No
Comments:
Regulating the Profession to Maintain the Quality of Audit Practice
A. In re Recommendation 36, should AICPA publish the names of all members invol­
ved in Trial Board actions and name all those against whom action is taken?
Yes X No
Comments:
B. In re Recommendation 37, should AICPA initiate action in support of this recom­
mendation?
Yes X No______
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
- 1 6 -
Comments:
C. In re Recommendation 38, should AICPA urge CPA firms to experiment with the 
type of reporting suggested?
Yes X No
Comments:
D. In re Recommendation 39, should AICPA regularly conduct studies and publish 
findings about cases involving significant audit failures, as it did in the Equity 
Funding case?
Yes X No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
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June 13, 1977
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Attention: Douglas R. Carmichael
Research Director
Dear Sirs:
This letter relates to the Commission's Report of 
Tentative Conclusions (the "Report") and is submitted in 
response to the Commission's solicitation of comments 
and suggestions for change. This letter has been pre­
pared by the members of the Committee on Audit Inquiry 
Responses and of the Committee on Corporate Law and 
Accounting of the Section of Corporation, Banking and 
Business Law of the American Bar Association. The 
following are personal comments and do not represent 
the official position of the American Bar Association 
or any of its Sections or Committees, and do not 
necessarily reflect the positions of individual members 
of the Committee on Audit Inquiry Responses or the 
Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting.
We believe it appropriate under the circumstances 
to limit our comments to those portions of the Report 
dealing with concerns and proposals which would involve 
lawyers in the auditing function and create new responsi­
bilities for lawyers in the presentation of audited 
financial statements (or otherwise). Our comments 
revolve around the Report's treatment of the subject 
of reporting on uncertainties and legal matters in 
financial presentations.
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(1) Commission Recommendation: "The present requirements for
disclosure and presentation of uncertainties should be 
modified. Users should be better informed about the un­
certainties involved in the preparation of financial state­
ments, and the information required to be disclosed should 
be expanded to improve the ability of users to identify and 
evaluate significant uncertainties. A separate note, 
similar to that on accounting policies, should be required 
for uncertainties. It should explain the significance of 
the information for future operations." (page 29)
Discussion: At the outset, we wish to express our strong
concurrence with the Commission's recommendation that the 
audit requirement to express a "subject to" qualification 
when financial statements are affected by material un­
certainties should be eliminated. We express this view in 
the context of the difficulties frequently encountered in 
predicting the ultimate resolution of uncertainties 
presented by legal matters, but recognize the validity of 
the recommendation in other contexts.
While the Report is not specific in this regard, it 
is assumed that this recommendation is not intended to 
extend the required disclosure of uncertainties broadly to 
the variety of economic risks faced by all companies (see 
page 26) or the general business risks referred to in 
paragraph 14 of Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, 
Accounting for Contingencies (March 1975) ("FAS 5").
A number of the uncertainties to which this recommenda­
tion would apply, if such were the case, are mentioned 
throughout the Report; for example:
- jeopardy to assets in a foreign location due 
to political unrest or threat of expropriation 
(page 23)
- recoverability of investments (page 24)
- future changes in the national economy (page 26)
- inflation (page 26)
- changes in national laws and regulations (page 26)
- unasserted legal claims (page 26)
- ability to obtain additional financing (page 27)
- compliance with fair employment practices or 
antitrust laws (page 57)
- product safety or efficacy (page 57)
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The foregoing is, of course, but a bare beginning for the 
listing of the total universe of uncertainties which 
confront companies today.
Such an interpretation of the Commission's recommenda­
tion would be consistent, however, with the observation 
that financial statements should represent a self-contained 
disclosure document detailing all uncertainties a company 
faces and their possible effect on its earnings and 
financial position (see page 26). Setting aside the 
fundamental question whether such an expanded objective 
(to be contrasted with the traditional historical per­
spective for financial statement presentation) would be 
desirable for financial statements qua financial state­
ments, we question whether the almost limitless array of 
disclosed uncertainties predictably engendered by this 
approach would comport with the recognized needs of users 
for information in an understandable form. Boiler plate 
cautions would quickly emerge and multiply, and the 
proposed footnote regarding uncertainties would soon 
be recognized as a legal defense mechanism calling for 
the most wide-ranging and elaborate disclosures.
Recommended Change: If this recommendation is intended
to broaden the scope of the disclosure of uncertainties 
to include future risks, it is proposed that required 
disclosures of uncertainties other than overtly threatened 
or pending litigation, claims and assessments be expressly 
limited to those (i) coming within the usual framework 
of quantitative measures of materiality, and (ii) meeting 
a standard of imminence, which we would suggest be framed 
on the basis that within a stated time period the prospects 
of occurrence seem reasonably certain (i.e., supported 
by extrinsic evidence strong enough to establish a pre­
sumption that the event changing a future risk to a 
present loss contingency and/or resulting in asset 
impairment or liability incurrence will happen) and the 
prospects of non-occurrence seem slight. In this way, 
the disclosure of future risks would be made capable of 
meaningful evaluation by users. The accounting standards 
for recording and disclosing uncertainties involving 
overtly threatened or pending litigation, claims and 
assessments, as set forth in FAS 5, would remain unchanged.
Commission Recommendation: "Management's responsibility
for disclosure of litigation, claims, and assessments 
can be better fulfilled if greater reliance is placed on, 
and greater assistance obtained from, corporate or outside
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counsel, who would thus assume greater responsibility for 
the disclosure of legal matters. ... [M]anagement and 
its legal advisors should provide whatever assurances are 
necessary for such matters." (page 49)
Discussion: This recommendation overlooks the fundamental
distinction between the role of the auditor and the lawyer. 
As recognized in the Report:
"The auditor is a third-party intermediary in 
an accountability relationship between the 
issuer of audited financial information and 
users of that information. His primary 
responsibility is to the users of his work.
While the auditor is not an adversary of 
management, he must be independent." (page xvii)
"The auditor is an intermediary in an account­
ability relationship. He is a third party in 
the relationship between the issuer of financial 
statements and those who use and rely on those 
statements." (page 4)
"An independent audit is necessary because of 
the inherent potential conflict between the 
entity's management and the users of its 
financial information. ... The auditor attempts 
to achieve an equitable balance among management 
and the various users." (page 5)
"The independent auditor is responsible to a 
variety of interested parties, but his responsi­
bilities vary in nature and extent. ... Much of 
the auditor's work involves equitably resolving 
the conflicts that arise among interested 
parties." (page 11)
In contrast, the lawyer is not a third-party inter­
mediary, is not expected to be independent and is not 
responsible to a variety of interested parties; indeed, 
the lawyer's role is that of advocate and advisor whose 
responsibility is customarily solely and always principally 
to protect the interests of his client. A lawyer employed 
or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his 
allegiance to the entity (and not to any other person), 
must keep paramount its interests in advising the entity 
and has the fundamental duty to represent his client 
zealously within the bounds of the law. (See ABA Code 
of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations 
5-18 and 7-1.)
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Fundamental to this relationship is the strict 
obligation placed upon the lawyer to preserve his 
client's confidences and secrets. The discussion of 
the public policy considerations in protecting lawyer- 
client confidentiality, set forth in the Preamble to 
the ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses 
to Auditors' Requests for Information, well summarizes 
the important concerns underlying the lawyer's different 
role and relationship with his client; for convenience, 
such Preamble is set forth in Annex A attached hereto.
Recommended Change: While it is appropriate for the
Commission to suggest that corporate and outside counsel 
provide full assistance to management, within the pro­
fessional experience and competence thereof, to enable 
management to fulfill its disclosure responsibilities, 
it is inappropriate for the Commission to suggest that 
such counsel assume direct responsibility for the dis­
closure of legal matters or provide whatever assurances 
to auditors Or other third parties are deemed necessary 
for such matters. We assume that this was not the 
Commission's intention and we request revision of the 
Report to eliminate any such suggestion.
Commission Recommendation: "A substantial portion of
the work and responsibilities in these areas [the 
conformity of corporate actions with laws and regula­
tions and information on the status of pending and future 
litigation] should fall on the corporate or outside legal 
counsel". (page 45)
Discussion: The discussion of the lawyer's role and the
protection of lawyer-client confidentiality in (2) above 
is equally applicable to this recommendation. While we 
can understand the Commission's concern that "some 
parties view independent auditors as public agents to 
be used to improve the functioning of the enforcement 
system as it relates to the conduct of business", we 
believe it entirely inappropriate that the Commission 
volunteer the legal profession to assume that the 
Commission volunteer the legal profession to assume 
responsibility for greater assurance to auditors and 
other third parties as to the compliance of corporations 
with laws and regulations. While the lawyer is of 
course concerned that our laws and regulations are 
observed and "shall not counsel or assist his client in 
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent" 
the lawyer has no responsibility to third parties to *
* ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary 
Rule 7-102(A)(7).
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police his client's conduct in order to assure compliance 
with our laws and regulations. Obviously, such a pro­
posal would fundamentally alter the lawyer's role in our 
society and would therefore warrant the most thoughtful 
and thorough consideration if it were to become the 
subject of serious attention.
In this connection, it is relevant to review the 
background for the current concerns in the area of legal 
compliance by corporations. As noted in the Report (page 
42), current attention is being paid to illegal or 
questionable corporate payments. Virtually without 
exception, these payments have involved accounting 
irregularities and, in most cases, covert acts which 
have placed corporate assets outside of the corporation's 
regular system of accounting and control; as a consequence, 
cash has been made available for disposition by corporate 
personnel free of normal accountability constraints.
Because the integrity of the corporation's system of 
accounting and control was placed in question by the 
deliberate circumvention thereof, the responsibilities 
of those concerned with such system (including the 
auditor) have been the subject of reexamination and, in 
this context, the usual framework of quantitative measures 
of materiality has been considered irrelevant. In a 
parallel but separate vein, issues of morality and 
management integrity (where there has been participation 
in illegal acts) have been raised and, in the context 
thereof, materiality has again been considered irrelevant.
Consistent with framework set forth at the outset 
of this letter, we do not undertake to comment upon the 
auditor's responsibility to detect illegal or questionable 
acts or the auditor's response to detected illegal or 
questionable acts. We do believe, however, that the 
discussion in Section 5 of the Report should be reconsidered 
and we would urge that the Commission adopt the position 
that financial statement presentation is not the appropriate 
vehicle for dealing with wide ranging areas of societal 
concern falling outside the channels of economic informa­
tion with which users have been traditionally concerned.
Recommended Change: We request revision of the Commission's
Report to eliminate any direct or indirect suggestion that 
lawyers assume responsibility to the auditor or other third 
parties for assurances regarding the compliance of corpora­
tions with laws and regulations. Further, we believe that 
the discussion suggesting acquiescence by the Commission in 
proposals that financial statement presentation serve as a 
mechanism for monitoring legal compliance, be reconsidered. 
Specifically, absent legislative prescriptions or accounting 
irregularities (including covert transactions outside of 
the normal channels of financial control), we would propose
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that determinations regarding financial statement dis­
closure, where questions regarding conformity of corporate 
actions with laws and regulations are concerned, be made 
within the usual framework of quantitative measures of 
materiality and detected illegal or questionable acts 
be treated as contingencies to be evaluated as a component 
part of the universe of uncertainties discussed in Section 
3 of the Report.
(4) Commission Recommendation: "The report by management
[suggested by the Commission] could include the statement 
that management believes that all material uncertainties 
have been appropriately accounted for or disclosed, and 
that it has consulted with legal counsel with respect 
to the need for, and the nature of, the accounting for 
or disclosure of legal matters. Alternatively, a 
separate report by legal counsel might be included".
(page 49)
The Commission illustrates this recommendation as follows:
"The company's legal counsel has reviewed the 
company's position with respect to litigation, 
claims, assessments, and illegal or questionable 
acts; has communicated that position to our 
independent auditors; and is satisfied that it 
is properly disclosed in the financial state­
ments ." (page 79)
Discussion: This recommendation would implement the
recommendations discussed above; to facilitate analysis, 
its various aspects are separately considered below.
(a) "all material uncertainties" - we refer you 
to the discussion in (1) above.
(b) "consulted with legal counsel" - there is no 
objection to the lawyer providing assistance 
to management, if within his professional 
competence and experience and so long as 
lawyer-client confidentiality is protected.
(c) "need for, and the nature of, the accounting 
for or disclosure of legal matters" - it is 
not within the lawyer's professional competence 
to advise in this area. It is for the accountant 
to determine the need for, and the nature of, the 
accounting for or disclosure in financial state­
ments of legal matters.
(d) "a separate report by legal counsel" - we refer 
you to the discussion of lawyer-client con-
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fidentiality in (2) above. Separate and 
apart from this concern, we note that, even 
if cost were to be disregarded, a legal 
compliance audit in the sense suggested by 
the Report is simply not a workable concept.
In this connection, we refer you to the 
observation in the Report that "the audit 
function is more effective when applied to 
matters with a factual base and less 
effective to the extent that information 
lacks that support" (page 58); as you know, 
there is no data base (akin to the corpora­
tion's accounting and control system) by 
which all of the acts and omissions of the 
corporation's employees and agents are re­
corded. Finally, we note that, if dis­
closures in the corporation's audited 
financial statements are to be expertised 
by persons other than the auditor, the 
lawyer is but one of a host of advisors 
to the corporation who might provide 
assurance as to management's representa­
tions (e.g., geologists, actuaries, 
economists, lobbyists, insurance brokers, 
real estate appraisers, to name but a few).
(e) "the company's legal counsel" - as pointed 
out in (d) immediately above, the inference 
that legal counsel has pervasive knowledge 
required for a legal compliance "certificate" 
along the lines suggested by the Report is 
categorically wrong.
(f) "the company's position with respect to 
litigation, claims, assessments, and illegal 
or questionable acts" - there presently 
exists a mechanism* for review by counsel of 
the company's position with respect to pend­
ing or overtly threatened litigation, claims 
and assessments and specifically identified 
unasserted possible claims and other matters 
(including illegal or questionable acts) and 
communication thereof to its independent 
auditors, which we believe to be working well.
* The ABA Statement of Policy referred to above and State­
ment on Auditing Standards No. 12 - Inquiry of a Client's 
Lawyer Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments.
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If the Commission intends that this cryptic 
language have a broader compass and deal with 
the subjects of uncertainties and legal com­
pliance, we refer you to (1) and (3) above.
(g) "communicated that position to our independent 
auditors" - we refer you to (f) immediately 
above and (2) above.
(h) "satisfied that it is properly disclosed in 
the financial statements" - we refer you to 
(f) immediately above and note that the 
question of proper disclosure in financial 
statements is a matter to be resolved by the 
accountant, by reason of his close familiarity 
with the enterprise's financial transactions 
and financial position and his special 
competence to apply concepts of materiality 
and contingency disclosure established by his 
profession for financial statement presenta­
tion.
Recommended Change: Assuming the concept of a Report by
Management is preserved, we would suggest the portion 
under consideration be changed to read:
"Having consulted with those advising the 
company regarding material uncertainties, 
including a review with legal counsel of the 
company's position with respect to litigation, 
claims and assessments, in each case to the extent 
we believe appropriate, we believe that the 
company's position in regard to these matters 
is properly accounted for or disclosed in the 
financial statements."
* * * * *
In summary, we do not take issue with the Commission's 
recommendations that disclosures in financial statements 
regarding litigation, claims and assessments and regarding 
uncertainties involving legal matters be removed from the 
direct ambit of the independent audit function. We do, 
however, raise strong objection to the Commission's
Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities - 10
suggestions that the auditor be replaced by the lawyer, for 
these suggestions, if pursued, would result in fundamental 
changes in the lawyer's role in our society. We are 
sympathetic with the Commission's desire to establish 
acceptable working boundaries for expansion of the audit 
function, but the collateral changes in the lawyer's 
function and duties proposed by the Commission are 
clearly unacceptable and will be resolutely resisted.
Should the Commission desire to meet with repre­
sentatives of our Committees to discuss the foregoing 
comments and suggested changes, we would be pleased to do 
so at your convenience.
Very truly yours
Joseph H insey; Chairman 
Comm ittee on Audit
Inquiry Responses
Thomas E. Baker, Chairman 
Committee on Corporate Law
and Accounting
c c : Section Officers and 
members of Committees
Annex A
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF POLICY 
REGARDING LAWYERS’ RESPONSES 
TO AUDITORS’ REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION
Preamble
The public interest in protecting the confidentiality of lawyer-client 
communications is fundamental. The American legal, political and economic 
systems depend heavily upon voluntary compliance with the law and upon ready 
access to a respected body of professionals able to interpret and advise on 
the law. The expanding complexity of our laws and governmental regulations 
increases the need for prompt, specific and unhampered lawyer-client communi­
cation. The benefits of such communication and early consultation underlie 
the strict statutory and ethical obligations of the lawyer to preserve the 
confidences and secrets of the client, as well as the long-recognized testi­
monial privilege for lawyer-client communication.
Both the Code of Professional Responsibility and the cases applying 
the evidentiary privilege recognize that the privilege against disclosure 
can be knowingly and voluntarily waived by the client. It is equally clear 
that disclosure to a third party may result in loss of the "confidentiality" 
essential to maintain the privilege. Disclosure to a third party of the 
lawyer-client communication on a particular subject may also destroy the 
privilege as to other communications on that subject. Thus, the mere dis­
closure by the lawyer to the outside auditor, with due client consent, of 
the substance of communications between the lawyer and client may significantly 
impair the client’s ability in other contexts to maintain the confidentiality 
of such communications.
Under the circumstances a policy of audit procedure which requires 
clients to give consent and authorize lawyers to respond to general inquiries 
and disclose information to auditors concerning matters which have been 
communicated in confidence is essentially destructive of free and open communi­
cation and early consultation between lawyer and client. The institution of 
such a policy would inevitably discourage management from discussing potential 
legal problems with counsel for fear that such discussion might become public 
and precipitate a loss to or possible liability of the business enterprise 
and its stockholders that might otherwise never materialize.
It is also recognized that our legal, political and economic systems 
depend to an important extent on public confidence in published financial 
statements. To meet this need the accounting profession must adopt and 
adhere to standards and procedures that will command confidence in the audit­
ing process. It is not, however, believed necessary, or sound public policy, 
to intrude upon the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship in 
order to command such confidence. On the contrary, the objective of fair 
disclosure in financial statements is more likely to be better served by 
maintaining the integrity of the confidential relationship between lawyer 
and client, thereby strengthening corporate management’s confidence in counsel 
and encouraging its readiness to seek advice of counsel and to act in accord­
ance with counsel’s advice.
2Consistent with the foregoing public policy considerations, it is believed 
appropriate to distinguish between, on the one hand, litigation which is pend­
ing or which a third party has manifested to the client a present intention 
to commence and, on the other hand, other contingencies of a legal nature or 
having legal aspects. As regards the former category, unquestionably the 
lawyer representing the client in a litigation matter may be the best source 
for a description of the claim or claims asserted, the client's position 
(e.g. denial, contest, etc.), and the client's possible exposure in the 
litigation (to the extent the lawyer is in a position to do so). As to the 
latter category, it is submitted that, for the reasons set forth above, it 
is not in the public interest for the lawyer to be required to respond to 
general inquiries from auditors concerning possible claims.
It is recognized that the disclosure requirements for enterprises 
subject to the reporting requirements of the Federal securities laws are a 
major concern of managements and counsel, as well as auditors. It is sub­
mitted that compliance therewith is best assured when clients are afforded 
maximum encouragement, by protecting lawyer-client confidentiality, freely 
to consult counsel. Likewise, lawyers must be keenly conscious of the 
importance of their clients being competently advised in these matters.
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THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, INC.
INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, ALTAMONTE SPRINGS, FLORIDA 32701 PHONE: 305 830 -7600
June 7, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, N. Y. 10036
Dear Doug:
In May, 1977, The Institute of Internal Auditors solicited opinions from 
its key leaders on the "Report of Tentative Conclusions" issued by the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. The following is a consensus 
of opinion that has been consolidated from the reactions of the members 
solicited. These comments represent an extension of the initial review 
conducted in December, 1975 on the booklet entitled "Statement of Issues: 
Scope and Organization of the Study of Auditors' Responsibilities."
As reflected in Bill Perry’s previous letter of June 3, 1976 (copy 
attached), the IIA recognizes the positive initiative taken by the AICPA 
in this vital area. The specific comments that follow are additional 
items submitted for the Commission's consideration.
General Comments
The report focuses directly on the public accounting profession and the 
inference carried in most of the report is that there should be expanded 
scope and more audit coverage by public accountants.
The need and importance of internal control is stated repeatedly (for 
example, pages 35, 39, 51, and 61), but we were unable to find internal 
auditing identified with internal control.
It would seem to be in the best interest of the public accounting pro­
fession for the Commission to demonstrate its responsibilities to share­
holders and the public by recognizing available resources within the 
corporate structure. This would be to give fair evaluation and place 
appropriate reliability on the internal audit function as an existing 
factor of corporate accountability.
If the CPAs’ responsibilities and accountabilities are increased, it 
would seem to follow that internal audit responsibilities and accounta-
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bilities will be increased also.
Various recommendations of the Commission have the effect of having external 
auditors assuming responsibilities in areas heretofore covered by the in­
ternal auditors. (SEC and Metcalf are currently critical of external aud­
itors for engaging in services tenuously related to the basic purpose of their 
certificatory mission.) In recommendations made to narrow the gap between 
auditor performance and user expectations, the role of the internal auditor 
seems to have been completely ignored and, as such, would have the effect of 
not recognizing an important management control. These recommendations, if 
implemented, could make corporate management subservient to outsiders 
(external auditors) for review and evaluation of the soundness, adequacy, 
and application of accounting, financial, and other operating controls.
The report could lead one to conclude that no one is studying and evaluating 
an organization's system of internal control. We do not believe this con­
clusion, if reached, is true. We in internal auditing have done and are doing 
a great deal of work in this area. Internal auditors have been studying and 
evaluating the system of internal controls for many years (this includes the 
whole spectrum of internal controls, i.e., accounting, administrative, etc.).
Internal auditing was mentioned very few times in the entire report. But, 
when internal auditing was referred to, the report's wording (primarily pages 
78 and 79) appears to put internal auditing in the role of the company's po­
licemen, whose primary duty, we presume, will be to prevent and detect irreg­
ularities, fraud, legal policy violations, etc.
We feel the Commission should address the question of internal auditing's 
independence role and reporting relationship. We do not feel the Commission's 
findings fully represent internal auditing's present role within most organi­
zations. The Commission should recognize the misunderstanding the report's 
proposals (if adopted) could create between presently established internal 
audit functions and their respective executive managements.
It is generally felt there are many ways the internal and external auditor 
can assist each other. To maximize this relationship, the two groups (AICPA 
and IIA) have to recognize each other more, support each other more, and most 
importantly, understand each other's problems better. In our opinion, the 
report could be improved by greater understanding, recognition, and support 
of the role of internal auditing.
Specific Comments
Section 3 - Reporting on Significant Uncertainties - This section deals with 
a different method of reporting significant uncertainties on the part of the 
independent auditor. For the most part, since this deals basically with
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uncertainties regarding the marketplace, litigation, the economy, or other 
items of an environmental nature, the internal auditor would not be affected. 
However, if the uncertainty is related to the completion of a project such 
as a building, or an information system, etc., internal audit could be called 
upon by management to evaluate project control and project progress, thus 
allowing management to respond to the reported uncertainty.
Section 4 - Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud - The program 
recommended in this section for a Standard of Care for Fraud Detection has two 
steps that have bearing on internal audit.
The first step is to observe conditions suggesting predisposition to management 
frauds. Several examples are given, but not mentioned under this heading is 
an evaluation of the independence or objectivity of the internal audit function. 
An examination of the internal audit program and a review of internal audit 
reports in sensitive management areas should indicate whether the internal 
audit function is acting objectively vis-a-vis the organization's management. 
The organization and reporting structure of internal audit as well as an 
assessment of the qualification of personnel would also be of great importance 
in the independent auditor's evaluation as to the effectiveness of internal 
audit in preventing management fraud.
The second step is to extend the study and evaluation of internal control.
This adds considerably to the scope and responsibility of the work of the ex­
ternal auditor, but pressures of time, money, and competition referred to 
elsewhere in this report may stop him from effectively performing the extra 
work. To overcome this, the external auditor may find it necessary to rely 
heavily on the work and objectivity of the internal audit function.
Section 6 - The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and its Extension - This 
section talks about expanding the role of the external auditor beyond the 
accounting system to the entire financial reporting system. Much of the 
material in Section 6 essentially duplicates work associated with, and ex­
pected from internal auditing groups which also have a professional code of 
ethics.
Increased emphasis on the evaluation of internal control, both of the account­
ing system and the entire financial reporting system, would seem to be leading 
to increased emphasis on the assistance of the internal audit group. The ex­
tent to which the independent auditor could rely on the work of the internal 
staff would either be an approval or indictment of the internal audit function. 
At present, any prudent auditing firm would expand its work if there was an 
ineffective internal auditing program. Since lack of reliance would result 
in the request for increased auditing fees, the internal audit staff would be 
placed in a highly visible position by this requirement.
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The discussion on efficiency, economy, and effectiveness relates purely to 
the external auditor. While the report refers to cost benefit relation­
ships, the emphasis is on the cost of not doing rather than measuring what 
benefit would accrue from the cost of doing. Any extension of the audit 
role of independent public accountants requires a capability to perform 
and qualifications which state licensing, i.e., certification, may or may 
not fully evaluate.
Certainly, the external auditor should not place himself in a position to 
make management decisions. However, the internal auditor is currently an 
extension of management and, thus, depending on the internal audit charter, 
could address such matters with no conflict of interest.
Auditor involvement on a continuous basis may be acceptable for some (large) 
companies, but would most certainly be too costly for others. No company, 
shareholder, or the economy should be asked to absorb the cost to review and 
test the entire system of internal accounting control as suggested unless it 
is fundamentally structured.
The degree of sophistication through integrated systems, control interrelation­
ships, etc., makes it highly questionable that anything other than a limited 
test within a defined scope is practical. At the present time, too much of 
the audit costs which are absorbed by the company's shareholders (not the 
management) results from subsidizing the learning process for new outside 
accountants and to expand the scope would further reduce the ratio of pro­
ductive audit hour to dollar cost.
While we agree that the outside accountant has an obligation to comment on 
weaknesses in internal control, any such weaknesses can be resolved within 
the existing structure of the audit committee, company management, and the 
independent accountant. For that reason, we are not in full accord with the 
paragraphs in the proposed reports of the independent auditors and the report 
by management as they pertain to internal control weaknesses.
Section 9 - Maintaining the Independence of Auditors - This section finds no 
conflict between the same firm having both auditors and management advisory 
service people at the same client. It even suggests that this could be good 
from an audit viewpoint since the MAS people learn things not always known 
by the auditor. While it is not our purpose to comment on the effect of MAS 
services on the external auditor's independence, we would hasten to add that 
these same principal benefits may be realized by following the guidelines 
established by SAS 9, "Using the Work of Internal Auditors."
We feel the overall conclusion of the report is that the external auditors'
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role, as expressed in formal traditional opinions, is too narrow and needs 
to be expanded to cover the entire accounting and reporting systems to form 
an opinion on a more current and continuing basis. A similar expansion of 
scope includes reviewing and testing the entire system of internal account­
ing controls and not just the controls which determine the scope of audit 
procedures. The objective of these expanded scopes is to enable the external 
auditor to reach a conclusion as to whether controls over each significant 
part of the accounting system provide assurance that the system does not 
contain material weaknesses.
In the environment we are in today (the Proxmire Bill and proposed SEC 
regulations which will make a crime of erroneous information) increased re­
sponsibilities and liability on the part of external auditors seem inevitable. 
The report seems to accept and to guide the approach toward that trend. The 
report makes little mention of internal auditors but assigns to external 
auditors the responsibility for independent appraisals of an organization's 
systems of internal accounting controls and for preventing and detecting 
fraud.
These responsibilities, of course, are one of the primary functions of many 
internal audit staffs today. It would seem that the degree of reliance ex­
ternal auditors place on internal audit work, which is already an important 
area of coordinating audit reports to accomplish audit coverage in the most 
efficient manner, should be reflected in the recommendations of the report.
Sincerely,
S. C. Gross, CIA 
International President
SCG/mp
NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
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Dear Doug:
Enclosed is the report of our Society's 
Committee on the Future of the Profession 
commenting on the tentative report of the 
Cohen Commission.
Robert L. Gray, CPA 
Executive Director
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Research Director 
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The Committee on the Future of the Profession of the New York 
State Society of Certified Public Accountants is pleased to 
offer the following comments and recommendations to The 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities on its Report of 
Tentative Conclusions.
RE: THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S ROLE IN SOCIETY (SEC. 1)
Our committee concurs in the Commission's views on this subject. 
Regarding the role of auditors in serving non-public companies, 
with which the Commission admittedly does not deal, we urge the 
earliest possible attention to this subject.
On page xvii, last paragraph, the report states that "Audits 
are designed to assure..." We suggest the use of "reasonably 
assure."
The paragraph continues with "Audits are designed...to help safe 
gu ard the assets..." Our committee could not unanimously concur 
in this position since some feel that safeguarding a company's 
assets is solely management's responsibility.
R E : FORMING AN OPINION ON FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (SEC. 2)
We accept with some concern the Commission's position that the 
independent auditor should undertake the responsibility for 
judging the preferability of the accounting principles employed 
by a company in the preparation of its financial statements.
The concern arises from the foreseen difficulties in reaching a 
judgment in some, perhaps many, situations. It is therefore 
essential that the Commission recommend the development of 
guidelines for judging preferability in order that a frame of 
reference be available to assist auditors and to help achieve 
such uniformity as is possible.
As to the recommended exclusion of the word "fairly" from the 
term "presents fairly" in the auditor's report, our committee 
was evenly divided on the advisability of this action.
RE: REPORTING ON SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES
IN FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS (SEC. 3) I.
I. Approximately half the committee agreed with the primary
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recommendation in Section 3 that "subject to" qualifications 
should no longer be required in accountants' opinions with 
respect to uncertainties. The remainder of the Committee 
was not prepared to endorse this recommendation for the 
following reasons:
A. The need to obtain more data as to the possible legal 
consequences to the auditor. The courts may not accept 
a pronouncement of the profession that uncertainties
do not require reference in the auditor's opinion even 
if there is adequate disclosure in the financial state­
ments. This is an area that should be investigated 
thoroughly before any change in reporting standards 
is adopted.
B. The need to educate the public prior to implementing 
such a significant change in reporting practice. The 
Commission's Report points out that presently many users 
may believe that there are no uncertainties in financial 
statements if the auditor's opinion is "clean." They 
are more likely to believe this if, as recommended, 
material uncertainties would not be cited in the audi­
tor's opinion.
C. The practical desirability of retaining "subject to" 
qualifications to ensure adequate emphasis in financial 
reports having material uncertainties.
II. The support for the premise that auditors cannot evaluate 
the outcome of most uncertainties any better than users of 
financial statements should be improved. This is a concept 
that many people outside the profession may disagree with 
since, as indicated in the Commission's Report, financial 
statements contain numerous estimates (also see IV below). 
The profession should be prepared to undertake a public 
relations effort to clarify this misconception.
If "subject to" opinions are eliminated, the responsibility 
for evaluating material uncertainties would rest almost 
entirely with the user. There is some doubt that the user 
(with some exceptions) is as qualified to evaluate uncer­
tainties as is the independent auditor. Accordingly, the 
recommendation that "subject to” be eliminated deserves 
further study. I.
III. Further, if "subject to" is eliminated, a standard should be 
promulgated to set forth the requirements for disclosure of
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uncertainties in financial statements. Particular atten­
tion should be given to unasserted claims and other actions.
If it is intended that all material uncertainties should be 
disclosed, a statement from the FASB should set forth in 
great detail the nature of the items that should be included 
and the information that should be given about each, though 
this may prove to be a most difficult task. A single foot­
note which purports to include all uncertainties, which, in 
fact, does not deal with all the uncertainties that face a 
business enterprise, could be more misleading than useful. 
Companies and their auditors might innocently overlook some 
of the uncertainties which should be disclosed even if there 
is extensive guidance in this area. In addition, without 
adequate guidance, serious disagreements may occur between 
auditors and clients over some disclosures of uncertainties.
The need for disclosure guidelines for "going concern" un­
certainties is acute. Because such a disclosure can be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, the auditor confronts a most agoniz­
ing dilemma —  to disclose or not to disclose. In periods of 
economic distress many such cases may exist, making the devel­
opment of guidelines an urgent matter.
IV. There is a need to develop cautionary expressions to accompany 
an uncertainty disclosure. Illustrative of such a caveat is 
that appearing in the disclosure in 1976 financial statements 
pertaining to replacement cost data. Such cautionary expres­
sions might also relate to estimates of the provisions for 
bad debts, obsolescence in inventories, outstanding warranties 
and other estimates.
V. The use of a middle paragraph in the auditor's report, to
emphasize a situation affecting the financial statements, is 
suggested in paragraph 27 of Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 2. The committee feels that the Commission should deal 
with whether this provision of SAS No. 2 would be appropriate 
for the disclosure of uncertainties in the absence of a 
"subject to" qualification.
In suggesting that "subject to" opinions be eliminated, the 
Commission should also address itself to the use of a dis­
claimer where there is a material uncertainty (see footnote 
8, paragraph 25 of SAS No. 2). Further, in addressing the 
appropriateness of adverse opinions, the Commission should 
also deal with the propriety of "except for" qualifications 
where there is inadequate disclosure of material uncertain­
ties.
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RE: CLARIFYING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
DETECTION OF FRAUD (SEC. 4)
The committee supports the Commission's desire to clarify the 
auditor's responsibility. It believes that SAS No. 16 adequate­
ly defines the responsibility of the independent auditor for the 
detection of errors and irregularities. As stated in SAS 16, the 
independent auditor has the responsibility to plan his examina­
tion to search for errors and irregularities that could materially 
affect the financial statements, and to exercise due professional 
care in the conduct of that examination. While we agree with the 
recommendations proposed by the Commission to further expand on 
the general concept of due professional care, we do not believe 
that the concept of due professional care can be reduced to a 
detailed list of steps and procedures because, in our view, audit­
ing involves a considerable amount of professional judgement.
RE: CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW (SEC. 5)
We agree with the Commission that the independent auditors should 
take steps to improve corporate accountability. However, as 
indicated by the Commission, accountants are not trained to detect 
violations of law; therefore, we support the need for a clear 
definition of prohibited corporate conduct.
We also agree with the Commission's conclusions that management 
has the primary responsibility in this area. Corporations should 
adopt statements of policy and monitor compliance with such 
policy. Companies should be encouraged to disclose the existence 
of the policy in public documents.
The auditors should report any questionable or possibly illegal 
activities noted during their audit to the Audit Committee or 
the Board of Directors. The Audit Committee or the Board of 
Directors should seek the advice of legal counsel on these 
matters.
We do not agree with the Commission that auditors should disclose 
confidential information to government agencies or publicly dis­
close any questionable activities without regard to materiality.
We believe that a reasonable standard of materiality should be 
adopted for disclosure in the financial statements.
 The committee supports the Commission's view that better assis­
tance and involvement by the legal profession should be sought by 
management to enable them to fulfill their responsibility for 
disclosure of litigation and illegal or questionable acts. A
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report by management covering accounting systems and internal 
control and their discussions with legal counsel with respect 
to accounting for and disclosure of legal matters, would be 
desirable. We agree with the Commission that the auditor's 
responsibility should be to review the information and the 
representations of management and counsel to determine that 
the financial statements properly reflect the information 
provided.
RE: THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITOR'S ROLE
AND ITS EXTENSION (SEC. 6)
We concur in the Commission's proposal for a continuing involve­
ment by the auditors in a company's accounting and reporting 
process. We also concur with (1) the concept of the fundamental 
separation of the roles of management and the auditor, and (2) 
limiting the auditor's association to information of an account­
ing and financial nature which is verifiable.
However, we believe that before new areas of auditor involvement 
are mandated, further study should be recommended in order to 
provide for the orderly evolution of the audit function. 
Specifically, the study should focus on (1) the question of 
the auditor's independence as a result of his assumption of 
a new responsibility; (2) the auditor's inability to provide 
assurance on matters with which he is associated; and (3) the 
benefits of extending the auditor's responsibility against the 
cost of such extension. This same cost-benefit analysis should 
be made before mandating a comprehensive review of internal 
control for the purpose of detecting all deficiencies.
We recommend that independent auditors be required to commun­
icate internal control weaknesses to the Audit Committee or 
the Board of Directors. We do not agree, however, that a 
brief summary of such weaknesses would be meaningful to the 
public because of the difficulty of communicating inherent 
limitations in internal control.
An agreement could not be reached on the suggested form of 
"negative assurance" to the public with respect to quarterly 
financial statements. Further study is necessary of the audi­
tor's ability to convey to users the degree of assurance which 
can be expected from limited reviews.
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RE: THE AUDITORS' COMMUNICATION WITH USERS (SEC. 7)
While we agree with the Commission's conclusion that many users 
instinctively view the auditor's report as a seal of approval 
with respect to the financial soundness of a company, we quest­
ion whether the Commission's suggested revised auditor's report 
and report by management should be implemented at this time. 
Rather, the Commission should recommend research and study of 
the feasibility and implications of an expanded auditor's report 
and of a management report.
We are concerned with the suggestion that the auditor's report 
cover such matters as internal controls, association with 
quarterly information, corporate codes of conduct and meetings 
with the Audit Committee. The auditor may not be able to con­
vey, and the user may not be able to comprehend, the extent 
of the auditor's involvement in such matters. If reporting 
of this information is deemed valuable to users, such communi­
cation should be channeled through the company’s Audit Commit­
tee rather than public reporting.
The committee could not reach a consensus as to whether "fairly" 
should be eliminated from the auditor's report with the substi­
tution of "in all material respects". A material number of 
committee members urge that this matter be further studied.
Although the committee endorsed the concept of the report by 
management, it was divided on the need for a statement by 
management with respect to its communicating with legal counsel 
regarding litigation. Outside legal counsel may not be quali­
fied to make a determination on the disclosures required in 
financial statements. Management's statement on the efficiency 
of internal controls should eliminate the need for an additional 
statement on illegal and unethical activities.
RE; THE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF AUDITORS (SEC. 8)
The committee concurs in the Commission's conclusion that there 
is a need for improvement in the educational process. However, 
it could not agree on the proposed solution that a separate 
professional school of accountancy is ideal for improving the 
educational process.
The committee agrees that in the last decade the academic account 
ing community in graduate B-schools with executive training
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motivation has increased its emphasis on managerial accounting 
and financial analysis with a heavy mathematical emphasis.
However, it is only the degree to which this has been done 
that should be of concern to those engaged in educating public 
accountants.
We also agree with the Commission that the emphasis on the 
attainment of the Ph.D. degree, generally following directly 
after undergraduate work, most often precludes the completion 
of any significant amount of audit experience (which is, inci­
dentally, also a basic prerequisite for the CPA certificate in 
many states). The result is that such academics lack the pro­
fessional background necessary to a full understanding of the 
needs and problems of a public accounting practice.
It is agreed that possession of a Ph.D. Degree and a CPA certi­
ficate, coupled with professional experience and scholarly 
attainment will remain the optimum type of academic preparation. 
However, we recognize the difficulty of attaining this optimum 
combination of credentials.
The mere establishment' of a professional school of accountancy 
will not in itself solve this type of faculty problem. Rather, 
a solution, not suggested by the Commission, is to accept an 
approved MBA degree plus a CPA certificate, supplemented by 
high-level practical experience and an acceptable record of 
scholarly writings in lieu of the Ph.D. degree.
It is submitted that neither the inadequacies in auditing 
instruction nor the substandard audit performance cited in 
detail by the Commission will be corrected unless the accounting 
curriculum (in the first instance) and the accounting firms' 
policies (in the second) undergo substantial change. Merely 
spinning off the educational vehicle as a separate professional 
school of accounting would not, of itself, cure the cited 
defects.
The Committee believes that what is needed is a major reorgani­
zation of existing collegiate schools of business along lines 
that would recognize all other student career goals than that 
of executive administration. Accounting (as well as the other 
departments) should be free to develop and control its own 
curricular offerings according to preceived professional needs 
within the appropriate time frame, as well as to prescribe the 
criteria for the appointment and advancement of its own personnel. 
The instruction would be more responsive to professional needs, 
students would have less cause for complaint on this score, 
and the professional identity of a public accountant would be 
greatly enhanced.
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The Commission also proposes an internship program as a curricu­
lum requirement. This proposal may be desirable but it would 
be difficult for business schools to administer. If it is 
to be a curricular requirement, every student must be provided 
with an opportunity to enjoy substantially the same extent and 
level of exposure to actual practice, which is a virtual 
impossibility.
Thus the committee believes that the solution of the educational 
problems cited by the Commission may lie in the establishment 
of separate professional schools of accounting regardless of 
whatever other merits they may have, but rather in the reorgani­
zation of existing collegiate schools of business.
The report recommends the gradual extension of the educational 
process with a four year liberal arts under-graduate program 
followed by a three year graduate professional program as the 
ultimate goal. The committee was divided on the necessity 
for more than a bachelor's degree as preparation for a pro­
fessional accounting career.
RE: MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF AUDITORS (SEC. 9)
In general, the Commission's conclusions on problems involving 
independence appear sound and are based on reasonable and 
impartial evidence. Our committee endorses them, with one 
exception. Rather than prohibit a specific management services 
activity (i.e., certain executive recruitment and placement 
services) the committee feels that all management services 
activities should be authorized and approved by a committee of 
outside directors of the client being served.
RE: THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AUDITING STANDARDS (SEC.10)
The committee is in general agreement with the recommendations 
in respect to the establishment of auditing standards. However, 
we believe that auditors are the best qualified to set auditing 
standards —  that outsiders should be encouraged and invited 
to participate and to contribute their views in task force and 
subcommittee deliberations, particularly in their field of 
expertise, they should not be members of an official standard 
setting body.
RE: REGULATING THE PROFESSION TO MAINTAIN
THE QUALITY OF AUDIT PRACTICE (SEC. 11)
We are in general agreement with the Commission's recommendations 
with respect to regulating the profession to maintain the quality 
of audit practice.
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However, we question the Commission's recommendation for moving 
more expeditiously in disciplinary matters when litigation is 
invloved. Unleashing the disciplinary mechanism prior to 
conclusion of the litigation clearly could have an adverse 
effect on the defendant's right to "due process.” Nevertheless, 
we believe that the profession, in response to public expecta­
tions, should re-evaluate the practice of waiting until liti­
gation is concluded before commencing its investigations.
The Commission suggests that users of audited financial infor­
mation rely heavily on the name and reputation of the particular 
accounting firm performing the audit. From this, it concludes 
that experimentation with disclousure of information by a firm 
about itself would be useful. Although unstated, it is clear 
that this recommendation implies that the information include 
financial information. We believe this is a questionable 
recommendation which, as the Commission acknowledges, is not 
supported by a demonstrated user need. Absent such a demon­
strated need, we believe it is the right of a private partner­
ship to limit distribution of its financial information to its 
partners. Recognizing that the public has an interest in the 
reputation of an accounting firm, we believe that one of the 
best ways to provide it with meaningful information about the 
firm's professional standing is through publication of the 
results of the AICPA peer review program.
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Office of the Controller June 13, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Report of Tenta­
tive Conclusions by the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities.
We believe the Commission has focused its attention on issues of 
the day and offered many sound recommendations for improvement.
Our comments, limited to areas of disagreement, are submitted as 
preparers of financial statements, communicators of financial 
information to stockholders and others, as well as users of 
financial information provided by others.
Auditors' Responsibilities
Management is responsible for all financial information released 
by an enterprise whether the information is inside or outside the 
financial statements. Accordingly, we believe that the auditors' 
responsibility should continue to be limited to attesting to data 
in financial statements only. However, we do agree that when 
audited financial statements are presented and the accompanying 
data is inconsistent or misleading and management is unwilling 
to modify its statement, then the auditor should so note in his 
report.
It is recognized that it has and will continue to be the auditors' 
responsibility to evaluate management's choices among alternate 
accounting principles, the appropriateness of those principles in 
the circumstances and the cumulative effect of their application 
on financial statements. Wherever judgment is required, differ­
ences of opinion will always exist and, thus, we believe the 
auditors' primary role should continue to be to exercise pro­
fessional judgment with respect to the results of management's 
interpretation and application of accounting principles. Accord­
ingly, we believe that any guidelines on preferability among 
alternative accounting principles should emanate from the FASB 
and, therefore, reject the Commission's recommendation to develop
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
June 13, 1977
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audit guidelines to assist auditors in the determination of pre­
ferability. We do not believe the auditor is or should be placed 
in the position of making determinations as to preferability 
except when a change is made. Further, we continue to believe 
consistency is a very important consideration to users of financial 
statements and, therefore, warrants comment in the auditors' report.
Uncertainties
We believe that most preparers of financial statements are well 
aware of the need for providing as much information as possible 
on each potentially material uncertainty and attempt to fulfill 
that responsibility. Further, we believe that the auditor should 
be in a position to assess the completeness of the disclosure and 
the magnitude of the uncertainty. Accordingly, we favor the con­
tinued use of the "subject to" opinion in those instances where 
the uncertainties are such that the auditor cannot satisfy him­
self to the extent necessary to express a judgment on the finan­
cial condition of the enterprise as a whole. If properly used, 
we believe that a "subject to" is an appropriate means of empha­
sizing material uncertainties.
Internal Controls
In our view, the Commission's emphasis on the auditors' responsi­
bility with regard to internal controls is justified. Since 
management and auditors depend on an effective system of internal 
controls as the foundation for proper financial reporting, we are 
sympathetic to having the auditor elaborate thereon in his report.
Except for actual material frauds or frauds involving top manage­
ment, we do not share the Commission's view that this is a proper 
subject to specifically address in the auditors' report.
Form of Auditors' Report
We believe the present short form report has stood the test of 
time and has served the informed users well. We accept the de­
sirability of possible modifications thereto, but we see little 
justification for the major changes proposed by the Commission.
In addition, we believe that the negative implications therein 
do little to serve the needs of the preparer, user, or the 
auditing profession. Although we recognize that the auditor's 
report is his prerogative, we question whether the suggested 
areas of expansion (other than perhaps internal controls) truly 
represent better communications with users, and believe it raises 
additional questions in the minds of users as to the scope of the 
audit in other perhaps more significant areas not addressed.
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
June 13, 1977
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Personnel and Recruiting Services
Although we can appreciate the Commission's concern about public 
accounting firms providing clients with personnel and recruiting 
services, we would like to state that we as well as other indus­
trial companies look upon the public accounting field as a poten­
tial source for qualified technical people.
Therefore, we would urge the Commission in preparing its final 
report to focus only on situations which could create the 
appearance of a conflict of interest, such as the placement of 
those responsible for expressing an opinion on particular finan­
cial statements in a management position with that client.
Sincerely
C. A. Northrop
THE ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS
Incorporated by Royal Charter
22 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3HS. Telephone: 01-636 2103-9 
Telegrams: Laofact London WC1 Telex: Certifax 24381
A-36
Our Ref. SRS/DRW/C3/1 10th June, 1977
Douglas R. Carmichael Esq.,
Research Director,
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 
1211 Avenue of the Americas,
New York,
New York 10036,
U.S.A.
Dear Mr. Carmichael,
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
Report of Tentative Conclusions
We have pleasure in submitting our comments on the above report, which 
have been prepared by our Auditing Practices Sub-Committee.
Yours sincerely,
S.R. SIBLEY, 
SECRETARY-TECHNICAL.
Enc. two copies
Incorporated by Royal Charter
22 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3HS. Telephone: 01-636 2103-9 
Telegrams: Laofact London WC1 Telex: Certifax 24381
THE ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS
SUBMISSION OF COMMENTS ON
THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS* RESPONSIBILITIES
REPORT OF TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
The Association of Certified Accountants wishes to thank the Commission 
on Auditors' Responsibilities for providing the opportunity for them to 
comment on its Report of Tentative Conclusions.
The Association congratulates the Commission on the production of a 
splendid document and looks forward to the release of the final report.
The Association also wishes to thank the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants and the various contributing firms for the provision 
of the facilities and finance that have made the report available to the 
accountancy profession.
The comments which follow are of course based on United Kingdom experience 
and whilst the basic problems may be the same our own professional and 
legislative structure must by definition affect our observations.
Auditing Practices Sub-Committee
DP/DW/C3/1
10/6/77
SECTION 1 It is noted and agreed that in a fast changing economic and social 
scene it is diffiicult to keep pace professionally with rapid changes. 
The enormous burden of new legislation which often affects every 
economic entity makes the task a formidable one, but any a ttempt to 
accelerate the pace of change in the profession is to be welcomed. 
However, a note of caution should be sounded in tha t any changes 
should be thoroughly analysed and discussed before acceptance as 
an auditing standard.
We agree that there is a lack of understanding by many users of the 
distinction between auditing and accounting. Many are also unaware 
of management’s responsibility in this respect. We agree that there 
is a clear need to explain the audit functions and in particular 
to ensure that users in general do not regard an unqualified audit 
report as a guarantee or insurance that a corporate entity is sound.
In our opinion the profession should initially concentrate on the 
clarification of functions and definitions.
In considering the clarification of the auditors' role it would seem 
important to explain in clear terms what is meant by ’fairly presents’ 
or, as is used in the UK, 'true and fair'.
We do not agree with the suggestion that 'fairness' as a standard 
is not fruitful and that references to fairness should be eliminated 
from the auditors’ report. There should instead be renewed efforts 
to explain the objective judgments that make up the auditors' opinion. 
It should be mentioned that UK legislation at present obliges auditors 
to report on whether or not the financial statements of corporate 
entities show a ’true and fair view', and that the EEC member states 
have only recently been persuaded of the efficacy of this approach 
to reporting by auditors.
We consider that it must be made abundantly clear that in the final 
analysis the auditors* report is an expression of a considered 
opinion and not a guarantee, The auditor is applying himself both 
to an art and a science. He is at all times only human and whilst 
he applies his skills with integrity and without bias the element 
of judgment is always present and with it its own limitations.
SECTION 2
In calling for more enlightenment of the auditors' role there 
would appear to be a strong case for more user 'education' and 
explanation by the profession.
in the UK all limited liability companies are governed by the 
legislative requirements of the Companies Acts 1948, 1967 and 1976.
To this extent the accountability of companies via management to 
their shareholders and other users of financial statements is laid 
down by statute. Although these Acts refer to accounts, the UK 
accountancy profession has produced its own accounting standards 
and the first of its auditing standards is in the course of 
preparation. Nevertheless there is much progress to be made on 
the UK form of corporate report. In July 1975 the Consultative 
Committee of Accountancy Bodies, representing the major UK 
accountancy bodies, suggested that the fundamental objective of 
corporate reports is to communicate economic measurements of and 
information about the resources and performance of the reporting 
entity useful to those having reasonable rights to such information. 
Therefore the corporate report should be relevant, understandable, 
reliable, complete, objective, timely and comparable. We therefore 
agree that the auditor has a vital role in reporting as to the 
validity of the statements prepared and presented by management.
The suggestions that 'the audit function requires a confidential 
relationship between auditor and management' and 'that the auditor 
cannot assume that management is dishonest' are welcomed. The 
principle of being a 'watchdog' and not a 'bloodhound' is still 
tenable. The objective should be one of mutual respect and confidence 
to the benefit of all.
In our opinion it is impossible to provide standards for every 
contingency, circumstance or event and we consider that there is 
merit in expecting the auditor to be able to exercise his judgment 
in situations hitherto unknown.
The principles enunciated for analysing the underlying facts to 
determine which alternative presentation is more in accord with 
the substance of an event is accepted.
SECTION 3
We concur with the opinion that the ultimate objective of any 
audit must be to ensure that notwithstanding the application of 
accounting and auditing standards the overall result is not 
misleading.
In our view the exercise of prudent judgment by the auditor should 
safeguard against these dangers.
In the Report the statement that 'the auditor normally evaluates 
whether financial information presented by management conforms with 
appropriate standards' is contrasted with the situation in respect 
of uncertainties in regard to which the auditor is required to be 
a reporter and interpreter of financial information as well.
The Report suggests that these aspects of the auditors' role are 
contradictory.
In our opinion it is by no means clear why there should be a 
contradiction. In so far as uncertainties may affect the auditors' 
report the auditor ensures as full a disclosure as possible of the 
uncertainty and reports thereon. In reaching a conclusion as to 
whether to qualify his report he will exercise his judgment as in 
any other case.
We do not agree that the 'subject to' qualification is confusing 
and ambiguous. The *subject to* qualification is considered an 
essential tool to be protected by the auditor in all cases where 
an unqualified report cannot be given. The auditor is seeking to 
alert all users of financial statements that all is not well and 
to explain why thorough the medium of explanatory notes and his own 
report. It is therefore not considered desirable to dispense with 
'subject to' reports.
It is acknowledged and agreed that independent auditors are in no 
way better able to predict business success or failure than they 
are able to predict the outcome of other uncertainties. The auditor 
should therefore take care to ensure that any relevant information 
that will assist in explaining uncertainties should be disclosed in 
the notes to the accounts. Care must be exercised at all times
   to ensure that a reference to a particular uncertainty does not 
as a result of undue publicity precipitate that happening of an 
event that might otherwise not occur, e.g. loss of confidence by 
creditors. As in many other instances the auditor must maintain
SECTION 4
SECTION 5
a reasonable balance and apply his skills and intellectual honesty 
to the task.
It is not clear why the present requirements for qualifying an 
opinion because of uncertainty do not provide desirable legal protection 
for the auditor. Possibly this is peculiar to the American scene.
We agree with the statement that the public expect that auditors 
will concern themselves with the detection of fraud and we consider 
that in planning the audit programme the auditor should bear this 
in mind.
In our opinion it is obvious that the detection of management fraud 
is of prime importance to the auditor, and he should therefore 
look into the possibility of such fraud in considering whether 
the accounts on which he is reporting show a 'true and fair' view.
However, we do not think that the detection or prevention of fraud 
are the chief objects of the audit. In our opinion the auditor 
should satisfy himself that the system of internal check provides 
adequate safeguards. We agree with the observation that an audit 
in depth with a view to detecting possible fraud would be prohibitively 
costly.
We agree with the the suggested explanation of the auditors responsibility 
for the detection of fraud.
We concur with the view that auditors should assume more responsibility 
for the detection and disclosure of illegal or questionable acts by 
management.
We consider that the following statement is of major importance:
'Auditors are primarily accountants, trained and 
experienced in activities that are basically financial.
They are not lawyers nor are they criminal investigators 
and they do not presently possess the training or skills 
of either group.'
We therefore agree entirely with the proposals for increasing the 
role of lawyers in respect of corporate legal accountability.
SECTION 6 We have no specific comments to make on this section of the Report.
SECTION 7 We would reiterate our views regarding the suggested elimination 
of references to 'fairness' in the auditors' report. (See our comments 
on Section 1, above.)
We would also reiterate our views regarding the 'subject to' qualification 
and we believe that a case for reporting by exception, as is the 
* manner in the UK at present, can be supported. (See our comments on 
Section 3, above.)
SECTION 8 This section is mainly applicable to the American situation and we 
have no comments to make.
SECTION 9 We are generally in agreement with the contents of this section 
insofar as they are applicable to the accountancy profession in the 
United Kingdom.
However, with reference to the effect of time pressures we should 
like to see a recommendation that the auditor be protected by  
legislation in respect of a claim by a client if any penalty is 
incurred by the client for late filing or registration of accounts, 
when the reason for the late filing is attributable to disagreement 
between management and auditor as to the audit opinion.
SECTION 10 This section is mainly applicable to the American situation and we 
have no comments to make.
SECTION 11 This section is mainly applicable to the American situation and we 
have no comments to make.  
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SHELL OIL COMPANY
ONE SHELL PLAZA 
PO. BOX 2463 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77001
June 10, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael Research DirectorCommission on Auditors' Responsibilities 1211 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
Shell Oil Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Report of Tentative Conclusions published by the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. The Commission and its  staff are to be complimented on the quality and scope of the Report, and especially for the decision to expose the tentative conclusions for comment by all interested parties.
Shell endorses a substantial number of the Commission's conclusions and recommendations. We disagree with others, particularly those recommenda­tions dealing with significant expansion of the audit function, because they would not serve the best interests of shareholders and other financial statement users.
The Commission's "forty" recommendations were somewhat d ifficu lt to identify. Shell suggests the Report would be improved by specifically denominating each recommendation within the body of the appropriate sections, listing the relevant recommendations at the conclusion of each section, or listing all recommendations in an appendix to the Report.
Although we would have preferred more time in which to develop comments on the Report and recommendations, we wish to express again our appreciation for the opportunity provided by the Commission. Should clarification or additional information be desired with regard to our comments, we would be happy to cooperate.
Very truly yours,
A-37
For: J .  C. Jacobsen
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SHELL OIL COMPANY
Comments Submitted to the Commission on Auditors' Responsib ilities 
With Respect to the Report of Tentative Conclusions
SECTION 2 - FORMING AN OPINION ON FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS
Recommendation: Reference to "fa irne ss" should be eliminated and an increased
emphasis placed on the description of the judgments and decisions required of 
auditors by (1) improving guidance for evaluating the appropriateness of 
accounting in the absence of detailed accounting princip les, (2) improving 
guidance for evaluating the appropriateness of alternative accounting principles, 
and (3) improving guidance for evaluating whether financial statements as a 
whole are biased or misleading.
The phrase "present fa ir ly . . . in  conformity with generally accepted 
accounting p rinc ip les" is  not tru ly  meaningful and is  subject to varying in ter­
pretations or, in some instances, misinterpretation. Therefore, Shell concurs 
that reference to "fa irne ss" should be eliminated and that the description of 
the judgments and decisions required of auditors be emphasized. The recommendations 
for providing improved guidelines as the basis for auditors' judgments and 
decisions should improve the quality of financial statement audits and, just as 
importantly, provide the auditor with a sounder basis for providing advice and 
counsel to management. Further, such guidelines could foster improved 
understanding by users of the aud ito r 's  role and responsib ility.
Improved guidance for auditors in the three identified areas must be 
established with great care, particu larly  the evaluation of proper alternative 
accounting principles. With respect to the auditors' re sponsib ilit ie s for 
evaluating the appropriateness of accounting alternatives determined by manage­
ment, we wish to emphasize that management has an overriding re sponsib ility—  
the integrity and completeness of financial reports based on an in-depth 
knowledge of business operations, conditions and plans. Auditors cannot be 
expected to be as knowledgeable as management in such areas.
SECTION 3 - REPORTING ON SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES IN FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS
Recommendation: The existing requirement that an auditor express a "subject to"
qualification  for material uncertainties should be eliminated.
It  is  suspected that the existing requirements are often interpreted 
d ifferently and that other equally competent auditors might have rendered an 
unqualified opinion with respect to the Armstrong Cork Company example shown in 
the Report. Further, "subject to" qualifications might be detrimental to the 
reporting entity simply because some users are confused about the reason for the 
qualification. These reasons coupled with those presented in the Report provide 
strong and valid arguments for support of th is recommendation.
2Recommendation: A separate note, sim ilar to the Accounting Policy note,
should be required for uncertainties; to include d isclosures generally contemplated
by FASB No. 5 for each material uncertainty.
Shell disagrees with th is recommendation because it  stresses form over 
substance by congregating and relocating d isclosures presently required. The 
content and defin ition  of d isclosures are promulgated by the FASB. The aud ito r 's  
function, in S h e ll 's  opinion, should be to determine that disclosures of 
material uncertainties are complete and provide users with enough information to 
make their own r isk  evaluations. It  is  conceivable, indeed probable for many 
entities, that a company may not have material uncertanties to d isclose every 
year. Would a company in that position have to provide a negative disclosure 
note i f  the Commission's recommendation was adopted?
Recommendation: I f  uncertainty about a company's a b ility  to continue operations
is  adequately disclosed, the auditor should not be required to call attention 
to that uncertainty in his report. Considerable improvement is  required in the 
disclosure of going-concern uncertainties and i f  the auditor does not believe 
disclosure is  su ffic ien t to portray the company's financial position, he 
should express an adverse opinion.
The recommendation and supporting discussions are not clear. In 
essence, i t  appears the Commission is  recommending that auditors be responsible 
for evaluating whether management d isclosures adequately reflect "going concern" 
uncertainties, the relationships among uncertain matters disclosed ind iv idually, 
and the estimated effects of resolution of uncertainties on the v ia b il ity  of 
the enterprise. Without better audit guidelines and more defin itive  disclosure 
requirements under GAAP, such general evaluations introduce too great a degree 
of subjectivity on the part of the auditor.
SECTION 4 - CLARIFYING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETECTION OF FRAUD
Recommendation: Auditors should establish a systematic c lient investigation
program; prospective c lients with untrustworthy management or deficient internal 
controls should not be accepted and existing c lients which develop such 
characteristics should not be retained.
An unwarranted rejection by an auditor based on subjective judgments 
made without fu ll knowledge of a ll pertinent facts could cause irreparable harm 
to a business e n t ity 's  reputation. Therefore, investigative programs leading 
to possible resignation from an existing engagement or rejection of a prospective 
client should be instituted only with very specific  guidelines and controls.
The guidelines should preclude other factors, such as account p ro fitab ility , 
from influencing a decision which might be interpreted by outsiders as a c lient 
rejection based on questionable actions of management.
Rejection of audit engagements based on inadequate or deficient 
internal controls should be governed by guidelines different from those for 
investigating client honesty. Is  is  certainly possible for deficient internal 
controls to coexist with an honest management and with financial statements of 
the highest caliber. An honest management, of course, would be expected to
discuss implementation of improved controls with the auditor and to pay higher 
fees commensurate with the additional tests and procedures required for a 
satisfactory audit.
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SECTION 5 - CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW
Recommendation: Corporations should adopt and d istribute to employees detailed
policy statements on ille ga l or questionable acts along with procedures to 
monitor compliance with the policy. The statements should be available to 
shareholders and others.
It  is  agreed that the f i r s t  re sponsib ility  for meeting the demands for 
corporate accountability belongs to management. Adoption of detailed policy 
statements and compliance measures relative to ille ga l or questionable acts is ,  
therefore, appropriate. D istribution of the policy statements to outsiders 
should not be necessarily discouraged or prohibited, however, Shell is  not 
persuaded that outside d istribution  should be mandatory.
Recommendation: Additional guidance on the meaning of "professional s k i l l  and
care" is  needed by auditors for detection of ille ga l or questionable acts.
Development of such guidance for auditors is  c r it ic a l i f  the 
independent auditor is  to f u l f i l l  his re spon sib ilit ie s both to financial state­
ment users and to management. Shell shares the Commission's view that immediate 
steps should be taken in th is regard because the subject of ille ga l and 
questionable acts is  evolving rapidly. However, our company cautions that 
costly "o ve rk ill" provisions might resu lt i f  auditor guidance was developed 
without input from user groups and from the business community.
Recommendation: The aud ito r 's  re sponsib ility  for detecting illega l or
questionable acts must be distinguished from his re sponsib ility  for taking 
action when such acts are detected or discovered.. .The need for public disclosure 
must be considered i f  the board of d ire c to r 's  response to the situation is  
inadequate.
Shell agrees with the general thrust of these recommendations. As 
previously stated, however, the primary re sponsib ility  for corporate accountability 
rests with management. Public d isclosure in the aud ito r 's  opinion should be 
permitted only when the magnitude of the situation might materially compromise 
the va lid ity  of the financial statements. I f  public disclosure of ille ga l or 
questionable acts of a material nature is  considered necessary by the auditor, 
the d isclosure should be limited to a factual description of the situation and 
management's actions thereon.
Recommendation: Greater re sponsib ility  for the d isclosure of legal matters
should l ie  with management in consultation with it s  corporate lawyers and 
outside counsel. The auditor should be responsible for reviewing the information
4and representations of management and counsel to determine that the financial 
statements properly reflect the information.
Corporate accountability encompasses the re sponsib ility  for disclosure 
of legal matters, and it  is  agreed the auditor should not be expected to assume 
responsib ilit ie s in those areas where he lacks train ing, knowledge and 
experience. However, i t  does not necessarily follow that lawyers should 
assume an auditing function with respect to such areas. The role of lawyers 
in th is area should be consultative, consistent with the lawyers' obligations 
to their c lients. Unlike the auditor, a lawyer is  not an independent third- 
party intermediary and in accord with existing public policy lawyers are 
expected to maintain the traditional lawyer-client relationship. In specific  
cases or situations where i t  is  appropriate to refer to opinions of counsel on 
specific  matters, opinions could be provided and mentioned in footnotes, 
sim ilar to that practice sometimes followed in SEC registration statements.
Certainly corporate and outside counsel should provide fu ll professional 
assistance to management to enable it  to f u l f i l l  it s  corporate accountability 
and disclosure re sponsib ilit ie s. However, it  is  inappropriate to suggest or 
impose obligations or re sponsib ilit ie s inconsistent with the traditional role 
and re sponsib ilit ie s of lawyers. Shell believes SAS No. 12 is essentia lly  
valid  in that primary reporting re sponsib ility  rests with management and the 
lawyers' traditional role is  maintained.
SECTION 6 - THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITOR'S ROLE AND ITS EXTENSION
Recommendations: Aud itor's association with interim information, other
financial information in the annual report, or earnings forecasts should not be 
approached as separate services; rather as the total reporting process.
The audit function should not be limited by the annual financial statements. 
Auditor association should be limited to information of an accounting and 
financial nature; the accounting system establishes the most important audit 
function boundary.
The audit function should be expanded to include a ll accounting and financial 
information produced by the accounting system that management has a responsib ility  
to report; limited only by auditor competence relevant to verification.
The audit should be considered a function to be performed during a period of time 
rather than an audit of a particular set of financial statements:
- Financial statement audits should be expanded to include more elements of the 
financial reporting process.
- Annual financial statements, while the most important, should be only one 
audit element.
- Audit function should expand to include a ll important elements of the 
financial reporting process.
5- Audit expansion should begin with the accounting system and it s  controls.
- Add a new aspect to independent auditing - the need to examine and report 
on the functioning of the accounting process and it s  controls during the 
year.
These related recommendations are examined as a group. Shell 
believes the Commission proposes to extend the boundary of audited financial 
information not only beyond what is  needed by financial statement users, but 
beyond what is  desired by most users. Even i f  there was a need for the 
recommended expansion of the aud ito r 's  function and i f  public accounting firms 
had the sta ff capability and competence to adequately discharge those 
re sponsib ilit ie s (both being doubtful hypotheses), the increased costs to the 
shareholder would far outweigh the benefits. Undoubtedly, the recommendations 
would generate sizable increases in audit fees. More importantly, perhaps, the 
increased involvement of auditors in day-to-day operations would place an 
inordinate demand on management's time— time needed to properly conduct and 
control business operations. Time taken to apprise auditors of business 
conditions and plans, and to ju st ify  the correctness of business judgments 
would detract from management's a b il ity  to meet other more important 
re sp o n s ib ilit ie s .
Too l i t t le  is  known about the quantification of increased costs and 
the measurement of attendant benefits to users. The fact that the Commission 
concluded that benefit-cost analyses could not be conducted at th is time was 
dismissed with the rationalization  that the public accounting profession should 
provide the new services needed by society. There was no clear demonstration, 
however, of so c ie ty 's  need for new services.
The assertion that financial statement users need assurance on 
financial information not presently audited is  not persuasive. There is  no 
question but what users are demanding greater corporate accountability and a 
higher level of professionalism  in the public accounting profession. Shell believes 
these demands can be better achieved by improving existing reporting and auditing 
standards rather than by extending the aud ito r 's  role into other provinces.
Further, we believe user confidence in financial reporting is  far more 
dependent upon confidence in management and its  record of consistent and honest 
reporting rather than on the comfort and assurance provided by an aud itor 's 
opinion.
Shell agrees that auditors should be involved with the accounting process 
and controls throughout the year in order to f u l f i l l  their primary role of 
auditing and providing an opinion on the financial statements prepared by 
management. However, continuous involvement does not extend to auditing a ll or 
even more of the financial reporting processes. There is ,  already, considerable 
involvement by auditors with interim reports and other financial reporting 
throughout the year.
6Recommendation: After gaining experience with the expanded study of accounting
system controls, the auditor should be required to review the financial reporting 
process for interim reports as part of a single on-going audit. The review 
would be sim ilar to but more extensive than the "lim ited review" contemplated 
by SAS No. 10. The aud ito r 's  interim report should emphasize the review of the 
accounting process rather than providing assurance related to the interim 
information.
Shell believes the vast majority of interim financial reports are 
already responsible representations by management of operating performance.
It  is  doubtful that users would accept a review letter on the accounting 
process as the basis for appreciably improved confidence. Regardless of the 
report language, we believe the d istinction  between a review of the accounting 
process and an audit would not be understood by many users. A careful 
evaluation of the substance of the proposed reporting format leads us to the 
conclusion that the prudent and well-informed user would find l i t t le  value in 
an aud itor 's interim review of the accounting process. Shell does not agree 
with suggestions that s ign ifican tly  greater involvement by auditors in the 
financial reporting process is  needed to improve the process and the preparation 
of financial information.
Recommendation: The auditor should be fam iliar with the company's earnings plan
and should relate that plan to h is knowledge of it s  annual and quarterly budgets 
and it s  operating a c t iv it ie s.
Earnings plans are tools for guiding future management actions and are 
subject to frequent change and revision. Auditors do not need access to 
confidential future plans in order to f u l f i l l  their re sponsib ility  for 
auditing statements of financial condition and results. In fact, time taken 
to review such plans could detract from the aud ito r 's  a b ility  to sa t is fa c to rily  
conduct the audit in a timely manner. Shell agrees the auditor needs famil ia r ity  
with budgets and operating a c t iv it ie s  to a s s is t  in his role as auditor of 
financial statements and information.
Recommendation: The audit function should be extended to include other annual
report information (outside the financial statements) which is  derived from the 
accounting system.
Shell agrees. Management's re sponsib ility  for accurate and consistent 
reporting of other financial information in the annual report is  no less than 
that required for the financial statements.
Recommendation: The audit function should evolve to include information bearing
on the efficiency, economy, or effectiveness of corporate programs, including 
social programs, that is  produced by the accounting system and is  required to 
be disclosed in public releases of financial information.
7As in other areas the aud ito r 's  role should not be extended beyond 
normal verification  and audit of information produced by the accounting system 
which is  included or associated with annual financial statements or securities 
registrations which require an aud itor 's opinion.
SECTION 7 - THE AUDITOR'S COMMUNICATIONS WITH USERS
Recommendations: The aud ito r 's  report in the annual report should be more
descriptive of his role and findings.
Chief financial o ffice rs should present a new report with financial state­
ments acknowledging management re spon sib ilit ie s and describing programs and 
actions having a bearing on the financial statements and the accounting process.
Generally, Shell agrees with these proposals. A great deal of work 
would be required of standard-setting bodies to establish guidelines; however, 
several aspects of the Commission's suggested report examples have merit.
The fourth paragraph of the proposed aud ito r 's  report is  weak because it  
requires subjective judgements that would tend to confuse rather than enlighten 
statement users. We believe financial statements users are far more interested 
in the aud ito r 's  opinion as to the factual presentation of financial resu lts in a 
complete and honest manner. It  is  lik e ly  some users would view the latter part 
of the paragraph as a protective disclaimer by the auditor just in case some­
thing was wrong in the statements. The corresponding second paragraph of the 
proposed management report has basica lly  the same weaknesses. Further, both 
paragraphs could project an image of auditor-management conflict on procedural 
matters that could easily  be misunderstood by the user.
In the suggested management report the fourth paragraph might raise 
more questions and problems than i t  dispenses with. As suggested in our 
comments on Section 5, i t  might be appropriate to refer to opinions of legal 
counsel on some specific  cases or situations in footnotes to financial statements. 
Absent special circumstances, we do no t be lie ve  i t  is  appropriate to spec ifica lly  
mention outside experts, including auditors, in a report by management.
Basically, Shell believes such a report should be limited to setting forth the 
po lic ies, procedures and controls exercised by the company's management, 
board of directors and committees thereof.
SECTION 10 - THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AUDITING STANDARDS
Recommendation: AudSEC should be replaced by a smaller fu ll-tim e Auditing
Standards Board, appropriately' compensated.
In S h e ll 's  opinion the fu ll range of recommendations in th is section 
are appropriate. The Commission suggested two possible methods of providing 
for formal participation by outsiders. We believe aspects of both methods 
should be formally incorporated in an Auditing Standards Board's organizational 
and procedural documentation. While we believe outsider representation on the
8Board and an advisory committee would be highly desirable, we do not believe in 
specific membership quotas for either AICPA members or for members representing 
other groups or organizations. To achieve the best possible Board and advisory 
committee requires selection of the most qualified persons available on the basis 
of a b ility ,  knowledge, experience and interest without regard to association 
with the accounting profession, private industry, academe or any other group.
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Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
SUBJECT: The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
Report on Tentative Conclusions_____________
D ear M r. C a rm ic h a e l :
We have reviewed the report and offer our comments, most 
of which are noted on the enclosed "Response Sheet." Our comments are 
directed to the list of 39 recommendations as worded by the AICPA staff 
for the Member Forum Program. Instead of indicating our response by 
checking the appropriate "yes" or "no" blank for each recommendation, 
we have instead inserted the staff's recommendation number in the 
appropriate space. Since there does not seem to be specific provision 
for a response to Recommendation 7, we have inserted a comment on page 5, 
marked as C under Section 4.
The list of recommendations worded by the AICPA staff was 
especially helpful. We request that the Commission's final report 
specifically identify and highlight each of its recommendations, rather 
than just weave them into the text without special notice.
In view of the fundamental nature of the Commission's recommen­
dations, we are shocked and disappointed that their tentative report was 
not promptly distributed to all AICPA members as well as non-member 
preparers and users of financial statements. Since the sweeping recommen­
dations could impact all of those groups for many years, the topic of 
auditors' responsibilities deserves extensive consideration. We were 
not among those invited to the Member Forum Discussions. Upon learning of 
the significance of the Commission's recommendations, we requested a copy 
of the report. Since its receipt, we have devoted many hours to its 
study and consideration. We look forward to the timely receipt of a 
copy of your final report and hope that it will reflect our several comments.
Respectfully submitted,
J. Lee Ledbetter  
WPT/jLL/mct
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RESPONSE SHEET
Section 1:
Section 2:
MEMBER FORUM DISCUSSION
"Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: Report of Tentative Conclusions"
The Independent Auditor's Role in Society
A. Should AICPA encourage closer cooperation between audit committees of Boards 
of Directors and auditors? Should Boards regularly require a report from the 
auditor on the accounting system and controls over it?
Yes 1 No
Comments:
Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations
A. Should the auditor's reporting role be clarified as recommended? 
Yes 2 , 3 No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space fo r  c o m m e n ts , please use back o f page
- 2 -
Section 3:
Section 4:
Reporting on Significant Uncertainties
A. Do you agree that the auditor's report should be revised as recommended? 
Yes 4 No_______
Comments:
B. Should AICPA urge the FASB to adopt a standard that requires a separate note on 
uncertainties?
Yes 5 No______
Comments:
Clarifying the Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud
A. Do you agree that the application of the recommended guidelines would benefit 
both third parties and auditors?
Yes 6 No
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 3 -
Comments:
B. Should guidelines cover recommended requirement:
a. Yes 6 a No_______
Comment:
b. Yes 6 b No
Comment:
c. Yes 6 c No
Comment:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 4 -
d. Yes 6 d No
Comment:
e. Yes 6 e No
Comment:
f. Yes 6 f No
Comment:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
Section 5:
g. Yes 6 g No
Comment:
h. Yes 6h No
Comment:
Should Recommendation 7 be adopted?
Yes 7 No.
Comment: We suggest changing the phrase "of fraud" to
"of material fraud", to emphasize that regular
audit work is limited to major instances of fraud.
Corporate Accountability and the Law
A. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement this recommen­
dation?
Y es 8 ,10 ,11,12 ,13  No 9
Comments:
Recommendation 8 - Since all publicly-owned corporations should be
required to adhere to the same standards of
____________________ corporate accountability, we propose that a uniform
statement of such policies be developed through the 
coordinated efforts of the principal professional 
organizations representing preparers (including 
lawyers, actuaries and others who contribute to the
preparation), auditors and users of financial
____________________ statements. Such an effort should be funded by the
participating organizations.
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page (OVER)
— 5  —
- 6 -
Section 6:
i
The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and its Extension
A. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's role as recommended 
in Recommendation 14?
Yes 14 No______
Comments:
B. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's role as recommended 
in Recommendation 15?
Yes_____  No 15
Comments:
The auditor should not be required to comment on his review of management's 
description of the controls over the accounting system unless there 
are material weaknesses which management has not adequately disclosed.
See also Comments for Section 7, Item A.
C. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's role as recommended 
in Recommendation 16?
Yes_____  No 16__
Comments:
We do not believe that auditors should be required to report publicly on
quarterly financial information unless that information has been subjected 
__to the same auditing standards as annual audits. If the information were
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page (OVER)
Section 7: The Auditor's Communication with Users
A. Should the auditor's standard report be revised to provide for an expanded flexible 
report?
Yes______ No 17
Comments: Although we agree that the current standard audit report
could be clarified, we cannot accept the logic that a new standard audit
report with standard alternatives will be read as much or more carefully 
than the current report. Sophisticated users will first look for the 
standard buzz words to see which standard paragraphs have been used and 
then for the standard buzz words which identify the standard alternative 
used. Unsophisticated users may notice that the report is there but will 
not change their habit of skipping it. 
The audit report should be as short as possible and as non-technical as 
possible while meeting all of the professional and governmental regulatory 
requirements and highlighting exceptions. We suggest a standardized (OVER)
B. Should the report reflect the recommendations concerning:
1. Consistency
Yes 18 No
Comments:
2. Reliance on work of another auditor 
Yes______ No 19
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
-7-
- 8 -
Comments:
The principal auditor should not duplicate the work of another 
auditor just to avoid relying on the work of another auditor.
Such a requirement could lead to higher than necessary audit 
fees, expecially in years where a merger or acquisition occurred 
after auditors of each organization had begun their work for 
the year. This proposal would also tend to favor larger CPA 
firms at the expense of smaller ones when clients of smaller 
firms establish operations distant from their principal operations, 
especially if the expansion were overseas.
3. Unaudited information associated with audited information 
Yes______  No 20
Comments:
The auditor should not report on unaudited data with which 
he is associated unless management has not reported the
data appropriately. See Comments for Item A.____________
C. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to require that corporate 
management present a report as recommended?
Yes No 21
Comments:
Although we approve of Recommendation 21 as written, the illustration 
on page 79 of the Commission’s report should be modified in several respects
a. The comments in the second paragraph on the correction of
material weaknesses in the accounting and control system
_________should be excluded Unless there is a weakness at the statement
date or a weakness was eliminated during the year. See Comments 
for Item A.
b. We also propose deleting the second and fourth sentences of the 
third paragraph. These report that the board members who serve
on the audit committee are neither officers nor employees and 
mention meetings of the audit committee. If such information 
is meaningful at all, perhaps it would be more appropriate in 
the proxy statement.
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page (OVER)
- 9 -
Section 8:
D. Should AICPA urge the stock exchange to Implement the recommendation that 
auditors be required to be present at the company's annual meeting to answer ques­
tions of shareholders?
Yes 22 No
Comments:
The Education, Training and Development of Auditors
A. Should AlCPA's goal be a four-year undergraduate and three-year graduate program 
of entrance education?
Yes_____  No 23
Comments:
While we agree that public accounting must be able to attract to the
profession enough persons with adequate training and skills to meet the 
requirements of society, we cannot justify such a requirement for entry-
level auditors in the foreseeable future. Certainly, we would encourage 
accounting students to seek as much education as they desire. However, 
we would be reluctant to recommend doctoral programs to them if they wish 
to enter the accounting profession. Possibly the reason so many of those
with Ph.D. degrees in accounting have remained in academia is that the 
market for their services in the business world is very limited. We are also 
concerned about the economics of such a general educational requirement from 
the standpoint of the individual students and ability of industry to afford
B. Should AICPA work toward separate schools of professional accounting or place 
principal emphasis on graduate degree programs in professional accounting regard­
less of organizational structure?
(OVER)
Yes No
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
- 1 0 -
Although we do not oppose separate schools of professional accounting, 
we feel that principal emphasis should be placed on making educators 
at both the graduate and undergraduate levels more aware of the
profession’s needs and assist them in developing courses with 
appropriate content. This should alleviate the burden of entry-level 
training which has fallen on public accounting firms by default of 
the educational system.
Comments:
C. Should AICPA provide a form of membership for non-CPA accounting educators? 
Yes 24 No
Comments:
D. Should AICPA encourage state societies to provide similar forms of membership? 
Yes 24 No_____
Comments:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back of page
- 1 1  -
Section 9: Maintaining the Independence of the Auditor
A. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement Recommendation 
25?
Yes 25 No______
Comments:
B. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement Recommendation 
26?
Yes 26 No______
Comments:
If board's of directors are to determine if other services 
performed by auditors pose an independence problem, then some 
technical group, such as the AICPA, should establish guidelines
so that well-informed non-accountants who serve on boards can 
adequately monitor relationships.
C.   Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement Recommendation
27?
Yes 27 No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space fo r comments, please use back of page
- 12 -
D. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct to implement Recommendation 28? 
Yes No 28
Comments:
We believe it is impossible to administer this proposal in a wav that: 
would avoid the appearance of conflicts of interest. A placement 
that would comply with this recommendation at the time it was made
could very possibly not comply within a short time as a result of
changes in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the placement.
The cases referred to on page 99 of the Commission’s report do not, in 
our view, represent conflicts of interest so much as they appear to be
E. 1. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement Recom­
mendation 29?
Yes 29 No
Comment:
2. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct which would require a successor 
auditor to insist on such disclosure?
Yes 29 No_______
(OVER)
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 1 3 -
Comment:
F. Should AICPA support Recommendation 30? 
Yes 30 No______
Comments:
G. Should AICPA implement Recommendation 31 through its Quality Control Review 
Program?
Yes 31 No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 1 4 -
Section 10:
H. Should AICPA implement Recommendation 32 through its Quality Control Review 
Program?
Yes 32 No
Comments:
I. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct to implement Recommendation 33? 
Yes 33 No______
Comments:
The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards
A. Should an Auditing Standards Board of full-time members be established? 
Yes 34 No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 1 5
B. Should AICPA implement the recommendation that more attention be directed to 
the needs of firms involved with non-publicly-owned companies?
Yes 35 No
Comments:
Section 11: Regulating the Profession to Maintain the Quality of Audit Practice
A. In re Recommendation 36, should AICPA publish the names of all members invol­
ved in Trial Board actions and name all those against whom action is taken?
Yes 36 No
Comments:
B. In re Recommendation 37, should AICPA initiate action in support of this recom­
mendation?
Yes 37 No
I f  you need additional space for comments, please use back o f page
- 1 6 -
Comments:
C. In re Recommendation 38, should AICPA urge CPA firms to experiment with the 
type of reporting suggested?
Yes 38 N o
Comments:
D. In re Recommendation 39, should AICPA regularly conduct studies and publish 
findings about cases involving significant audit failures, as it did in the Equity 
Funding case?
Yes 39 No______
Comments:
I f  you need additional space fo r comments, please use back o f page
r
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15 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10023 • (212) 765-7500
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CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS A-39
June 14, 1977
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Attn: Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
Research Director
Dear Sirs:
Enclosed are this firm's comments on the Commissions’
Report of Tentative Conclusions. I know that it is a day 
late, but I would respectfully request that you still consider 
the comments set forth.
Very truly yours
Richard A. Meyer 
General Counsel
RAM:s 
ends.
(Hand Deliver)
Offices Throughout the United States • Representation in Other Parts of the World through Binder Seidman International
C E R T I F I E D  P U B L I C  A C C O U N T A N T S
15 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10023 (212) 765-7500
June 14, 1977
To: Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Attn: Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael
Research Director________
Re: Comments on Commissions' Report
of Tentative Conclusions____
Dear Sirs:
On behalf of my firm, I wish to offer certain comments on 
the Commission's recently issued Report of Tentative Conclusions. 
First, however, I would like to extend our congratulations to the 
Commission on its substantial efforts. The Report is well written 
and evidences a significant investigation into the various aspects 
of auditors' responsibilities.
We have one general criticism. Many of the items in the 
Report seem sketchy compared to the overall Report, and offer little 
guidance to auditors. For example, in Section 4, on auditors' re­
sponsibility for detecting fraud, the middle item on page 39 in­
volves the study and evaluation of internal controls. This is an 
important area. In fact, the Report deals with it again in Section 
6, and makes certain recommendations. However, the discussion on
Offices Throughout the United States • Representation in Other Parts of the World through Binder Seidman International
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page 39 consists of two short paragraphs. Without further guidance, 
the Report suggests "...a study and evaluation of internal control 
beyond that now required,” and that the auditor should be concerned 
with "...all controls that have a significant bearing on the preven­
tion and detection of fraud.” We do not believe such, summarial 
recommendations are helpful.
We understand the Commission's role, and that the procedures 
for implementing its recommendations are left to the profession and 
other appropriate bodies. However, we believe that the circumstances 
surrounding a Commission recommendation should be fully discussed, 
the recommendation explained and reasonably defined, as has been done 
in many cases. Vague or general suggestions raise questions, but do 
not provide the necessary guidance to the profession or those charged 
with standard-setting.
We are especially concerned with two areas of the Report: re­
sponsibilities with respect to fraud; and competition among firms.
We feel that the entire discussion on the auditors' responsibility 
for detecting fraud is too summarial and general, and includes some 
dangerous comments. Section 4 contains a useful discussion of the 
background to the problem--expectations of users, concepts of fraud, 
etc. It also contains some interesting recommendations. Too much 
of this Section, however, appears to be a recap of material pre­
viously published elsewhere. It does not seem to reflect the fresh
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thinking evident in other parts of the Report.
The summarial nature of the discussion leads to troublesome 
statements, such as that the auditor "...has a duty to search for 
fraud...” (p. 36). While this is tempered somewhat by other comments, 
it is too broad and vague by itself. "An auditor cannot be expected 
to detect all frauds” (p. 37) does not explain the scope of the duty 
to search for it, nor give an indication of those frauds one can 
expect to be detected. While the recommendations help somewhat in 
this regard, they are often too general and insufficiently explained. 
We also note that the Report does not substantially address certain 
considerations, with respect to the detection of fraud, such as: 
the tailoring of audit programs; communications between predecessor 
and successor auditors; communications with the SEC; and data pro­
cessing matters.
The auditor’s duty with respect to fraud is relevant. If the 
matter is to be discussed, it should be thrashed out and brought down 
to some reasonably definitive conclusions. If the subject is too 
complex for the Commission to deal with fully, which would be under­
standable, it should say so and possibly set forth some recommenda­
tions in that context.
One disturbing suggestion by the Commission is that the AICPA 
should regularly issue reports on frauds, such as its report on the 
Equity Funding matter (pp. 39-40). We disagree, and the suggestion
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is inconsistent with the recommendations made in Section 11. Re­
ports analyzing individual fraud cases as they move through the 
courts, as suggested on page 145, may well be useful. However, the 
Equity Funding report was not of that nature.
The Equity Funding report was a critical discussion of the 
audits, inexcusably issued during the course of litigation, before 
any trial, and was a disservice to the AICPA and the profession.
The report was ill-conceived in an emotional atmosphere after the 
Equity scandal arose. It was based to a large extent on material 
supplied by persons who were suing the auditors, and on press reports. 
The investigation was more a witch-hunt than a careful analysis. 
Auditors who were involved were not interviewed; many workpapers 
were not reviewed. The report was issued in the midst of complex 
litigation over the objections of at least two members of the report 
committee and other responsible persons. The report provided no 
substantial answers to the questions raised by the Equity fraud; 
its principal accomplishment was to bolster the plaintiffs’ arguments 
against the auditors in the settlement negotiations, to the eventual 
detriment of the whole profession.
The Equity report then is not the type of communication by 
the profession which should be encouraged. It represents an arbitrary, 
unproductive effort which should be discouraged. Of much greater 
benefit to the profession and society would be a thorough, careful
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analysis of a problem, such as Equity Funding, providing guidance 
for future situations. This may be the type of report the Commission 
envisions on page 145, and could be useful.
We agree with most of the Commission's other recommendations 
in Section 4, but have the following comments.
Extending study of an evaluation of internal control: This
recommendation, of extending the study and evaluation of 
internal control beyond that which the auditor believes 
necessary to perform his audit, would add substantially 
to the cost of an audit, particularly for smaller clients.
We do not feel that the Commission has provided sufficient 
rationale to justify this recommendation in view of its 
additional cost to society. If there is to be an expanded 
study of internal control, we suggest the requirement be 
limited to publicly-held companies.
Developing and disseminating information on frauds and 
methods of detecting frauds: While we agree that auditors
should be generally knowledgeable about the latest methods 
of perpetration of fraud, we do not think there should be 
a higher responsibility imposed on the auditor for the 
detection of fraud. For example, there should not be a 
responsibility in a normal audit to expand audit procedures
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simply to ascertain whether the type of frauds perpetrated 
in other situations have occurred.
Awareness of deficiencies in individual audit techniques 
and steps: The AICPA should pay continuous attention to 
the effectiveness of conventional auditing techniques and 
develop new ones as the need arises; but the individual 
auditor should not have to assume the burden of developing 
other auditing procedures unless he is aware that a step 
he is performing has little validity on a particular audit.
We are also concerned with the discussions on competition among 
accounting firms appearing on pages 106-118, in Section 9 on Inde­
pendence. We are happy that the Commission has addressed what we 
perceive to be a serious problem within the profession, and we agree 
with many of the conclusions and recommendations. However, we do 
not feel the Commission has dealt adequately with the problem and 
find that it has too cryptically dismissed items as not being of 
concern.
In our practice, my firm has experienced many questionable 
and undesirable practices in competing with large national firms.
I will limit my present comments to irresponsible price competition 
and related questions. These activities are not only harmful to 
smaller firms, but are dangerous to the entire profession.
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Unfair competition with respect to engagements for publicly- 
held companies is a very real problem. The Commission has properly 
concluded that "...the profit motive, competition among firms, and 
the need to attract new clients and keep existing ones are...empha­
sized too much.” (p. 113). We also agree with the Commission's 
view that accepting engagements at a loss, to be offset by future 
fees, may create an independence problem, a matter the AICPA should 
consider.
Yet, the Report does not fully come to grips with the problem. 
Indeed, the discussion of the concentration of public company audits 
in large national firms (pp. 109-110) appears to be a defense of the 
large firms' activity, not a thoughtful analysis of the matter. For 
example, the Commission too cryptically concludes that there is no 
evidence to support the presumption that concentration might result 
in poor audits. We agree the big firms are making efforts to improve 
the quality of their work. All firms are. However, that is not a 
complete answer.
"Concentration" cannot be viewed as a bare concept, but should 
be viewed in light of the present excessive price competition (Report, 
pp. 107-9). Fee-cutting appears a normal practice of some large firms 
for obtaining and maintaining engagements for large public companies. 
This obviously encourages the trimming of audit procedures, shortcutting
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and hurried work. We have heard reports of such practices being em­
ployed, as cost-reducing devices. Such inappropriate practices re­
sult in bad audits. Thus, concentration, in conjunction with exces­
sive price competition, does encourage substandard work. Further, 
such a system has the unfortunate habit of enforcing itself, and en­
couraging further, undesirable cost-saving practices.
The concentration of publicly-held clients in the big firms 
tends to create other problems. However, it is the fact that such 
concentration is based in part on inappropriate price competition 
that must be of major concern to the profession, and to society. It 
encourages cost-reducing practices and discourages objective pro­
fessional performance.
Another cryptic, self-serving comment, on page 110, is: 
"Concentration may also hold the promise of benefits to users." There 
follow, in the discussion on pages 109-110, unfounded suggestions 
that only the big firms can adequately audit large public companies, 
that concentration reduces costs to users, and that the performance 
of such audits by smaller firms is undesirable because the fees may 
be material as to the smaller firm. The Commission should not be a 
party to such statements, which are misleading and promotional of 
the big firms' activity. Such statements seem to support an argument 
that only big firms should audit public companies of any size.
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Smaller national firms like ours, with international affiliations, 
are equipped to audit most public companies, even international 
entities, as efficiently as the large firms. The fees of such 
clients would not generally be material to a firm such as ours.
Many regional firms, too, are equipped to audit smaller public com­
panies, and would not have a materiality problem on the fees.
Further, the big firms, like other firms, must serve their 
large public clients through one primary office. That office must 
be concerned with retaining that client and making a profit. The 
fees may well be material to that office. Viewed in this manner, 
such engagements pose as much a potential independence problem to 
the big firms as to smaller ones.
The Commission has not dealt with the affect on smaller firms 
of the concentration of public company audits in the large firms.
Many smaller firms like ours depend in part on public-company busi­
ness. The increasing concentration will destroy some smaller firms, 
stymie the growth of others, and reduce our ability to compete with 
the larger firms. The problems stemming from concentration, discussed 
above, will then be greatly intensified. It will also create an even 
greater domination of the profession by the larger firms. On pages
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109-110, the Commission states that, because of price competition, 
"there is no reason to condemn concentration on the basis of costs 
to the users of financial statements." This ignores the fact that 
the solidifying of such concentration will reduce competition and 
enable the large firms to charge greater fees to public company 
clients. The users will be the ultimate victims of those larger fees.
There are other problems involved with big firms securing en­
gagements on the basis of low initial fees, and with the concentra­
tion of the public company practice in such firms. We do not feel 
the Commission has adequately analyzed this area or dealt with it 
completely, as we think it should. We do not know all the answers 
to the problems of price competition and concentration. Treating 
fee-cutting, with contemplated recoupment, as an independence problem 
is one answer. There must also be stronger sanctions against un­
ethical practices in securing audit engagements, and more attention 
to this area by the proper authorities. In any case, we feel the 
Commission should have taken a stronger stand, and come up with 
more recommendations, in this area.
Outside of the main concerns above, we have certain other 
comments on the Report, which I will set forth in the same order 
as that of the Report.
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Section 1
We agree with most of the Commission’s comments and recom­
mendations in Section 1. However, while we agree that auditors 
should have a closer working relationship with a company's board of 
directors, we do not feel that the Report provides enough guidance 
in this area. For example, it would be helpful if the Commission 
made further and more definitive recommendations with respect to 
interaction between the auditors and a company’s audit committee, and 
with respect to other communications between the auditors and the 
board of directors.
Section 2
Evaluating the appropriateness of accounting in areas in 
which there appear to be acceptable alternative accounting principles 
The Commission’s discussion of the selection of accounting principles 
from alternatives should not deal with accounting for transactions 
in accordance with their substance. To account for them otherwise 
would not be in conformity with GAAP; therefore, there is no alterna­
tive involved. We believe that, absent a conceptual framework for 
financial reporting or an objective basis in accounting literature, 
the auditor cannot form a professional judgment as to appropriate­
ness without introducing personal bias; this would result in the 
auditor superimposing his personal bias for that of the management.
In the case of most accounting alternatives there is rationale for
each of the alternatives and therefore it's a question of degree -
i.e. how much weight should be given each reason - pro or con - 
for a particular accounting alternative. In practice, this evalua­
tion is very difficult if not impossible for the auditor to make, 
and at the same time preserve the character of financial statements 
as being those of the company. Moreover, auditor evaluation in these 
circumstances would encourage the unhealthy practice of "shopping 
around” for accounting principles. Therefore, the thought of ex­
tending the requirement for the auditor to judge preferability of 
acceptable accounting alternatives when there are no objective stan­
dards is ludicrous in those cases where there is not even a switch 
from one accounting principle to another. In fact, some of the 
"free-choice” alternatives mentioned in the report, although char­
acterized as extremely few, are those that have a very significant 
impact on financial reporting. Moreover, those alternatives that 
are not "free-choice” normally have objective criteria to determine 
preferability and, therefore, in those cases we would agree that 
the most appropriate accounting method should apply regardless of 
whether there is an accounting change.
Evaluating whether financial statements taken as a whole have 
been prepared in a biased manner or are otherwise misleading: We
think it would generally be very difficult, if not impossible, for 
the auditor to evaluate whether the cumulative effect of the selection
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and application of accounting principles produces a misleading pic­
ture. Our feeling is that as long as the basic underlying accounting 
principles are described (which they are not under existing litera­
ture), the reader would be in a position to evaluate the risk factors 
involved.
Section 5
Responsibility for detecting illegal or questionable acts: If
a corporation adopts a policy on corporate conduct and procedures 
to monitor compliance with the policy, the auditor in a separate en­
gagement could review the policies and procedures to determine whether 
there are material weaknesses in them. However, we do not believe 
it necessary for the normal audit under generally accepted auditing 
standards to be expanded to have the auditor plan his examination 
to search for illegal acts. Because of a lower materiality threshold 
for illegal acts, it would unnecessarily add significant costs to 
the ordinary audit.
Reporting on corporate codes of conduct: We do not think the
auditor should report publicly on corporate codes of conduct because 
of the cost involved in making such a mandatory review and the false 
expectations that the public might receive from that kind of a re­
port, in view of the inherent limitations involved in any system 
and procedures to prevent or detect illegal or questionable acts.
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Increased involvement of lawyers on illegal or questionable 
acts: The Commission is correct that the conformity of a corpora­
tion’s actions with laws and regulations is properly within manage­
ment's and the lawyers' scope of responsibility, not the auditors'. 
However, the Commission would still impose on auditors inappropriate 
duties, such as requiring them (p. 48) to publicly disclose question 
able or illegal acts when management or the board of directors makes 
"an inadequate response." We feel the Commission's conclusions 
would leave auditors in substantially the same, uncomfortable posi­
tion as at present. The conclusions do not reflect the shifting of 
most responsibility on illegal and questionable payments to manage­
ment and the lawyers as suggested by the Commission.
Section 6
Expanding study and evaluation of internal control: Because
this would substantially add to the cost of an audit and because the 
perceived need for this service is largely in the public sector, we 
do not think it should be extended to all companies. If expanded at 
all, it should be limited to publicly-held companies. Even with re­
spect to publicly-held companies, we doubt that management's dis­
cussion of its controls would have any meaning to the public and, 
in fact, such controls may appear to others to be more impressive 
than they actually are. Users would have more of an interest in
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knowing of material weaknesses, than of being in a position to 
evaluate the controls from the description given by management.
Also, before the auditor will be in a position to report all material 
weaknesses in controls, a framework would have to be developed as 
to the objectives of internal controls and what would constitute 
weaknesses in the system.
More extensive involvement in the financial reporting pro­
cess review: We believe the SAS No. 10 type of review would be
sufficient, and need not be expanded for this purpose.
Extension of the auditor's role re other annual report data:
We disagree with the recommendation for the auditor to immediately 
extend the audit function to other information in an annual report 
and modify his report accordingly. While we agree with the idea of 
communicating better in a report, that communication should, at 
least initially, relate to the financial statements and not to 
matters with which auditors are not traditionally associated in the 
public's mind.
Section 7
A new approach to reporting: We agree that there needs to
be better communication in the auditor's report. Moreover, we generally 
agree with the idea of a report by management, and with the idea of 
expanding upon the auditor's report, to better communicate. However,
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we have concerns about some of the substance of the auditor's report, 
which concerns are set forth above in response to other recommenda­
tions.
Section 8
Professional schools for accounting: We agree with the recom­
mendation.
Professional society affiliations for academics: We do not
think that non-CPAs should be permitted to join the AICPA. While 
we agree with the desirability of improving interaction between 
academicians and practicing accountants, such interaction can be en­
couraged by the AICPA through other means, without admitting aca­
demicians to membership in the AICPA.
Section 10
Retain standard setting in the private sector and with the 
AICPA: We heartily agree.
Replace AudSEC with a full-time Board: We agree, provided
there are safeguards to assure adequate consideration of the im­
pact on smaller clients and smaller accounting firms. We feel 
AudSEC has performed well, but the need for more attention to this 
area would be better served by a full time group.
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Participation from outside the profession in setting standards: 
While we agree with the recommendation of greater outside participa­
tion, these outsiders should not serve directly on the new standards- 
setting Board because of their lack of practical knowledge and ex­
perience in auditing.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the tentative Re ­
port of the Commission, and we would be happy to expand on any of 
our comments at the Commission's request. We wish the Commission 
success in its further deliberations and the conclusion of its sub­
stantial and difficult task.
Respectfully submitted,
Bernard Z . Lee 
Managing Partner
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Research Director
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
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New York, NY 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
The Regulation and Surveillance Group of the New 
York Stock Exchange, Inc. is pleased to submit its 
commentary on the AICPA's Independent Commission 
Report of Tentative Conclusions on Auditors' Responsi­
bilities. Generally, we endorse the tentative con­
clusions and recommendations and offer our congratu­
lations to the Commission for the fine job it has 
done.
Please don't hesitate to call on us for any assistance 
or support that you feel may be helpful in reaching 
your stated objective.
Very truly yours,
 
 
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 55 Water Street New York, New York 10041
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AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES
A New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Regulation and Surveillance 
Group Commentary Submitted to the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants' Independent Commission on Auditors' Responsi­
bilities.
1This paper represents a commentary on the Report of Tentative 
Conclusions of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, an ad­
visory commission established by the American Institute of Certi­
fied Public Accountants (AICPA). The commentary represents the 
position of the staff of the Regulation and Surveillance Group of 
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Because of the uniqueness in­
volved in broker/dealer auditing and regulating, our report briefly 
discusses the group's operating functions and responsibilities 
before addressing the Commission's conclusions.
THE EXCHANGE'S ROLE 
AS A SELF-REGULATOR
The Regulation and Surveillance Group regulates and monitors 
the financial and operational condition and sales practices of 374 
member firms who, in the aggregate handle 85% of our nation's secur­
ities business. In performing these responsibilities, the Exchange 
is subject to the jurisdiction and oversight of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which designated the Exchange as the 
primary self-regulator of its broker/dealer members. In order to 
effectively regulate the broker/dealer community, the SEC and the 
Exchange adopted a series of financial responsibility and report­
ing rules.
REQUIREMENTS FOR AUDITS OF 
BROKER/DEALERS IN SECURITIES
The financial responsibility rules are concerned with broker/ 
dealer financial viability and operational integrity and the pro­
tection of customers' assets. The reporting rule, SEC Rule 17a-5,
2provides the framework for the comprehensive monitoring system 
which is supplemented by examinations conducted by the Exchange's 
personnel. Since the audited financial statement required by SEC 
Rule 17a-5 is to be presented in a form similar to the financial 
reports submitted to the Exchange by broker/dealers during the 
year, the annual audit - by virtue of its confirming character­
istic - is the cornerstone of the broker/dealer reporting system. 
Because our commentary is based on our experience with broker/ 
dealer audits, a copy of the relevant sections of the SEC Rule 
17a-5 pertaining to the audit function is included in the appendix 
of this paper.
Basically, the reporting rule mandates that each broker/dealer 
doing a public business be subject to an annual audit. As such, it 
defines a series of minimum requirements as to the conduct of the 
audit and the content of the resulting audited reports.
In addition, the audit rule requires that the independent ac­
countant express an opinion on the financial statement and on the 
computations of Net Capital and Customer Protection Reserves under 
the financial responsibility rules. This is especially relevant in 
that SEC Rule 15c3-1, the Net Capital rule, makes it unlawful for 
a broker/dealer to do business if they are not in compliance with 
this rule. Furthermore, the auditor is required to issue a letter 
identifying any material inadequacies that were found in the ac­
counting system, internal control, and procedures for safeguarding 
securities, etc. Consequently, the Exchange views the statements
3and reports on which independent auditors' render opinions as 
critical to the effectiveness of its regulation and surveillance 
efforts.
Examinations of member firms conducted by Exchange personnel 
are not reaudits. Accordingly, the Exchange relies on the in­
tegrity and professionalism of independent accounting firms and 
expects professional presentation characterized by full and com­
plete disclosure of material adverse matters.
The degree of disclosure and comprehensiveness of the opinion 
are required by the rule with the express purpose of assisting the 
designated primary self-regulator in fulfilling its surveillance 
responsibilities under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
In effect, the self-regulator is the primary user of financial 
reports and statements audited by independent public accountants.
In our case, the Exchange is the primary user of the auditors' 
reports concerning 374 member organizations. It is in this role 
that we offer our commentary to the Commission. The major section 
of this paper discusses our experiences with the gap that we per­
ceive to exist between auditors' performance and our expectations.
THE GAP BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE AND EXPECTATIONS
Before the formation of the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC), the New York Stock Exchange, through its Special 
Trust Fund, assumed responsibility for the protection of customers' 
accounts at certain liquidating member organizations that were 
unable to meet their obligations to their customers.
4During the liquidation process, numerous material accounting 
and operational deficiencies were discovered by Exchange staff 
members. In some instances, these deficiencies indicated that 
audits were not conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards (GAAS). Most often in such instances, adequate 
disclosure of material information had not been made. In some 
instances, rather than submit to a legal proceeding, some of the 
accounting firms involved acquiesced to the Exchange's claims of 
material deficiencies in auditing procedures and reporting require 
ments and entered into monetary settlements with the Exchange.
In other instances, the Exchange refrained from legal action 
because the monetary damages arising from such inadequacies were 
not large enough to justify legal proceedings.
Following, are five examples of deficiencies discovered by 
the Exchange staff during the liquidation process. The defi­
ciencies which were found to have been in existence from several 
months to several years were of such a material nature that, if 
properly disclosed and comprehended in the capital computation, 
they would have resulted in violations of the financial respon­
sibility rule then in effect. We should point out that these 
deficiencies were encountered when the securities industry was 
undergoing a severe "operations backlog". Although some would 
view this as mitigative in circumstance, the Exchange feels that 
this period demonstrated a classic need for quality audits.
51. General ledger accounts were out of balance for 
unreasonable time periods on numerous occasions. These differ­
ence or suspense items, related to security positions as well 
as money balances, were not audit-verified, not disclosed and 
not comprehended as a charge in the net capital computation.
In addition, subsidiary ledger trial balances were found to have 
been out of balance for unreasonable time periods. The reports 
did not disclose these out-of-balance conditions and the ac­
countants rendered unqualified opinions in their submitted reports.
2. Bank reconciliations had not been prepared and 
cash accounts had not been adjusted for material debit or 
credit items on many occasions. The Exchange staff also noted 
that material adjusting entries had not been made to correct 
the books and records. In some instances, bank reconciliations 
had not been prepared by the member organizations for unreason­
able time periods. Disclosure of these deficiencies was not 
made in the auditor's report.
3. Stock records - the records that list each security 
with detailed information about its ownership and physical loca­
tion - had been materially out of balance as of the audit date. 
Capital computations did not properly comprehend charges for 
these out-of-balance conditions. Disclosure was not made, and 
unqualified opinions were rendered.
4. Omnibus account balances with other broker/dealers, 
for material money balances and securities positions, were not 
reconciled for unreasonable time periods by the member organiza­
tions and the accounting firms did not prepare proper reconciliations.
6Confirmation responses were not reconciled with the money balances 
and security positions. Correcting journal entries were not made. 
In one instance, these out-of-balance conditions continued for at 
least two consecutive annual audits. The submitted reports, which 
were accompanied by clean opinions, did not disclose any deficiency 
or problem in this area.
5. Money balances due from customers were presented as 
being "bona fide" (current and collectible) cash accounts or as 
fully secured accounts. However, some material customers' account 
balances were not collectible and were either unsecured or partly 
secured. Capital computations were incorrect since the computa­
tions did not comprehend these incorrect classifications. In one 
instance, a customer's account with a material balance was classi­
fied as a bona fide cash account for two successive audits when, 
in fact, it was unsecured.
In recent years the Exchange has not supervised the liquida­
tion of any broker/dealers. Consequently, while we have seen no 
evidence casting doubt on the quality of most current audits we 
are not in a position to determine the extent to which the afore­
mentioned audit inadequacies have been eliminated.
Today, our differences with auditors are more fundamental. 
However, any differences of opinion are much more difficult to 
resolve. Generally, our dissatisfaction lies with the area of 
limited disclosure and the profession's general unwillingness to 
recognize that designated self-regulators are the prime users' 
of the audit report and, consequently, accept the attendant respon­
sibility the auditors have to those users'.
7For example, some accounting firms issue a confidential 
"management letter" to member organizations that, in effect, is 
a critique of a member's accounting system, operations department 
and internal controls. Recommendations are made to improve any 
disclosed deficiencies of the aforementioned areas. Accountants 
will not provide the Exchange with a copy of this management 
letter, claiming a confidential client relationship.
As a result of this practice, the following questions arise: 
How can the Exchange determine whether there are any material weak 
nesses inherent in the member's accounting system, operations or 
internal controls, if the Exchange, as the designated primary self 
regulator, is not privy to this confidential letter? Does the 
confidential management letter contradict the material inadequacy 
letter which may have stated that no material weaknesses were dis­
closed? Has full disclosure been made to the Exchange regarding 
the material aspects of the critique? If the accountants' role 
is interpreted to be that of an impartial party, how can this be 
reconciled with the need for a confidential report to the client? 
Does the preparation of a confidential management letter place 
the accountant in the position of being an advocate of the member 
organization (client) and, in turn, an adversary of the Exchange 
or any user relying on the accountant's opinion? Is the confi­
dentiality concept of management letters appropriate in broker/ 
dealer audits in view of the requirements of SEC Rule 17a-5?
8As long as the practice continues, these questions will linger 
with us as a self-regulator.
Recently, certain audited financial statements were submitted 
that reflected management's opinion on pending legal actions, al­
though an independent legal opinion had been obtained from the 
client's outside counsel. In some cases, management's opinion 
concerning contingent liabilities, or the resolution of pending 
litigation differed from that of the outside counsel. The Ex­
change believes if outside legal opinion has been obtained, the 
footnote to the financial statements should contain the substance 
of such an opinion.
In another situation, footnotes in the submitted reports 
were stated in vague, deceptive and misleading language. In one 
instance, an accounting firm stated that sufficient information 
and adequate disclosure had been submitted to the Exchange rela­
tive to a material problem. However, the Exchange's examination 
disclosed that the information referred to was indicated in a 
four-word parenthetic statement which contained misleading in­
formation. In essence the parenthetic statement commented on 
the currency of certain items in terms of being outstanding longer 
than 40 days. We subsequently learned that such items were in 
fact outstanding for at least three-to-five-years and should have 
been considered in the firm's capital computation. The eventual 
outcome of this situation was the decision by the member firm to 
liquidate its business.
9A RECOMMENDATION TO
OVERCOME COMMUNICATIONS BARRIERS
Currently, if a specific difference of opinion exists between 
the Exchange staff and an independent accountant or his client, 
there is no vehicle to reach an ultimate mutual understanding. 
Although the Exchange has regulatory authority over its membership, 
it does not have jurisdiction over the accountants.
In numerous instances, the accountants have dismissed our 
concerns with the statement that the items under discussion are 
not "material" and that the professional judgment exercised by the 
accountant is final. When users such as the Exchange and auditors 
disagree, there should be recourse for resolution other than legal 
action, which can be costly, time-consuming and embarrassing.
The Exchange believes that if the AICPA established a vehicle 
—  i.e., a forum to stimulate discussion where differences of 
opinion exist —  hopefully, a reconciliation of such differences 
could be achieved.
In addition, a component of this vehicle should explore the 
professional accountability of individual Certified Public Accoun­
tants. Recently, we informed the AICPA's Committee on Professional 
Ethics of a situation where we questioned the independence of an 
auditor vis-a-vis his client. Although the Committee investigated 
the matter, it was not empowered to inform us of its final disposi­
tion. Consequently, we were provided with no response or perspective 
with which to arrive at our own determination on the position we 
should take relative to the audit. It seems to us that the AICPA,
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as the professional authority for CPAs, ought to consider desig­
nating its staff to act for the Institute in enforcing professional 
standards and establishing a hearing process whereby such questions 
can be decided, with public disclosure of penalties for inadequate, 
substandard or negligent observance of auditing standards. The 
Exchange's own disciplinary process may furnish an example of a 
balance of fairness with due process, privacy for persons found 
not guilty, and public notice of disciplinary penalties. We feel 
that some change is necessary in the governance of the professional 
accountants. The alternative is the imposition of complex rules 
of conduct by regulatory authorities or Congress.
The issues that must be faced in deciding how auditors should 
meet the audit requirements entail many fundamental value judgments. 
In exercising such judgment the independent accountant must give 
consideration to the underlying purpose of the audit. The auditor 
can be aided in his considerations by referring to the objectives 
stated in SEC Rule 17a-5. Because one of the major functions of 
the audit is to provide users with the financial information 
necessary to fulfill their responsibilities, the accountants' should 
place greater importance on the regulatory establishment as a prime 
user of the auditor's report and be guided accordingly. In short, 
we do not expect the accounting profession to regulate the securities 
industry but, rather, look for their professional cooperation so 
as to allow us to meet our overall regulatory objectives.
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Considering the importance of these objectives, we are greatly 
encouraged by the AICPA's Independent Commission's report and the 
tentative conclusions reached. We believe the report represents 
a substantial effort and offers the profession a meaningful and 
practical blueprint for today and the future. Although we com­
mend the conclusions and tentative proposals for change made, we 
especially endorse the Commission's recommendations in reporting 
on significant uncertainties; boundaries and extension of the 
auditor's role? auditor's communication with users'; and regulation 
of the profession to maintain the quality of audit practice. 
Finally, we applaud the conclusion that the gap which exists be­
tween the users' expectations and the auditors' performance must 
be considerably narrowed.
To this end, the staff of the Regulation and Surveillance 
Group of the Exchange would be pleased to assist the Commission in 
any way which may be helpful.
June 13, 1977
APPENDIX
RELEVANT SECTIONS* OF SEC RULE 17a-5: REPORTS TO BE MADE
BY CERTAIN EXCHANGE MEMBERS, BROKERS AND DEALERS
(d ) Annual Filing of Audited Financial Statements.
(1) (i) Every broker or dealer registered pursuant to Section 
15 of the Act shall file annually, on a calendar or fiscal year 
basis, a report which shall be audited by an independent public 
accountant. Reports pursuant to this paragraph (d) shall be as
of the same fixed or determinable date each year unless a change 
is approved by the Commission.
(ii) A broker or dealer succeeding to and continuing the 
business of another broker or dealer need not file a report under 
this paragraph as of a date in the fiscal or calendar year in which 
the succession occurs if the predecessor broker or dealer has filed 
a report in compliance with this paragraph as of a date in such 
fiscal or calendar year.
(iii) A broker or dealer who has not transacted a business 
in securities directly with or for other than members of a national 
securities exchange, and has not carried any margin account, credit 
balance or security for any person who is defined as a "customer" 
in paragraph (c)(4) of this rule, shall not be required to file a 
report under this paragraph.
(2) The annual audited report shall contain a Statement of 
Financial Condition (in a format and on a basis which is consis­
tent with the totals reported on the Statement of Financial Con­
dition contained in Form X-17A-5, Part II or Part IIA), a Statement 
of Income, a Statement of Changes in Financial Position, a Statement 
of Changes in Stockholders' or Partners' or Sole Proprietor's 
Equity, and a Statement of Changes in Liabilities Subordinated to 
Claims of General Creditors. Such statements shall be in a format 
which is consistent with such statements as contained in Form X-17A-5, 
Part II or Part IIA.
[As amended in Release No. 34-11935, March 19, 1976, 41 F.R. 12638.]
(3) Supporting schedules shall include, from Part II or Part IIA 
of Form X-17A-5, a Computation of Net Capital Under Rule 15c3-1, a 
Computation for Determination of the Reserve Requirements under 
Exhibit A of Rule 15c3-3 and Information Relating to the Possession
or Control Requirements Under Rule 15c3-3, and shall be filed with 
said report.
* Note: Sections e and f are not included.
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(4) A reconciliation, including appropriate explanations, of 
the Computation of Net Capital under Rule 15c3-1 and the Computation 
for Determination of the Reserve Requirements Under Exhibit A of Rule 
15c3-3 in the audit report with the broker's or dealer's correspond­
ing unaudited most recent Part II or Part IIA filing shall be filed 
with said report when material differences exist. If no material 
differences exist, a statement so indicating shall be filed.
(5) The annual audit report shall be filed not more than 
sixty (60) days after the date of the financial statements.
(6) The annual audit report shall be filed at the regional 
office of the Commission for the region in which the broker or 
dealer has its principal place of business, the Commission's 
principal office in Washington, D.C., and the principal office 
of the designated examining authority for said broker or dealer. 
Copies thereof shall be provided to all self-regulatory organi­
zations of which said broker or dealer is a member.
(g ) Audit objectives.
(1) The audit shall be made in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards and shall include a review of the 
accounting system, the internal accounting control and procedures 
for safeguarding securities including appropriate tests thereof 
for the period since the prior examination date. The audit shall 
include all procedures necessary under the circumstances to enable 
the independent public account to express an opinion on the 
statement of financial condition, results of operations, changes 
in financial position, and the Computation of Net Capital Under 
Rule 15c3-1, the Computation for Determination of Reserve Require­
ments for Brokers or Dealers under Exhibit A of Rule 15c3-3, and 
Information Relating to the Possession or Control Requirements 
Under Rule 15c3-3. The scope of the audit and review of the 
accounting system, the internal control and procedures for safe­
guarding securities shall be sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurance that any material inadequacies existing at the date 
of the examination in (a) the accounting system; (b) the internal 
accounting controls; (c) procedures for safeguarding securities 
and (d) the practices and procedures whose review is specified 
in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of this paragraph would be disclosed. 
Additionally, as specific objectives, the audit shall include re­
views of the practices and procedures followed by the client:
(i) in making the periodic computations of aggregate in­
debtedness and net capital under Rule 17a-3(a)(11) and the re­
serve required by Rule 15c3-3(e);
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(ii) in making the quarterly securities examinations, counts, 
verifications and comparisons and the recordation of differences 
required by Rule 17a-13;
(iii) in complying with the requirement for prompt payment 
for securities of Section 4(c) of Regulation T of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and
(iv) in obtaining and maintaining physical possession or 
control of all fully paid and excess margin securities of cus­
tomers as required by Rule 15c3-3.
(2) If the broker or dealer is exempt from Rule 15c3-3, 
the independent public accountant shall ascertain that the con­
ditions of the exemption were being complied with as of the ex­
amination date and that no facts came to his attention to indicate 
that the exemption has not been complied with during the period 
since his last examination.
(3) A material inadequacy in the accounting system, in­
ternal accounting controls, procedures for safeguarding securi­
ties, and practices and procedures referred to above which is 
expected to be reported under these audit objectives includes 
any condition which has contributed substantially to or, if 
appropriate corrective action is not taken, could reasonably
be expected to (i) inhibit a broker or dealer from promptly 
completing securities transactions or promptly discharging his 
responsibilities to customers, other broker-dealers or creditors; 
(ii) result in material financial loss; (iii) result in material 
misstatements of the broker or dealer's financial statements; 
or (iv) result in violations of the Commission's recordkeeping or 
financial responsibility rules to an extent that could reasonably 
be expected to result in the conditions described in parts (i), 
(ii), or (iii) of this subparagraph (3).
(h) Extent and Timing of Audit Procedures.
(1) The extent and timing of audit procedures are matters 
for the independent public accountant to determine on the basis 
of his review and evaluation of existing internal controls and 
other audit procedures performed in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards and the audit objectives set forth 
in paragraph (g) above. In determining the extent of testing, 
consideration shall be given to the materiality of an area and 
the possible effect on the financial statements and schedules 
of a material misstatement in a related account. The performance 
of auditing procedures involves the proper synchronization of 
their application and thus comprehends the need to consider 
simultaneous performance of procedures in certain areas such as,
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for example, securities counts, transfer verification and cus­
tomer and broker confirmation in connection with verification 
of securities positions.
(2) If, during the course of the audit or interim work, 
the independent public accountant determines that any material 
inadequacies exist in the accounting system, internal accounting 
control, procedures for safeguarding securities, or as otherwise 
defined in subparagraph (g)(3), then he shall call it to the 
attention of the chief financial officer of the broker or dealer, 
who shall have a responsibility to inform the Commission and the 
designated examining authority by telegraphic notice within 24 
hours thereafter as set forth in paragraphs (d) and (f) of Rule 
17a-11. The broker or dealer shall also furnish the accountant 
with a copy of said notice to the Commission by telegraphic com­
munication within said 24 hour period. If the accountant fails 
to receive such notice from the broker or dealer within said 
24 hour period, or if he disagrees with the statements contained 
in the notice of the broker or dealer, the accountant shall have 
a responsibility to inform the Commission and the designated 
examining authority by report of material inadequacy within 24 
hours thereafter as set forth in paragraph (f) of Rule 17a-11.
Such report from the accountant shall, if the broker or dealer 
failed to file a notice, describe any material inadequacies found 
to exist. If the broker or dealer filed a notice, the accountant 
shall file a report detailing the aspects, if any, of the broker's 
or dealer's notice with which the accountant does not agree.
(i) Accountant's reports, general provisions.
(1) Technical requirements. The accountant's report shall: 
(i) be dated; (ii) be signed manually; (iii) indicate the city and 
state where issued; and (iv) identify without detailed enumeration 
the financial statements and schedules covered by the report.
(2) Representations as to the audit. The accountant's re­
port shall": (i) state whether the audit was made in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards; (ii) state whether 
the accountant reviewed the procedures followed for safeguarding 
securities; and (iii) designate any auditing procedures deemed 
necessary by the accountant under the circumstances of the par­
ticular case which have been omitted, and the reason for their 
omission.
Nothing in this rule shall be construed to imply authority 
for the omission of any procedure which independent accountants 
would ordinarily employ in the course of an audit made for the 
purpose of expressing the opinions required under this rule.
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(3) Opinion to be expressed. The accountant's report shall 
state clearly the opinion of the accountant: (i) in respect of 
the financial statements and schedules covered by the report
and the accounting principles and practices reflected therein; 
and (ii) as to the consistency of the application of the ac­
counting principles, or as to any changes in such principles 
which have a material effect on the financial statements.
(4) Exceptions. Any matters to which the accountant takes 
exception shall be clearly identified, the exception thereto 
specifically and clearly stated, and, to the extent practicable, 
the effect of each such exception on the related financial state­
ments given.
(5) Definitions. For the purpose of this rule, the terms 
"audit" (or "examination"), "accountant's report", and "certified" 
shall have the meanings given in Rule 1-02 of Regulation S-X.
(j ) Accountant's report on material inadequacies.
The broker or dealer shall file concurrently with the annual 
audit report a supplemental report by the accountant describing 
any material inadequacies found to exist or found to have existed 
since the date of the previous audit. The supplemental report 
shall indicate any corrective action taken or proposed by the 
broker or dealer in regard thereto. If the audit did not dis­
close any material inadequacies, the supplemental report shall 
so state.
MEMBERW i l l i a m  A. B r y d e n
Cer tified  P ublic A ccountant
69  P A R A D IS E  R O A D
Go lden , Colorado  80401 
Te l e p h o n e  (303) 277 -0 5 6 3
A M E R IC A N  IN S T IT U T E  OF  
C E R T IF IE D  P U B L IC  A C C O U N T A N T S  
C A N A D IA N  IN S T IT U T E  OF  
C H A R T E R E D  A C C O U N TA N TS
June 10, 1977
Dr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York, 10036
Dear Sir:
Re: Report of Tentative Conclusions
In response to the request for suggestions for change 
in the Report of Tentative Conclusions, I wish to complement 
the Committee on the report in general, but would suggest 
reconsideration of the following subjects:
1 PUBLIC REPORTING ON INTERNAL CONTROL
It seems that from time to time various hot proposals 
spearhead the current wave of reform. Sometimes they fade, 
as unfortunately appears to have happened with proposals for 
published forecasts. I believe, for the following reasons, 
that public reporting on internal control is a proposal which 
should also be permitted to fade.
(A) The external auditor is an integral part of the overall
system of control. If a company has no internal controls, but 
a complete external audit of all transactions, it still has 
adequate controls. The overall control system is only inadequate 
if the external auditor is prevented from extending his audit 
to the extent neccessary to supplement lack of internal controls. 
He is already required to report if this occurs. I agree with 
the SEC position on detection of fraud on pages 31-32 of the 
report. If the auditors' clean certificate means that the accounts 
are not materially distorted, then it is implicit that the 
overall controls, inclusive of the external audit, have functioned 
adequately.
In many smaller companies the external auditor is 
expected to perform the functions that are performed by internal 
auditors in larger concerns. It would seem to be a matter of 
management prerogative to determine whether certain functions 
should be performed by an internal audit staff or by external 
auditors. It is impractical to draw an arbitrary line and say 
that controls are inadequate if not performed by an internal 
staff. Requirements for reporting on inadequacies in internal
A-41
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control will result in a multitude of exception reports for 
companies which have adequate overall control.
(B) As stated in the sample audit report on page 78 of
the report, "control procedures can be circumvented by collusion 
or overridden". Management can always override internal controls. 
In an analysis of computer fraud at the recent AICPA Computer 
Conference in Chicago, it was noted that by far the largest 
average loss per fraud occurred in management frauds and that 
a significant percentage of computer fraud was perpetrated 
by people in management positions. To paraphrase the comments 
from ACCOUNTANCY on page 32 of the report; it is absurd to 
say that controls are all right subject to the possibility 
that they may have been circumvented. Public reports can only 
lull the lay reader into unwarranted reliance on controls and 
open the profession to further litigation.
(C) Public reporting on controls will tend to harness
the profession to the current approach of reliance on "internal 
controls". It may be found in the future that alternative audit 
approaches prove more effective. Modern management now controls 
through budgets, not through extensive review of detailed 
documents as used to be the practice. It is desireable that 
the profession have flexibility to change without having any 
particular audit technique set in cement by requirements for 
public reporting. "Internal Controls" is the current panacea 
for all ills. We may find in the future that alternative app­
roaches are more cost effective.
2 MANAGEMANT SERVICES PRACTICES
In my opinion, current trends in management services 
are adversely affecting audit performance. This is not because 
of its effects upon independence, but because of the organ­
izational trend to segregation of separate management services 
departments.
In most major firms the management services function 
is handled in a separately staffed department. Development 
of accounting systems, EDP consulting and all business oriented 
analysis goes to this department. As a result, the audit staffs 
tend to be lacking in experience in accounting systems, par­
ticularly EDP systems, and in understanding of the businesses 
they audit. The greatest internal problem facing the profession 
at the present time is the question of how to co-ordinate the 
various specialists and bring their composite knowledge to 
bear on the professions primary function of auditing. Whatever 
the theory, the practical fact is that auditors and management 
services staff tend not to speak to each other and that cost 
and other considerations tend to inhibit use of MAS specialists 
on an audit.
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It is noticeable that the Metcalf report, and also 
one of the major accounting firms, believe that public accountants 
should restrict their activities to auditing, accounting and 
accounting systems. The practice of offering a supermarket 
full of of financial services, based upon specialties in which 
the partners of accounting firms are not trained, is questionable. 
Auditors cannot function adequately without being experts in 
accounting systems and it is desireable to limit approaches 
which tend to remove this training from their experience.
I believe that accounting firms should stick to their area 
of expertise and understand that an auditor must be a systems 
expert as well as auditor and accountant.
In conclusion, let me again complement the Committee 
on a very comprehensive report and trust that these suggestions 
will receive consideration.
Very truly yours,
 
 
William A. Bryden.
OWENS-ILLINOIS
A - 4 2
Kenneth E. Tigges
Vice President and 
Comptroller
June 13, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Sir:
We are pleased to take this opportunity to comment 
to you on the report of tentative conclusions of 
the AICPA Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities.
Owens-Illinois is one of the world's leading manu­
facturers of packaging products with sales of $2.6 
billion annually. The Company manufactures and 
sells products including glass containers, metal 
containers, semi-rigid plastic containers, metal 
and plastic closures, containerboard, corrugated 
and solid fiber shipping containers, composite 
cans, multiwall paper and plastic shipping sacks, 
plywood and dimensional lumber, disposable paper 
and plastic cups, tubs, lids, and plates. In 
addition, an important part of Owens-Illinois' 
business consists of specialized glass products, 
such as glass television bulbs, scientific and 
laboratory glassware, and glass tumblers and stem- 
ware for household and institutional use. The 
operations of Owens-Illinois are international in 
scope. In the United States, the Company employs 
nearly 50,000 persons and has more than 100 manu­
facturing and related facilities in 27 states and 
extensive administrative, research, and marketing 
facilities. Owens-Illinois has investments in 21 
other countries. We are enclosing a copy of our 
1976 Annual Shareholders' Report which will provide 
further information on our Company.
As background for the following specific comments 
on the report, we believe it is important to point 
out that Owens-Illinois has long been a proponent 
of good and complete financial reporting. We also
Post Office Box 1035 Toledo, Ohio 43666 (419) 242-6543
2have been strong supporters of the concept that 
financial statements of a company are the prime 
responsibility of management and that is the 
auditor’s responsibility to attest as to whether 
the statements presented represent within reason­
able parameters the condition and results of the 
company. Also, in accordance with our commitment 
to good financial reporting and control, we have 
a comprehensive and, we believe, sophisticated 
internal audit function.
While, as stated in the previous paragraph, we 
believe in full and good disclosure, we have be­
come increasingly concerned that the vast amounts 
of additional information, much of it of a techni­
cal nature now being required by the FASB and SEC, 
has significantly reduced the readability and 
understanding of such reports for all but a few 
sophisticated users. The addition of a statement 
regarding management's acknowledgement of its 
responsibility for the reports together with its 
assessment of the company's accounting system and 
controls (which could run several pages) appears 
to us to be one additional step in the wrong 
direction. Once again, additional information 
is being used as a substitute for correction of 
the real problem as further discussed under auditor's 
responsibilities.
While there have been some instances where auditors 
failed to fulfill what sophisticated readers would 
consider the auditor's responsibility, the number 
of these cases has been relatively few in comparison 
to the total number of companies audited annually.
The publicity given them has distorted the reputa­
tions of both management and the public accountants 
far beyond the importance of these few situations.
This is not to imply that both professions do not 
have a responsibility for improved quality of audits 
and financial reporting, but rather to reflect that 
no matter how stringent the rules, there will be 
human failures in the accounting profession as in 
any other way of life. We believe that as compared 
to some of the detailed recommendations in the report,
3a more satisfactory solution might well be an 
educational program on the part of the Institute 
to better educate users as to realistic expecta­
tions from audits. Such educational program could 
reach professional users through organizations 
such as Financial Accounting Foundation, Credit 
Managers Association, American Bankers Association, 
American Bar Association, etc. This could be 
accomplished by direct mail literature, their 
periodicals and/or conferences. Most other users 
could be reached through articles in the various 
business publications.
While the commission included representatives of 
the legal, educational and financial analysts 
professions as well as industry and research, there 
was a strong flavor also of public accountants.
This may, in part, explain the principal emphasis 
on curing the problem through reducing auditors 
responsibility while increasing audit time and 
thus fees. In a period when operating margins 
are being squeezed (despite reported record earnings 
by many companies each year), the great number of 
additional requirements by the SEC, FASB, and now 
this proposal, causes audit fees to be one of the 
fastest rising costs of companies at least on a 
percentage basis.
We believe firmly that the public accountant, 
particularly as to larger clients, should maintain 
a continuing interest in the company and, in fact, 
have involved our public accountants in consulting 
on major financial matters long before it was a 
requirement. However, the expansions in the audit 
function proposed in your report and summarized 
below appear to provide an open-ended opportunity 
for the public accountant to run up considerable 
additional time without adequate justification.
"Audit Function
"— The audit function should be expanded 
to include other information of an 
accounting and financial nature that 
management has a responsibility to 
report— in addition to periodic finan­
4cial statements— provided that it 
is produced by the accounting system 
and the auditor is competent to 
verify the information.
"— The audit function should include 
greater involvement in a company's 
financial reporting process on a 
more current and continuing basis.
"— The auditor's report on the audit 
function, issued annually, should 
include an evaluation of manage­
ment's description of controls 
over the accounting system, and 
should disclose material uncorrected 
deficiencies not disclosed by manage­
ment.
"— The audit function should gradually 
expand to include all important 
elements of an entity's financial 
reporting process."
In fact, with the degree of involvement suggested, 
we even question whether the auditor can retain 
an independent viewpoint.
As to questionable acts of clients, we concur 
that auditors should be subject to the concept 
of due professional care and concur that they 
cannot reasonably be expected to detect all frauds. 
Here, again, however, we believe that a primary 
requirement is to educate users as to what can 
reasonably be expected rather than great expansions 
of the audit function. As to the specific steps 
that management should take, we believe that each 
individual management can more appropriately judge 
what is appropriate to its style rather than having 
specific documents required.
While we concur with the guideline for selection 
and appointment of auditors and have followed this 
procedure, as well as the ratification of the 
selection by our shareholders, we are concerned 
that the setting of fees be centered in the Board 
of Directors or its Audit Committee. While we 
have a dedicated and active Audit Committee, they
5cannot be as well informed as to the specifics 
of audit time as can the financial management 
of the company. We believe that a better prac­
tice is to allow management to continue to set 
fees with the auditors, but allowing the auditors 
to advise the Audit Committee and/or full Board 
as necessary if they feel that the setting of 
fees has placed undue restrictions on them. This 
can readily be accomplished during the portion 
of the Audit Committee meeting where management 
representatives are not present. We have a concern 
that there might be a growing philosophy that 
audit fees, no matter how high, are "good for 
the country".
The report states in part, "Management of public 
accounting firms should take steps to reduce 
pressures on independence which arise from time 
budgets that are too stringent and cost constraints 
that are too restrictive, and arbitrary deadlines 
imposed by clients should be resisted when they 
threaten audit quality." We believe the real 
answer here is for public accounting firms to 
make the decision to abandon a client if they  
feel the above creates a problem. In due respect 
to its responsibility to the shareholders, manage­
ment must work in a cost-conscious manner and 
report on a timely basis. Proper scheduling and 
a coordinated effort between the auditor and the 
company is essential. If deadlines set for certi­
fication happen to make the auditors concentrate 
on those issues necessary for certification and 
spend less time on unimportant matters, the share­
holders interest has been served.
We heartily concur with the recommendation that 
the establishment of auditing standards remain 
in the private sector and that the AICPA or some 
associated body is probably the best vehicle to 
establish such standards. We strongly encourage 
some outside participation in the standards setting 
body particularly representation from the business 
community to insure a degree of practicality in 
the process.
6In summary, we believe that the public accounting 
profession should take such steps as are necessary 
to insure quality audits. These should not neces­
sarily include significant expansions of audit 
time but rather redirection to important matters. 
The expectations of users have become so great 
in many areas because of a lack of understanding 
that even great expansions of the audit would 
not serve this purpose. An educational program 
by the Institute may well have a significant 
impact in this area.
Perhaps a paragraph could be inserted in the 
auditor's certificate to the extent that the 
audit is intended to verify the reasonableness 
of the representation but is not intended to 
insure against fraud may well alert the uninformed 
reader. In closing, we would not want the Commis­
sion to believe that the comments above should 
necessarily reflect pro or con on our experience 
with our public accountants. They are the com­
bined thoughts of a number of people whose exper­
iences include time in public accounting and with 
other companies as well as O-I.
Once again, we appreciate having the opportunity 
to comment on your report.
rp
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Mr. J. A. Bohland, Owens-Illinois, Inc 
Mr. R. H. Kohring, Owens-Illinois, Inc 
Mr. W. D. Reed, Owens-Illinois, Inc.
cc:
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June 13, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research D i rec to r
Commission on A u d i to r s '  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear S i r :
Comments on Tentat ive  Conclus ions  o f  
The Commission on A u d i to r s '  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
Chemical New York Corporation apprec ia tes  t h i s  opportun ity
to o f f e r  comments in response to the Report of Tentat ive  Conclus ions  
prepared by the Commission on A u d i to r s '  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  an in ­
dependent group e s t a b l i s h e d  by the American I n s t i t u t e  o f  C e r t i f i e d  
P u b l i c  Accountants.
The Commission 's report i s  probably  the most herculean  
e f f o r t  yet attempted to analyze the mult i tude o f  i s sues  now con­
f ro n t in g  the au d i t in g  p ro fe s s ion .  I t  is  we l l - reasoned  and wel l - t imed.  
The eventual reso lu t ion  o f  the independent a u d i t o r s '  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
could have an important impact on cer ta in  re la ted  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
o f  management.
Accord ing ly ,  from management's viewpoint,we wish to draw
the a t ten t ion  o f  the Commission to two s e n s i t i v e  i s sues  which we 
fee l  require fu r the r  coord inat ion  with statement preparers and 
the lega l  p ro fe s s ion .  These i s sues  are:
1) A proposed new report by management fo r  
i n c lu s io n  in the annual report.
2) A proposed separate footnote,  s i m i l a r  to 
that  on accounting  p o l i c i e s ,  commenting 
ex te ns iv e ly  on " u n c e r t a i n t i e s . "
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These issues are more f u l ly  developed below.
New Report by Management
The Commission's report furnishes a well-balanced analysis  
of the d is t inc tions  between the re s p o n s ib il i t ie s  of management and 
those of independent auditors with respect to published f in a n c ia l  
statements. This c la r i f ic a t io n  is long overdue and should help 
c lear  up ex is t in g  confusion in the pub lic 's  mind.
Chemical views th is  as a f i r s t  step. Subsequent research, 
we be lieve , should include a f u l l  assessment of the legal profession's  
position w ith respect to these newly-defined areas o f re s p o n s ib il i ty .
As to the example of a "Report by Management" furnished  
on page 79, we res ta te ,  fo r  reference purposes, the paragraph 
suggested by the Commission w ith regard to the position o f the 
company's legal counsel:
"The company's legal counsel has reviewed the 
company's position with respect to l i t i g a t i o n ,  
claims, assessments, and i l le g a l  or questionable  
acts; has communicated that position to our 
independent aud itors; and is s a t is f ie d  that  
i t  is properly disclosed in the f inanc ia l  
statements."
Strong resistance to the above a l l - in c lu s iv e  statements 
should be an tic ip a ted  from the legal profession on the grounds 
that the suggested text is overly s im p lis t ic .
Accordingly, we recommend that before f in a l i z a t io n  of  
th is  proposed report by management, f u l l  coordination be e ffec ted  between 
the accounting and legal professions.
Uncerta inties
The Commission's proposal to include, as a separate 
footnote to f in an c ia l statements, a comprehensive commentary and 
evaluation by management o f  the company's uncerta in ties  is by f a r ,  
we be lieve , the most important and controversial issue in this  
report. Research in the reporting of uncerta in ties  (and unusual 
risks) must, we fe e l ,  include an assessment of the Securit ies  and 
Exchange Commission's Accounting Series Release No. 166, dated 
December 23, 1974 , on "Disclosure o f  Unusual Risks and Uncerta inties  
in Financial Reporting." The point of departure from th is  Accounting 
Release must be c lear i f  the constituency is to measure properly the 
extent o f the add itional reporting disclosure on uncerta in ties  
being suggested.
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The apparent open-endedness o f  the proposal i s fraught  
with d i f f i c u l t i e s  in p rac t ica l compliance. Of p a r t ic u la r  s ign ificance  
is the fa c t  that a l l  footnotes must be covered by the accompanying 
opinion o f  the independent aud itors . No mention is made in the 
report of the extensive add itional audit work which would be required, 
no less the cost th e reo f,  to enable the independent aud ito r to have 
such a footnote covered by his opinion.
Because the very nature o f  any discussion o f uncerta in ties  
(or unusual risks) involves important legal considerations fo r  both 
the independent auditor and the preparer o f  f in a n c ia l  statements, 
we recommend the f in a l  report of the Commission include a complete 
discussion o f  the legal issues involved.
In a s im ila r  ve in , we believe the Commission should give  
cognizance to the s a t is fa c to ry  progress already made between in­
dependent auditors and members of the bar regarding legal counsels' 
responses to aud itors ' inqu iries  concerning uncerta in t ies . Any new 
footnotes on uncerta in ties  should avoid upsetting unnecessarily  
the ex is t in g  arrangements in th is  respect between the two professions.
Self-Regulation
We understand that the American In s t i tu te  o f  C e r t i f ie d  
Public Accountants has established a special committee fo r  the sole 
purpose o f  eva luating  the Commission's report and recommending 
appropriate courses o f co rrec tive  action . Further, i t  is expected 
that the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management 
(the Metcalf Subcommittee) w i l l ,  when reconvened in ea r ly  1978, 
consider such proposed correc tive  actions.
Both the Commission's f in a l  report and the correc tive  
actions to be recommended by the AICPA's special committee should 
be o f the greatest importance in demonstrating that the priva te  
sector is capable of prompt and e f fe c t iv e  s e l f - re g u la t io n .
Very t ru ly  yours,
George C. Deecken
C ontro lle r
G. C. D.
©
K I M B E R L Y - C L A R K  C O R P O R A T I O N
June 13, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
RE: Report of Tentative Conclusions - The Commission
on Auditors' Responsibilities_______________________
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
Kimberly-Clark Corporation appreciates the opportunity to 
comment on the tentative conclusions and recommendations contained 
in the above subject report. Our comments are directed specifically 
at those recommendations which appear to most directly affect 
management’s role in the accounting and reporting process, its 
communication with investors and with those recommendations which 
will increase audit fees while not commensurately increasing the 
benefits of independent auditor review and examination to investors 
and creditors.
Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations (Section 2)
We agree with the Commission that management has the responsi­
bility to select and apply accounting principles that are appropriate 
in the circumstances. We further agree with the Commission that 
the auditor has responsibility to determine whether management’s 
judgments were appropriate.
However, we do not agree with the Commission's conclusions 
with respect to auditors' responsibility for judging the appropriate­
ness of accounting principles when alternatives exist in the absence 
of direction in authoritative pronouncements.
K I M B E R L Y - C L A R K  C O R P O R A T I O N  
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First, the Commission states that the auditor should not be 
expected to judge the choice among alternatives in the instances 
when (a) authoritative bodies have considered the alternatives and 
have not been able to conclude as to the preferability of one of 
several generally accepted alternatives or (b) when all of the 
generally accepted alternatives are equally arbitrary.
Second, the Commission states that present standards require 
justification by management that change to a new principle is 
preferable.
Finally, the Commission states that an auditor's responsi­
bility to evaluate management's choice among alternative principles 
should not be different simply because there has been a change.
The auditor, it says, should have the same obligation to analyze 
the underlying facts and circumstances for accounting principles 
for which alternatives exist even in the absence of a change.
This series of observations indicates that the auditor has no 
duty with respect to preferability in the two instances cited 
regardless if such principles are changed or not. In our view, 
consistent application of accounting principles is important and 
preferability should be a criteria when change is contemplated.
By contrast, for those principles where an objective basis for 
their selection does exist, the Commission directs the auditor to 
assess preferability of the principle regardless of whether or not 
change is contemplated. In our view, this charge will have the 
effect of requiring all such principles to be continually assessed 
as to preferability in the circumstances and could result in a mis­
direction of audit effort. As previously stated, consistent 
application of a principle is an important aspect of financial 
accounting and reporting. Furthermore, consistent application of an 
appropriate generally accepted principle, while perhaps not the 
preferable one, is likewise important. To interject the auditor 
into a constant assessment of the preferability of generally 
accepted accounting principles is inappropriate when no change in 
principle is contemplated or no change in circumstances has 
occurred. Assessment of preferability of accounting principles is 
properly the role of the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
We wish to emphasize again that management has the responsi­
bility to select and apply accounting principles appropriate in 
the circumstances, and when circumstances change management has an 
obligation to change the accounting principle if the one they are 
currently following is no longer appropriate.
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In Section 7 of the report, the Commission recommends deletion 
of the auditor's reference to "consistency" in his report. We 
disagree with that recommendation for the reasons stated above. In 
addition, the deletion of the reference to consistency in the 
auditor’s report will not be in the best interest of investors and 
other users of financial statements. Readers noting a "consistency" 
exception are alerted that certain changes in accounting principles 
or their application have been made during the period, that non­
comparability may exist and that further analysis is often required.
We, therefore, urge that the reference to "consistency" be retained 
in the auditor's report.
We agree with the Commission that removal of "fairly" from the 
auditor's report and substitution of "appropriate in the circumstances" 
will result in an improvement of the auditor’s communication with 
financial statement users.
Reporting on Uncertainties (Section 3)
We agree with the Commission that the auditor’s role with 
respect to reporting on uncertainties requires clarification. In 
addition, we see merit in management’s obligation to report to 
investors and other statement users on significant uncertainties. 
However, we do not agree with the Commission's recommendation that 
a separate note to the financial statements describing the signifi­
cance of all material uncertainties will necessarily be in the best 
interests of investors unless the auditor's "subject to" opinion 
is retained and truly major uncertainties are separately discussed 
in other notes to the financial statements. Our concern stems from 
the fact that truly major uncertainties (those which in the past 
would have resulted in a "subject to" opinion by the auditor) will 
be obscured by other less significant uncertainties described in 
the note.
Otherwise, investors will be required to rank uncertainties as 
to likelihood of adverse effects on the earnings and financial 
position of the enterprise. It is unlikely that all investors will 
sufficiently understand the uncertainties to enable them to rank 
them in a consistent manner.
Although we agree with the Commission’s logic with respect to 
exclusion of the "subject to" qualification from the auditor’s 
report, we believe that the needs of investors to have the most 
significant uncertainties highlighted by means of a "subject to"
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qualification report should override the limitations on the auditor' 
ability to predict the future of uncertainties. In addition to 
the auditor's reporting on major uncertainties by means of a 
"subject to" opinion, uncertainties involving litigation or going 
concern problems are typically discussed thoroughly in a separate 
note to the financial statements - such note being clearly the 
responsibility of management. We do not, therefore, see merit in 
repeating such items in a note entitled "uncertainties."
Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud (Section 4)
Most of the recommendations contained in this section will aid 
in clarifying the auditor's role in fraud detection and will 
provide guidance with respect to minimizing instances of undetected 
major fraud. We support their adoption. However, on page 36, the 
Commission states that the auditor "...has a duty to search for 
fraud...". An expansion of detail testing by a significant extent 
in order to "search" for fraud would result in prohibitively costly 
audits, the benefits of which would be of minimal value in most 
instances.
In our view, the auditor's responsibility for the detection of 
fraud should be encompassed in an increased awareness of the 
possibility of fraud and a charge to the auditor to perform a more 
thorough and penetrating examination of the propriety of trans­
actions otherwise selected for audit test and, as the Commission 
recommends, to study and evaluate internal control systems as to 
prevention and detection of fraud.
Accordingly, we urge the Commission to clarify the intended 
meaning of the phrase "search" for fraud.
Corporate Accountability and the Law (Section 5)
On page XIX in the summary of conclusions and recommendations, 
the Commission states that the "auditor has a duty to search for 
illegal or questionable payments." However on page 47, under the 
subtitle of Detecting Illegal or Questionable Acts, the Commission 
states that it has no specific recommendations similar to those for 
the auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud. We find 
the two statements in opposition to one another.
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If the Commission believes that the auditor has a duty to 
"search for illegal or questionable payments," we believe that it 
has an obligation to clarify just what is intended by the phrase.
In our comments in Section 4, we recommended what we believe to be 
the intent of the phrase "search for fraud." We believe that a 
similar meaning should be given to the phrase "search for illegal 
or questionable payments" in Section 5.
We support the Commission's recommendation that management 
should bear the primary responsibility for corporate accountability 
and that it should adopt and distribute to employees detailed 
policy statements indicating specifically the conduct that will not 
be tolerated. In addition we agree with the Commission that 
adoption of a compliance monitoring system is highly desirable. 
However, we disagree with the Commission's recommendation that such 
statements of policy should be distributed to shareholders and 
others. We see no compelling need to distribute this policy to the 
exclusion of other policies, such as goals, strategies, conduct, 
labor relations and social and legal ethics, which may have a much 
greater effect on a company. We are not suggesting that these 
other policies be made available to shareholders and others - we 
see no useful purpose which would be served. In our view, report­
ing in a general manner the existence of these policies, their aims 
and the existence of compliance procedures, when appropriate, 
should be sufficient.
Section 5 of the report also contains a discussion of the 
Commission's views on increased involvement of lawyers. The 
Commission claims that because an elaborate procedure involving the 
auditor, the client and the lawyer now exists for determining which 
legal claims need to be disclosed, such procedures and division of 
responsibilities are inefficient and ineffective. To overcome the 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness, the Commission recommends that 
greater reliance be placed on corporate or outside legal counsel in 
management's responsibility to disclose significant legal matters.
It suggests that legal matters be disclosed in the uncertainties 
note to the financial statements described in Section 3 of the 
report and that auditors have materially decreased reporting 
responsibilities for such matters.
In our view, a significant reduction in the auditor's report­
ing responsibilities with respect to legal matters will not be in 
the best interest of informing investors and other users of finan­
cial statements. Our comments under Section 3 set forth the reasons 
why we hold this view.
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
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The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and its Extension (Section 6)
This section of the report contains the Commission's recommenda­
tions with respect to future extension of the auditor's role into 
the entire financial accounting and reporting process.
We do not take exception to the Commission's suggestion that 
the first step in the expanded role is for the auditor to become 
more involved in the study and evaluation of the internal accounting 
control system. We view the expanded role of the auditor in the 
review of the internal accounting control system to be a logical 
reaction stemming from the publicized corporate accountability 
problems experienced by certain corporations. However, we believe 
the thrust of such a review should still be directed toward signifi­
cant parts of the internal control system and those aspects which 
may have a potential material effect on the enterprise's financial 
statements. We do not believe that the Commission intends that the 
auditor should loose sight of the cost/benefit aspects of internal 
control systems.
The Commission states that the next step in the expanded role 
is for the auditor to become more involved in the review of the 
company's financial reporting process for preparing quarterly 
information released to the public. In addition, the Commission 
suggests that the limited review procedures of Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) No. 10 be expanded.
We are not convinced that the present involvement of auditors 
in the quarterly reporting process needs expansion. At present, 
registered companies are required to have auditor involvement with 
quarterly data either on a timely basis or on a retrospective 
basis. We believe the present system is operating effectively.
Those registrants wishing timely involvement may have it; those who 
do not are not required to have it. In either case, the quality of 
the quarterly reporting process is subject to limited review by the 
auditor on a reasonably current basis. We believe that expansion 
of the auditor’s role in the quarterly reporting process should not 
be made until a stronger case for it can be demonstrated.
The Commission recommends an immediate extension of the audit 
function to other information in an annual report, such as the 
financial highlights section, management's analysis of changes in 
earnings, comments on financial statements in the president's
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
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letter and similar information. We believe that the auditor's role 
with respect to such other information is adequately covered in SAS 
No. 8. In addition, expansion of the auditor's role over that now 
prescribed could frustrate the efforts of certain management's in 
providing interpretive and qualitative information of a subjective 
nature in the annual report. Subjecting such information to attesta­
tion and verification by independent auditors could inhibit this 
important means of communication of relevant information to 
investors.
The Auditor's Communication With Users (Section 7)
In this section the Commission makes two major recommendations 
a new approach to auditor reporting and a report by management.
A New Approach to Auditor Reporting
We agree with the Commission that the communication between 
the auditor and the users of his work is unsatisfactory. The 
Commission offers many sound reasons for supporting revision 
in the present auditor's report. We believe that the goal of 
the auditor's report should be to describe in precise and 
unambiguous terms, the auditor's function and the results of 
his examination. The direction of change is shown in the 
Commission's illustration of a revised auditor's report. In 
general, we have no important objections on the first three 
paragraphs of the report shown on page 77. However, we believe 
that the next paragraph dealing with the internal control 
system is too negative and will likely create the wrong 
impression with investors who are not familiar with the limita­
tions of such systems. We suggest that the paragraph is 
directed more at protecting the auditor than informing the 
reader. We believe that the limitations of any attestation as 
to the effectiveness of an internal control system can be 
conveyed without the recitation of a list of observations that 
the system may be circumvented, deteriorate or otherwise fail.
The final four paragraphs of the illustrative report convey 
certain messages as to what the auditor has specifically 
performed in discharging his duties under generally accepted 
auditing standards. We do not believe that such a listing is 
appropriate within the larger context of the auditor forming 
an opinion and reporting on the financial statements taken as 
a whole. In fact, we see the list of messages growing as new 
issues arise in the evolution of business activities and 
reporting thereon. We urge the Commission to delete the 
enumeration of selected tasks performed by auditor's in its 
final report and conclusions.
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We have previously commented on our support for removing 
"fairly presents" from the auditor’s report and why we believe 
that reference to "consistency" is important to retain in the 
auditor’s report.
Report by Management
In general we support the concept of a report by management. 
Although the entire annual report is a report by management, 
we do see a useful purpose served in communicating with 
investors by specifically addressing the issue of management's 
responsibilities, as differentiated from the auditor's, in the 
preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles. We believe, however, that 
flexibility in language and subject matter should be permitted 
in any final recommendation by the Commission. Only by 
permitting flexibility will "boiler plate" language be avoided 
and investor understanding improved.
Maintaining the Independence of Auditors (Section 9)
We strongly support the Commission's conclusion that transfer 
of the approval, assignment or compensation function to the govern­
ment sector or to have audits performed by a corps of governmental 
auditors is not warranted or necessary.
Similarly, we support the Commission’s arguments for rejecting 
the notion that auditors be compensated from a pool of funds to be 
created by an assessment against all audited companies.
The Commission recommends that the board of directors or its 
audit committee take a more active role in establishing audit 
arrangements, including matters of fees and timing of audit work.
We agree that exercise of an oversight role by the board of directors 
or its audit committee is important in maintenance of auditor 
independence.
We support the Commission's views against adoption of a 
policy requiring the manditory rotation of auditors.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, we have supported the Commission’s recommenda­
tions when a clear need for change has been demonstrated. We have 
expressed reservations when the need for change has not been so 
demonstrated. We look forward to the Commission's final report and 
would be pleased to discuss our views with the Commission if it
wishes.
Sincerely,
D. W. Dusendschon 
Assistant Controller
DWD:dt
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GENERAL ELECTRIC
G EN ER A L ELECTRIC  COMPANY  
3 1 3 5  E A S T O N  T U R N P IK E  
F A IR F IE L D ,C O N N E C T IC U T  0 6 431
T.O.THORSEN 
V IC E  P R E S ID E N T - C O M P T R O L L E R June 15, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
We have studied the Report of Tentative Conclusions by the Commission 
and appreciate the opportunity to offer some brief comments.
It is our view that the Report points a viable way for the auditing pro­
fession to evolve in an orderly manner in these tumultuous and trying times.
The more significant recommendations in the Report will probably require a 
considerable number of specific actions such as changes in the Code of Ethics, 
development of new auditing standards, and revisions of SEC regulations and 
practice. These activities obviously will take some period of time, will require 
considerable educational effort, and may result in actual implementation some­
what different than the tentative conclusions in the Report. Therefore, we urge 
the AICPA to act promptly by adopting immediately the recommendation in 
Section 10 to establish a full-time Auditing Standards Board with adequate pro­
cedures for considering diverse views of interested parties. The Board’s 
charter should include assignment of priorities to the Report’s conclusions 
and recommendations, determination of appropriate implementation procedures, 
and commencement of actual work as soon as possible.
Please be assured of our support for this effort, and we look forward 
to participating constructively as the work progresses.
Very truly yours
TOT:ck
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National Electrical Manufacturers Association 
2101 L Street, N.W., Suite 300 
Washington, D.C. 20037 (202) 457-8400 June 14, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
AICPA Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
NEMA(1) endorses the creation of a full-time Auditing Standards Board.
We are not now commenting on the specific paragraphs and sections of these 
tentative conclusions. Presumably, when this Commission's recommendations 
in final form are presented to the AICPA, each of the action recommenda­
tions will be subject to formal implementation procedures within the AICPA.
It seems to us that all of this Commission's action recommendations would 
be subject to due process deliberation by such a full-time board. Even if 
the recommendations were to be acted upon by a continuation of the Account­
ing Standards Executive Committee, we confidently expect that due process 
implementation would include solicitation of comments. Since we view both 
the form and content of implementation as the most important elements, we 
expect to respond to the solicitation for comments during those deliberation 
processes. Our response will include an assessment of the benefits vs. costs 
of eventually implemented recommendations.
We express agreement with the intentions supporting the reforms recom­
mended, but submit that unless implementation proceeds with due process and 
with dispatch the Commission's efforts will have been wasted.
(1) The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) Is the 
principal national trade association of the electrical manufacturing industry. 
The electrical products within NEMA's scope are used either as components or 
as end-equipment in the generation, transmission, distribution, control and 
utilization of electrical energy. The association has some 550 member manu­
facturing companies who are affiliated with one or more of our 70 product 
sections; each section, in essence, representing a separate and distinct 
industry. Over 90 NEMA member firms are represented in the Fortune 500 list, 
with others varying in size down to many small businesses.
This comment letter, as are all others from NEMA on accounting issues, 
has been written under the direction of the NEMA Advisory Committee on 
Financial and Accounting Issues, which is a subcommittee of the NEMA Financial 
and Accounting Council. All comment letters are approved in final form before 
release by the Advisory Committee, the Council and the NEMA President.
Sincerely yours
Thomas B. Fauls
Vice President - Statistical
and Financial Services
TBF:msp
FARMLAND INDUSTRIES, INC.
p o s t  o ffic e  box  7 3 0 5 / k a n s a s  c ity , m isso u ri 6 4 1 1 6
June 17, 1977
Dr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Dr. Carmichael:
We have reviewed the Report of Tentative Conclusions of the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. The objectives of 
the Commission of securing absolute clarity and honesty in 
presentation coincide precisely with the views of our 
organization. We are in general, however, concerned as to 
whether the implementation proposed will in many cases 
accomplish the objectives.
Rather than generalizing about the entire report, we would 
like to select several parts of the report with which we most 
strongly disagree and comment on them, saving our general 
remarks for the last.
Specifically, we are most concerned with Section 5, "Corporate 
Accountability and the Law," Section 6, "The Boundaries of the 
Auditor's Role and Its Extension," and Section 7, "The Auditor's 
Communication With Users."
Section 5 - Corporate Accountability and the Law - Many 
organizations, including our own, already have policy statements 
intended to clarify those areas which might be considered "grey", 
for example, conflict of interest. We agree that these areas 
need to be clearly stated by employers and clearly understood by 
employees. We have no objection to auditors using these company 
policies as guidelines for investigation. What we are concerned 
about is the apparent intent to use the suggested "detailed 
policy statement" as the only measurement upon which the auditor 
is required to comment.
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2We feel that there are two types of policy statements that a 
company might consider appropriate. The first is the type of 
statement earlier mentioned, one that clarifies company 
policy on those "grey" or difficult to legally define areas.
The other, far more broad ranging and completely general in 
nature, is a simple statement expressing that the employer 
expects honesty and legality in the acts of the employee.
It is our opinion that in the case of these few "grey" or 
difficult to define areas, the auditor should exercise profes­
sional discretion and indicate in the final audit report the 
extent to which the business has been carried out in line with 
the policies issued by management.
In the case of the many areas which can only generally be 
defined, we have to be like Moses. The Lord gave Moses Ten 
Commandments, but if Moses had asked for a statement of specific 
detail on every way in which those Ten Commandments could have 
applied, he'd still be on the mountain waiting. Business is in 
somewhat the same position. Employees are to be honest and not 
commit illegal acts, but to anticipate in advance when, where 
and how each act requiring discretion should be handled is 
simply impractical. However, we believe that the judgment of 
management on the character of its employees when coupled with 
the checks and controls normal to an accounting system and the 
professional audit will catch most material activities that 
would be detrimental to meaningful financial statements.
To summarize, we agree that a policy statement should contain 
specific and detailed policies for easily misunderstood areas, 
but suggest that a general policy that anticipates honesty, 
integrity, and legality is the only practical way to handle the 
balance of any rulemaking. Management should exercise all pos­
sible control to see that the general actions of its employees 
fall within the scope of its policy statement. The auditors, 
on the other hand, should assist management by the examination 
of records to make sure that honesty, integrity and legality 
have been observed.
Section 6 - The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and Its 
Extension - In our comments on Section 5, we indicated that the 
scope of the auditor's responsibility be relaxed. In this Section 6, 
we find ourselves confronted with the proposed expansion of auditor's 
responsibilities to the extent that an audit function would be 
performed on practically every financial report released outside 
the company.
We see in this a contradiction, as it is extremely difficult for us to 
understand how an auditor could approve a financial report and still 
not have reviewed the books with a responsibility to judge the honesty 
and legality of their various entries. Additionally, the recommendation 
ignores what would become an unbelievable cost resulting from main­
taining a high level, full-time audit staff on the premises that 
possessed the necessary level of understanding of the company.
It also ignores the time involved with auditing and disregards the 
fact that there are financial statements which an outside user, such 
as a bank, might properly be perfectly willing to accept on an 
unaudited basis.
Here again, as in the case of Section 5, we have a conflict between 
objectives and the implementation of programs to attain those objec­
tives. The implementation is again impractical, and in this case, 
also involves a cost which would be prohibitive.
Section 7 - The Auditor’s Communication With Users - We agree with 
the provisions concerning materiality in the management statement. 
However, we see some severe problems in the management statement 
when it touches the area of responsibility of the legal counsel.
Many additional guidelines beyond those thus far stated will be 
required to avoid conflicts of responsibility created by the problems 
resulting from the anticipated outcome of a pending lawsuit, the 
uncertainty of damages expected to be awarded in litigation and the 
lack of guidance as to whether the same standards of materiality apply 
in the legal area as apply in the accounting and auditing area. The 
problems in this legal area are so great that we can visualize 
attorneys feeling it is not legally possible to be a party to such 
a "Mother Hubbard" statement. If a management statement that includes 
conclusions concerning legal counsel's disclosures is to be required, 
we feel that much more guidance must be given on the legal problems 
that follow such a requirements.
General Comments - The objective of the auditing function, the 
promulgation of accounting principles, and the regulation by 
government of public financial statements is to avoid information 
which might be misleading to users outside the company.
The function of the auditor was established in recognition of the 
fact that honesty and integrity cannot be legislated or created by 
a standardized control system. The auditor performed a third party 
function of impartial judging recognizing the difference between 
different companies engaged in different enterprises and attempted 
to ensure that the informa tion that was material was presented in 
an acceptable manner.
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We see this proposal in general as removing the auditor from a 
judgment position and introducing instead what in effect is the 
legislation of rules, checklists, forms, and shifted responsibility 
so that it undermines the original need for which auditing was 
created.
A company management which seeks to intentionally mislead will 
have no more concern about making a misleading statement about 
its integrity than it will in issuing a misleading financial 
statement comprised of improper figures. The function of the 
auditor is to prevent the dissemination of misleading information 
and not to set up a better mechanism by which it can be proven 
that the misleading information was deliberately presented.
However, it seems that that is the direction in which this entire 
proposal is headed.
In conclusion, the stated objectives of the Commission and the 
management of our company are absolutely identical; the presentation 
of accurate information which will inform and not mislead. We 
should all be agreeable to changes which will accomplish that 
objective. Our objections to the report are based upon the 
probability that what has been proposed will mislead the public 
into thinking that steps have been taken to accomplish this 
objective, when in fact little of a preventive nature has been 
done. We feel the public user could be mislead even more than 
he was before.
We appreciate this opportunity to express our comments on the 
Commission's report. We would be happy to answer any questions 
you have concerning our position on these matters.
Sincerely
J. P. Blair 
Vice President
Corporate Development and Control
JPB:ds
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE
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June 20, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of Financial Executives 
Institute appreciates the opportunity to comment on the "Report of 
Tentative Conclusions," by the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibi­
lities. The CCR supports the basic objectives of the Commission as 
embodied in the tentative conclusions, and we commend the members 
and staff on the quality of their work and the foresight demonstrated 
in the report. While our following comments reflect concern about 
particular aspects of some of the specific conclusions, we offer 
these views in the spirit of constructive dialogue, and with our 
endorsement of the report.
The Commission’s undertaking is timely, in view of the increasing 
litigation and public attacks on the independent public accountant 
and corporate management. The need for a reappraisal of the role of 
auditors and their responsibilities has recently been underscored by 
the pointed questions being asked by Congressional committees and 
others as to the ability of the private sector to serve properly the 
needs of investors and other users of financial statements. Never­
theless, while we can agree that there is room for improvement in 
the present system, we should not overlook the fact that the corporate 
financial reporting system in the United States is the most informa­
tive and advanced in the world. We also recognize that our superior 
capital formation accomplishments in the past may not have been pos­
sible without this system and an effective balance between the func­
tions and responsibilities of corporate management, the independent 
public accountant, and government agencies.
In our view, however, the existing structure has well served the pub­
lic interest and, while it must be adaptable to the changing environ­
ment, the present structure should not be radically changed unless 
there is evidence to suggest that such change is necessary or desir­
able. In this regard, we believe it is unfortunate that the Commis­
sion’s report creates the impression that management in general needs
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the constant vigilance of the auditor in order to protect the users 
of financial statements from the negligent or abusive actions of the 
few. Since the overwhelming majority of corporate managements dis­
charge their responsibilities with integrity and high ethics, we be­
lieve the report overemphasizes the need to expand the auditor’s re­
sponsibilities in this regard.
We recognize the need for independent verification; however, we be­
lieve management’s representations should be accorded a high degree 
of trust and credibility. In this context, our specific comments on 
certain of the tentative conclusions are as follows:
Section 1 - The Independent Auditor’s Role in Society
The CCR agrees with the Commission that the auditor’s primary respon­
sibility is to the users of his work. Also, by defining his primary 
responsibility and limiting the other expectations for which he may 
presently be held responsible, as more fully developed in subsequent 
sections of the report, all parties would be better served if the CPA 
is not held accountable for "all things to all people." That is, 
more reliance should be placed on management and its other experts, 
such as lawyers, engineers, actuaries, geologists, etc.
Section 2 - Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations
We accept the fact that the auditor has, and will continue to have, 
responsibility for evaluating management’s choice of accounting 
principles. However, the auditor’s responsibility should be limited 
to commenting on the appropriateness of those principles in the cir­
cumstances, and the cumulative effect of their application on the 
financial statements.
We also believe that the criteria for judging preferability should 
result from authoritative accounting standards or pronouncements, 
rather than from auditor interpretations. As stated in the report 
(page 19), there exist widely divergent opinions among qualified 
professional accountants as to which accounting treatment is appro­
priate under a given set of circumstances. It is, therefore, reason­
able to expect that such differences will continue to exist in areas 
which have not been addressed in authoritative accounting pronounce­
ments. Thus, we believe the auditor’s role should continue to be to 
exercise professional judgment in commenting on the results of man­
agement’s interpretation and application of accounting principles, 
rather than to express opinions as to preferability.
The designation of financial accounting standards is, and should re­
main, in the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s province. Where 
alternatives do exist within generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), management has the responsibility to select the most appro­
priate accounting method in the circumstances. Preferability is a
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controversial "standard," about which there have been sharp disagree­
ments, and the auditor, therefore, should not be expected to super­
impose his judgment as to preferability on issues for which there is 
no general agreement.
Accordingly, we believe that when a new situation arises requiring the 
selection of an accounting principle from among possible alternatives, 
or when the underlying circumstances change to the extent that an ac­
counting change is warranted, the auditor should, in his opinion, either 
express his agreement with management’s choice or take exception to the 
change or principle selected. Further, we believe that, in addition 
to the disclosure of significant accounting policies and principles in 
the notes to the financial statements, any significant change in ac­
counting, with the effect of said change, should be disclosed in the 
notes and, again, the auditor should express his agreement or take 
exception in his opinion. Thus, we believe that consistency is im­
portant to the users of financial statements, and it should continue 
to be commented on in the auditor’s report.
The CCR agrees with the Commission’s reasoning and supports its 
recommendation to remove the word "fairly" from the auditor’s re­
port on the basis that "appropriate in the circumstances" is more 
objective and better understood. However, as stated above, we do 
not support the Commission’s reasoning for this change as a vehicle 
to address the preferability issue.
Section 3 - Reporting on Significant Uncertainties in Financial 
Presentations
The CCR supports the Commission’s basic conclusions about the need 
to clarify the auditor’s role in reporting on uncertainties, and a 
majority of CCR members agrees with the Commission’s recommendation 
to eliminate "subject to" qualifications in auditors’ opinions and 
to include footnote disclosure of material uncertainties. However, 
a significant minority of CCR members disagrees and believes that 
"subject to" opinions should be retained because the "subject to" 
represents a useful means of attracting attention to truly material 
uncertainties.
We believe the disclosures in the proposed standardized note on un­
certainties would be largely repetitive and would not improve dis­
closure. Also, a standardized note would tend to obscure material 
uncertainties.
Section 4 - Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud
Most of the recommendations in this section will aid in clarifying 
the auditor’s role in fraud detection, and they should provide guid­
ance with respect to minimizing instances of undetected major fraud. 
Accordingly, we support these recommendations, with the following 
exception:
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On page 36, the Commission states that the auditor "has a duty to 
search for fraud." We are concerned that this assertion could cause 
auditors to expand substantially their audit tests and detailed re­
views of transactions over the customary audit procedures followed 
in the examination of financial statements, and to go well beyond 
the effort required to establish "reasonable assurance that the finan­
cial statements are not affected by material fraud." Since a signifi­
cant expansion in detail testing in order to "search for fraud" could 
result in prohibitively costly audits, the benefits of which would be 
of minimal value in most instances, we urge that this language be 
clarified.
We suggest that the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of 
fraud should be encompassed in an increased awareness of the possi­
bility of fraud, perhaps with a more penetrating examination of 
transactions selected for audit tests and, as the Commission recom­
mends, the study and evaluation of internal control systems, in­
cluding the work of the internal auditors.
Section 5 - Corporate Accountability and the Law
We are concerned with the apparent contradiction wherein, on page XIX 
in the summary of conclusions and recommendations, the Commission 
states that the auditor "should search for illegal or questionable 
acts," while on page 47, the Commission states that it has no spe­
cific recommendations similar to those for the auditor’s responsi­
bility for the detection of fraud. Our comments in Section 4, rela­
tive to the intent and clarification of the phraseology "search for 
fraud" are equally applicable to the Commission’s admonishment that 
the auditor should search for illegal or questionable acts.
The CCR endorses the Commission’s recommendation that corporations 
adopt codes or statements of policy detailing the ethical conduct 
expected of its employees and the distribution of the statements to 
all employees. We further believe that a program for monitoring 
compliance is a desirable, if not necessary, feature of the ethical 
conduct policy.
While we believe it should be unnecessary to make the policy state­
ment on ethical conduct available to the public, companies should 
be encouraged to report a general description of the policies adopted 
the existence of monitoring and compliance procedures, and the fact 
that the company’s compliance will be subject to periodic or annual 
review by the independent auditor.
The CCR accepts the Commission’s logic that the timing and extent of 
disclosures of pending and potential legal claims should be the re­
sponsibility of management and its legal counsel. We further believe 
that the auditor’s responsibility for reviewing legal matters should
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be no different from his responsibilities in reviewing other areas of 
expertise, such as actuaries, geologists, etc. In our opinion, a 
logical extension of the Commission’s recommendation is for manage­
ment to address other areas for which it relies on experts, and for 
the investment community to abandon their expectation that the in­
dependent auditor is their surrogate expert in all matters which 
might have an impact on the company’s financial statements.
Section 6 - The Boundaries of the Auditor' s Role and Its Extension
The introduction to this section indicates that it presents a frame­
work for the evolution of the auditor’s role to accommodate changing 
business and investment needs. We do not question that there will 
be a continuing evolution of the auditor’s role; however, we agree 
with the Commission’s conclusion that management is the originator 
and interpreter of financial information, and the auditor’s role is 
to provide an objective evaluation of management’s presentations. 
Accordingly, we do not agree with the Commission’s recommendation 
that the present boundary of the "annual financial statements" on 
the auditor’s role be expanded to include the more abstract concept 
of "information of an accounting and financial nature that is pro­
duced by the accounting system."
As part of its framework for the evolution of the auditor’s role, the 
Commission recommends requiring the auditor to expand his review and 
evaluation of the company’s controls over its accounting system and 
to form a conclusion on the functioning of the system. Financial 
Executives Institute has publicly endorsed the principle that corpo­
rations should establish and maintain internal accounting control 
systems in recent letters to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the United States Senate. Auditors of the larger companies pre­
sently rely on the company’s internal accounting controls. Accord­
ingly, we anticipate few, if any, implementation problems with re­
spect to the larger companies. However, we are concerned that the 
recommendation could involve significant implementation problems with 
respect to smaller, closely-held, and/or non-public companies, and 
the smaller audit practitioners. We urge the Commission to include 
an assessment of these implications in its final report.
The Commission also recommends that auditors become involved in the 
quarterly financial reporting process on a timely basis, and that 
they expand their present "limited review" procedures. We do not 
agree with this recommendation because the need for this magnitude 
of auditor involvement has not been demonstrated. Indeed, the SEC 
requirements that the auditors become "associated with" the reporting 
of quarterly financial results were only recently adopted and, while 
a number of companies do have their auditors conduct timely "limited 
reviews," we are not aware of any strong criticisms of, or pressures 
to expand, the new procedures. Unless it can be demonstrated that man­
datory timely involvement would add meaningfully to the present require­
ments, we believe the Commission should drop this recommendation.
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Also, we are not aware of any supportable need to expand the existing 
"limited review" procedures. In our opinion, the Commission’s objec­
tive of having the auditors obtain an understanding of the process 
used by the company to prepare quarterly financial information and 
to evaluate its ability to prepare reliable interim information is 
achieved by the existing limited reviews under SAS 10.
The Commission’s recommendation would also extend the auditor’s role 
beyond the annual financial statements to include other financial 
presentations in the annual report, such as the financial highlights, 
management’s analysis of changes, and the President’s letter. We 
believe the extension is unnecessary, since the auditor’s present pro­
cedure in reviewing all financial information in the annual report is 
sufficient to safeguard the interests of investors, and that it is 
understood by reasonably well-informed users of the reports. We 
further believe that this would involve the auditor in areas which 
have not been standardized as to the information required to be dis­
closed and the format to be used. In our opinion, the annual report 
is an important means by which management can provide information 
outside the financial statements which it deems relevant to investors, 
but which involves a degree of subjectivity not susceptible to inde­
pendent attestation. We are also concerned that this extension of 
the auditor’s responsibilities would result in substantially higher 
audit costs and, since the Commission has not demonstrated that any 
resulting benefits would warrant the additional cost, we suggest that 
this recommendation be dropped or, at least, clarified in the final 
report.
Section 7 - The Auditor’s Communication with Users
The CCR concurs in this section’s opening sentence which states 
"evidence abounds that communication between the auditor and users 
of his work ... is unsatisfactory." We likewise believe that reso­
lutions to this problem have to involve more than the message con­
tained in the audit certificate. Thus, while emphasis on a clearer 
audit message by auditors is needed, the more basic need is for users 
to have a clear understanding of an auditor’s work and his function, 
including both the benefits and the limitations.
A program to educate users on the meaning of "generally accepted 
auditing standards" would be a good starting point; however, we do 
not believe that the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements 
is a proper forum. The illustrative report describes certain pro­
cedures, but necessarily omits many others, and those which are 
described have negative implications which reflect unfavorably on 
the credibility of the entire reporting process. Accordingly, we 
believe that the accounting profession should conduct a continuing 
educational program through other media. We also believe that 
corporate management and Financial Executives Institute should co­
operate and assist in this effort, since the objective of the pro­
gram - increased credibility - would benefit everyone.
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The Commission has offered compelling reasons for revising the auditor’s 
"certificate;" however, we are concerned that some of the suggested 
changes will not accomplish the stated goals. For example, the final 
four paragraphs dealing with information in the annual report, other 
than the financial statements, appear to be the beginning of an expand­
ing listing of messages about what the auditor does to "check up on 
management." Because we believe this kind of information is not con­
ducive to the users’ need to grasp the auditor's opinion of the presen­
tation of the financial condition of the company, it should be excluded 
from the audit report. We urge that efforts to improve the users' 
understanding of the scope of procedures which become generally ac­
cepted auditing standards be conducted through the educational program 
discussed above.
On the other hand, we believe the explanation in the first paragraph 
of who prepared the financial statements and notes, the addition of 
"in all material respects" and "appropriate in the circumstances" in 
the second paragraph, and the addition of remarks on internal controls 
in the third paragraph, appear to be meaningful steps to enhance an 
understanding of the auditor's certificate.
The Commission’s recommendation regarding auditors’ attendance at 
annual meetings has considerable merit; however, since it may not 
be practical in all cases, such as smaller or closely-held companies, 
we urge that this be encouraged, but not required at this time.
The CCR endorses the principle of a separate report from management.
Even though there could be some confusion, since the entire annual 
report is from management, there are possible advantages in a sepa­
rate report directed to accountability. We agree that such reports 
should be along the lines suggested by the Commission, so management 
could better communicate matters of substantial interest and concern 
to investors and other users. However, we caution against any "stand­
ardization" of subject matter or format which might soon deteriorate 
to boilerplate language.
We agree that the present method of referring to other auditors’ re­
ports and unaudited data are problem areas, but we believe the audit 
firms can best offer comments on these questions.
Section 8 - The Education, Training, and Development of Auditors
The CCR believes the Commission has overstated the need for profes­
sional schools of accounting to overcome deficiencies in the educa­
tion of auditors. While professional schools of accounting may 
ultimately be desirable, we do not foresee them as the only route 
for entry into the accounting profession. We are concerned that 
the movement toward separate schools of accounting, apart from busi­
ness administration, could weaken the business education for ac­
countants and the accounting education for business students.
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Likewise, we are concerned about the proposal that the AICPA and 
the state CPA societies develop an associate membership to permit 
non-CPA educators to participate in their activities. Rather than 
lower the professional standards for CPAs to accommodate those who 
are unwilling or unable to meet the standards, non-CPAs should be 
encouraged to pass the CPA examinations, obtain the experience, and 
meet the other requirements in these organizations.
Section 9 - Maintaining the Independence of Auditors
The CCR does not find it surprising that the Commission found little 
or no empirical evidence to support the presumption that the perform­
ance of "other services" compromises an auditor’s independence. We 
believe that independence is primarily a state of mind in situations 
where one party is not under the "control" of the other. The concept 
of economic control is an important reason why we do not share recent 
concerns that the growth of large accounting firms has been an ad­
verse development. We believe it is clear that the audit fees billed 
to even the largest corporations do not individually represent a 
significant percentage of their audit firm’s revenues and, in that 
sense, the firms are not economically dependent on individual clients. 
The principal asset of an audit firm is its good name, and we per­
ceive that audit personnel are mindful of this economic fact, as well 
as the importance of their personal reputations, when confronted 
with particular factual situations.
In view of this, and for other reasons noted in the Commission’s 
report, it is our perception that audit personnel are as objective 
regarding areas in which their firm has performed other services as 
they are in general. We further agree with the Commission’s conclu­
sion that the performance of other services often puts the auditors 
in a better position because they can become more knowledgeable of 
the client’s operations. We, therefore, support the recommendation 
that there be no bar to offering such services, including financial 
executive placement services. As to the latter, audit firms can be 
particularly qualified to help fill the need of offering highly 
qualified candidates for important positions, often with candidates 
who are known quantities to the client and/or the firm. We do not 
believe, due to the aforementioned considerations, that an inde­
pendent attitude of either the audit personnel or the financial ex­
ecutive is compromised in the ongoing relationship. Also, for the 
above reasons, we agree with the Commission that payment by the 
client for the firm’s services does not cause the audit firm to be 
less independent, given the economics of a large firm’s practice.
We also support an oversight role by audit committees of the board 
of directors in appointing auditors and arranging the audit scope 
and fee. However, we emphasize "oversight role" here because we
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believe that management is best qualified to work out the many de­
tails of audit arrangement and to assess the scope from a require­
ment and cost/benefit viewpoint. Management and the auditors should 
then present these arrangements to the audit committee for its con­
currence. We believe this is already the procedure in a majority of 
large public companies. In this same connection, we agree with the 
Commission’s conclusion against mandatory rotation of audit firms 
for the reasons stated in the report.
Finally, on independence, we believe the Commission has overstated 
the effect of time and budget pressures on an auditor’s independent 
state of mind. Certainly, there are time deadlines - but they are 
most often real and not arbitrary as stated in the Commission’s 
report. A financial report must be timely to be useful, not to 
mention a company’s filing obligations to the SEC, stock exchanges, 
and to the shareholders in connection with annual meeting require­
ments. And, certainly, there are budget pressures to keep total 
time and charges to a reasonable level. No business has the luxury 
of being unconcerned with the pricing of its product or services.
The ingredients of any business success must normally include ef­
ficiency in offering the best quality at a price related to the use­
fulness and need of the product. For expenditures of the magnitude 
of annual audit costs, it is not at all unreasonable to agree be­
forehand on the expected time and fee requirements. To do other­
wise would expose clients to open-ended charge commitments even for 
gross inefficiencies, and to remove administration of its own practice 
from an audit firm’s management. Assuming that a firm would not 
knowingly commit to uneconomic or impossible arrangements, we can 
see a need for good planning and scheduling, and efficient performance 
of the audit work with full cooperation of the client’s personnel, 
but we do not agree that running a "tight ship" in this regard bears 
on independence. It has more to do with keeping the cost commensurate 
with use and benefit, especially with the need of firms to offer com­
pensation at a professional level to continue to attract and hold 
high quality individuals to the profession.
Section 10 - The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards
The CCR fully supports the Commission’s rejection of the idea that 
a government agency should set auditing standards. However, we en­
dorse the concept of a full-time auditing standards board, within 
the private sector, appropriately compensated, and staffed with 
qualified personnel.
We are not in agreement with the Commission’s conclusion that the 
establishment of auditing standards "does not need to operate to 
the fullest extent practical in public." This view seems contrary 
to the "sunshine" concept and to the stated purpose of the Commis­
sion’s report, namely, improved communication to users of the 
auditor’s work.
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We note that the Commission has cited corporate personnel as partici­
pants in the process of setting auditing standards (page 133). We 
agree that the standards-setting body should solicit the views and 
comments of financial executives and others who have a direct interest 
in the effective functioning of the body and its pronouncements as a 
source of constructive advice in its deliberations.
Finally, we urge the AICPA to take immediate action to adopt and im­
plement the proposed full-time auditing standards board.
Conclusion
We reaffirm our endorsement of the Commission’s report and our sup­
port for its basic objectives. While we have expressed some reserva­
tions on certain of the specific recommendations, we believe it is 
timely for the AICPA to begin the process of assigning priorities 
and developing the means to implement the Commission’s final con­
clusions and recommendations. The CCR looks forward to the Commis­
sion’s final report, and would welcome the opportunity to cooperate 
in its implementation on a continuous basis.
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Sincerely,
 Joseph A. Sciarrino 
Technical Director
TIMES MIRROR SQUARE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90053
(213) 486-3849
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HARVEY V. GUTTRY, JR.
V ic e  P re s id e n t a n d  C o n tro lle r
June 17, 1977
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Attention: Douglas R. Carmichael
Gentlemen:
The Times Mirror Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Report 
of Tentative Conclusions of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. We 
congratulate the Commission on the objectivity, insight and thoroughness of 
its tentative conclusions. By exposing its views in a preliminary, yet very 
readable form, the Commission has undoubtedly increased the impact of its 
work.
In responding to the urgent need for clarification and possible modification 
of the auditors' responsibilities, the Commission's study is an integral com­
ponent of the private sector's responsiveness to the major conceptual issues 
confronting those who are involved with financial reporting. Out of the 
Commission's work and that of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, which 
is examining the very basis of financial statements, has come a great deal of 
helpful study and dialogue as well as increased understanding.
In the present environment of responsiveness and ongoing evaluation, there 
should be continued open-mindedness of the type that has obviously character­
ized the Commission's efforts to date. In particular, the discussion on the 
conceptual framework should not be hampered by any set positions taken in 
the Commission's report. At the same time, we encourage the Commission to 
be generally unequivocal in its conclusions and recommendations.
The FASB's final conclusions on the objectives of financial statements will 
certainly have a significant impact on the auditor as well as the financial 
statement preparer. In our response to the FASB, we are urging the Board to 
recognize that formal financial statements do not, by themselves, give suffi­
cient information to meet the principal need of a user, which we perceive to 
be the assessment of cash flow prospects. We believe that the most useful 
information to investors is obtained via the system of informal disclosure -- 
including press releases, management's discussion and analysis of operations, 
and the financial review section of annual reports. We are asking the FASB 
to consider following the example set by the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion in recognizing the use of the informal disclosure system for disclosing 
subjective, predictive or uncertain information.
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The Committee on Corporate Reporting of the Financial Executives Institute, 
with which we have worked closely, is proposing a modification of the alterna­
tive objectives of financial statements suggested by the FASB in its tentative 
conclusions. In recognition of the full spectrum of financial information pro­
vided to users, the Committee on Corporate Reporting has developed a definition 
of the objectives of financial reporting for business enterprises which we 
endorse. We have asked the Financial Executives Institute to provide the Com­
mission with a copy of the Institute's forthcoming response to the FASB.
In its report, the Commission presents an excellent discussion of the trend 
to "hardness" in accounting measurement where substantial uncertainty is 
involved. The Commission appears to accept as a necessary compromise "the 
tradeoff between the hardness of a measure and the accuracy of measurement." 
While recognizing that the auditor has major difficulties with uncertainties 
(a form of "soft" data) and that more of the responsibility for reporting on 
uncertainties should be visibly shifted to management, the Commission is 
proposing that more information on uncertainties be included in the audited 
financial statements. The Commission is apparently suggesting that all 
material uncertainties be disclosed in the formal financial statements.
Strictly interpreted, the recommendation would seem to encompass all risks 
of varying degrees that face the enterprise, including the general business 
risks presently disclosed in the unaudited portions of the Form 10-K.
The Commission has zeroed in on perhaps the major inadequacy of financial 
statements and the auditor’s relationship to financial statements -- the 
current handling of significant uncertainties. As is skillfully explained 
by Robert J. Runser in the June 1977 issue of Financial Executive magazine, 
uncertainties about the future are a central focus of the economic decision­
making process and are perhaps the predominant concern of the financial 
statement user. Under any conceptual framework, we believe management cannot 
properly and fully report on uncertainties within the confines of the audited 
financial statements. If users are persuaded to rely primarily on the formal 
financial statements, such items as research and development costs that have 
been expensed but which have considerable future cash flow prospects will 
further widen the credibility gap for both management and the auditors. We 
foresee a sharp increase in the amount of crucial, essentially soft informa­
tion which, if included in the audited statements, will be calling for the 
auditors’ attestation but will be generally unverifiable. Out of such incom­
patability of the reporting framework to deal with the range of predictive 
data to be communicated, there is little hope for meaningful and useful dis­
closure. Both management and the auditors may find themselves in the vicious 
circle of legal liability considerations.
Times Mirror believes that the solution to the uncertainties question is for 
the FASB to participate in the establishment of standards for all aspects of 
financial reporting. If recognition is given that only limited data can be 
presented in audited financial statements and that there are informal dis­
closures with which auditors can be "associated," the financial community can 
unify the subject of financial disclosure without being restricted by audit- 
ability.
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The implication of this broadening of the FASB's role is that, in many cases, 
such as those dealing with values, changes in values, unrealized gains and 
losses, meaningful business segment reporting and so forth, unauditable data 
will be provided. Users, we believe, if given a choice, would rather have a 
range of predictive data than disclosures limited to that which is precise.
Auditors generally are uncomfortable with imprecision. In some cases, they 
do not have the expertise to deal with uncertainty and, in other cases, the 
accounting and reporting framework is not equipped to deal with it. Corporate 
management, as well as the outside investor and creditor, constantly contend 
with imprecision. While there is a role for the precision and confidence­
building which an independent audit provides, it should be recognized that 
unauditable data may be more useful.
Having alerted the Commission that Times Mirror, and probably other companies, 
will be asking the FASB to consider the full sphere of financial reporting 
and the limits of the attestation function, we will make the rest of our com­
ments generally in the context of the traditional emphasis of the FASB and 
AICPA on formal, audited financial statements.
Section 1 -- The Independent Auditors' Role in Society
Times Mirror agrees that a board of directors has an oversight responsibility 
with respect to the company's accounting and financial reporting system. 
Directors must take an active interest in the adequacy of internal controls 
and the propriety of the company's financial statements. In these areas, the 
independent auditors are a principal means for the board of directors to moni­
tor management's performance, and the board should regularly require a report 
from the auditors on the accounting system and the controls over it. In turn, 
the active interest of the board of directors, in the Commission's words, "can 
go a long way toward balancing the auditor's relationship with management."
The active interest of Times Mirror directors has been concentrated through 
the board's audit committee established several years ago and made up of out­
side directors. Times Mirror's independent auditors meet regularly with the 
audit committee to review and approve fee arrangements, the scope of the audit 
work, and the auditors' principal findings.
We endorse the Commission’s suggestion that the board of directors be made up 
of a significant proportion of outside directors. While there is a practical 
need for a sufficient number of inside directors, we believe that the out­
siders must have clear authority and the votes to support that authority.
Both the auditors and management of our company have sought ways to further 
improve the independence and quality of the auditors’ performance. For example, 
at the suggestion of management, the audit committee of the board of directors 
recently took the initiative of insisting that our company's independent audi­
tors implement the following:
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1. Rotation every three years or less of audit partners, managers 
and supervisors assigned to audit Times Mirror operating units.
2. Annual review of the audit by a partner from a different district 
of the audit firm and rotation of this review partner every three 
years.
3. Rotation periodically of the partner-in-charge of the Times Mirror 
audit and rotation of the manager and/or supervisor not less fre­
quently than every three years.
Times Mirror strongly believes in the value of continuing audit by its exter­
nal and internal auditors. Extensive coordinated audit work is a necessary 
part of Times Mirror's approach to quality financial reporting. This joint 
effort in no way infringes on the independence of the auditors, yet it does 
illustrate that the auditor can function effectively without assuming the 
role of being an adversary to management.
Section 2 —  Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations
We agree that the word "fairly" as used in the standard auditor's report is 
highly ambiguous and should be replaced with "appropriate in the circum­
stances."
We concur with the general thought that more guidance must be developed for 
the selection of the most appropriate accounting principles when there are 
alternatives or when there are no applicable accounting pronouncements. 
Additional guidelines for evaluation of the cumulative effect of the appli­
cation of alternative accounting principles should also be considered. This 
guidance should, however, come from the FASB rather than the accounting 
practitioners. Based on past experience, we would not rely on the AICPA to 
reach an effective consensus on the delicate issues of preferability. Our 
fear is that the result of any audit standards designed to handle prefer­
ability would unnecessarily restrict management's efforts to make meaningful 
financial disclosure. Requiring the independent accountant to declare one 
acceptable method as preferable to another equally acceptable method forces 
the accountant to make a determination that hinges on business planning and 
judgment, rather than accounting judgment.
The need for additional guidelines should be considered in the light of the 
"efficient market" research findings that users of financial statements are 
not confused or misled by alternative accounting treatments. This lack of 
confusion is partially the result of disclosure requirements mandating the 
exposure of accounting methods employed.
Section 3 —  Reporting on Significant Uncertainties in Financial Presentations
As stated earlier, Times Mirror believes that the present accounting and 
auditing framework is unable to properly handle uncertainties. We support the 
Commission's reasoning and proposal that the "subject to" qualification be elim­
inated from the auditor's opinion.
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We question the value of a requirement for a separate note on uncertainties. 
Regardless of the limitations given in any new accounting standard, financial 
statement users would expect a separate note entitled "uncertainties" or the 
like to cover all material uncertainties, up to and possibly including gen­
eral business risks. We cannot imagine how such disclosures could be effec­
tively handled in the formal financial statements.
Section 4 -- Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud
We agree with the Commission's observation that users of financial informa­
tion and the public have generally had higher expectations concerning the 
independent auditor's role in detecting fraud than has been traditionally 
acknowledged by the profession.
SAS No. 16, "The Independent Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of 
Errors or Irregularities," did respond to public expectation by mandating 
that "...under generally accepted auditing standards the independent auditor 
has the responsibility... to search for errors or irregularities that would 
have a material effect on the financial statements, and to exercise due skill 
and care in the conduct of that examination." The requirement that an audi­
tor search for material fraud is explicit in the statement in SAS No. 16 that 
"an independent auditor's standard report implicitly indicates his belief 
that the financial statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated 
as a result of errors or irregularities." In our opinion, the adoption of 
SAS No. 16, combined with SAS No. 6, "Related Party Transactions," indicates 
that the profession has moved sufficiently to codify that frame of mind which 
the Commission aptly characterizes as "healthy skepticism."
In our opinion, a pragmatic definition of materiality must be developed before 
any additional audit procedures to uncover fraud are instituted. In the 
absence of such a standard, we are concerned that the Commission's recommenda­
tion of a "search" for fraud might lead to additional audit work beyond that 
which is necessary to provide audit assurance to financial statement users. 
Where the independent auditors are satisfied with a company's internal con­
trols and the fraud detection work of the internal auditors, the independent 
auditors should concentrate on top management fraud.
Section 5 -- Corporate Accountability and the Law
We concur with the Commission's position that management has an obligation to 
adopt and disseminate policies setting forth the company's standards of conduct 
Management also must ensure that the company's accounting system and the con­
trols over it provide a cost effective opportunity to detect violations of 
company policy. As the Commission has properly suggested, a company's internal 
audit staff should play a major role in the attainment of optimum "corporate 
legal accountability." It is our hope that if a corporation has an effective 
approach, its independent auditors will, with minimal incremental cost, be able 
to obtain assurances that any illegal and questionable acts are being detected 
and disclosed.
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As part of the ideal corporate accountability framework, Times Mirror proposes 
the use of internal letters of representation. Two years ago, we instituted 
a required procedure of quarterly representation letters from each of our com­
pany's operating units executed by the respective Chief Operating Officer and 
Chief Accounting Officer. In addition to covering normal financial represen­
tations, these letters require representations covering compliance with public 
laws and our company's policies in the following areas:
1. Conflict of interest.
2. Related party transactions.
3. Improper or illegal payments, including payments of a political 
nature.
4. International boycott.
5. Recognition that the unit management is responsible for the finan­
cial statements of the unit.
While these letters merely emphasize long-established company policy, they do 
continually remind the operating unit management of the company's requirements.
The Commission has set forth a well-reasoned description of the manner in which 
the auditor should respond to detected illegal or questionable acts. The audi­
tor should consider detected illegal or questionable acts "without regard to 
traditional standards of materiality."
We strongly endorse the Commission's suggestion that the responsibility for 
legal disclosures should be placed squarely on management and its legal counsel. 
We support the study and development of improvements in the manner in which 
legal matters are disclosed. In particular, a solution to the auditor-lawyer 
impasse over the disclosure of unasserted claims needs to be found.
Section 6 -- The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and Its Extension
Times Mirror involves its independent auditors in the quarterly financial 
reporting process on a timely basis. Our internal auditors also play an active 
role in the review of subsidiaries' quarterly results while the corporate 
policy and control section, which is independent of the consolidation process, 
performs quarterly overview procedures. We have found that the benefits of 
this coordinated review program exceed the costs involved.
The focus of the quarterly work of our independent and internal auditors is on 
internal controls. Both the independent auditors and management are pleased 
with the results of this more frequent involvement. On this basis, we endorse 
the Commission's proposal for timely involvement by independent auditors in 
the financial reporting process.
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Times Mirror supports the concept that management should make explicit repre­
sentations covering the adequacy of the corporation's accounting system and 
the internal controls over it. This representation should extend to disclo­
sure of uncorrected material deficiencies.
We also endorse the expansion of the audit function to include a more compre­
hensive study and evaluation of controls over the accounting system. The 
auditor's report, we agree, should include a conclusion on the functioning of 
the system and comment on inadequacies in management's disclosures on internal 
controls. Although we would envision that this expansion will not result in 
a significant increase in the annual cost of auditing services, there should 
be further dialogue and research among interested parties to assess the bene­
fits and costs of the additional audit work.
In reviewing the annual report information outside the audited financial 
statements, the auditor should "extend his procedures to include a comparison 
of the other information in the financial statements and his audit work papers" 
and "when necessary...recompute information stated in percentages or combined 
in a manner different from that in the financial statements." It is unfortunate 
that SAS No. 8, "Other Information in Documents Containing Audited Financial 
Statements," did not contain this additional guidance. Nevertheless, it is our 
impression that most major accounting firms are performing these procedures. 
While we do endorse these "limited review" procedures, we strongly disagree 
with the recommendation of the "extension of the audit function to other infor­
mation in the annual report." Any suggestion that the other information should 
be audited will give the auditor serious problems since he will find that much 
of the other information is nonverifiable. We believe there must be a gener­
ally understood boundary for the audit responsibility, and the audited financial 
statements are the limit of the information susceptible to the auditor's attes­
tation.
Section 7 —  The Auditor's Communications with Users
Times Mirror strongly endorses the concept of the "report by management" acknow­
ledging management's responsibility for the financial statements, and the audi­
tor's opinion stating his satisfaction or dissatisfaction with management's 
representations. Logically, management should make the representations per­
taining to the propriety of financial statement presentation and the status of 
the accounting system and internal controls.
In keeping with the concept that management has the responsibility for the 
financial statements, management rather than the auditors, should be making 
consistent representations. Accordingly, we agree with the omission of the 
consistency comment from the revised auditor's report. We do, however, believe 
that significant accounting changes should be highlighted in the report by 
management and then discussed in detail in the notes to the financial statements
While calling its example of a report by management an "illustration," the Com­
mission comments that a "standardized format" should be developed through 
"substantial cooperation...between auditors and management." If the Commission 
is suggesting that customized reports by management should be developed by
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individual corporations and that an authoritative body need not promulgate a 
rigid universal format, we heartily support the Commission's proposal in its 
entirety. Even before the distribution of the Commission's tentative con­
clusions, Times Mirror management was using an abbreviated report by manage­
ment in internal financial statements and in 10-Q filings.
Because we believe that the typical financial statement user should not be 
expected to comprehend the essence of the expression "generally accepted 
accounting principles” or to understand the other intricacies of the present 
standard auditor's report, we endorse the Commission's proposal for a more 
explanatory auditor's report. A new report should be devised to include a 
series of paragraphs with standardized alternative wordings, noting all sig­
nificant aspects of the audit function. While we do share the concern of 
others that the expanded report, by referring to the auditor's monitoring of 
management activities, could unnecessarily imply that management is not to 
be trusted, we have faith that interested parties will be able to develop 
balanced language.
Section 8 -- The Education. Training and Development of Auditors
Times Mirror agrees that there is a need for significant improvement in the 
education of entrants to the accounting profession. Practitioners, accoun­
tants in industry and educators should interface more to resolve deficiencies 
in current curriculums.
However, we do not believe that there is a demonstrated need for background 
and skills beyond what universities should be able to arrange into a four or 
five year program. It is doubtful that a seven year higher level education 
will help prevent "the exercise of poor judgment under conditions of stress 
and pressure” cited by the profession. It is our observation that "good" 
judgment in an auditing context is the result of practical and sufficient 
audit experience; it is gained not in the classroom, but rather in the field 
by exposure to accounting and auditing problems under actual conditions of 
stress and pressure.
In addition, the kind of specialized training gained in a seven year program 
would be unnecessary for individuals who decide to pursue careers in private 
industry and government. It would also tend to eliminate the enriching 
interchange of professional personnel among public accounting, private indus­
try and government.
The Times Mirror Company does support measures which would enhance both the 
technical skills and integrity of the entrant. We suggest consideration of 
the following proposals:
1. The background of the CPA candidate should be broadened to require 
effective courses in economics, statistics, electronic data pro­
cessing and written communication, to name a few.
2. A separate course covering the legal and ethical responsibilities 
of the auditor.
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3. The business schools should place a greater emphasis on auditing. 
Courses in auditing which focus on fraud detection and particular 
industries and are oriented, perhaps, toward the AICPA Industry 
Audit Guides should be considered by the schools.
We are disturbed by the trend, described by the Commission, that accounting 
teachers are coming "directly through the educational process, without a 
period of experience." Interested parties should study this detrimental 
development for ways to arrest it. However, the entrance standards for the 
CPA's professional societies should not be diminished for the sake of more 
communication with academics. We do believe it is incumbent upon educators 
and CPA's to find and fully utilize other means of regular contact between 
the two groups.
Section 9 Maintaining the Independence of Auditors
We believe that the Commission has advanced sufficient grounds to support its 
conclusion that accounting advice, accounting advocacy, income tax consulta­
tion, and similar services not directly related to the audit do not affect the 
independence of the auditor. On the other hand, we disagree with the Commis­
sion in that we believe management services work and "peripheral services" can 
possibly conflict with the auditor's independence and, perhaps more importantly, 
can damage the public credibility of the auditor. The feeling that public 
accountants should not perform the latter types of services for their audit 
clients is too wide-spread to be ignored. We foresee that the trend for 
increased disclosure will lead to the requirement that publicly-owned enter­
prises report the details of all transactions with their auditors. Such a 
requirement is inevitable, we believe, because there is no sustainable basis 
for opposing it. In anticipation of the disclosure requirement, some corpora­
tions will avoid criticism, even if refutable, by discontinuing the use of the 
peripheral services of their auditors.
We believe that the Commission should explicitly note that a high proportion 
of boards of directors and managements had already been scrutinizing the nature 
of services received from their auditors and have not retained them for services 
that could be reasonably viewed as counter-productive to the auditors' indepen­
dence. On this point as well as others throughout the Commission's tentative 
conclusions, the report has failed to describe measures already in practice 
which serve to demonstrate the integrity of the vast majority of the nation's 
business leaders. In recent times, the ethical and law-abiding behavior of 
this majority has been overlooked in the concern over a relatively few instances 
of gross misconduct. This perspective, we hope, will be reflected throughout 
the Commission's final conclusions.
The Commission has used its survey of individual audit personnel as the basis 
for strong charges regarding the effect of time pressures and cost restraints 
on auditor performance. We are deeply disturbed by the indicated incidence of 
substandard performance. As the information is presented in the tentative con­
clusions, however, we have the impression that, due to the fogging of the data- 
gathering process, the survey results do not show that some of the omissions 
were supportable although the auditor did not document this support or was too
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inexperienced to recognize that the omission was supportable. In any event, 
the accounting profession must seriously study the survey and its results 
and take prompt action to resolve any significant problems indicated by the 
survey results and the subsequent dialogue.
We do not believe that relaxing deadlines or increasing audit fees will sig­
nificantly improve audit quality. In the isolated instances where audit 
firms have agreed to unconscionable fees or deadlines, they have a duty to 
resign if they are unable to satisfactorily perform the audit. The peer 
review process should help identify and bring pressure for reform of poor 
management practices and other shortcomings of individual auditing firms.
Section 10 —  The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards
We strongly endorse the Commission's recommendations for prompt private 
sector action in the improvement of the auditing standard setting process.
We have faith that the current momentum of independent accountants and indus­
try will be sufficient to produce effective solutions to significant defi­
ciencies. In the revision of standard setting structures and the standards 
themselves, the Securities and Exchange Commission should be consulted; how­
ever, only after the profession has failed to act promptly and adequately 
should it be advocated that the Government intervene. A full-time Auditing 
Standards Board within the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
should be seriously considered. This board should open up the standard 
setting process to greater participation by interested parties, including 
industry accountants serving in advisory capacities. The business of the new 
board should be conducted in public forum to the maximum extent practical to 
reveal the objectivity and fairness of the standard setting process.
Recognizing that non-publicly-owned companies and small practitioners have 
legitimate complaints, we support recommendations to give their needs more 
consideration in the standard setting processes for both accounting and 
auditing standards.
Section 11 —  Regulating the Profession to Maintain the Quality of Audit 
Procedures
While agreeing with critics that the accounting profession has, in the past, 
not taken prompt, effective action to respond to deficiencies, including the 
need for peer reviews, we believe that recommendations from certain quarters 
for direct Government action are premature. The profession should be given 
a limited, although reasonable, amount of time to establish a mechanism for 
periodically evaluating the work of auditing firms.
Yours truly,
HVG:pc
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Research Director
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New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
The Report of Tentative Conclusions by the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities is a thoughtful and balanced presentation which could 
well result in an improvement in the performance of independent auditors. 
Many of the recommendations can be accepted as stated. I am noting 
below only those points which we wish to emphasize or which we recommend 
be changed.
FORMING AN OPINION ON FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS (Section 2)
We agree that the word "fairly" should be eliminated from the auditor's 
report. With the heavy emphasis on compliance with rules, the 
judgmental decision as to whether or not the financial statements are 
"fair" has taken a subordinate position.
REPORTING ON SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES (Section 3)
The elimination of the "subject to" qualification in the auditor's opinion 
has merit, and any uncertainty could best be described in a note to the 
financial statements. However, the Cohen Commission recommendation 
is that "the note should describe all material uncertainties, not only 
those that might have resulted in a qualification." The problem with 
this recommendation is that clear standards of such note disclosure 
must be established in order for both the company and its auditors to 
satisfactorily determine those uncertainties which should be considered 
material. Uncertainties could be quite lengthy and, therefore, burden­
some if the threshold of materiality is too low.
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CLARIFYING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETECTION OF FRAUD (Section 4)
The Cohen Commission recommendation is that the auditor should "search 
for material fraud" and that he should make certain that the " financial 
statements report and explain the nature and effects of material frauds 
that are discovered."
In this case, two standards need to be established: (1) A standard 
must be carefully defined as to what represents "due professional 
care" for use as a guide by the auditor in determining how far to take 
his search for material fraud and (2) a standard must be set to deter­
mine what level of frauds or defalcations must be reported in the financial 
statements. For instance, in financial organizations, where many people 
are handling cash or its equivalent, it is not uncommon for there to be 
small defalcations by employees. The threshold of materiality must be 
sufficiently high to safeguard against the financial statements being 
cluttered with the listing of small "frauds."
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW (Section 5)
The Cohen Commission recommendation properly makes it a management 
responsibility for meeting society's demands for corporate accountability. 
I would also agree that management should adopt publicized and detailed 
policy statements indicating the correct conduct of its officers and 
employees. I am concerned, however, that the independent auditor 
not expand unduly the scope of his audit in monitoring compliance with 
corporate policies as laid down by management. I believe it would be 
proper for the independent auditor to note any failures in compliance, 
but they should not have as one of their primary missions the monitoring 
of the policy in all its aspects. The cost and time consumption involved 
would be totally uneconomic. I would agree that any detected illegal 
or questionable acts be brought by the auditor to the attention of manage­
ment without regard to traditional standards of materiality.
BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITOR'S ROLE AND ITS EXTENSION (Section 6)
This entire set of recommendations is too broad and sweeping. First of 
all, it would encompass all "information of an accounting and financial 
nature that management has a responsibility to report." This could expand 
the auditor's scope to almost limitless bounds. Further, it is indicated 
that the auditor's report on the audit function should include an evaluation 
of management's description of controls over the accounting system. It is
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not clear to whom the report should be issued but presumably it would 
be made public. If so, this could be considered objectionable inasmuch 
as at any one time there are control problems which any company is 
working on and which it would not care to have made a part of the public 
record.
The scope of this set of recommendations is so broad that there would 
need to be established a very well-defined set of standards by which 
they would be made to operate.
THE EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITORS (Section 8)
I am in enthusiastic agreement with the recommendation that an educa­
tional program similar to that of the legal profession should be instituted 
over a period of time. Four years of undergraduate work plus a graduate 
program in a professional school of accounting would be a major step 
in elevating accounting to true professional status and help to insure 
a level of competence adequate to meet the financial and accounting 
problems in the next generation. I would question whether a three- 
year graduate program might not be overlong, at least initially; a 
full three-year graduate program might require greater time and experi­
ence to develop.
MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF AUDITORS (Section 9)
These recommendations would result in removing management's effective 
control over audit costs and for this reason are not supportable.
Further, the recommendations would result in steps being taken to 
reduce the pressures which arise from time budgets and also would 
remove deadlines. I don't know of any business or profession which 
is not confronted with deadlines and time budgets. Further, there is 
no instance of which we have knowledge in which it has been alleged, 
much less proven, that independent auditors have "missed" because of 
deadlines or time budgets. It is the responsibility of any auditor to 
withdraw from the engagement if the time requirements make it impossible 
for him to perform an adequate audit.
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Despite the specific disagreements noted above, we believe the Cohen 
Commission's report is worthwhile and is a step in the right direction. 
Further, it is tangible evidence that the private sector acting on its own 
initiative can continue to improve its procedures and techniques without 
the intrusion of Congress or Federal regulatory agencies.
JWO:cc
Very truly yours,
 J. W. Ostrem
RESPONSE OF ALEXANDER GRANT & COMPANY 
TO THE REPORT OF TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS BY 
THE AICPA COMMISSION ON AUDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
I. Introduction
This paper presents the views of Alexander Grant & 
Company on the Report of Tentative Conclusions of the AICPA 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. On the whole, we 
are impressed with the Report of Tentative Conclusions, and, 
as will be set out hereinafter, there are a number of specific 
conclusions which we think the profession would do well to 
implement. The Report also presents a few conclusions with 
which we do not agree and such conclusions are also discussed 
in this paper.  
II. Principal Points of Agreement
AICPA Auditing Standards Executive Committee
We agree with the fundamental thrust of the Commis­
sion's recommendations about restructuring the AICPA Auditing 
Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC). The present Committee 
of twenty-one part-time voting members is plainly too large 
to be effective. Moreover, the fact that one-third of the 
Committee members are new each year causes problems of up­
dating and efficiency. As we noted in our testimony before 
the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the 
Committee on Government Affairs of the United States Senate,
"a number of (AudSEC’s) recent pronouncements have appeared 
to us to be ill-considered and awkwardly drafted."
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2We concur in the finding of the Commission that 
many AudSEC "pronouncements could usefully provide more 
specific guidance.” All too frequently the pronouncements 
use language which is not understood by the average practi­
tioner in the field and key issues are either ducked or 
finessed.
Our recommendations for changes in AudSEC as set 
forth in our testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee 
are as follows:
The Committee should be reduced in size —  to 
five or seven members. Some of the "Big Eight” 
and other larger firms would thus have to forego 
their permanent representation. Terms should be 
increased from three to at least five years.
AudSEC should be given adequate staff, including 
counsel and assistants who can communicate in 
plain English. Meetings should be conducted in 
the open, allowing all who wish to attend or send 
observers to do so. AudSEC could also continue 
to be assisted by special task forces drawn from 
the accounting profession and elsewhere.
We do not believe, however, that it is necessary or 
desirable for AudSEC to become a full-time body. Practitioners 
who are involved with practice problems on a day-to-day basis 
can make a better contribution to setting the rules for 
conducting audits than those who are removed from practice. 
Also, it seems to us that before the cost —  which would be 
substantial —  of a full-time AudSEC is incurred, we should 
test whether a part-time AudSEC comprised of a smaller number 
of practicing professionals would be effective.
3Audits of Non-Public Companies
We concur with the Commission's conclusion that 
"there are two distinct types of audit practice within the 
profession." We were also pleased to see the Commission's 
comment that "the users of audited statements of non-public 
companies differ significantly enough from investors in 
public companies to suggest that not all the requirements of 
every Statement on Auditing Standards should apply."
We believe that not only do the users of financial 
statements of non-public companies differ from users of 
financial statements of public companies, but that the audit 
approach for the non-public company must itself be different 
in many cases. For example, it is not uncommon in non-public 
companies to find that accounting departments are of 
insufficient size to permit a full separation of functions 
and, hence, an adequate system of internal accounting controls 
in the classical sense. Nonetheless, these companies fre­
quently have excellent controls over their day-to-day operations 
and accounting records because the personnel performing the 
accounting functions are experienced, intelligent and 
closely supervised by the top management (likely including 
the owners) of the enterprise.
It is frequently more efficient to audit the 
financial statements of such enterprises by applying sub­
stantive tests to the account balances rather than concen­
trating on review of the system of internal accounting 
control and test of compliance. This distinction is already 
recognized in the present literature in Section 320.55 of 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1.
4We know that some professional accountants will 
argue that "an audit is an audit is an audit." While we 
agree that the end product of an audit examination of 
financial statements should be the auditor’s opinion about 
the client's financial statements, the procedures applicable 
in various circumstances — to various sizes of companies —  
will not necessarily be the same. In short, the nature of 
procedures applied to a public company's financial statements 
may differ from those applied in the case of a non-public 
company; but the end result should be the same —  an opinion 
on the cli e n t ’s financial statements.
Uncertainty Qualifications and Statement of Uncertainties
We agree with the Commission’s recommendation about 
elimination of the requirement in the present literature that 
auditors qualify their reports (or deny an opinion) for 
material uncertainties. It seems clear to us that financial 
statements which adequately present and disclose the effects 
of uncertainties are in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles and, accordingly, no qualification of 
the auditor's report is necessary. We have no problem 
extending this principle to the so-called "going concern" 
situation. Even if the auditor has significant doubts 
about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, 
as long as the client’s problems relating to going concern 
uncertainties are adequately disclosed and emphasized, the 
financial statements should be regarded as presented in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
Of course there can be circumstances where it is clear to 
the auditor and to management of the enterprise that 
preparation of financial statements in accordance with the 
going concern assumption is not warranted. In these latter
5situations the auditor should be careful to see that the 
financial statements present information in accordance with 
the facts.
We also agree with the Commission’s suggestion that 
each set of audited financial statements should contain a 
separate "statement of uncertainties." A separate statement 
would serve to emphasize uncertainties about the financial 
statements and help to reduce the communication problem with 
users of such statements who may believe that the financial 
reporting process is more precise than it actually is.
We think a great deal of work will have to be done 
on developing standards for the content of a statement of 
uncertainties within the context of generally accepted 
accounting principles and adequately distinguished from 
statements of "risk factors" included in prospectuses. For 
example, most CPAs today would qualify their audit reports for 
material uncertainties about the collectability of accounts 
receivable but would not qualify their reports for uncertain­
ties about the useful lives selected by management for the 
depreciation of property, plant and equipment. We think that, 
properly conceived, a statement of uncertainties could open 
the way toward frank discussion of all material uncertainties 
about the financial statements of an enterprise without 
attempting to make the artificial distinctions caused by the 
present literature and practice on auditors’ reports.
Consistency Exceptions
We agree with the Commission that the present 
auditing standard requiring the auditor to take an exception 
in his report letter for changes of accounting principles 
should be revised. A clear-cut note to the financial
6statements describing accounting changes should be sufficient 
to adequately communicate the information needed to users of 
financial statements. In this regard, the matrix set up by 
the present auditing literature is so complicated that only 
technicians inside the profession can hope to understand 
what the standard short-form report intends to communicate. 
For example:
1. Certain accounting changes involving the 
inseparability rule (paragraph 11 of APB
Opinion No. 20) may be treated as changes 
in accounting estimate but will be treated 
as involving the consistency standard on 
accounting principles changes for the pur­
poses of the auditors’ report letter.
2. Major reclassifications in financial 
statements will usually not be considered 
as affecting the consistency standard 
but changes which relate to an adjustment 
of the presentation of the statement of 
changes in financial position will be 
considered to involve the consistency standards 
(paragraphs 420.14 and 420.15 of Statement
on Auditing Standards No. 1).
3. Even the periods to which the consistency 
standard is applied are interpreted in a 
highly technical and somewhat confusing 
manner. For example, if the auditor 
"reports only on the current period, he 
should report on the consistency of the 
application of accounting principles in
7relation to the preceding period, regard­
less of whether the financial statements 
for the preceding period are presented"
(paragraph 420.20 of Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 1). But if the auditor 
reports on two or more years he reports 
only on consistency among those years 
and not on consistency with any year prior 
to such years reported on unless financial 
statements of such prior periods are 
presented.
Management Acknowledgement of Its Responsibility
We agree with the Commission’s suggestion that 
management acknowledge its responsiblity for the financial 
statements in a formal written report to be attached to 
each set of audited financial statements. We believe that 
some additional work will have to be done on the suggested 
form of the management responsibility statement, but think 
that matter can be resolved.
Management Advisory Services
We believe that the Commission’s discussion of 
management advisory services is extremely well done. We 
agree that while providing such services to clients poses 
"an obvious potential threat to the auditor’s independence," 
"the evidence contradicts the theory."
However, we do believe that the practice of public 
accounting must stop somewhere, and, accordingly, our firm 
has not chosen to provide an unlimited range of management 
advisory services to audit clients. One specific area
8where we have chosen not to provide non-accounting consulting 
services to our clients is that involving actuarial services. 
As we said in our testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Reports, Accounting and Management of the Committee on 
Government Operations, United States Senate, actuarial 
services place "the auditor in the troublesome position of 
appearing to audit his own work." We acknowledge that 
this problem may be more one of appearance of independence 
rather than fact of independence, but we believe that 
actuarial services are exactly the type of services which 
the profession would do well not to perform for its audit 
clients.
We also concur with the Commission’s suggestion that 
non-audit services performed for audit clients ought to be 
disclosed.
Professional Discipline
We agree that removal of some of the secrecy from 
the profession's present disciplinary processes is advisable. 
Undoubtedly this will have to be handled carefully as a 
professional's reputation can be severely injured by the 
mere indication that he is being considered for disciplinary 
action. Nonetheless, subject to proper control, we think 
removal of secrecy may be a good idea.
We agree that there is a problem regarding deferral 
of disciplinary action where litigation is pending. However, 
we think that the AICPA and the State Boards of Accountancy 
have little choice but to defer their proceedings in such 
situations. In the case of complicated litigation, it is 
useful to wait so as to have the benefit of the record
9developed in discovery and at trial. The important thing is 
that there be follow-through on disciplinary action at a 
later date after pending litigation has been concluded. All 
too often, it appears to us that when the cases drag on for 
years, disciplinary action is eventually not taken simply 
because the matter has become "yesterday's newspaper."
Information About Audit Failures and Fraud
We agree with the Commission that dissemination of 
information about "audit failures" and fraud would be helpful 
to the practicing profession. Because of the legal difficul­
ties which may be involved (which we understand caused 
problems for the AICPA special committee on the Equity 
Funding matter), we suggest that the information disseminated 
be written up in a "case study" format without reference to a 
specific matter which has actually occurred. Such case 
studies may even be more instructive than lengthy descriptions 
of actual "audit failures" and frauds.
III. Principal Points of Disagreement
Revised Auditor's Report
We are very troubled by the revised auditor's 
report letter recommended by the Commission. Our concerns 
may be summarized as follows: 
1. We doubt that the suggested revised report 
really communicates the fundamental audit 
responsibility on the financial statements 
better than the present short-form report.
This is not to say that we believe the 
present report communicates adequately either.
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But we do believe that the first three para­
graphs of the Commission's suggested report 
letter will leave the public in the continuing 
position of wondering what it all means.
Phrases such as "in all material respects" 
and "generally accepted accounting principles 
appropriate in the circumstances" are still 
not sufficiently clear to really result in 
help for the user of financial statements.
2. Until the concept of a fair presentation is 
fully incorporated in generally accepted 
accounting principles we would be reluctant 
to remove the phrase "presents fairly" from 
the short-form report. Indeed, in the present 
state of the art where authoritative literature 
does not exist for the selection among 
various' accounting principles, we believe
that the auditor should be required to give 
his opinion both on fair presentation of the 
financial statements and on their conformity 
to generally accepted accounting principles.
3. At page 20 of its Report the Commission states 
the following:
The mere absence of authoritative literature 
specifying how the choice among alternatives 
should be made is not sufficient grounds for 
the auditor to accept management's selection 
(of accounting principles).
We agree with this statement by the Commission 
but are unable to discern how the Commission
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would have the auditor cope with a situation 
where he does not agree with management’s 
selection of principles from among alternatives 
permitted by generally accepted accounting 
principles. We also note with interest that 
the Commission has stated that accounting 
principles appropriate to individual circumstances 
may be selected and applied properly, yet the 
resulting financial statements as a whole may 
be biased or misleading.” We agree that in the 
present state of the art this can sometimes 
happen, but we believe that the best answer 
lies in adopting a uniform set of accounting 
principles tied to a conceptual framework —  
not in imposing a further audit reporting 
requirement. Moreover, what the public really 
wants —  it seems to us —  is the auditor’s 
overall view of the integrity of the financial 
statements, not just his view about alternative 
principle selection. For this reason dropping 
of the phrase "presents fairly” from the 
auditor’s report would in our view be a step 
backward.
4. We doubt that non-public companies will need 
or desire in all cases for the auditor to be 
involved with quarterly information.
Accordingly, reporting on the quarterly 
information of non-public companies should 
not be mandatory. We also wonder whether timely 
quarterly involvement of the auditor is sound 
from a cost/benefit standpoint for smaller, 
and less actively traded SEC registrants.
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Reporting on Internal Accounting Control
The new auditor’s report letter proposed by the 
Commission also contains a paragraph reporting on the client's 
internal accounting controls. We are gravely concerned about 
this recommendation.
To us it appears that the profession (with a push 
from the SEC) is moving headlong toward foisting on the 
public another idea which will not serve the purpose for 
which it may be intended. Every auditor knows that a good 
system of internal accounting control does not necessarily 
result in correct financial statements. All that a system 
of internal accounting control can mean to the auditor is 
possible adjustment of the nature, timing and extent of his 
audit procedures. The public will inevitably believe that 
if the auditor makes no negative comment about the client's 
system of internal accounting control that there is little 
or no possibility of fraud. This is plainly not so. In 
some of the more significant cases of "audit failure" 
management has overridden the system of internal accounting 
control for its own purposes —  whether fattening the 
financial statements, fattening its own pockets or both.
We know the Commission's suggested report says this —  but 
who will remember or understand?
We also believe that it will prove to be virtually 
impossible to define an "adequate system of internal accounting 
control." The SEC has tried; AudSEC has tried —  each without 
success.
As we have noted above in our discussion of auditing 
non-public companies, the system of internal accounting
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control in one enterprise may differ significantly from that 
in another enterprise simply because of the size or nature of 
the company being audited. When viewed in a cost/benefit 
context the internal accounting control systems of many 
smaller clients are perfectly adequate even though they may 
not match up well against some absolute concept of an "ideal 
system." For such smaller companies, we believe the Commis­
sion's suggestion that the auditor report on "material 
weaknesses" could lead to lengthy —  and silly -—  lists of 
weaknesses which have no effect whatsoever upon the 
reliability of the financial information presented because of 
the substantive tests which the auditor has applied in 
making his examination.
Outside Directors and Independence
The Commission has said that "an active Board of 
Directors with a significant proportion of independent, 
outside directors to whom the auditor reports is necessary 
to help sustain his independence." In principle, we agree 
that it is desirable to have knowledgeable and outside 
directors on any board, but we believe the Report of the 
Commission has overstated the issue. Indeed, an appropriate 
audit committee staffed with outside directors has proven 
to be helpful in many public company situations. However, 
we really doubt whether it is necessary to have outside 
directors on the boards of non-public companies across the 
country. We also doubt whether a requirement for outside 
directors could be adopted by the profession in the face of 
the varying business corporation laws of all of the states 
and serious questions about cost/benefit which would likely 
be raised at the state level.
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Education of Auditors
We think the Commission's discussion about the 
education of auditors misses a very significant point. It 
is not the length of the education that matters (seven years 
under the Commission’s suggestion) but the quality of 
education and the nature of the material taught. Increasingl y , 
the major business schools throughout the country have begun 
to emphasize sophisticated management information and computer 
systems which are encountered only in large companies. Many 
new auditors appear to lack knowledge of how a basic set of 
accounting records works. In short, as one practitioner 
put it recently —  "many d o n ’t know the debits from the 
credits."
 
It is true that the profession itself presently 
bears a very heavy educational burden discharged by each 
of the firms providing lengthy training courses of their 
own. In part, however, such costs have been escalated 
because the firms have not chosen to cooperate through the 
AICPA by sharing their educational efforts. If the 
Commission were to analyze the success of the Institute 
program to exchange educational materials (the so-called 
"EDMAX Program") they would learn that the major firms have 
been singularly reluctant to support the program. Is it 
really necessary that all of the firms develop their own 
materials on accounting for leases, for example?
Materiality for Illegal Acts and Social Control
We are concerned by the manner in which the Report 
deals with illegal or questionable acts, and its abandonment 
of materiality as an insufficiently "powerful" concept for 
application by an auditor once he has discovered or believes 
he has discovered such an a c t .
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Our concern is more fundamental. It appears to be 
a major premise of the Report that a principal purpose of the 
auditing function is societal control over corporate enter­
prise, and that the auditor and his function are perhaps best 
viewed as agencies of social control. If that premise is 
accepted, then, of course, materiality is not a sufficiently 
powerful concept, because it is not responsive to the interests 
society may have in controlling corporate enterprises. In 
our own society, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, the 
Department of Defense, and even the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation may well be 
vitally interested in or curious about matters which are of 
no concern to the average investor or shareholder in making 
investment decisions. Public interest groups and private 
citizens may have other areas of interest or curiosity —  
all without limit.
We do not accept the premise. We believe that 
materiality is an important concept in the preparation and 
auditing of financial statements. We believe that materiality 
is a prerequisite to keeping financial statements within 
usable and understandable dimensions.
As for societal control in general, and as for 
disclosure of questionable acts as a more particular but 
still vaguely defined application of such control, we urge 
that the matter be dealt with apart from the preparation and 
audit of financial statements. If particular corporations 
or classes of corporations should be required to report upon 
their conformity or non-conformity with prescribed norms 
of corporate conduct then let them do so in a report clearly 
intended for that purpose. We are not ducking responsibility.
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We are willing to assist in exploring how we, and other 
accountants, directors, counsel and management might play 
a role in the preparation of and attestation to such reports. 
But we object to cluttering and confusing the auditing of 
financial statements with new arid still undefined notions. IV.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, we repeat that on the whole we are 
impressed with the Commission’s recommendations. We trust 
that those points with which we disagree will be carefully 
considered by the Commission in its further deliberations. 
We look forward to the Report of Final Conclusions.
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Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
RE: Tentative Conclusion on Auditors' Responsibilities
Dear Sir:
In response to the Commission's report of tentative conclusions on Auditors' 
Responsibilities, The Dayton Power and Light Company ("the Company") submits the 
following comments.
The Company does not agree with the Commission that an overriding need 
exists to expand the audit function and its reporting process on annual financial 
statements. If these expansive recommendations are adopted, the cost will become 
quite an added burden on industry, and the benefits to be derived are not substantially 
assured. Once the novelty of the new audit report and management's report fade, 
they too may become an "unread symbol." If the auditor's expanded role adds 
clarity as to what an auditor does, as the Commission contends, the Company 
questions the propriety of industry absorbing this additional cost created by 
the independent accounting profession which in actuality is public relations. On 
the whole, these recommendations would not accrue sufficient benefits to justify 
their added cost.
The Company agrees with the Commission's suggestion to do away with "subject 
to" qualifications on annual reports by reporting the uncertainty which might 
cause such an opinion. Full disclosure of uncertainties is essential in an era 
of corporate distrust. The best way to eliminate the confusion of a "subject to" 
qualification is to allow the user of financial statements to evaluate the 
uncertainties for himself. The need to disclose "other" services of independent 
auditors in the proxy statements in order to safeguard independence is not seen. 
Presently, auditors affirm their lack of material relations with the Company in 
the proxy statements. To fully disclose any normal management advisory service 
which auditors perform is unnecessary.
The effects of time pressures on auditors as well as on internal company 
staff are inevitable. A certain level of time pressure is tolerable, but most 
excessive time pressures can be avoided by careful time budgeting by management. 
However, at times, these pressures are unavoidable, and for an auditor to simply 
refuse to accept these pressures, as the Commission suggests, is unworkable. The 
Company believes that some allowance should be arranged ahead of time to deal 
with these type of occurrences.
The Company approves of the Commission's recommendation for a professional 
school of accounting. Such a school will result in a better quality audit because 
time will not be spent training untested new employees. Graduates of such a 
school would be more professional, more knowledgable, and more efficient than 
persons who have gone through the traditional method of training.
The importance of maintaining the regulatory function of accounting and 
auditing within the private sector cannot be understated. The Company agrees 
with the Commission that the government should not assume the role of determining 
auditing and accounting principles. The Company also agrees that the standards 
board should include some input from industry. The Commission should further 
study specific means of including industry in the decision process.
The Company appreciates the opportunity to submit its comments in regard to 
auditors' responsibilities and thanks the Commission for its consideration 
thereof.
Respectfully submitted.
THE DAYTON POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
J . R. Dill 
Comptroller
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June 20, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director, Commission 
on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
N e w  York, N e w  York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
The Financial Management Standards Board of the Association of Government 
Accountants has reviewed the Commission's "Report of Tentative Conclusions." 
The views expressed represent a consensus of the Board, speaking for the 
Association, and do not necessarily represent the views of individual m e m b e r s  
or their employers.
The Board agrees with the report. In our opinion, the conclusions are 
adequately supported and the recommendations sound. Hopefully, the final 
report will reinforce the conclusions and recommendations and would serve 
as a master blueprint for the profession to follow in realigning its relation­
ships with clients, regulatory bodies, recipients of financial statements and 
the public.
The opportunity to review and consider the report was appreciated.
Sincerely,
John T. Crehan
Chairman, Financial Management 
Standards Board
NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS A -54
President
HARRY F REISS. JR. CPA 
President-Elect 
MARIO P BORINI. CPA 
MICHAEL GOLDSTEIN. CPA 
HERBERT M. HABER. CPA 
WILLIS A. SMITH. CPA 
Vice Presidents 
STUART KESSLER. CPA 
Treasurer
BERNARD WERNER. CPA
Secretary
ROBERT L. GRAY. CPA 
Executive Director
June 23, 1977
Dear Doug:
It was necessary to make several revisions 
in the report of our committee on the recommen­
dations of the Cohen Commission. Accordingly, 
we enclose a revised copy.
Robert L. Gray 
Executive Director
Douglas Carmichael, CPA 
Managing Director of 
Technical Services 
American Institute of C P A 's 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036
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The Committee on the Future of the Profession of the New York 
State Society of Certified Public Accountants is pleased to 
offer the following comments and recommendations to The 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities on its Report of 
Tentative Conclusions.
RE: THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S ROLE IN SOCIETY (SEC. 1)
Our committee concurs in the Commission's views on this subject. 
Regarding the role of auditors in serving non-public companies, 
with which the Commission admittedly does not deal, we urge the 
earliest possible attention to this subject.
On page xvii, last paragraph, the report states that "Audits 
are designed to assure..." We suggest the use of "reasonably 
assure."
The paragraph continues with "Audits are designed...to help safe 
guard the assets..." Our committee could not unanimously concur 
in this position since some feel that safeguarding a company's 
assets is solely management's responsibility.
RE: FORMING AN OPINION ON FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (SEC. 2)
We accept with some concern the Commission's position that the 
independent auditor should undertake the responsibility for 
judging the preferability of the accounting principles employed 
by a company in the preparation of its financial statements.
The concern arises from the foreseen difficulties in reaching a 
judgment in some, perhaps many, situations.  It is therefore 
essential that the Commission recommend the development of 
guidelines for judging preferability in order that a frame of 
reference be available to assist auditors and to help achieve 
such uniformity as is possible.
As to the recommended exclusion of the word "fairly" from the 
term "presents fairly" in the auditor's report, our committee 
was evenly divided on the advisability of this action.
RE: REPORTING ON SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES
IN FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS (SEC. 3)
I. Approximately half the committee agreed with the primary
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recommendation in Section 3 that "subject to" qualifications 
should no longer be required in accountants' opinions with 
respect to uncertainties. The remainder of the Committee 
was not prepared to endorse this recommendation for the 
following reasons:
A. The need to obtain more data as to the possible legal 
consequences to the auditor. The courts may not accept 
a pronouncement of the profession that uncertainties
do not require reference in the auditor's opinion even 
if there is adequate disclosure in the financial state­
ments. This is an area that should be investigated 
thoroughly before any change in reporting standards 
is adopted.
B. The need to educate the public prior to implementing 
such a significant change in reporting practice. The 
Commission's Report points out that presently many users 
may believe that there are no uncertainties in financial 
statements if the auditor's opinion is "clean." They 
are more likely to believe this even if, as recommended, 
material uncertainties would not be cited in the auditor's 
opinion but would be disclosed in a footnote.
C. The practical desirability of retaining "subject to" 
qualifications to ensure adequate emphasis in financial 
reports having material uncertainties.
II. The support for the premise that auditors cannot evaluate 
the outcome of most uncertainties any better than users of 
financial statements should be improved. This is a concept 
that many people outside the profession may disagree with 
since, as indicated in the Commission's Report, financial 
statements contain numerous estimates (also see IV below). 
The profession should be prepared to undertake a public 
relations effort to clarify this misconception.
If "subject to" opinions are eliminated, the responsibility 
for evaluating material uncertainties would rest almost 
entirely with the user. There is some doubt that the user 
(with some exceptions) is as qualified to evaluate uncer­
tainties as is the independent auditor. Accordingly, the 
recommendation that "subject to" be eliminated deserves 
further study.
III. Further, if "subject to" is eliminated, a standard should be 
promulgated to set forth the requirements for disclosure of
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uncertainties in financial statements. Particular atten­
tion should be given to unasserted claims and other actions.
If it is intended that all material uncertainties should be 
disclosed, a statement from the FASB should set forth in 
great detail the nature of the items that should be included 
and the information that should be given about each, though 
this may prove to be a most difficult task. A single foot­
note which purports to include all uncertainties, which, in 
fact, does not deal with all the uncertainties that face a  
business enterprise, could be more misleading than useful. 
Companies and their auditors might innocently overlook some 
of the uncertainties which should be disclosed even if there 
is extensive guidance in this area. In addition, without 
adequate guidance, serious disagreements may occur between 
auditors and clients over some disclosures of uncertainties.
The need for disclosure guidelines for "going concern" un­
certainties is acute. Because such a disclosure can be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, the auditor confronts a most agoniz­
ing dilemma —  to disclose or not to disclose. In periods of 
economic distress many such cases may exist, making the devel­
opment of guidelines an urgent matter.
IV. There is a need to develop cautionary expressions to accompany 
an uncertainty disclosure. Illustrative of such a caveat is 
that appearing in the disclosure in 1976 financial statements 
pertaining to replacement cost data. Such cautionary expres­
sions might also relate to estimates of the provisions for 
bad debts, obsolescence in inventories, outstanding warranties 
and other estimates.
V. The use of a middle paragraph in the auditor's report, to
emphasize a situation affecting the financial statements, is 
suggested in paragraph 27 of Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 2. The committee feels that the Commission should deal 
with whether this provision of SAS No. 2 would be appropriate 
for the disclosure of uncertainties in the absence of a 
"subject to" qualification.
In suggesting that "subject to" opinions be eliminated, the 
Commission should also address itself to the use of a dis­
claimer where there is a material uncertainty (see footnote 
8, paragraph 25 of SAS No. 2). Further, in addressing the 
appropriateness of adverse opinions, the Commission should 
also deal with the propriety of "except for" qualifications 
where there is inadequate disclosure of material uncertain­
ties.
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RE: CLARIFYING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
DETECTION OF FRAUD (SEC. 4)
The committee supports the Commission's desire to clarify the  
auditor's responsibility. It believes that SAS No. 16 adequate­
ly defines the responsibility of the independent auditor for the 
detection of errors and irregularities. As stated in SAS 16, the 
independent auditor has the responsibility to plan his examina­
tion to search for errors and irregularities that could materially 
affect the financial statements, and to exercise due professional 
care in the conduct of that examination. While we agree with the 
recommendations proposed by the Commission to further expand on 
the general concept of due professional care, we do not believe 
that the concept of due professional care can be reduced to a 
detailed list of steps and procedures because, in our view, audit­
ing involves a considerable amount of professional judgement.
RE: CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW (SEC. 5)
We agree with the Commission that the independent auditors should 
take steps to improve corporate accountability. However, as 
indicated by the Commission, accountants are not trained to detect 
violations of law? therefore, we support the need for a clear 
definition of prohibited corporate conduct.
We also agree with the Commission's conclusions that management 
has the primary responsibility in this area. Corporations should 
adopt statements of policy and monitor compliance with such 
policy. Companies should be encouraged to disclose the existence 
of the policy in public documents.
The auditors should report any questionable or possibly illegal 
activities noted during their audit to the Audit Committee or 
the Board of Directors. The Audit Committee or the Board of 
Directors should seek the advice of legal counsel on these 
matters.
We do not agree with the Commission that auditors should disclose 
confidential information to government agencies or publicly dis­
close any questionable activities without regard to materiality.
We believe that a reasonable standard of materiality should be 
adopted for disclosure in the financial statements.
• The committee supports the Commission's view that better assis­
tance and involvement by the legal profession should be sought by 
management to enable them to fulfill their responsibility for 
disclosure of litigation and illegal or questionable acts. A
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report by management covering accounting systems and internal 
control and their discussions with legal counsel with respect 
to accounting for and disclosure of legal matters, would be 
desirable. We agree with the Commission that the auditor's 
responsibility should be to review the information and the 
representations of management and counsel to determine that 
the financial statements properly reflect the information provided.
RE: THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITOR'S ROLE
AND ITS EXTENSION (SEC. 6)
We concur in the Commission's proposal for a continuing involve­
ment by the auditors in a company's accounting and reporting 
process. We also concur with (1) the concept of the fundamental 
separation of the roles of management and the auditor, and (2) 
limiting the auditor's association to information of an account­
ing and financial nature which is verifiable.
However, we believe that before new areas of auditor involvement 
are mandated, further study should be recommended in order to 
provide for the orderly evolution of the audit function. 
Specifically, the study should focus on (1) the question of 
the auditor's independence as a result of his assumption of 
a new responsibility; (2) the auditor's inability to provide 
assurance on matters with which he is associated; and (3) the 
benefits of extending the auditor's responsibility against the 
cost of such extension. ___
We recommend that independent auditors be required to commun­
icate internal control weaknesses to the Audit Committee or the 
Board of Directors. This same cost-benefit analysis should be 
made before mandating a comprehensive review of internal control 
for the purpose of detecting all deficiencies. We do not agree, 
however, that a brief summary of such weaknesses would be mean­
ingful to the public because of the difficulty of communicating 
inherent limitations in internal control.
An agreement could not be reached on the suggested form of 
"negative assurance" to the public with respect to quarterly 
financial statements. Further study is necessary of the audi­
tor's ability to convey to users the degree of assurance which 
can be expected from limited reviews.
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RE; THE AUDITORS' COMMUNICATION WITH USERS (SEC. 7)
While we agree with the Commission's conclusion that many users 
instinctively view the auditor's report as a seal of approval 
with respect to the financial soundness of a company, we quest­
ion whether the Commission's suggested revised auditor's report 
and report by management should be implemented at this time. 
Rather, the Commission should recommend research and study of 
the feasibility and implications of an expanded auditor's report 
and of a management report.
We are concerned with the suggestion that the auditor's report 
cover such matters as internal controls, association with 
quarterly information, corporate codes of conduct and meetings 
with the Audit Committee. The auditor may not be able to con­
vey, and the user may not be able to comprehend, the extent 
of the auditor's involvement in such matters. If reporting 
of this information is deemed valuable to users, such communi­
cation should be channeled through the company's Audit Commit­
tee rather than public reporting.
The committee could not reach a consensus as to whether "fairly" 
should be eliminated from the auditor's report with the substi­
tution of "in all material respects". A material number of 
committee members urge that this matter be further studied.
Although the committee endorsed the concept of the report by 
management, it was divided on the need for a statement by 
management with respect to its communicating with legal counsel 
regarding litigation. Outside legal counsel may not be quali­
fied to make a determination on the disclosures required in 
financial statements. Management's statement on the efficiency 
of internal controls should eliminate the need for an additional 
statement on illegal and unethical activities.
RE: THE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT
OF AUDITORS (SEC. 8)
The committee concurs in the Commission's conclusion that there 
is a need for improvement in the educational process. However, 
it could not agree on the optimum method to achieve this objec­
tive.  
The committee agrees that in the last decade the academic account­
ing community in graduate B-schools with executive training
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motivation has increased its emphasis on managerial accounting 
and financial analysis with a heavy mathematical emphasis. 
However, it is only the degree to which this has been done 
that should be of concern to those engaged in educating public 
accountants.
We also agree with the Commission that the emphasis on the 
attainment of the Ph.D. degree, generally following directly 
after undergraduate work, most often precludes the completion 
of any significant amount of audit experience (which is, inci­
dentally, also a basic prerequisite for the CPA certificate in 
many states). The result is that such academics lack the pro­
fessional background necessary to a full understanding of the 
needs and problems of a public accounting practice.
It is agreed that possession of a Ph.D. Degree and a CPA certi­
ficate, coupled with professional experience and scholarly 
attainment will remain the optimum type of academic preparation. 
However, we recognize the difficulty of attaining this optimum 
combination of credentials.
The mere establishment of a professional school of accountancy, 
will not in itself solve this type of faculty problem. Rather, 
a solution, not suggested by the Commission, is to accept an 
approved MBA degree plus a CPA certificate, supplemented by 
high-level practical experience and an acceptable record of 
scholarly writings in lieu of the Ph.D. decree.
As noted before, the Commission states that "formal education 
does not now adequately prepare students to meet the demands 
and risks of professional practice" and that "at present it 
usually does not instill in them an appreciation of the legal 
and ethical obligations assumed by independent auditors."
The study conducted by Professor John G. Rhode, described in 
Appendix B (pp. 167-174), summarizes the reasons why the 
respondents believed their education was insufficient.
It is submitted that neither the inadequacies in auditing 
instruction nor the substandard audit performance cited in 
detail by the Commission will be corrected unless the accounting 
curriculum (in the first instance) and the accounting firms' 
policies (in the second) undergo substantial change. Merely 
spinning off the educational vehicle as a separate professional 
school of accounting would not, of itself, cure the cited 
defects.
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The Committee believes that what is needed is a major reorgani­
zation of existing collegiate schools of business along lines 
that would recognize all other student career goals than that 
of executive administration. Accounting (as well as the other 
departments) should be free to develop and control its own 
curricular offerings according to preceived professional needs 
within the appropriate time frame, as well as to prescribe the 
criteria for the appointment and advancement of its own personnel. 
The instruction would be more responsive to professional needs, 
students would have less cause for complaint on this score, 
and the professional identity of a public accountant would be 
greatly enhanced.
The Commission also proposes an internship program as a curricu­
lum requirement. This proposal may be desirable but it would 
be difficult for business schools to administer properly if at 
all. If it is to be a curriuclar requirement, every student 
must be provided with an opportunity to enjoy substantially 
the same extent and level of exposure to actual practice, which 
is a virtual impossibility.
Thus the committee believes that the solution of the educational 
problems cited by the Commission is not necessarily to be  
found in the establishment of separate professional schools of 
accounting regardless of whatever other merits they may have, 
but rather in the reorganization of existing collegiate schools 
of business.
The report recommends the gradual extension of the educational 
process with a four year liberal arts under-graduate program 
followed by a three year graduate professional program as the 
ultimate goal. The committee was divided on the necessity 
for more than a bachelor's degree as preparation for a pro­
fessional accounting career.
RE: MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF AUDITORS (SEC. 9)
In general, the Commission's conclusions on problems involving 
independence appear sound and are based on reasonable and 
impartial evidence. Our committee endorses them, with one 
exception. Rather than prohibit a specific management services 
activity (i.e., certain executive recruitment and placement 
services) the committee feels that all management services 
activities should be authorized and approved by a committee of   
outside directors of the client being served.
RE: THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AUDITING STANDARDS (SEC.10)
The committee is in general agreement with the recommendations 
in respect to the establishment of auditing standards. However, 
we believe that auditors are the best qualified to set auditing 
standards —  that outsiders should be encouraged and invited 
to participate and to contribute their views in task force and 
subcommittee deliberations, particularly i n  their field of 
expertise, but they should not be members of an official standard 
setting body.
RE: REGULATING THE PROFESSION TO MAINTAIN
THE QUALITY OF AUDIT PRACTICE (SEC. 11)
We are in general agreement with the Commission's recommendations 
with respect to regulating the profession to maintain the quality 
of audit practice.
However, we question the Commission's recommendation for moving 
more expeditiously in disciplinary matters when litigation is 
involved. Unleashing the disciplinary mechanism prior to 
conclusion of the litigation clearly could have an adverse 
effect on the defendant's right to "due process." Nevertheless, 
we believe that the profession, in response to public expecta­
tions, should re-evaluate the practice of waiting until liti­
gation is concluded before commencing its investigations.
The Commission suggests that users of audited financial infor­
mation rely heavily on the name and reputation of the particular 
accounting firm performing the audit. From this, it concludes 
that experimentation with disclosure of information by a firm 
about itself would be useful. Although unstated, it is clear 
that this recommendation implies that the information include 
financial information. We believe this is a questionable 
recommendation which, as the Commission acknowledges, is not 
supported by a demonstrated user need. Absent such a demon­
strated need, we believe it is the right of a  private partner­
ship to limit distribution of its financial information to its 
partners. Recognizing that the public has an interest in the 
reputation of an accounting firm, we believe that one of the 
best ways to provide it with meaningful information about the 
firm's professional standing is through publication of the 
results of the AICPA peer review program.
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George L. McCalla 
2 Gap View Road 
Short Hills, N. J.
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June 29, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Sir:
We appreciate this opportunity to submit in the attached 
memorandum our thoughts on the Commission's tentative conclusions, 
which are underlined therein.
The report of the Commission comes at a time when the 
accounting profession is under critical review by the Subcommittee 
on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Committee on 
Government Operations (the "Metcalf Subcommittee"). The Subcommittee 
has reported that the accounting profession should make many changes 
to eliminate a number of alleged bad practices, conditions, etc., 
but members of the Subcommittee have said they prefer to give the 
private sector an opportunity to eliminate the reported weaknesses 
rather than propose new legislation to correct the weaknesses. 
Senators Metcalf and Percy said at the recent public hearings of 
the Metcalf Subcommittee that the Subcommittee should meet early 
next year and review the actions taken by the AICPA in response to 
the conclusions of the Cohen Commission.
We trust that the Commission's final report and the corrective 
actions to be recommended by the AICPA's committee will demonstrate 
conclusively that additional legislation is not required.
Comments on Tentative Conclusions of 
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
Yours very truly,
George L. McCalla
Enclosure
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COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES
COMMENTS OF GEORGE L. MCCALLA 
ON THE COMMISSION'S TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
SECTION 1
NEED FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS
Boards of directors should have a significant proportion of independent, outside 
directors.
We agree that this composition is necessary to sustain the independent accounts' 
independence. We believe that not less than two thirds of the board should be 
composed of independent, outside directors.
SECTION 2
DELETE "FAIRLY"
The word "fairly" should be eliminated from the auditor's report.
We disagree on two grounds. "Fairly" expresses the element of estimation which 
pervades most financial statements, yet is rarely discussed or disclosed in 
annual reports. In fact, the quantitative content of financial statements 
contributes unfortunately to the apparent existence of exactitude, which is 
usually unobtainable. In addition, "fairly" emphasizes the need for management 
and auditors to consider the general over-all view presented by the financial 
statements notwithstanding technical compliance with the accounting standards 
applicable to the individual amounts contained in the statements.
 SECTION 3
REPORTING ON SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES
(a) Users do not sufficiently recognize the degree of uncertainty that affects 
all financial statements, and present reporting does not adequately 
emphasize uncertainty. A separate note in financial statements should
be required on uncertainties similar to that required on accounting policies. 
The note should explain the significance of the uncertainties for earnings 
and financial position.
(b) The note would identify material uncertainties for users, which is the purpose 
of the auditor's "subject to" qualification, and the requirements for the 
"subject to" qualification should be eliminated. The note should describe 
all material uncertainties, not only those that might have resulted in a 
qualification.
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(c) The most significant uncertainty that can cause a "subject to" qualification 
under present reporting requirements is doubt about a company's ability to 
continue to operate as a going concern, but there is no reason to believe 
that independent auditors are better able to predict continued business success 
or failure than they are able to predict the outcome of other uncertainties.
The auditor's responsibility for "going concern" and other uncertainties 
should be to evaluate whether the disclosure presented by management includes  
all the available material information on the potential effect of the 
uncertainties on the entity's earnings and financial position.
(a) We are dismayed by the Commission's recommendation that there is need for a 
footnote on uncertainties similar to that on accounting policy in view of 
the fact that the latter note is comprehensive, required every year, and 
largely repetitive. We fear that the footnote recommended by the Commission 
would have to include such diverse matters as the economic and political 
conditions in the industry and in the countries where the company has its 
offices, supply sources, production facilities, customers, or investments.
The type of information to be covered appears to be limitless and might 
pose an unsurmountable auditing problem.
Under ASR 166 issued by the SEC in December 1974, registered enterprises must 
report their unique or unusual circumstances so that investors will be made 
aware of unusual risks and uncertainties. We believe this disclosure should 
be required by generally accepted accounting principles, and that with this 
information plus the reporting of contingent liabilities arising because of  
litigation, assessments, claims, etc., which has been required for many years, 
the users of financial statements would be adequately informed of the 
uncertainties applicable to the reporting company.
(b) (c) We agree that "subject to" qualifications  should be eliminated by requiring 
disclosure in the footnotes of all material uncertainties in sufficient 
detail to enable users of financial statements to evaluate the possible 
impact of uncertainties on the future earnings, financial position, and 
viability of the enterprise.
However, if the auditor is not to issue "subject to" opinions, we believe 
the footnote on uncertainties should include a prominent statement expressing 
the import of the contingencies on management’s ability to report on the 
financial position and results of operations of the enterprise. This require­
ment is necessary because the footnote must not only describe the contingencies 
and their possible effects, but it must also serve as an adequate substitute 
for the warning now expressed emphatically by the unusual, additional 
paragraph(s) contained in the auditor’s report.
SECTION 4
MATERIAL FRAUD
(a) An audit should be designed to provide reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements are not affected by material fraud. The auditor 
should search for material fraud. The auditor should also see that *
financial statements report and explain the nature and effects of material 
frauds that are discovered.
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(b) The profession should develop and disseminate information on frauds and 
methods of detecting them.
(c) Individual auditors should be more aware of the limitations of certain 
audit procedures.
(a) We agree. However, we believe that most major frauds were made possible 
by the collusion of corporate personnel and that it is extremely difficult 
for an auditor to detect frauds perpetrated by collusion, particularly if 
those colluding include one or more members of the enterprise’s top 
management.
Accordingly, to hold audit costs to a level where they are commensurate 
with the possible benefits to be obtained, we recommend that the auditors 
should be held responsible for performing audit procedures with professional 
skill that can be reasonably expected to detect major frauds, which might 
be defined as those which are of major consequence to the future of a 
business enterprise, that is, having an effect of possibly 20% to 25% of 
the enterprise’s net assets or $5,000,000, whichever is less.
(b) (c) We agree. We believe that major fraud cases should be studied at length 
during the training of persons entering the accounting profession and that 
there should be periodic courses for experienced auditors (partners, 
managers, and seniors) to enable them to keep abreast of developments in 
the procedures being used in fraudulent activities.
SECTION 5
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
(a) Management should bear the primary responsibility for corporate accountability 
and should adopt and publicize detailed policy statements indicating the 
conduct that will not be tolerated and develop appropriate compliance
(b)
procedures.
The independent auditor should search for illegal or questionable acts
and should be expected to detect those acts that the exercise of professional
(a)
skill and care would normally uncover.
We agree that management should announce publicly its primary responsibility 
for endeavoring to eliminate and for detecting illegal and questionable 
acts, that its detailed statement of policy should be widely disseminated 
within its organization and, if appropriate, to those with whom it has 
business dealings. (We do not believe that inclusion of a detailed policy 
statement in the annual report to stockholders would serve a useful purpose.) 
We also agree that management should develop effective procedures to 
enforce compliance.
(b) We disagree if adoption of this conclusion would require the independent 
accountants to search for immaterial illegal or questionable acts because 
we believe that the additional cost of such expansion of audit scope would 
be far greater than the possible benefits.
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The accounting profession is undoubtedly fully aware at the present time 
of the public’s rejection of illegal or questionable acts. We believe 
strong steps should be taken to continue this awareness, with implementation 
via appropriate audit procedures, including particularly the review and 
testing of management's procedures to assure detection and compliance. 
However, we also believe that generally accepted auditing standards should 
have as one of their basic elements that of materiality, and that materiality 
should not be excluded here in determining the audit scope of the independent 
accountants.
SECTION 7
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT
The independent accountants should revise their standard report as indicated 
in the Commission's report so that it would be expanded and flexible, with 
a paragraph on each major element of the audit function.
We agree with this change as a valid effort to improve the public's understanding 
of the role and function of the independent accountant.
However, we are pessimistic on its likelihood of being successful because the 
accounting profession can be expected to standardize the various paragraphs so 
that the signing accountants and their legal counsel would be able to know the 
exact meaning of the report being issued. As a result, the users of financial 
statements will continue to be confronted with paragraphs which are boiler-plate. 
We believe this standardization will minimize any increase in the public's 
understanding of the auditor's work.
ANNUAL REPORT BY MANAGEMENT
Corporate management should present a report that acknowledges their responsibility 
for the representations in the financial statements, that states the information 
is presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles appropriate 
in the circumstances, and that states that legal counsel has communicated the 
company's position with respect to litigation, claims, and assessments to the 
independent auditor and is satisfied that it is properly disclosed in the financial 
statements. The report should also present management's assessment of the 
company's accounting system and controls over it and describe the response of 
the company to material weaknesses in controls identified by the independent 
auditor.
We agree with this conclusion except that we recommend deletion of reference to 
legal counsel because legal counsel is rarely, if ever, so well informed of 
all aspects of a business enterprise that they are able to state with reasonable 
assurance that management's statement of its position regarding litigation, 
claims and assessments is adequate. Only management is competent to make a 
statement of an enterprise's contingent liabilities.
We believe that the present system of lawyers' responses to auditors' inquiries, 
which was only recently developed, should be tried for a longer period before 
any radical change is considered.
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REPORT ON CONSISTENCY
Reference to consistency in the auditor's report should be deleted.
We agree. The quality of consistency from one reporting period to the next 
is required by generally accepted accounting principles.
Further, because of the importance of consistency, we recommend that its 
application be mentioned prominently in management’s footnote on significant 
accounting policies.
WORK OF OTHER AUDITORS
The method of referring to the work of other auditors should be revised.
We agree. The report of the independent accountants in which the work of other 
auditors is mentioned should name the other auditors and give a clear indication 
of the materiality of the accounts (assets, liabilities, revenues, net income, 
etc.) which are included on the basis of their opinion.
AUDITORS AT ANNUAL MEETINGS
The independent accountants should be present and available to answer questions 
at the annual meeting of stockholders.
We agree. Their attendance might well be made a requirement of generally 
accepted auditing standards
GRADUATE SCHOOLS OF ACCOUNTING
An educational program similar to that of the legal profession should be 
gradually instituted, which would include a four-year undergraduate and a 
three-year graduate program in a professional school of accounting.
We believe this conclusion has merit if the graduate program would include 
several actual working periods, each of which are of five or six months’ duration. 
Further, the program should stress the auditor's need for individualistic, 
imaginative thinking, possibly by use of the case method of study. The course 
should also feature a number of lectures by practicing independent accountants 
on current accounting and auditing problems and developments.
In order that the course might be thoroughly up-to-date, there should be 
relatively little use of textbooks. Much of the reading matter in the field 
of accounting and auditing might well be publications issued by authoritative 
bodies such as the AAA, AICPA (including AcSEC and AudSEC), CASB, FASB, NAA 
and SEC.
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OPEN THE PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES
The AICPA and state societies should make it possible for the increasing 
proportion of accounting educators who are not CPAs to join those organiza­
tions and take part in their professional activities.
We agree for two reasons. The participation by educators would be most 
helpful in increasing the educators' knowledge of current events in actual 
accounting practice so that such knowledge might be drawn upon in designing 
courses for the graduate accounting program.
In addition, addition of educators to the society memberships would 
broaden the base of understanding within the societies. This broader 
understanding should improve the work of the operating committees of the 
societies and lead to a better acceptance by the business community and the 
public of the actions of the groups who set accounting and auditing 
standards.
Section 9
AUDIT COMMITTEES
The board of directors should evaluate the relationship between the 
auditor and management, review and approve all arrangements for the 
audit, including the fee, scope and timing, and recommend the 
appointment of independent auditors to shareholders.
We agree and believe that this function can be performed most effectively 
(in fact and in appearance) by an audit committee drawn from the outside 
directors. The committee should include one well qualified attorney, one 
well qualified professional accountant, and one businessman with wide, 
diversified experience. As a practical matter, we fear that such persons 
would be in short supply and might require additional staff and fees to 
handle the expanded workload.
The scope of the committee should cover the work of the internal auditors 
as well as that of the independent accountants. The importance of internal 
auditing would be greatly expanded if the Commission’s tentative conclusions 
are put into effect since they would undoubtedly be the main instrument by 
which the company would exercise surveillance over its programs regarding 
investigation of possible internal fraud or predispositions to management 
fraud and its search for illegal or questionable acts. The internal 
auditors would continue as in the past to evaluate management's controls 
over the accounting system and management's correction of deficiencies 
found in that system by the internal auditors and the independent accountants.
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The audit committee should keep minutes of its meetings with the independent 
accountants and the internal auditors, should circulate or distribute these 
minutes to the other directors, and should issue a summary report each year 
on its activities and recommendations.
AUDITORS OFFERING OTHER SERVICES
Individual auditing firms should consider the potential impact (on their 
independence) of the services they offer.
We agree with this conclusion.
OTHER SERVICES BY AUDITORS
Boards of directors or their audit committees should determine if the 
nature and extent of other services performed by their auditor pose a 
problem. The nature and extent of other services provided by the auditor 
should be disclosed in proxy statements.
We agree. The proposed action by the directors is an integral part of 
the actions required to fulfull their role of protecting the interests of 
the stockholders. The disclosure in the proxy statement should add to 
the stockholders' understanding of the various roles played by the 
independent accountants. This disclosure should, of course, include the 
non-audit services, if any, performed by other auditors if any are referred 
to in the independent accountants* report.
RECRUITMENT BY AUDITORS
Audit firms should neither recruit for management positions which carry 
discretion over the selection or retention of the auditors nor place 
former employees in those positions.
We agree with this conclusion.
CHANGE OF AUDITORS
The disclosure now required by the SEC when auditors are changed should 
accompany all audited financial statements.
We agree with this conclusion
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Section 11
INFORMATION ABOUT AUDITORS
Public accounting firms should voluntarily experiment with public reporting 
of information that would increase understanding of their organization and 
operation.
 
We disagree with this conclusion on the belief that such reports will 
give little, if any,practicable information to investment advisers, 
investors, and creditors (this group of three include those who are most 
likely to read them carefully) and none to the general public.
ANALYSIS OF AUDIT FAILURES
The AICPA should regularly publish analyses of cases involving significant 
audit failures.
We agree. These analyses should be made as deeply as possible and 
reported as fully as possible. They would fill a long-felt need of 
management, independent accountants, and internal auditors.
June 29, 1977
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A r t h u r  Y o u n g  & C o m p a n y
2 7 7  P A R K  A V E N U E  
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July 5, 1977
Mr. D. R. Carmichael, Research Director 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
This letter supplements our letter to the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities dated June 17, 1977 and our oral 
presentation at the Commission's public meeting on June 22, 1977.
We are writing now in response to Professor Lee Seidler's request 
for a more explicit description of the internal accounting control 
procedures on which we have suggested it would be feasible for 
auditors to report.
The control procedures we had in mind are those whose 
purpose is to provide reasonable assurance that:
a. Transactions are executed in accordance with 
management's general or specific authorization.
b. Transactions are recorded as necessary (1) to 
permit preparation of financial statements in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles or any other criteria applicable to 
such statements and (2) to maintain account­
ability for assets.
c. Access to assets is permitted only in accordance 
with management's authorization.
d. The recorded accountability for assets is com­
pared with the existing assets at reasonable 
intervals and appropriate action is taken with 
respect to any differences.
The control procedures identified above imply appropriate 
segregation of functions. You will recognize them as the ones 
listed in Paragraph 320.28 of the AICPA's Statements on Auditing 
Standards. In our letter of June 17, we referred to these pro­
cedures, for simplicity, as "the record-keeping activities." These 
are the procedures whose operation can be tested and thus can be 
determined with reasonable assurance. Consequently, they are the 
procedures on which auditors could reasonably report.
A r t h u r  Y o u n g  & C o m p a n y
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We suggest that it is important for the Commission, in 
discussing the controls on which auditors could report, to 
emphasize two categories of controls on which auditors would 
not report. The first category encompasses the control pro­
cedures that have to do with how a company runs its business. 
These procedures, sometimes called "administrative controls," 
include such matters as production control procedures, budgets, 
and the processes by which management decides on the general 
or specific authorizations for transactions. For the most part, 
the procedures in this category deal with matters that are not 
within the competence of most auditors.
The second category of controls on which it would not be 
feasible for auditors to report encompasses the aspects of the 
accounting process that we have referred to as "the financial 
reporting activities" —  the estimates, evaluations, decisions 
and disclosures that management must make in preparing financial 
statements (for example, What is the proper amount for a reserve 
for uncollectible accounts? Or: Is part of the inventory obso­
lete; and, if so, by how much should the carrying amount be 
reduced?). No amount of testing can assure that judgments will 
be exercised without bias, that all relevant facts will receive 
adequate consideration, or that objectives other than informing 
the users of financial statements will not unduly influence 
decision-makers.
We trust that the foregoing will help the Commission to 
identify those controls on which auditors could reasonably report 
If you have further questions, please do not hesitate to contact
us.
Copy to: Professor Lee Seidler
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F R E D E R I C K  B .  H IL L  A N D  C O M P A N Y
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FREDERICK B. HILL. C. P. A. 
(1882-1963) June 23,  1977
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 
PORTSMOUTH. VIRGINIA
SEAB E. DUVALL. C. P. A.
ERNEST L. JOHNSON. JR.. C. P. A. 
ROBERT E. RAPER. C. P. A. 
PATRICK S. CALLAHAN. C. P. A. 
GARY C. CARLTON. C. P. A.
MEMBERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
VIRGINIA SOCIETY OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
JOHN ROBBINS HILL. C. P. A. 
E. CLIFTON INGRAM. C. P. A.
Mr . Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research D irector
Commission on Au d i t o r s ' Re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
12 11 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr . Carmichael:
The Commission on Au d i t o r s ' Re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  has made a recom­
mendation that separate consideration be devoted to the problems of smaller practice
U N I T S  W IT H  P R I N C I P A L L Y  N O N - P U B L I C  C L I E N T S .  | T  WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER I F  THE  
I SS U E HAD BEEN MET H E A D - O N ,  IN S T E A D  OF S I D E S T E P P I N G  THE MATTER AS HAS BEEN DONE SO 
OFTEN IN  THE P AS T .  UN FO RT UN AT EL Y,  STANDARDS,  ONCE ADOPTED,  GENERALLY TEND TO BE­
COME RE Q UI RE D FOR ALL RE PO RT IN G  U N I T S ,  NOT JUST THOSE FOR W HI CH  THEY WERE O R I G I N A L L Y  
AND P R I N C I P A L L Y  I N T E N D E D .
I M P E R A T I V E  THAT G U I D E L I N E S  FOR A P P L I C A T I O N  TO SMALLER PR A CT IC E U N I T S  AND N O N - P U B L I C  
C L I E N T S  BE CLEARLY D E F I N E D .  THE EF FEC TS OF T H I S  REPORT W I L L  BE F A R - R E A C H IN G  AND
the I n stitu te  should be careful not to create more problems than are solved.
Re : Or ie n ta ti o n  toward a u d i t i n g  of
P U B L I C L Y  HELD COMPANIES
Before adoption of the recommendations in t h i s  report i t  seems
Seab E .  DuVa l l , Jr
PSC/l l c : vm
Very Tru ly  yours,
Pa t r i c k  s . Callahan
N ational A ssociation  o f A ccountants
William M. Young, Jr.. E xecu tive  D ire c to r
919 THIRD AVENUE 
NEW YORK. N.Y. 10022 
(212) 754-9700
A-58
July 11, 1977
Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibility 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, N.Y. 10036
Dear Dr. Carmichael:
The Management Accounting Practices Committee of the National 
Association of Accountants is pleased to offer its comments 
on the Commission's Report of Tentative Conclusions. We 
hope that our remarks will be useful despite th e i r  late 
submission.
From a broad perspective, we believe the report has raised 
questions that are timely and important. In general, our 
committee is in accord with the Commission's recommendations. 
The comments that follow address specific aspects in the 11 
sections of the Report, although in one case so noted, we 
have combined sections as seems appropriate.
Section I - The Independent Auditor's Role In Society
To be effective, in both reality and in the perception of 
others, auditors must be truly independent of management.
We think the proper mechanism to promote such a relationship 
is the corporate audit committee composed of outside directors. 
The audit committee should be empowered to hire and to 
dismiss the outside auditor.
We believe, however, that recognition should be given to the 
audit committee's potential for establishing adversary 
relationships between auditors and management. Such a 
situation must be avoided because of the desirability for 
cooperation between auditors and management so as to maximize 
potential benefits from the audit process.
On another matter affecting independence, we think the 
practice of periodically rotating partners in charge of 
audit engagements is desirable.
Section II - Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations and 
Section VII - The Auditors Communication with Users 
We agree that the standard audit report is not especially 
useful to readers. Moreover it is reasonable to assume that
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an expanded, flexible report containing more information 
about more items would be a definite improvement. We would, 
however, like to point out certain considerations that 
should be weighed.
For one thing, there is a practical problem in such a con­
version. There exist a significant precedence in law that is 
based on what auditors' responsibilities have been determined 
to be. There would have to be a redefinition of responsibilities 
based on the new reporting plan. This is not to imply that 
we are locked into the present short-form report, but rather 
to note potential problems.
Another matter is of concern to us. With the use of a 
flexible reporting system, there exist the risk of readers' 
attributing significance to circumstances that may or may 
not be significant. For example, one auditing firm may 
insist on mentioning some uncertainty about its client in 
the report. A reader may assume that, because the report of 
another company does not refer to that type of uncertainty, 
it does not exist as concerns this other company. In fact, 
the same uncertainty may well exist with respect to both 
companies but the two auditing firms are exercising differing 
levels of judgement. Conversely, standardized audit reports 
cause a risk of failing to recognize differences among 
companies because of the uniformity of the reports. Some­
how, a middle ground must be found between both extremes.
Section III - Reporting On Significant Uncertainties in Financial 
Presentations
This section expresses our feelings very well. The reporting 
of significant uncertainties really is a matter of disclosure 
rather than being a part of the auditor's report. We agree 
that the "subject to" qualification is inappropriate.
The auditor should not be in the position of assessing the 
likelihood of uncertainties occurring; his (or her) responsibility 
is the revelation of the basic facts and reasonable potential 
consequences of the facts.
Our only concern with this section is the possibility of 
ignoring an uncertainty because of lack of timely knowledge 
that it was indeed an uncertainty. It obviously is not 
feasible to address directly all possible uncertainties that 
may affect an enterprise. Only hindsight may reveal at some 
point in time that some circumstance was in fact an uncertainty 
that significantly affected the organization. Furthermore, 
there are all sorts of problems in defining the uncertainty.
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For example, assume a division of a company, for a brief 
period engaged in an activity that reasonably could be 
construed as being in violation of an anti-trust statute.
Then, upon discovery of the act by corporate officials, the 
activity is discontinued. Certainly continuing potential 
liability exists for the past act. Should disclosure be 
made in such a circumstance, thus inviting suits?
The foregoing example is cited to illustrate the difficulties 
inherent in reporting uncertainties.
Section IV - Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud
We think that, in general, auditors would not have difficulty 
in accepting a concept of expanded responsibility for the
detection of fraud---on a prospective basis. They might as
well learn to live with the greater responsibility already 
assumed by the public at large. Of course, it should be 
recognized that certain well executed frauds perpetrated by 
several parties in collusion with each other could likely 
escape detection by any auditor regardless of the diligence 
exercised.
With, however, the added responsibility must come some 
reasonable statutory limitation of liability, as is recom­
mended in the paragraph titled, Statutory Limitations to 
Damages on page 146 of the Commission's Report.
There is another question we would raise in connection with 
this section. Auditors are expected to be alert for evidence 
of dishonesty on the part of management. It is not certain 
to us that "honesty" is susceptible to clear-cut definition 
when applied to particular circumstances. For example, many 
executives have the use of a company vehicle. It is undoubtedly 
true that, in many cases, the vehicles are not used 100% for 
business purposes and the personal portions are not reported 
as additional compensation to the employees. If an auditor 
encounters such a situation, should he take it as an indication 
of an untrustworthy management? Or, assume an auditor becomes 
aware that a member of management is associated in a totally 
different activity with a person having an unsavory reputation. 
Should this affect the auditor's perception of management's 
honesty?
Section V - Corporate Accountability and the Law
The recommendation that management assume the responsibility 
for adopting policy statements dealing with permissible 
conduct and that the auditor monitor for compliance has
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considerable merit. We wonder, though, whether the emphasis 
on ignoring a concept of materiality would not impede its 
implementation. As noted in our comments on Section IV, 
questions regarding illegality and dishonesty often cannot 
be approached in simplistic fashion.
Another concern of ours is the competence of auditors to 
monitor compliance in certain areas such as, for example, 
possible violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. We feel that 
a greater burden must be assumed in such matters by companies' 
attorneys; they would have to abandon their roles of acting 
predominately as advocates in favor of enhanced responsibilities 
to the general public.
Section VI - Boundaries of the Auditors' Role and its Extension
We support the concept that an auditor should examine the 
events in a period of time rather than a set of financial 
statements. Again, a number of questions arise which we 
should like to see addressed specifically.
One problem relates to timing. Significant events considered 
reportable arrive irregularly throughout the course of the 
year. We are not certain how the Commission would propose 
that auditors go about ensuring appropriate disclosure.
What would be the vehicle for accommodating the auditor's 
responsibility in this respect? It is not clear that audited 
quarterly financial statements are the desired instrument 
for such disclosure.
We are concerned that the level of knowledge about clients' 
industries that apparently would be required to assure the 
effectiveness of such monitoring would place a severe, if 
not impossible, burden on many auditing firms and perhaps 
particular offices of even the major accounting firms.
Furthermore, we are concerned about the extension of auditors' 
responsibilities beyond the realm of professional auditors' 
expertise and into other professional areas such as law, 
engineering, appraisal, chemistry, and architecture.
Section VIII - Education, Training and Development of Auditors
We recognize and concur with the need for an enhanced level 
of education to enable auditors to effectively cope with the 
changing environment. We are not convinced, however, that 
any unique institutional framework, such as the four year 
undergraduate school and three year professional school of 
accounting is required at this time.
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It is not clear that auditing firms presently assume an 
inordinate burden of training. Auditing is one skill that 
must be honed to a considerable extent outside the classroom.
There does not appear to be evidence that anything beyond a 
five, or possibly six, year combined program is warranted at 
present, especially in light of the soaring cost of collegiate 
education.
Section IX - Maintaining the Independence of Auditors
We support the present system of a private profession with 
the combination of private and governmental regulation as 
superior to the alternative considerations. As we commented 
under section I, we believe that the existence of independent 
corporate audit committees is critical to the maintenance of 
auditors' independence.
We see no evidence that the performance of management advisory 
services by accounting firms compromises their independence 
vis-a-vis the auditing function. Conversely we believe that 
the knowledge gained during MAS engagements may well be 
helpful in conducting audits.
Recruiting services do, however, represent problems with 
respect to the appearance of independence. Whereas the 
problems may exist only in the perceptions of others, we
would recommend that auditing firms avoid that activity---
there is little to gain but much to lose from its continuation.
Our committee strongly supports the Commission's recom­
mendations that auditing firms take steps to reduce the 
pressure on independence that arises from unrealistic time 
constraints for doing audit work. In this regard, audit 
committees could be useful in asstiming responsibility for 
helping to define the scope and expected cost of audits.
Section X - Process of Establishing Audit Standards
We agree with the proposal that audit standards be established 
by a full-time board within the province of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. We think, however, 
that all members of this board should have substantial audit 
experience.
Section XI - Regulating the Profession
Our only comment is that the Commission's proposals for 
improving the self-regulatory efforts by the auditing 
profession are appropriate and should be implemented.
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We commend the Commission for its well-prepared document and 
we wish to express appreciation for the opportunity to make 
our views known.
Sincerely,
Martin V. Alonzo  
Chairman
Management Accounting Practices Committee
MVA/sg/6513
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BACKGROUND
In response to The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities Report 
of Tentative Conclusions, the California Society of Certified Public 
Accountants conducted 30 member discussion sessions throughout 
California. The purpose of the Member Forums was to obtain mem­
bers' views regarding the 39 recommendations of the Commission.
This report summarizes the response received from 544 participants 
at the close of the Member Forums. An outline of the Commission 
recommendations and the related questions is presented preceding 
each response section of this report to facilitate reading without 
reference to other materials. The yes and no answers were tabulated 
from all 544 responses received, with a percentage distribution of re 
plies to each question shown in parentheses. The comments of partici­
pants presented in this report are remarks extracted from a rep­
resentative sample of comments. Individual response sheets received 
from the participants have been transmitted to the AICPA in coopera­
tion with its program to provide assistance to the Commission in 
reviewing responses.
The short exposure period provided by the Commission did not permit 
sending participant materials in advance of the discussion session. 
Most participants believed the sessions were meaningful; however, 
discussion leaders reported that participants would have preferred 
an opportunity for advance preparation. A longer exposure period 
would have allowed for a more careful review of the Commission 
recommendations.
The majority of Member Forum participants were from small CPA firms. 
Many felt that the Commission recommendations were primarily germane 
to CPA firms with large publicly held clients and expressed concern 
that adoption of the proposed standards would result in requirements 
inappropriate for the local practitioner.
The Society appreciates the opportunity to report the views of its 
members and will be glad to further assist the Commission.
MEMBER FORUM RESPONSE SUMMARY
(Total member responses = 544)
SECTION 1: THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S ROLE IN SOCIETY
Recommendation:
1. Boards of Directors, with a high proportion of independent, 
outside directors, should assume a more active role in eval­
uating internal controls and management's supervision of 
them. The role of the independent auditor in improving 
corporate accountability can be significantly strengthened 
by closer cooperation between Boards and auditors. For 
example, directors should regularly receive a report on the 
company's accounting system and controls over it from the 
independent auditor.
Question:
A. Should AICPA encourage closer cooperation between audit com­
mittees of Boards of Directors and auditors? Should Boards 
regularly require a report from the auditor on the account­
ing system and controls over it?
Response:
Yes; 409*  (90%) No: 46* (10%)
*Note: 81 additional responses split the reply into separate answers
to each sentence in the question:
1) Yes: 78 (96%) No: 3 ( 4%)
2) Yes: 44 (54%) No: 37 (46%)
Comments:
Pro: -need strong, independent, more involved directors
-auditor should meet with the board before and after 
issuing report
-need a separate set of rules for public and non­
public companies, apply to public only
-auditors should attend board meetings
-AICPA should prepare a fact sheet explaining
the significance of the accounting and control 
system to the directors
-apply only to larger companies with audit com­
mittees
-should apply to all boards
-smaller companies are problem because owners and 
directors are the same
-apply only where management and board are inde­
pendent
-auditor should only be responsible for material 
weaknesses in informal controls
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Comments: (Continued from previous page)
Con: -regular reporting becomes too burdensome
-who should be advised when board is not in­
dependent?
-reporting requirement should not be adopted 
without waiver of accountant's liability 
-reports would not be used 
-reports too costly
-places responsibility on auditors instead of 
management
-cooperation not defined  
-SEC should require audit committees for pub­
licly held companies
-impractical due to large variation in internal 
controls
SECTION 2: FORMING AN OPINION ON FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS
Recommendations:
2. The word "fairly" should be eliminated from the auditor's 
report.
3. The auditor should make an objective appraisal of the ac­
counting principles used by management. Additional guides 
should be developed for evaluating 1) the choices made by 
management among the alternative principles, 2) the appro­
priateness of principles applied in the absence of formal or 
detailed accounting pronouncements and 3) the cumulative ef­
fect of management's decisions concerning selection and 
application of accounting principles.
Question:
A. Should the auditor's reporting role be clarified as recom­
mended?
Response:
Yes: 300 (57%) No: 228 (43%)
Comments:
Pro: -auditor should be required to review and recog­
nize the thrust of management decisions, if 
they are detrimental to the interests of a 
 third party
-audit principles should require the disclosure of 
cumulative effects of differences of applying 
accounting principles
-"fairly" is confusing, vague, ambiguous, mean­
ingless
-"fairly" is more difficult to defend than
"compliance with guidelines" or "compliance 
with GAAP"
SECTION 1: THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S ROLE IN SOCIETY
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SECTION 2: FORMING AN OPINION ON FINANCIAL PRESENTATIONS
Comments: (Continued from previous page)
Pro: -the guides referred to in paragraph 3 should be 
made available to management 
-substitute "reasonably" or "not misleading" for 
"fairly"
Con: -proposal is asking auditor to outguess management 
as to the propriety of each principal in use 
-auditor can't make an "objective" appraisal of 
accounting principles used by management, es­
pecially in small businesses where the auditor 
is often responsible for the selection of GAAP 
-"objective appraisal" not quantifiable 
— "cumulative effect" is too vague 
-"fairly" describes the impressions and uncer­
tainties which accompany any financial statement, 
avoids an implication of 100% accuracy, and keeps 
accounting from becoming an "exact science"
-user must be made to realize that judgement is 
involved
 
-eliminating "fairly" puts the auditor in a pre­
carious position in today's legal climate 
-independence and flexibility would be impaired 
-will tend to increase audit costs - how far will 
the auditor have to go?
-impractical or impossible to implement 
-will place auditors in an adversary position with 
management, and will encourage "shopping" for 
auditors who favor certain accounting prin­
ciples
-will change auditor decisions from accounting 
judgement decisions to market decisions 
-who will determine guidelines, and who will pay? 
enough are produced already
SECTION 3: REPORTING SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES
Recommendations:
4. The requirement to express a "subject to" qualification for 
significant uncertainties should be eliminated.
5. A separate note on uncertainties should be required. The note 
should include a description of all material uncertainties, 
not only those that require a qualification. It should in­
clude "going concern" uncertainties.
Questions:
A. Do you agree that the auditor's report should be revised as 
recommended?
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Questions: (Continued from previous page)
B. Should AICPA urge the FASB to adopt a standard that requires 
a separate note on uncertainties?
Response:
A. Yes: 267 (51%) *'No: 259 (49%)
Comments:
Pro: -remove auditors from the business of judging
"going concern" problems 
-user would be given the opportunity to use his 
own judgement more in reading the report 
-auditor only has the responsibility to identify 
  uncertainties, not evaluate them
-standardized footnotes are desirable, used in 
conjunction with the opinion 
-if auditor really adequately discloses uncer­
tainties, "subject to" can be eliminated 
-important to change the impression of unfailing 
accuracy
-generally agree with any proposal to increase 
  disclosures
-uncertainties are better bundled in footnotes 
-if "subject to" is eliminated, opinion must 
refer specifically to certain footnotes
Con: -proposal is a "cop-out" that forces an unso­
phisticated reader to form an opinion on un­
certainties
-no one knows "all going concern uncertainties"
-not all readers look at notes - so uncertainties 
may go undetected
-notes are those of management, so if they don't 
want to disclose uncertainties, what should 
the auditor do? disclaim? qualify?
-seems to require too much expertise on business 
matters of clients
-opens up more answers for legal action against 
CPAs
-significant uncertainties are a management prob­
lem, and shouldn't be passed to CPAs 
-major uncertainties should be footnoted and men­
tioned in the opinion paragraph 
-opinions belong to auditors - notes to management - 
responsibilities shouldn't be mixed 
-the specific wording (e.g. "subject to") is not 
the important issue - a red flag is raised in 
the opinion paragraph that shouldn't be relegated 
to footnotes
-revision of definition of "clean opinion" would be 
a better approach
SECTION 3: REPORTING SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES
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SECTION 3: REPORTING SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES
Response: (Continued from previous page)
B. Yes: 373 (74%) No: 132 (26%)
Comments:
Pro: -only for major uncertainties
-follow by publicizing the idea that understanding 
financial statements is impossible without a 
careful reading of the footnotes 
-this will place burden properly, on management 
-if adequate assistance by corporate attorneys in 
assisting management can be obtained 
-assuming the latitude of uncertainties is more 
closely defined
-although immaterial uncertainties shouldn't be 
disclosed, since they detract from the more 
important material ones
-but limited only to questions of "going concern"
Con: -present practice is adequate
-"material" needs defining
-a heavy burden for auditor to be responsible for 
"all uncertainties"
-footnotes can be just as confusing as the opinion 
paragraph
-will confuse and weaken a qualification and will 
expand liability
-obligation to find "all uncertainties" would re­
sult in an ever expanding list of audit procedures
SECTION 4: CLARIFYING THE AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DE­
TECTION OF FRAUD
Recommendations:
6. Auditors have a duty to search for material fraud and should 
be expected to detect those frauds that the exercise of pro­
fessional skill and care would normally uncover. Explicit 
guidelines for auditors on the exercise of professional skill 
and care should be developed. The guidelines should include 
requirements that the auditor:
a. establish an effective client investigation program;
b. take immediate steps if evidence indicates that management 
is untrustworthy, including, if necessary, resigning
from the engagement;
c. observe conditions suggesting predispositions to manage­
ment fraud;
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Recommendations: (Continued from previous page)
d. maintain an understanding of a client's business and 
industry;
e. extend the study and evaluation of internal controls 
to all controls that have a significant bearing on the 
prevention and detection of fraud;
f. seek, through a formal procedure developed by the pro­
fession, information on methods of perpetrating, con­
cealing and detecting fraud;
g. be alert for possible deficiencies in audit techniques 
and steps;
h.  understand the limitations of incomplete audits.
7. If auditors adhere to a standard of professional skill and 
care that covers detection of fraud, they should not be held 
liable for failure to detect all material frauds.
Questions:
A. Do you agree that the application of the recommended guidelines 
would benefit both third parties and auditors?
B. Should guidelines cover recommended requirement a,b,c,d,e,f, 
g /h?
Response:
A. Yes: 365 (71%) No: 148 (29%)
Comments:
Pro: -will take pressure off auditors, causing more
objectivity
-as long as requirements are not unreasonably 
complex
-the study of the problem of fraud would be an 
education for most auditors 
-but educate the public regarding inevitable cost 
increases
-except if management is untrustworthy, then the 
investigation should be expanded 
-''due professional care" to detect fraud is ex­
pected of every auditor 
-would imply too much credibility on audited 
statements
-costs would exceed benefits
SECTION 4: CLARIFYING THE AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DE­
TECTION OF FRAUD
Con:
SECTION 4: CLARIFYING THE AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DE­
TECTION OF FRAUD
A. Comments: (Continued from previous page)
Con: -formal client investigation programs may be in­
appropriate for smaller firms 
-liability isn't escaped by having a "guidelines 
list"
-no substitute for common sense and judgement 
-places too much responsibility on the auditor, by 
making him a guarantee that no fraud exists 
-will create more litigation
-recommendation goes beyond SAS-16, which should 
be the limit
-financial statements really belong to management, 
so automatically incorporate fraud auditing is 
to say that management is inherently fraudulent 
-auditors don't have the duty to "search for" and 
shouldn't be "expected to detect" fraud - a 
better wording would be "aware of the possibility 
of material fraud"
-proposal merely substitutes a procedure for a 
judgement
  -auditor's responsibilities for detecting fraud 
should be spelled out in auditor’s reports 
-regarding item 7, the courts must have the right to 
determine if the standard of professional skill 
is covered in the guidelines - which must be 
sufficiently clear to insure that material fraud 
will be detected
-duty of CPA is to exercise "due professional care", 
not to actively search for wrongdoing 
-the term "reasonable effort" should be emphasized - 
no one can do everything
B. Response and Comments:
a. establish an effective client investigation program 
Yes: 333 (72%) No: 129 (28%)
Pro: -proposal is fine, although "know your client" is
a basic rule that really is practiced currently 
by quality professionals 
-client investigations should be discreet 
-this should be publicized as an AICPA request of 
auditor procedures
-there is a danger of this leading to gestapo-like 
investigations
-would be impossible for small firms to cover the 
loss this could produce
Con:
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SECTION 4: CLARIFYING THE AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DE­
TECTION OF FRAUD
B. Comments: (Continued from previous page)
a. establish an effective client investigation 
program (continued)
Con: -will raise client: costs and have dangerous legal
implications
-in large cities a client investigation program 
may be appropriate, but in smaller cities 
reputations are generally well enough known 
-"effective" and "untrustworthy" are vague and 
subjective
-no assurance that these steps will have any effect
b. take immediate steps if evidence indicates that manage­
ment is untrustworthy, including, if necessary, resigning 
from the engagement
Yes: 402 (88%) No: 56 (12%)
Pro: -good idea but already being done by competent auditors
-would need very clear guidance on the applications 
of this
Con: -"untrustworthy" is difficult to define and harder
to evaluate
-difficult to establish formal steps 
-auditor should probably more properly withdraw 
from the engagement upon discovering major 
management dishonesty, or upon significant sus­
picion that it exists 
-guidelines cannot replace judgement
c. observe conditions suggesting predispositions to manage­
ment fraud
Yes: 382 (86%) No: 64 (14%)
Pro: -important to check internal controls - if they
are loose, the auditor should be doubly vigilant
Con: -court defense would be extremely difficult
d. maintain an understanding of a client's business and 
industry
408 (91%) No: 40 (9%)
Pro: -good, although this is really already a standard,
and should be happening presently
Yes:
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B. Comments: (Continued from previous page)
SECTION 4: CLARIFYING THE AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DE­
TECTION OF FRAUD
d. maintain an understanding of a client's business and 
industry (continued)
Con: -how does one get the first audit - what is the
availability of industry information?
-almost impossible to maintain a knowledge of 
diverse industries
-large companies make this idea impractical
e. extend the study and evaluation of internal controls 
to all controls that have a significant bearing on the 
prevention and detection of fraud
Yes: 339 (78%) No: 96 (22%)
Pro: -although it should be spelled out that this should
not result in a duplication of work by internal 
  and external auditors
-adequate guidance must be supplied 
 -really should be happening presently 
-recent illegal political contributions make this 
an obvious necessity
Con: -should not extend to all controls, but only those
that might materially affect firm position 
-only if existence of fraud is actually suggested
f. seek, through a formal procedure developed by the pro­
fession, information on methods of perpetrating, con­
cealing and detecting fraud
Yes: 361 (82%) No: 77 (18%)
Pro: -the more information the auditor has, the better
fraud can be detected 
-a great training project for auditors 
-should be a board to publish and disseminate
data on frauds, similar to that of aircraft and 
marine accidents
Con: -auditors should not be enforcers
-professional jealousy makes dissemination difficult 
-should be done through continuing education, rather 
than through required procedures which would be 
prohibitively costly 
-proposal is ambiguous
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B. Comments: (Continued from previous page)
g. be alert for possible deficiencies in audit techniques 
and steps
Yes: 400 (92%) ..No: 35 (8%)
Pro: -the AICPA should prepare some standard programs
that can be customized for each client 
-absolutely necessary, since "professional skep­
ticism" isn't strong enough 
-audit procedures should constantly be updated 
-although no list or guide is really sufficient 
-proposal is just common sense
Con: -where is one to obtain "all" information re­
garding new procedures, etc.?
-canned audit programs should be minimized
h. understand the limitations of incomplete audits
Yes: 403 (93%) No: 30 (7%)
Pro : -the conscientious auditor is always aware of the
limitations of incomplete audits 
-the engagement letter should specify exactly 
what won't be done in the audit
SECTION 5: CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW
Recommendations:
8. Management should adopt and publicize policies on illegal or 
questionable acts and develop appropriate compliance pro­
cedures.
9. The auditor should monitor compliance with the policies and 
describe his review of the procedures and his conclusions on 
them in his report.
10. Detected illegal or questionable acts should be considered 
by the auditor without regard to traditional standards of 
materiality. The auditor must consider each illegal or 
questionable act in light of the circumstances. This involves 
three steps:
a. determination of the extent to which the item might af­
fect the financial statements
b. comparison of the act with the standards of corporate 
conduct established by the corporation's Board of Di­
rectors
c. consideration of the need for public disclosure
SECTION 4: CLARIFYING THE AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DE­
TECTION OF FRAUD
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SECTION 5: CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW
Recommendations: (Continued from previous page)
11. The auditor should have responsibility for seeking out illegal 
or questionable acts, but he should be expected to detect only 
those that the exercise of professional skill and care would 
normally uncover.
12. Additional guidance is necessary on the meaning of the ap­
propriate "exercise of professional skill and care" in this 
area. (Because the subject of illegal and questionable acts 
is evolving rapidly, the Commission has no specific recom­
mendations for guidelines as it did for detection of fraud.)
13. Principal responsibility for assurance on legal claims and 
litigation against clients should lie with management acting 
in consultation with their lawyers.
Questions:
A. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to implement 
these recommendations?
Response:
 Yes: 226 (64%) No: 128 (36%)
Comments:
Pro: -would protect company employer and assist the
auditor as well
-guidelines for case, when owners of closely held 
companies are perpetrators of fraud and no 
higher Board of Directors exist should be 
included
-recommendation should apply to all companies - 
public and non-public
-except that trivial departures need not be reported
-fine provided that only generalities are covered
-management will need guides as to what constitutes 
an illegal act
-specific criteria must be established to evaluate 
management controls
-may help to improve bad image of business
Con: -long term public mores and goals should be arrived
at before the profession attempts to radically 
change standards
-assumes inherent management dishonesty
-government regulation generally end up making the 
auditor responsible for more than originally in­
tended
-will intensify current litigation environment
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SECTION 5: CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW
Comments: (Continued from previous page)
Con: -places unreasonable demands on auditors, to as­
sume roles of policeman and lawyer 
-CPAs should not become involved in trying to 
codify morality
-"monitoring compliance" is too broad a concept 
-small firms are not familiar enough with SEC work 
-another type of professional and another audit is 
needed to cover these areas - suggest consul­
tation with an independent attorney or require 
a "legal compliance audit" to be conducted by 
attorneys
-"questionable" is poorly defined 
-disclosure should be limited to items over a
specific dollar amount or percentage of income, 
etc.
-public disclosure is not necessary - disclosure 
to boards should be necessary 
-illegal acts must be material for the auditor to 
be expected to detect them using "due profesional 
care"
-many transactions are borderline - illegality is 
difficult to determine
SECTION 6: THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITOR'S ROLE AND ITS EXTENSION
Recommendations:
14. The audit function should be expanded to encompass all infor­
mation of an accounting and financial nature that management 
has the responsibility to report, provided that it is produced 
by the accounting systems and that the auditor is competent
to verify it.
15. The audit function should include a more comprehensive study 
and evaluation of controls over the accounting system. The 
auditor's report on the audit function, issued annually, should 
include an evaluation of management's description of the con­
trols over the accounting system and should disclose uncor­
rected material deficiencies in a company's internal control 
that are not disclosed by management.
16. The audit function should gradually expand to include all im­
portant elements of an entity's financial reporting process 
and should provide assurance on management's accountability 
over a period of time. To achieve this the auditor of a pub­
licly-owned company must be continuously associated with a 
client's financial reporting process. The auditor should re­
view the process used by the company to prepare quarterly 
financial information and should give timely assurance on his 
review in an interim report on the audit function. (The Com­
mission suggests that this recommendation be adopted after ex­
perience with implementing recommendation No. 15 has been 
gained.)
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Questions:
A. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's 
role as recommended in Recommendation 14?
B. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's 
role as recommended in Recommendation 15?
C. Should the profession support the expansion of the auditor's 
role as recommended in Recommendation 16?
Response:
A. Yes: 250 (58%) No: 185 (42%)
Comments:
Pro: -the recommendation should be directed at various
statistical information required in SEC reporting 
-good but a definition is required for "information 
management has the responsibility to report"
-with emphasis on, and confined to, "produced by 
the accounting systems"
-assuming information is objectively verifiable 
  -should be limited to public companies
-limitations should be established regarding reports 
to governmental units
-a good step if fees charged will cover the work 
done
Con: -will involve CPAs in areas beyond training
-not applicable to small companies who do not 
publish annual reports
-"auditor competent to verify it" needs defining 
- confusion results as to what information is un­
audited
-definition of "field" is too broad
-what exactly will management be required to report? 
-additional cost of interim reporting not juctified 
-proposal is too general - not clear as to what 
"expansion" means
-seems to nullify the concept of materiality 
-"all information" needs defining 
-what if management produces reports beyond those 
necessary, e.g. reports intended only for in­
ternal use?
-will make policemen and watchdogs of auditors
B. Yes: 262 (60%) No: 178 (40%)
Comments:
Pro: -study of the controls over the accounting system
is always part of the audit function
SECTION 6: THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITOR'S ROLE AND ITS EXTENSION
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SECTION 6: THE BOUNDARIES OF THE AUDITOR'S ROLE AND ITS EXTENSION
B . Comments: (Continued from previous page)
Pro: -report should be given to boards but not made part 
of a public report - that is a management de­
cision
-proposal acceptable within the confines of cost- 
benefit analysis
Con: -management will oppose inclusion in annual reports 
-will tend to make outside auditors full-time, in- 
house auditors
-too many small companies don't have good internal 
control due to staff size 
-who would determine material deficiencies? 
-controls and procedures are too fluid for spot 
analysis
-proposal is broad, vague, and could get out of 
hand
-could create libelous situations
C. Yes: 222 (53%) No: 201 (47%)
Comments:
Pro: -ongoing familiarity with the company is essential
Con:
-should be limited to public, SEC-listed companies 
-fees must cover expanded work
-must be strictly limited to areas of competence 
of the auditor
-good idea but would the requirement be for the 
accountant with a new client?
-may be accomplished over a period of years
-might present the implication of a "lock" on 
engagements
-unreasonable financial burden for small firms 
-what is meant by "gradually"?
-case where the same auditor is not continuously 
associated with a company over the years makes 
this impractical
-will destroy or at least call into question the 
independence of the auditor 
-additional cost without additional benefit 
-legal exposure is increased
-may be inconsistent with the requirement that 
CPAs not let the company set audit guidelines, 
etc.
SECTION 7: THE AUDITOR'S COMMUNICATIONS WITH USERS
Recommendations:
17. The auditor's standard report should be revised. The new report
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Recommendations: (Continued from previous page)
should consist of a series of paragraphs with standardized 
alternative wordings, describing all major elements of the 
audit function.
18. The reference to consistency in the auditor's report should be 
deleted and the responsibility of disclosing changes should be 
reserved to management.
19. The principal auditor should do enough additional work so that 
he does not need to rely on the work of another auditor. If 
this is not possible, management should present the reports
of the other auditors who audit material components of the 
reporting entity.
20. The auditor should report on all unaudited financial informa­
tion with which he is associated, including that which appears 
in a document containing audited information. Additional 
clarification and guidance is needed in this area.
21. The Board of Directors should require management to issue a 
detailed complimentary report that acknowledges management's 
responsibility for the representations in the financial state­
ments. The report should 1) state that the information is 
presented in conformity with GAAP appropriate in the circum­
stances, 2) discuss the company's accounting system and internal 
control system, and 3) state that legal counsel has communica­
ted the company's position with respect to litigations, claims 
and assessments to the independent auditor.
22. Auditors should be present and available to answer questions 
at annual stockholder meetings.
Questions:
A. Should the auditor's standard report be revised to provide for 
an expanded flexible report?
B. Should the report reflect the recommendations concerning:
1. Consistency
2. Reliance on work of another auditor
3. Unaudited information associated with audited information
C. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to require that 
corporate management present a report as recommended?
D. Should AICPA urge the stock exchange to implement the recommen­
dation that auditors be required to be present at the company's 
annual meeting to answer questions of shareholders?
SECTION 7: THE AUDITOR'S COMMUNICATION WITH USERS
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Response:
A. Yes: 295 (63%) No: 177 (37%)
Comments:
Pro: -the report will be more meaningful to the reader,
as current report is difficult to understand 
-descriptions of inherent limitations in audit 
procedures should be included 
-a less "canned" approach could induce more people 
to read the report, increasing understanding and 
eliminating disputes
-should be revised because "clean" opinion letters 
are largely meaningless
-greater education is the key, regardless of the 
wording used
-must be implemented within strict limitations, 
so attorneys won't have to be engaged 
-standardized responses must be developed
Con: -this is reminiscent of "piecemeal" reports
-result will be the opposite of what is intended - 
reader reliance will increase 
  -additional verbiage will only further confuse the
reader, and make the basic element of the opinion 
more difficult to discern 
-will increase potential legal problems 
-is simply a political response to consumerism 
-too idealistic for small practitioners 
-currently a standard is at least implied, while 
the alternative allows for too much variation 
-emphasizing that the report was "prepared" by 
management is false and it must be remembered 
 that preparing the report "for management" 
doesn't reduce management's responsibility for it
B. Comments:
1. Consistency
Yes: 241 (52%) No: 221 (4 8%)
Pro: -long felt that consistency per se was not neces­
sarily a virtue
-provided that management states that consistency 
exists between periods
Con: -''consistent application" of GAAP too important
to delete
-hiding changes in footnotes is not the answer - 
they need to be highlighted in opinion letter
SECTION 7: THE AUDITOR'S COMMUNICATION WITH USERS
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B. Comments: (Continued from previous page)
Con: -average reader understands consistency
-disclosure will become a question of optional 
usage
2. Reliance on work of another auditor
Yes: 209 (46%) No: 244 (54%)
Pro: -principal auditor has primary responsibility and
it is hard to feel comfortable relying on the 
work of another auditor
Con: -cost to companies would be prohibitive, in that
two audits are required
-virtually impossible to do enough work to not 
rely on another auditor 
-whether or not to accept the work of another 
auditor is an individual decision 
-will be seen as a self-serving concept 
-concept will confuse readers
-will eliminate use of other auditors - soon only 
large firms will be able to audit large companies 
 -end result will be to eliminate the small firm
3. Unaudited information associated with audited information
Yes: 242 (58%) No: 176 (42%)
Pro: -clarifies the exact position of the auditor to
the reader
■ -care must be expressed so the reader can distinguish 
between audited and unaudited information
Con: -mixing kinds of information confuses users
-SAS is adequate
-proposal not acceptable until profession decides 
the fate of unaudited information 
-if you examine material you are auditing it, and 
audited and unaudited material should not be 
missed
C. Yes: 329 (74%) No: 116 (26%)
Comments:
Pro: -would help clarify the primary responsibility for
the financial statements, and separate the re­
sponsibilities of management and the auditor 
-imperative because public often forgets that fi­
nancial statements belong to management 
-only for large, publicly held companies 
-except for discussion of system and controls, where 
too much "boiler plate" will make it meaningless
SECTION 7: THE AUDITOR'S COMMUNICATION WITH USERS
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C. Comments: (Continued from previous page)
Con: -financial statements are management reports
-management reports add nothing to audit reports 
and don't lessen CPA liability 
-new system is mostly "boiler plate”
-would eventually become the responsibility of the 
small practitioner in non-SEC audits 
-smaller companies couldn't and wouldn’t comply
D. Yes: 317 (71%) No: 130 (29%)
Comments:
Pro: -for publicly held companies only
-assuming that auditor participation can be strictly 
limited to its proper function
Con: -there is a danger of disclosing information manage­
ment doesn't want disclosed 
-places auditor in the position of umpire 
-unreasonable burden upon auditor since material
may not be available to answer specific, detailed 
questions
-this is ineffective since auditors really aren't 
independent enough to be publicly critical of 
clients
-shouldn't be mandatory but option should be
available to auditor to attend if something sig­
nificant can be contributed
SECTION 8: THE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITORS
Recommendations:
23. An entry-level educational program should be gradually insti­
tuted which would include a four-year liberal arts program and 
a three-year graduate program in a professional school of 
accounting.
24. The AICPA and state societies of CPAs should allow accounting 
educators who are not CPAs to become associate members and 
participate in the progessional activities of those organi­
zations.
Questions:
A. Should AICPA's goal be a four-year undergraduate and three-year 
graduate program of entrance education?
Should AICPA work toward separate schools of professional ac­
counting or place principal emphasis on graduate degree programs 
in professional accounting regardless of organizational 
structure?
SECTION 7: THE AUDITOR'S COMMUNICATION WITH USERS
B.
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Questions: (Continued from previous page)
C. Should AICPA provide a form of membership for non-CPA accounting 
educators?
D. Should AICPA encourage state societies to provide similar forms 
of membership?
Response:
A. Yes; 158 (35%) No: 300 (65%)
Comments:
Pro: -broader undergraduate education is necessary to
develop professionals, not merely technicians 
-give individuals the choice between graduate 
training or experience
-suggest a well rounded undergraduate business 
program with a three year accounting specialty 
-only if the AICPA finally recognizes specialties 
within the profession
Con: -better education is necessary, not more education
-expanded liberal arts curriculum is irrelevant 
to an accounting career
-experience is infinitely more valuable than formal 
education, so two years experience plus con­
tinuing education is preferable 
-too much schooling for the amount of pay available 
at the entry level
-salaries would be increased to unacceptable levels 
small firms couldn't accept such a graduate 
-non-accounting courses teaching the value of in­
dependent thinking and logic would help eliminate 
the tunnel vision of auditors 
-proposal coupled with the high cost of education 
will restrict access to the profession 
-would require students to select from public and 
private industry with no opportunity to switch 
later
-a 4-5 year graduate program plus 2-3 years in pro­
fessional school would be best 
-would be discriminatory unless financial aid were 
available
B. Yes: 210 (53%) No: 190 (47%)
Comments:
Pro: -emphasis of AICPA direction should be on content,
not form
-four year accounting programs are adequate
SECTION 8: THE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITORS
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Response: (Continued from previous page)
C. Yes: 232 (53%) No: 205 (47%)
Comments:
Pro: -may help foster better education
-desirable to expose educators to real-life situations 
-will allow for a greater distribution of material 
and information and create a filtering down ef­
fect
-may help to add theory and objectivity 
-without communicating with educators complaints 
about their products are unfair 
-any non-CPA should be welcome if interested 
-will help remove self-serving image 
-as associate members
-either adopt the proposal or consider something 
like the "Illinois Plan"
Con: -educators should pass the CPA exam and use edu­
cational experience to fulfill the experience 
requirement
-should be required experience for educators 
  -same standards should apply to educators and 
practitioners
-AICPA would degenerate into a trade organization 
-non-practicing educators produce impractical 
recommendations
-will probably lead to other non-CPAs getting into 
the AICPA
D. Yes: 228 (54%) No: 197 (46%)
Comments:
Pro: -students in many cases eventually become local
practitioners and this would help make them 
aware of local problems and conditions 
-as associate members
-may cause accounting theory to be brought into 
line with real life situations
Con: -educators should have to pass the CPA exam to
qualify for membership
-state societies should be free to reach their 
own conclusions on this
SECTION 8: THE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITORS
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Recommendations:
25. Corporate Boards of Directors or their audit committees should 
review and approve all arrangements for an audit, including 
the fee, scope and timing and selection of auditors.
26. Boards of Directors or their audit committees should determine 
if other services performed by auditors pose an independence 
problem.
27. The nature and extent of other services provided by auditors 
should be disclosed in proxy statements.
28. Audit firms should neither recruit for management positions 
which carry discretion over the selection and retention of 
the auditors nor place former employees in these positions.
29. The disclosure now required by the SEC when a change of 
auditors is made concerning disagreements on accounting me­
thods and disclosure should be required in all audited 
financial statements.
30. Professional standards should be expanded to provide guidance 
on the independent auditor's responsibility when he has 
knowledge of deficiencies in unaudited financial information 
released by an audit client.
31. Management of public accounting firms should take steps to 
reduce pressures on independence which arise from too stringent 
time budgets and too restrictive cost constraints.
32. Management of public accounting firms should revise their 
policies relating to fees (and the related pressure on staff 
to reduce time and costs), arbitrary deadlines and other 
factors which place unnecessary stress on the auditor's 
independence.
33. The practice of accepting an audit engagement for an unprof­
itable fee with the expectation of offsetting early losses 
with higher fees to be charged for future audits should be 
prohibited.
Questions:
SECTION 9: MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUDITOR
A. Should AICPA urge the 
Recommendation 25?
SEC or the stock exchanges to implement
B. Should AICPA urge the 
Recommendation 26?
SEC or the stock exchanges to implement
C. Should AICPA urge the 
Recommendation 27?
SEC or the stock exchanges to implement
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Questions: (Continued from previous page)
D. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct to implement Recom­
mendation 28?
E. 1. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to
implement Recommendation 29?
2. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct which would require
a successor auditor to insist on such disclosure?
F. Should AICPA support Recommendation 30?
G. Should AICPA implement Recommendation 31 through its Quality 
Control Review Program?
H. Should AICPA implement Recommendation 32 through its Quality 
Control Review Program?
I . Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct to implement Recom­
mendation 33?
Response:
A. Yes: 362 (84%) No: 71 (16%)
Comments:
Pro: -particularly if the audit committee works closely
with the audit
-boards and audit committees must be independent 
of management
-SEC should establish a Board of Standards that 
would hire auditors
-except for scope, which is at discretion of 
auditor, and may restrict the audit if it is 
determined by someone else 
-only outside directors should be involved with 
the auditor
-providing that the AICPA is to do the implementing
Con: -implies too much government control
-idea is good but may prove excessively costly to 
small firms
-puts too much power in directors - stockholder 
participation should be more encouraged 
-however AICPA should encourage boards to use 
more care in selecting auditors, perhaps dis­
closing how the selection was made
SECTION 9: MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUDITOR
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Response: (Continued from previous page)
B. Yes: 293 (73%) No: 109 (27%)
Comments:
Pro: -boards and audit committees should be only one
party to this determination 
-doesn't, however, relieve the auditor from making 
an evaluation of independence, and exercising 
his ultimate responsibility to withdraw if he 
is not independent
Con: -auditor alone should make this determination
-without specific guidelines, boards can't make 
this determination
-criteria should be standardized and formulated
by AICPA or it will vary from company to company 
-SEC committee should determine independence 
-independence is more a matter of attitude than 
observation by others
C. Yes: 267 (65%) No: 134 (35%).
Comments:
Pro: NO MEANINGFUL POSITIVE COMMENTS WERE RECEIVED ON
THIS QUESTION
Con: -vague and will confuse users on independence
question
-places too much responsibility on reader 
-will suggest to the public that independence is 
a problem
D. Yes: 238 (59%) No: 168 (41%)
Comments:
Pro: -the appearance of independence is crucial
-yes regarding outside recruitment, but not re­
garding placing a firm's own people - where 
are accountants leaving public pracitce to go? 
-proposal is good, but it should be noted that it 
may amount to a reduction of independence
Con: -not practical for small firms
SECTION 9: MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUDITOR
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Response: (Continued from previous page)
E. Comments:
1. Should AICPA urge the SEC or the stock exchanges to im­
plement Recommendation 29?
Yes: 295 (72%) No: 116 (28%)
Pro: -expand to unaudited information also
-not in financial statements, but in attachments 
-good although an integral 10-K would do the job 
-AICPA should consider it, rather than SEC
Con: -will inhibit changes for valid reasons
-creates too much legal exposure for slander 
-assumes the new auditor can resolve the original 
conflict or won't issue the report 
-the successor auditor will determine if the 
conflict was material or not
2. Should AICPA adopt a Rule of Conduct which would re­
quire a successor auditor to insist on such disclosure?
Yes: 296 (73%) No: 109 (27%)
NO MEANINGFUL COMMENTS WERE RECEIVED ON THIS QUESTION
F. Yes: 343 (85%) No: 61 (15%)
Comments:
Pro: -only if the CPA is associated with the unaudited
statements
Con: -adequate standards currently exist
G. Yes: 309 (79%) No: 82 (21%)
Comments:
Pro: -quality of work is increased by the CPAs judgement
of what is material
-but, at same time eliminate competitive bidding
 Con: -fees will become excessive
-unworkable in today's business environment
H. Yes: 282 (72%) No: 110 (28%)
Comments:
Pro: -these policies are usually dictated by the client,
not the firm
-price competition lowers quality - large firms are 
especially guilty
SECTION 9: MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUDITOR
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SECTION 9: MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUTHOR
Response: (Continued from previous page)
I. Yes: 258 (65%) No: 136 (35%)
Comments:
Pro: -no firm should be allowed to work for less than
direct cost plus reasonable return 
-assuming a provision is made for non-recurring 
start-up costs, which probably can't be charged 
to the client
-an attempt to create a client relationship based 
upon dollars rather than professionalism 
-how would "unprofitable fee" be defined?
-an important goal but difficult to enforce 
-will be a real change for some large firms 
-buying-in should be prohibited
Con: -unenforceable, silly, hard to detect
-disadvantageous to client 
-auditor should have control over his fee 
-client may rotate faster with a low initial fee, 
and its difficult to justify an increase in 
fee after first "loss" year
SECTION 10: THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AUDITING STANDARDS
Recommendations:
34. The Auditing Standards Executive Committee should be replaced 
by an Auditing Standards Board within the American Institute. 
This board should be composed of five to nine full-time 
members.
35. Auditing standards should be restructured to give more at­
tention to the needs of public accounting practice involving 
non-publicly-owned companies.
Questions:
A. Should an Auditing Standards Board of full-time members be 
established?
B. Should AICPA implement the recommendation that more attention 
be directed to the needs of firms involved with non-publicly- 
owned companies?
Response:
A. Yes: 265 (64%) No: 151 (36%)
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A. Comments:
Pro: -members should be rotated so no one misses work
for extended periods
Con: -looks like something that was changed years ago
-would move standards even further away from those 
who do the auditing
-would be incapable of dealing with local prac­
titioner problems
-would give standards to "ivory-tower" types 
-SEC and FASB currently have enough of third 
type of influence
-need actual practitioners on the Board 
B. Yes: 380 (94%) No: 26 (6%)
Comments:
Pro: -should be done immediately because unless there
are specific requirement separations between 
public and non-public companies, courts will 
adopt recommendations pertaining to publicly 
held companies
-this is where most firms work and they need help 
-should be expanded to governmental entities as 
well as companies
-small firms and companies have very different 
needs than larger ones
-too much latitude currently exists because of un­
certainties over reporting requirements
Con: -will cause greater rift between large and small
firms
-is a simple revisiting of "BIG GAAP-LITTLE GAAP"- 
problem of GAAP must be solved first 
-might cause a "two class" system for both firms 
and financial statements
-the less attention paid to small firms, the less 
they will be given "ivory-tower" directives
SECTION 11: REGULATING THE PROFESSION TO MAINTAIN THE QUALITY OF
AUDIT PRACTICE
Recommendations:
36. Secrecy should be removed from disciplinary actions and from 
the penalties imposed. Action should not be deferred pending 
the outcome of litigation except when the accused demonstrates 
that the litigation is directly related to the charges. Action 
should rarely await the outcome of appeals.
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OF AUDIT PRACTICE
Recommendations: (Continued from previous page)
37. The AICPA should support attempts to change the legal system 
that would:
a. give the courts additional discretionary authority to 
assess costs "against unsuccessful plaintiffs.
b. establish a statutory limit to damages.
c. increase the use of court-appointed masters.
d. grant temporary "safe harbors" when auditors' respon­
sibilities are significantly extended, for instance, in 
areas such as forecasts and various forms of current 
value. A safe harbor rule places the burden of proof 
that a specified standard was not met on the person 
seeking to establish liability.
38. Public accounting firms should voluntarily experiment with 
reporting information aimed at increasing understanding of 
their organization and operation by users of financial state­
ments .
39. AICPA should regularly publish analyses of cases involving 
significant audit failures.
Questions:
A. In re Recommendation 36, should AICPA publish the names of 
all members involved in Trial Board actions and name all 
those against whom action is taken?
B. In re Recommendation 37, should AICPA initiate action in 
support of this recommendation?
C. In re Recommendation 38, should AICPA urge CPA firms to 
experiment with the type of reporting suggested?
D. In re Recommendation 39, should AICPA regularly conduct studies 
and publish findings about cases involving significant audit 
failures, as it did in the Equity Funding case?
Response:
A. Yes: 199 (54%) No: 167 (46%)
Comments:
Pro: -if there is full disclosure by both sides, and
the final outcome is included 
-fine if the results are also published 
-public right to know is more important than the 
individual's right to secrecy
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OF AUDIT PRACTICE
A. Comments: (Continued from previous page)
Pro: -if the profession doesn't get tougher, the 
government will step in
Con: -should be published only for those found "guilty", 
as a person later proven innocent could be 
branded
-should depend on the reason for the action 
-is a legal question that should be resolved by 
lawyers
B. Yes: 325 (86%) No: 54 (14%)
Comments:
NO MEANINGFUL COMMENTS WERE RECEIVED ON THIS QUESTION
C. Yes: 253 (71%) No: 106 (29%)
Comments:
Pro: -a profession task that should be taken on by 
AICPA and state society joint effort 
-limited to large firms of significance to the 
financial community
Con: -will distort comparability and significance of 
auditor’s reports for the experimental period 
-should be done on a wider basis, similar to the 
AICPA effort regarding the Quality Control 
program
-would create chaos and financial statements are 
difficult enough for readers to understand now. 
-would be solely a sales document for large firms
D. Yes: 354 (94%) n o : 23 (6%)
Comments:
Pro: -could be of great value and produce educational 
benefits
-proposal is good but names of those involved should 
be withheld
Con: NO MEANINGFUL NEGATIVE COMMENTS WERE RECEIVED ON 
THIS QUESTION
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G E N E R A L  M O T O R S  C O R P O R A T I O N
July 8, 1977
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
We welcome the opportunity to respond to the Report of Tentative 
Conclusions ("Report") of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
("Commission").
We commend the Commission for a document which appears to be 
comprehensive in scope and relevant as to issues exposed. By contrast 
with lengthy, complex documents appearing regularly on a variety of account­
ing issues, the Report is presented in an easy-to-read and understandable 
style, yet fortified with enough background and reasoning material that the 
Commission's position on the several dozen issues are readily discernible 
and, thus, conducive to comment.
Before we comment on specific issues, we would like to make the 
following general points:
The summary on page xvii states in the fifth paragraph 
that the recommendations number forty. It has not been 
possible for us to determine these forty exactly. However, 
Appendix A to this letter contains fifty recommendations 
and conclusions we gleaned from the Report. To facilitate 
our response, we have indicated our approval or disagree­
ment with each issue and have cross-referenced those 
issues on which we have expanded in our written response.
Several of the recommendations could result in more audit 
work to be performed by auditors (and management) with 
consequent increases in audit fees. We strongly recommend 
that the Commission be completely satisfied that the 
expected benefits of the increased work are reasonably 
attainable and cost justified.
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We are concerned with the frequent references to what 
management should or should not do in a report on 
"auditors' responsibilities” wherein management had 
minimal representation on the Commission. We, of 
course, realize that an audit is a joint task which has 
to bring to bear the talents, patience, understanding, 
and cooperation of all parties involved to accomplish, 
among other things, the stated purpose of the Report —  
namely, to improve communication between provider and 
user of audited and other financial information. We 
believe that accomplishing the goal can be enhanced if 
a section in the final report recognizes this and 
suggests means for gaining management compliance with 
the recommendations addressed to it.
The task of setting sound auditing standards and 
improving the needs and expectations of users of 
financial information is exceptionally difficult. 
Accountants, management, and users view differently not 
only the end result of a financial statement audit, but 
also the extent to which each should participate in 
the overall goal as stated in the Report. Auditors 
stress the visibility which management must show because 
its financial statements are being audited; management 
reacts that an auditor through his opinion belongs in 
the forefront; the user is confused as to each party’s 
role because, among other things, he does not understand 
the complex audit process. In addition, the user is 
expected to have a reasonable understanding of business 
activities and financial reporting and auditing if he 
is to receive the message intended through the audit 
process —  no matter how seriously the party tries 
to communicate effectively.
We caution the Commission not to expect the proposed 
audit certificate and management report alone to solve 
the audit communication problem. Basically, while 
emphasis on developing a clearer message by auditors 
and management is worthy of support, and we do support 
this as explained on page 5, its significance must be 
viewed within the limitations of any written words and 
within the potential of other media sources to accomplish 
the desired objective.
Finally, we believe the format of the final report should 
enumerate in a more concise manner the Commission’s 
conclusions and recommendations in order to foster more 
prompt action on the final results of its study. An 
appendix explaining the reasoning behind each point, with 
reference to respondents’ comments, is also suggested.
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael - 3 - July 8, 1977
Following are specific comments on selected recommendations and 
conclusions included in the Report.
Section 1 - The Independent Auditor's Role in Society
This Section provides a framework for studying specific issues and 
covers not only what the auditor does, but what his relationship is to 
those interested or affected by his work. Thus, the social implications 
of accounting and auditing are identified and evaluated.
We essentially agree that an auditor's primary responsibility is 
to the user of his work. We caution the Commission, however, not to 
expect that the full range of his responsibilities can be conveyed through 
either his certificate or management comments. Other media sources must 
be exploited. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) received 
a recommendation from its Trustees to improve its public relations programs. 
This, we believe, is worthy advice also for the auditing profession.
Section 2 - Forming an Opinion on Financial Presentations
We concur in the Commission's reasoning to eliminate the word 
"fairly" in the opinion paragraph of this report. The use of "appropriate 
in the circumstances" and of "in all material respects" are better 
alternatives to raising the importance of judgments and decisions which 
auditors make in forming an opinion on financial statements.
We have difficulty in accepting the Commission's recommendation for 
providing auditors with more guidance in evaluating the preferability of 
alternative accounting principles. Auditors, of course, have a responsibility 
to counsel management on the selection of an accounting alternative. However, 
in the final analysis, we believe that management is in the position, 
unattainable by auditors, of having a personal, in-depth awareness of its 
business and, therefore, is best qualified to decide on the preferable 
alternative.
Section 3 - Reporting on Significant Uncertainties in Financial Presentations
The reasoning behind eliminating "subject to" in auditors' opinions 
is noteworthy. Simply put, the Commission is recommending that standards be 
adopted to require management to disclose a broad range of uncertainties 
and auditors to certify as to the adequacy of the disclosure. Users are 
then expected to qualify the financial presentations on the basis of this 
information. We are disturbed, however, by the emerging, changing emphasis 
on roles of the parties involved because an auditor's ability to objectively 
draw to a user's attention a potentially significant uncertainty is being 
traded for a clean opinion (or adverse opinion to a lesser degree). This 
further burdens the already under-educated user by requiring him to know even 
more about the audit/opinion process.
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Perhaps a better solution lies in not redefining the roles of 
auditors, management, and users, but rather in maintaining the status quo 
to the extent that the auditor's opinion includes words different than 
"subject to" to convey his qualifying opinion. We could support this 
alternative since adoption of an "uncertainties" note in place of "subject 
to" can only lead to both more and confusing disclosures. In many cases, 
it may be written in symbolic, boiler-plate, hedged language about the 
inherent difficulties every business faces in today's litigation-laced 
environment. The FASB's current exposure draft on objectives of financial 
statements may set the standard as to how much data must be disclosed 
since the draft proposes that users at least have an awareness of, as 
well as an interest in, understanding the financial reporting process.
Section 4 - Clarifying Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud
We concur in the theme of this Section. However, the Commission 
should answer the following questions to make its recommendations most 
effective:
1. What is meant by the words "search" and "material" 
as used in the sentence "the auditors should search 
for material fraud" (page xviii, Section 4, second 
sentence)? We believe these words need clarifica­
tion to avoid extensive auditing beyond either a 
reasonable cost-benefit measure or outside the scope 
expected of a reasonable standard of professional 
care and skill.
2. What is meant by the word "management" in the 
discussion of "management fraud" beginning on 
page 32? This needs clarification to help
frame the scope of an auditor's testing procedures.
Section 5 - Corporate Accountability and the Law
As in Section 4, the Commission uses the word "search" to 
describe how an auditor should test for illegal or questionable acts. The 
scope of the work being recommended should be defined for the reasons 
mentioned above.
We are concerned that the Commission has singled out a corporation's 
policy on employe conduct for publication in detail when comment on other 
policy statements may be as important. To publicize to employes is accept­
able; to publicize to the non-employe public is neither acceptable nor 
reasonable. The standard we believe which makes sense is to report 
externally that employe conduct policies, as well as other policies exist; 
that controls exist to require compliance; and that internal and external 
auditors assist in assuring management that compliance is being monitored.
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The last subject entitled, "A Proposal for Increased Involvement 
of Lawyers", (Page 49) disturbs us, particularly the first sentence in 
paragraph 4 which reads in part that "the present structure and division of 
responsibilities in this area are (not) efficient or effective". We 
realize that the struggle over disclosure amongst management, auditor, 
and lawyer, may not always be cordial, but then SAS #12 on lawyer inquiry 
has been in existence only since January 1976. It represents a major 
step forward towards defining the "rules" of inquiry, investigation, 
opinion, and disclosure and has not, to our knowledge, made the inquiry 
process less productive or unduly strained. After all, the auditor 
always has had the advantage of opining on the sufficiency of disclosure 
including requiring management's and/or his lawyer's opinion(s) to be 
published regarding the outcome of a contingency. We recognize that the 
Commission is only "orbiting a balloon" with this suggestion, but we 
react that, until proven otherwise, the idea may be more form than substance. 
The substance, we think, is in place and working.
Section 6 - The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and its Extension
We, at General Motors, are in accord with the Commission's 
recommendation that the auditor be involved with the financial reporting 
process. In our opinion, any auditor should strive for such a relationship —  
even if it should mean only reading his client's periodic financial 
statements to be aware of changing conditions.
We believe, however, that the final report should contain some 
guidelines as to how extensive an auditor's involvement should be with 
data other than financial statements "produced by the accounting system". 
Specifically, this means clarifying what the Commission means by the 
sentence "(It) recommends an immediate extension of the audit function to 
other information in an annual report" (page 68, 3rd full paragraph, 
second sentence). As to non-annual report areas, does the Commission 
envision that speeches by corporate personnel on financial activities, 
public interest reports, and new product press releases must be "audited" 
before being disclosed?
Section 7 - The Auditor's Communication With Users
We concur in the opening sentence in this Section which states that 
"evidence abounds that communication between the auditor and users of his 
work ... is unsatisfactory". We also believe that this problem must be 
solved by more than updating the audit certificate. Thus, while emphasis 
on a clearer audit message is important, its significance must be viewed 
within the limitations of written words and within the potential of other 
media sources.
While we have already remarked about eliminating "fairly", and 
adding "appropriate in the circumstances" and "in all material respects", 
and now indicate a general agreement with expanding the work scope and
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internal control remarks in the third and fourth paragraphs, respectively, 
we think that brevity of expression in the audit certificate is still the 
best approach. This means that the term "generally accepted auditing 
standards" is preferable over a reversion to the "long form report" wherein 
the standards (and only some of them) are described. On balance, we believe 
the profession can best revise its own report and thus limit our remarks 
as above.
We concur in the concept of a "management report". However, we 
would prefer that the final report offer guidelines for subjects which can 
be discussed in public reports vs. the structured example on page 79. 
Ultimately, management must decide on how extensively it will discuss its 
role in the financial reporting and audit process.
Section 8 - The Education, Training, and Development of Auditors
The concept that "more and better education can develop more 
qualified CPA's of the future" is support worthy. We caution the Commission, 
however, on holding to the premise that extended education is only for 
entry into public accounting. In many respects, the same preparation is 
required for entry into professional accounting positions in industry. The 
end result could be an undesirable trend towards CPA's being only qualified 
for public accounting and not for both public and private accounting as 
is the present working status.
We don't believe that weakening present standards for admission of 
accounting educators into a state society of CPA's is wise. The experience 
element of most professionals holding a certificate is not obtained other 
than in practice. Educators, of course, should continue to be encouraged 
to share their knowledge and viewpoints through professional activities.
Section 9 - Maintaining the Independence of Auditors
We support any reasonable recommendation which fosters auditor 
independence. In particular, we champion the benefits which can and do 
accrue from an independent audit committee as cited by the Commission. We 
urge the Commission, however, to emphasize the Audit Committee's role as 
that of a reviewer when it comes to arranging the audit scope and fee. The 
Committee can be a resource of valuable guidance if it acts on management's 
recommendations after management has explored the details of these two issues.
Though we agree that auditor rotation is not desirable, we 
recommend that audit personnel assigned to an engagement be rotated 
periodically.
As to the recommendation that audit firms not recruit from within 
their own ranks for positions which can influence the hiring of auditors, we 
question the value of this when obviously other important benefits may 
accrue to companies. We do not believe the Commission's recommendations 
on independence are enhanced by this suggestion.
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Section 10 - The Process of Establishing Auditing Standards
We endorse the concept of a full-time auditing standards board, 
within the private sector, appropriately compensated, and fully staffed 
with qualified personnel. We also suggest that membership be open to 
non-AICPA personnel.
If the Commission makes this recommendation in its final report, 
we urge the AICPA to adopt it immediately. The Board’s charter should 
be written to assign priorities to the other final conclusions and recommenda­
tions, to determine how to implement them, and to begin the process.
While we agree with the suggestion for improving the standard­
setting process, we disagree with the conclusion that this process "does 
not need to operate to the fullest extent practical in public". This 
viewpoint would appear to be contrary to the stated purpose of the Commission's 
Report, namely, better communication with the user of the auditor's work.
We suggest that the Commission adopt Finding #14 which the Trustees of the 
FASB made in their recent report on "The Structure of Establishing 
Financial Accounting Standards". This Finding encouraged the Board to 
educate its constituency by explaining its ideas, conclusions, and 
recommendations.
We are disappointed that the Commission did not cite qualified 
corporate financial personnel as individuals who should participate in the 
process of setting standards (6th full paragraph - page 133). Since 
corporations, through their financial staffs, are showing an increasing 
awareness and concern for accounting, these people represent a major source 
of constructive advice for the Board to use in its deliberating and deciding 
process.
Section 11 - Regulation of the Profession to Maintain the Quality of Audit 
Practice
We generally concur with the recommendations made in this Section 
which we believe are worthy of the accounting profession's insight, review, 
and response.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this report and 
urge the Commission to consider our remarks in its final report.
Attach.
Very truly yours,
A. M. Long 
Comptroller
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The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: 
______ Report of Tentative Conclusions______
A D X
AUDITOR'S ROLE
An auditor's function in society is represented by his posi­
tion as a third party intermediary between issuer and user 
of financial statements. His primary responsibility is to 
the user. X 2
OPINIONS
The word "fairly" should be eliminated from the auditor's 
report. X 3
More guidance is needed in evaluating:
a) appropriate accounting principles in areas when none exist; X
b) preferability of choice made by management among 
alternative principles; and X 3
c) cumulative effect of principles selected and applied. X
SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTIES
"Subject to" qualifications in opinions should be abolished. X 3
More uncertainties should be disclosed by management in a 
standard note to its financial statements. X 3
FRAUD DETECTION
Auditors should search for material fraud. X 4
Audits should be designed to provide reasonable assurance on 
the accountability of management. X 4
Auditors must continually assess management's integrity 
(existing and prospective clients). X
Auditors must act on evidence showing management to be 
untrustworthy. X
Auditors must be alert to situations conducive to manage­
ment fraud. X 4
Auditors must maintain a better understanding of the client's 
business and industry. X
Notes:
A = Agree X = Page number in letter containing explanatory
D = Disagree comments on answer, or qualifying language.
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12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
FRAUD DETECTION (continued)
Auditors must expand the study and evaluation of internal 
control.
Information regarding frauds and methods of detecting them 
must be developed and disseminated.
Auditors must constantly assess limitations of audit pro­
cedures.
Clients must understand limitations of incomplete audits.
X
X
X
X
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW
Corporations should publicize in detail their policy state­
ments re: accountability to society. X 4
Auditors should monitor compliance with policy statements. X 4
Auditors should search for illegal or questionable acts with­
out regard to traditional materiality standards; they should 
detect only those which "professional skill and care should 
uncover". X 4
Information on legal claims and litigation, including 
assurances on policies on illegal payments, is without the 
purview of financial statements; lawyers should assume this 
responsibility.
BOUNDARIES OF AUDITOR’S ROLE AND ITS EXTENSION
X 4
The audit function should not be viewed as confined to a set 
of financial statements but rather as an examination of the 
financial reporting process. X
Expansion of the audit function will require expanded study 
and evaluation of internal control and more timely involvement 
in the financial reporting process, including other financial 
information included in an annual report. X
4
5
A public report should be issued by the auditor on internal 
control. X
A public report should be issued by the auditor on the process 
used to prepare interim financial information. X
Notes:
A = Agree x = Page number in letter containing explanatory
D = Disagree comments on answer, or qualifying language.
A D X
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A D X
AUDITOR'S COMMUNICATION WITH USERS
24. The present auditor's report is deficient and should be re­
placed by a new, flexible, greatly expanded report. X 5
25. Management should report on its role as being responsible for 
the financial statements and related disclosures. X 5
26. Reporting on consistency in the auditor's report should be 
eliminated. X
27. Present method of referring to other auditors in the auditor's 
report is inadequate and should be revised. X
28. Auditors should be present at the annual stockholders' meeting 
to answer questions. X
29. The auditor's reporting requirement for unaudited information 
which is associated with audited information should be better 
clarified and expanded. X
EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITORS
30. A long-range goal for proper education would be a 4 year 
liberal arts program and a 3 year graduate professional 
program. X  5
31. The AICPA and state societies should develop better educa­
tional programs; non-CPA educators should be invited to par­
ticipate. X
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
32. MAS, tax. and other non-audit services are generally compatible 
with the client-audit relationship. This excludes engage­
ments to testify about or prepare accounting information as an 
advocate. X
33. Audit committees should evaluate nature and extent of other 
than audit services. X
34. Guidance is needed on action an auditor should take when, per­
forming non-audit services, he learns of deficiencies in dis­
closed unaudited information. X
35. Guidance is needed on how the auditor should give advice on 
selection and application of appropriate accounting principles  X
Notes:
A = Agree X = Page number in letter containing explanatory
D = Disagree comments on answer, or qualifying language.
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36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE (continued)
Other than audit services performed should be disclosed in 
proxy statements.
A D X
X
Auditor rotation is not advisable to maintain independence. X
The public sector should not become involved in auditor 
approval, assignment, or compensation process. X
Responsibility for selecting and evaluating auditors, 
establishing scope of work, and setting fees should rest with 
an audit committee whose members are independent; if auditors 
are changed due to disagreements, disclosure should be made 
in all audited financial statements.
Auditors should not influence auditor retention or selection 
by recruiting (externally or from within own ranks) for posi­
tions which may influence the decision. X 6
Clients should not cause undue pressures by setting arbitrary 
deadlines or releasing unaudited earnings information "early" X
Auditors should examine their "excessive price competition 
actions" if this causes undue time pressures on staff. X
Auditors should review their time budget processes to make 
sure lower quality audits are not resulting from present 
policies. • X
Auditors should adopt policies on accepting favors or gifts 
from clients. X
PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AUDITING STANDARDS
Setting standards by a government agency or outside the AICPA 
is not recommended. However present AudSEC should be replaced 
by a full-time (5 to 9 members), appropriately compensated 
committee, provided with improved staff support. X
Auditing standards should be restructured to recognize change 
in audit function. Participation in the standard setting pro­
cess should come from within and without the profession. X
REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION
Present set-up (private profession with private and public 
overseeing) does not need drastic change. X
6
6
Notes:
A = Agree X = Page number in letter containing explanatory
D = Disagree comments on answer, or qualifying language.
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REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION (continued)
48. Secrecy regarding how the profession undertakes disciplinary
actions and the outcome of the actions should be removed; pro­
cess of resolving violations of professional ethics should be 
revised. X
49. Public accounting firms should experiment with public dis­
closure of their organization and operation. X
50. AICPA should publish details of audit failures and take steps 
to change legal system by, for example, establishing statutory 
limitations for damages and granting temporary "safe-harbors" 
when auditors’ roles are extended. X
Notes:
A = Agree 
D = Disagree
X: — Page number in letter containing explanatory
comments on answer, or qualifying language.
D X
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GENERAL MILLS, INC. • EXECUTIVE OFFICES • 9200 Wayzata Boulevard • Minneapolis,Minnesota
Mr. Douglas R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors' Responsibility 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Carmichael:
We are pleased to have the opportunity to review and comment on 
the tentative conclusions and recommendations of the Commission 
on Auditors' Responsibility, established by the American Insti­
tute of Certified Public Accountants. We hope that the following 
comments will assist in finalizing your report and recommendations.
In general, we agree with most of the conclusions and recommenda­
tions presented in the Summary of the report.
We are, however, concerned with some of the detailed conclusions 
and recommendations. Some of these appear to be mostly self- 
serving for the public accounting profession - almost to the 
point of the public accountants walking away from the problems.
Our detailed comments are as follows:
1. Section 6 - The Boundaries of the Auditor's Role and its
We generally agree with the summary provided for Section 6.
We encourage both management and the public accountants to 
expand their interaction to provide the public accountants 
with greater and continuous knowledge of the ongoing business 
and transactions of the company.
At General Mills, we have established a good, ongoing, rela­
tionship with our public accountants. We involve them in 
all major new and unusual transactions or situations on a 
continuous basis. We feel that this assists both of us in 
assuring that a proper decision is reached before the fact 
and does not create dispute or confusion at a later date.
We would encourage this type of "continuous involvement" 
by all managements and public accountants.
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However, the detailed comments included in Section 6 of the 
report, includes inferences and possible ramifications which 
we strongly disagree with.
a. References (page 64) to an understanding of the company's 
budgeting system and earnings plan with subsequent com­
parisons to actual results sounds good but we seriously 
doubt budgeting is a skill that public accountants can 
develop with good cost/benefit balances.
To understand a budget or profit plan, it is necessary 
to have much on-going operating knowledge of the assump­
tions, strategies and action plans which were used by 
management in developing the numerical data. We do not 
feel that these discussions should include our public 
accountants.
Secondly, the explanation of the variances, not only 
requires knowledge of the above, but are also analytical, 
interpretive explanations. We do not feel that public 
accountants can be or should be expected to interpret 
these extremely complex situations.
b. Reference (on page 58) of possible extension of the 
accounting system to include data on backlogs of sales 
and purchase orders infers that the auditor should 
investigate 1) the accuracy of the data; and 2) the 
reasons for fluctuations. A logical result of the 
above would be an attempt to interpret the meaning of 
such fluctuations, with subsequent disclosure of the 
data and interpretations.
Again, we do not think that public accountants can 
adequately assess backlog positions and the implica­
tions of the fluctuations. This is true for no other 
reason than the fact that they are not associated with 
the business and the industry on a day-to-day basis.
c. The discussion on pages 61-63 relating to disclosure 
of internal control weaknesses appears to be self- 
serving to the public accountants while rendering a great 
disservice to the financial community.
Internal control and systems weaknesses are often quite 
complicated and technical. Any written explanation of 
the weakness in the financial statements would, generally, 
inadequately describe the true situation.
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Similarly, the total financial community should not, and 
probably cannot, be expected to understand the implica­
tions of the disclosures. The financial community has 
the right to expect the paid, professional public account­
ants to make these assessments and inform them whenever 
the weaknesses make the financial statements unrealiable.
It is our opinion that the public accountants have this 
responsibility today. To the extent that internal control 
and systems weaknesses are so material that the public 
accountants cannot attest to the fairness of the finan­
cial statements, a qualified opinion should disclose this 
fact.
The on site public accountants should make this deter­
mination, and not expect the remote financial community 
to be able to understand the implications of an inade­
quate description in the financial statements.
In our opinion, this recommendation does nothing but 
limit the liability of public accountants (if a fact is 
disclosed, how can I be held accountable?) while serving 
a great disservice to the financial community.
d. While the Commission report implicitly implies advance 
reviews of press releases, speeches, etc., by the public 
accountants, we strongly object to requirements of this 
type in most all instances.
Existing securities laws have adequate sanctions to deal 
with improper/misleading information without inserting 
the public accountants in this role.
2. Section 5 - Corporate Accountability and the Law
We agree that Corporate accountability and adherence to all 
laws is a must requirement of all corporations and manage­
ments. At General Mills, we have strict policies and guide­
lines on illegal or questionable acts which all levels of 
management are held accountable to.
We agree with the public accountants' role in assessing 
management's actions to monitor compliance and extending 
their efforts to uncover such actions.
We disagree, however, with the position taken in the report 
(page 49) relating to disclosure of litigation. In our 
opinion, the position taken in the report, which would require
the increased involvement of outside attorneys, simply 
restates the public accountants' position on legal matters 
which created the recent impasse with the legal profession.
While acknowledging, but without commenting on the merits 
of either professions' position, we believe that the compro­
mise previously reached was acceptable and workable. We do 
not believe that this compromise should now be unilaterally 
broken because one of the parties has discomfort with the 
arrangement.
3. Section 9 - Maintaining the Independence of Auditors
We generally agree with most of the conclusions reached in 
the discussion of maintaining the independence of Auditors.
At General Mills we have attempted to enhance their inde­
pendence through the use of a strong audit committee of 
outside directors. The public accountants have direct access 
to the directors at all times and have regularly scheduled 
meetings with them.
Additionally, we follow the practice of having the full Board 
of Directors recommend the auditors for the next year with 
the shareholders voting on this recommendation.
Internally, we follow the practice of not restricting access 
to any information and encourage their independence with our 
operations and subsidiaries.
However, while we agree that time pressures have often affected 
the quality of the audit, we cannot agree that the reasons are 
completely client imposed.
It had been our experience that the public accountants have 
self imposed time inefficiencies which should also be exam­
ined along with recommendations to increase time budgets.
a. Too often, inexperienced personnel are not adequately 
supervised. (We will comment more on this in our dis­
cussion of more education for accountants.)
b. Many procedures and specific workpaper format appears to 
be more related to form than to the substance of auditing. 
Too often, one gets the impression that auditors are more 
interested in completing good looking workpapers as opposed 
to in depth auditing of the function.
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c. Reluctance to supplement the work of public accountants 
with the work of independent internal auditors.
In most large corporations, especially those with decen­
tralized operations and a corporate controlled internal 
audit function, the internal auditors are truly independent 
of the operations and subsidiaries of the corporation.
Public accountants have traditionally been reluctant to 
rely on the work of the internal auditors and have gener­
ally relegated the work done to an additional feature of 
internal control. We feel that much can be done in many 
companies to increase the overall efficiency of the total 
audit effort by better coordinating the two groups. The 
public accountants, however, must change their insistence 
on doing all of their own work and be willing in appro­
priate circumstances, to place more reliance on the work 
of the internal audit staffs.
4. Section 8 - The Education, Training, and Development of 
Auditors
The major conclusion reached in this section is that public 
accountants should be required to attend professional schools 
of accountancy patterned after the legal profession and that 
public accounting firms have been required to do too much 
training of recent graduates.
The inference in the above is that the additional training 
would alleviate the public accounting firms' need to train 
their people and would automatically insure better auditing 
because of better trained personnel.
We disagree with this recommendation and conclusion. It has 
been our observation that the reason for the failure of 
auditing has not been the technical training of the indi­
vidual, but rather the lack of realistic on-the-job exper­
ience which the individual has. Experience cannot be 
learned in school.
In our opinion, the primary failure of the public accounting 
profession has been to develop and retain experienced quali­
fied, people at the auditing level.
We feel that this has been caused by, or accentuated by, two 
major factors:
a. The relatively low experience requirement needed to 
obtain a CPA certificate.
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In many states, the passing of the CPA examination is 
the only requirement for obtaining a CPA certificate.
To our knowledge, the most experience required by any 
state is two years.
This requirement is insufficient to develop the total 
skills needed by a CPA to properly perform his profession. 
With the recognition given to a CPA certificate by indus­
try and others, the low experience requirement encourages 
graduates to enter public accounting for the minimum time 
needed. This in turn creates turnover and inexperience 
at the basic, on site, auditor levels and diminishes the 
professional status of the CPA certificate.
In our opinion, the CPA profession should be encouraging 
all states to increase the experience level needed to 
obtain a CPA certificate to a minimum of four to five 
years.
b. Secondly, the "up or out" attitude of most public account­
ing firms leaves no place for the individual who does 
not have adequate qualifications for partnership but who 
would like to remain in public accounting.
In any industry, comparable individuals can be found 
in middle management positions performing a wide variety 
of functions in an important, fulfilling role. In most 
instances, these "staff sergeants" are vital to the 
total functioning of the business and they are rewarded, 
both monetarily and in prestige, accordingly.
To our knowledge, there are no comparable positions 
within public accounting. In our opinion, this contri­
butes to the "void" of experience between the partner 
on the engagement and the on-site people, and to the 
supervision which is given to the actual auditing of 
the engagement.
In many cases, this inadequate supervision of the "Jun­
iors" allows many items to go unchallenged, and contri­
butes to recent problems of the public accounting 
profession.
We feel that instead of first looking at the "easy" answer 
of a "professional school of accounting", the public account­
ing profession should also look inward at its own management 
practices and structure. Long-term solutions to the difficult 
problem of obtaining professional auditing at the "auditing" 
level cannot be achieved through additional education.
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Any changes in the educational process should include 
work/study programs and faculty members with actual, 
meaningful, industry experience.
EKS: ii
Sincerely,
